US Doc 2.1

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR FROM HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT AREA

PART 5—APPENDIX AND INDEX

AUGUST 17, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Foreign Relations

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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
83797 WASHINGTON : 1951

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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, AUGUST 17, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senator Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Sparkman, Gillette, Byrd, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, Long, and Flanders.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief clerk, Committee on Armed Services, Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

Gentlemen, I called you together this morning to discuss two matters, one of them rather minor, and the other very important.

We have not yet closed the record of these hearings, although we have ceased the taking of oral testimony.

Since the time that we closed the taking of oral testimony, Admiral Badger has written me a letter which somewhat amplifies and explains some of his testimony before the committee, and he has requested that that letter be included in the last volume of the printed record of the hearings.

If there is no objection on the part of any member, why, that will be done.

Chairman Connally. Whose testimony?

Chairman Russell. Admiral Badger.

Chairman Connally. Oh, yes.

(The document referred to will be marked "Appendix HH," and will be found in the appendix to this record.)

Chairman Russell. There are also one or two other matters that came in after the committee had its last meeting. One of them is a statement of Japanese imports and exports from and to Communist China and Hong Kong, January 1950 to February 1951, requested by Senator Sparkman. Without objection, this table will be printed in the record.

(The document referred to will be marked "Appendix II," and will be found in the appendix to this record.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright has requested in the course of the hearings a statement as to the number of aircraft in the Phillipines on December 7, 1941. That material came to the committee after the conclusion of the hearings.

I do not understand why it took them so long to get this because we had a magazine article—I am quite certain that most of the members of the committee received—as to the naval power of the Philipines at the outbreak of World War II, that had practically the same figures. That will be printed in the record.

(The document referred to will be marked "Appendix JJ," and will be found in the appendix to this record.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Johnson requested on May 28 information as to the estimates of the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force regarding the minimum number of air groups necessary to protect this Nation. I have a written communication from the Department of the Air Force on that question, and that will be printed in the record.

(The document referred to will be marked "Appendix KK," and will be found in the appendix to this record.)

Chairman Russell. I have here a "Cumulative list of information requested on the record and not previously supplied," prepared by the committee of all of the material requested, and the place where it appears, the page number where it appears in the record, and I think should all be printed at one point, and would be of considerable assistance to anyone studying the record. Unless there is objection that memorandum will be printed in the record.

(The document referred to will be marked "Appendix LL," and will be found in the appendix to this record.)

Chairman Russell. Now, the other question before the committee——

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, might I just interrupt a minute.

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. I think I sent you a letter which you acknowledged, requesting that certain exhibits I sent you might be incorporated in the record.

Chairman Russell. I think that has been done, has it not, Mr. Darden?

Mr. Darden. Yes.

Chairman Russell. The last volume has not yet come out, and I am not sure about that. I am glad you reminded me of that, and the Chair will check on that.

(The exhibits referred to will be marked "Appendix MM.")

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, before you go into the next question, you will recollect that near the end of the hearings I suggested that if we were not to have Mr. Harriman as a witness, that I intended to secure Harriman's statement under oath regarding the Yalta Conference, and particularly with reference to Hurley's testimony, and I have done so, and I shall offer this for incorporation in the record. I have copies here if anybody is interested.

Senator Knowland. I would like to have a copy.

Chairman Russell. Will you distribute the copies?

(The document referred to will be marked "Appendix NN" and will be found in the appendix to this record.)

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a statement of General Chennault that has not been included in the record.

Chairman Russell. That is correct.

(The document referred to will be marked "Appendix OO" and will be found in the appendix to this record.)

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the question, all this material that is now going in, I have in mind now particularly the Air Force statement, is it subject to censoring by Admiral Davis?

Chairman Russell. It is not classified by the Department that sent it to us, and therefore I did not submit it to Admiral Davis.

The only question that arose was as to whether the matter should be deleted from the record was if it had been classified. None of this has been classified.

I might say that the answer to Senator Johnson's question merely quotes from testimony that was given before the committees that had been printed. There is nothing that I saw classified about it.

Senator Saltonstall. I simply wondered for the sake of continuity, and so that everything should have the same treatment, whether it would not be wise, at least, to give Admiral Davis a chance to look over this material.

Chairman Russell. If there is no objection, I will be glad to get Admiral Davis to look at it. In my own view there is nothing that is detrimental.

Senator Hickenlooper. We cannot hear this friendly little conversation that is going on over at the other table.

Chairman Russell. Well, I think if all members of the committee would restrain themselves from conversation they probably would be hearing me a little better.

Senator Saltonstall raised a question as to whether or not this matter had been submitted to Admiral Davis. I had stated that none of it was classified, but that it came up from the Department and, therefore, I had not submitted it to Admiral Davis; that we had only submitted to him those documents that were classified. But if there is no objection, I will be glad to let Admiral Davis, if we can reach him and he is disposed to do so, go over this material, but I do not think any of it is likely to be detrimental to the national interest.

Senator Hickenlooper. I presume it should not be necessary if it is not classified by the department that sent it out.

Chairman Russell. What was that last?

Senator Hickenlooper. I say if the department that sent it over did not classify it, I think we would have no objection.

Chairman Russell. That was my view.

Senator Saltonstall. The statement of Harriman's is the same thing.

Chairman Russell. It is not in any wise marked "classified."

Of course, General Chennault's statement referred to by Senator Knowland was a statement that he made as an individual. I do not think there is any matter in there that would be detrimental to the national interest, do you, Senator Knowland?

Senator Knowland. I would not think so.

Chairman Russell. I think I sent that Chennault statement down here. Perhaps it is in my file up on my desk.

Mr. Mudge. We will check on it, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Without objection, it will be printed in the record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely want to suggest, Mr. Chairman—I raise no objection to the printing of either of these statements—except I want the record to show clearly that these are statements sort of ex parte. The witnesses are not subject to examination or to any probing of any of the statements that they have made; that is, with reference to the Harriman statement or the Chennault statement, and for whatever value an unprobed statement before the committee and the committee record may have, I presume we can concede that we should have the printing of these matters in the record, but the persons making either of these statements have not been subjected to examination or probing.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is very clear from the record, Senator Hickenlooper. Not only that, but they are not being printed in the record as such, but in the appendix to the record, along with the other documents and newspaper articles, editorials, which were submitted during the course of the hearings.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take it that any citizen or any individual or official can publish his own statement outside of this committee if he wants to.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is no question about that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is no objection then, those matters will be printed in the record.

Now, gentlemen, the next question is as to whether this committee should undertake to make a detailed report on these hearings. If it is determined to make a report, we should decide as to the scope and nature of the report that the committee will undertake to make.

I do not wish to influence any member of the committee in his thinking on this subject, but it is my own view, formed before the hearings were concluded, that no useful purpose would be served by the committee's undertaking to make a detailed report on these hearings.

In the first place, we have never had any legislation before us. The committee served as a medium of informing the American people of the views of the prime actors in the matters which we had under inquiry.

It went much further than that. When we concluded, we got into questions of a policy that were not related to the removal of General MacArthur.

It is my own judgment that in the long run that will be one of the most beneficial things, one of the most beneficial services, that the committee performed, because we did focus the attention of the American people on policy in the Far East, and I think it served as a means of informing them much better than they had been heretofore on various issues relating to those policies.

I think that the people have about made their own report in this case, and any effort on our part now to issue a report would be an anticlimax to the hearings.

There has never been a hearing held in my time here or in the past history of Congress of which I have any knowledge where the people got so fully and completely and as rapidly or that was read by as many people as were the hearings before this committee; and millions of American people have already made their own report in their own minds as to this entire matter, and nothing that this committee would say would change the opinion of any of those people.

It would take a considerable amount of time to make this report, if it is to be a committee report, because we would have to meet here from day to day, discuss the various issues involved, mull over the testimony, and arrive at a conclusion by the committee on a great many issues.

I do not say that in an attempt to influence the committee, but I am giving you my views. If the committee wishes to make a report, I am perfectly willing to take the time to devote to that report, any time that may be necessary.

Chairman CONNALLY. May I ask you a question, Senator?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Chairman CONNALLY. If we made the report, what could we do about it? Could we do a thing?

Chairman RUSSELL. All we could do would be to express our views.

Chairman CONNALLY. Of course.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is one reason why all of us, if we stood together as one man, all 26 of us, of course, could not restore General MacArthur to his command. We could not even force our views growing out of the hearings on the military operations in Korea and in China.

I think the hearings we have had, have had a very wholesome effect on those operations, but we could not, of course, even force our views, although we were unanimous.

I do not think there is any possibility whatever of a unanimous report on all of the details of the issues involved before us, but I am throwing the matter open to the committee for discussion and motion.

If the committee wants to make a report, I will work on that as assiduously and as earnestly as any other member of the committee.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. I merely want to express this viewpoint: We did go through a long period of hearings. We have four volumes before us, and there is still, presumably, one to come. I think that this committee has a responsibility to make a report to the Congress and to the people.

Now, until we attempt to do so, of course, we will not know what the views of the committee might be, but there is a great deal of material to be waded through to read four volumes of the hearings, and I would think we would be somewhat lax in our obligation to the Senate if we did not make a report or at least endeavor to do so.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, I feel that we should make some report, and if the committee in its wisdom, or the majority of the committee in their wisdom, decide not to make a formal report, then I think some group of individuals in the committee would want to make a statement—at least, express their views and offer such views over their own signatures. Instead of a formal report of the committee, it would be such a statement.

It would be the individual views of certain members of the committee. Of course, the preferable way would be to have the committee make the report, but if in their wisdom they do not see fit to do so, then I would think that for those who wanted to express their individual views, that they go ahead and do it over their own signatures.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, would you permit me to make this observation, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Because possibly some of our colleagues may not be aware of it, if I'm not mistaken, it was on Friday, the 13th day of July that I advised the chairman in a visit of brief duration, and indicated to him that certain members of this committee had committed their own views on this question to paper, and I told the chairman at that time that those for whom I was speaking were hopeful that the committee would find it convenient to call a meeting for the purpose of discussing a report.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the purpose of this meeting, Senator.

Senator CAIN. The chairman immediately said on the 13th day of July that as soon as it could conveniently be done, after the members of the joint committee then in Europe had returned, and certain other matters were gotten out of the way, that he would call the meeting which he has convened for this morning.

What I wanted to say is that the views of certain members have been commited week ago to paper, and those of us who subscribe to those views, and perhaps others would join with us, would not feel at this very late day that a publication of those views was an act anticlimax to our hearings.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon.

Senator MCMAHON. I gather that there have been meetings of certain members of the committee to discuss their views and, of course, I would be the last one to deny any member of the committee the right to express his views, or the right of any members of the committee to caucus privately and clandestinely, and reach an accord on their views. That is their privilege.

I would be somewhat surprised if the views that they had reached were not submitted to the full membership, because if they have done all this spade work and have got their views, which might be determined a report, how do they know until we read it that we might not find ourselves in accord with those views.

I have received no suggested findings. From my examination I do not suppose there is any intentional discourtesy involved in that, but I cannot understand it.

Senator BRIDGES. Senator McMahon, I know that you know it is no discourtesy to you or anybody else with respect to what was done, because certainly these joint committees have always operated with perfect courtesy to each other, and although disagreement has arisen personally sometimes, a mutual respect for each other's views exists.

The individuals, the members of the committee, who did work on a report were some of those people who, by their questioning and by their questions, developed and indicated their general beliefs in a crtain direction, and so they went ahead individually and prepared what is not a report but a summary of their views.

Of course, for one individual of that group—and I was one—I would welcome the adoption of their views as the views of the whole committee.

I am somewhat doubtful whether that would happen or not, but certainly I would welcome it. The point I make is that I think it wise to have some sort of a report from this committee. But if it is not done, why then, individuals, as you have so well stated, should have the right to express their opinions over their own signatures, and that they alone should be responsible, so that they will in no way reflect upon the other members of the committee.

Senator McMahon. Is it your intention, Senator, and that of the group, to submit this proposed document as a basis for a report by the full committee or have you arrived at a conclusion in your own mind that the effect of that document is of such a partisan nature that there is no use in submitting it for judicial examination?

Senator Bridges. No; it is not a partisan report, Senator McMahon. It is, I think, a very fair appraisal of the results of the hearing.

As far as I am concerned, as one of the group who have been working on this, if the committee decides to have a report, I certainly would be glad to submit this as the basis for that report.

If they decide not to have the report, then I, as one of a small group, would like to go ahead and publish the views of the certain individual members, but if we decide to have the report, we certainly would submit that as the basis for the report.

Senator Knowland. Would the Senator yield?

Chairman Russell. Does the Senator yield?

Senator Bridges. Yes.

Senator Knowland. Does not the Senator think, perhaps, that the first thing the committee might decide was whether in their judgment they want to issue a report or not? Obviously if the majority of the committee determines they do not care to issue the report, there will be no committee report as such.

Then, I think, it is a question as to whether individual members of the committee desire to issue at least their views on the outcome of the hearings or not; but, of course, in that event it would not be a report of the combined committees.

Senator Long. Mr. chairman, might I make a suggestion?

Senator Knowland. If I might just complete my statement——if, on the other hand, a majority of the committee should determine that a committee report would issue, then we would have to proceed, it seems to me, toward the drafting of such a report, and the committee itself would have to have an opportunity of determining just what went into such a report.

Senator Long. Mr. Chairman, if I might make a suggestion——

Chairman Russell. Senator Long.

Senator Long (continuing). One Senator told me that he had worked up his views, in collaboration with some other Senators, and he offered me the opportunity to look it over, and I have had a chance to just glance at it briefly.

I would say if a majority of this committee can agree on anything, that just by my looking at it, it would be the report of the committee, meaning the report of the majority. But if a majority cannot agree on a report, then I do not see how it can be anything but individual views.

Can it be a committee report if the majority cannot agree on it? I don't see how it could be.

Senator Gillette. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette.

Senator GILLETTE. May I make a general suggestion? The set-up of this group is an unusual thing, as everyone knows, and the steps that brought it into being, as I understand them, were as follows: The Armed Services Committee took the initial action, and addressed the letter to General MacArthur under date of April 13, from which I quote:

> The Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously requests that you appear before it to give your views on the military situation in the Far East and the circumstances leading up to your relief from your several commands in that area.

That is an excerpt, of course.

Then, subsequently, the chairman of this joint group on April 25 propounded a unanimous-consent agreement to the Senate:

> Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, Gen. Douglas MacArthur has accepted the invitation of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to appear before that committee on Thursday, May 3. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has requested that it be permitted to meet with us in a joint meeting. I ask unanimous consent that that may be done, for the purpose of that meeting as well as subsequent hearings on the subject.
>
> The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.
>
> Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
>
> Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
>
> Mr. WHERRY. Is it contemplated that the two committees will sit jointly in continuous hearings?
>
> Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; both for the purpose of hearing General MacArthur, and for the purpose of subsequent hearings to be held on the same subject.

Then, on May 3, at the time of the opening of these hearings, the chairman, in his very excellent statement to the joint committee, stated as follows:

> The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, today we are opening hearings on momentous questions. These questions affect not only the lives of every citizen, but they are vital to the security of our country and the maintenance of our institutions of free Government.
>
> We shall attempt to obtain the facts which are necessary to permit the Congress to discharge its proper functions and to make correct decisions on the problem of war and peace in the Far East and indeed throughout the world.

In view of those preliminary steps and the purpose for which it was set up, and the statement of the chairman, it would seem to me obvious that we ought to make a formal report.

It is obvious to everybody that we could not agree on conclusions, but it would seem to me that in the interest of orderly procedure, we should make a report of what we have done, that we held so many hearings, and present the record of the hearings to the Senate. We cannot leave it dangling in the air, as it now is; and it would seem to me that it was essential that, acting under the authority through which we were set up, and the statement of the purposes that we were developing facts on which the Congress should act, that we should present our developed facts to the Congress in a formal report, and without the conclusions, of course; and if anybody wants to, we could not present it if we wanted to, and nobody wants to prevent anybody from filing any statement that he wants to make.

It would seem to me that we should make a formal presentation of our action to the Congress.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an observation on Senator Gillette's statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon.

Senator MCMAHON. When we concluded these hearings, this committee adopted a statement to the American people which was submitted to the Senate in due course, and printed, as I recollect it, in the Congressional Record—a statement which met with, as far as I could see, almost the universal approbation of the American people.

It received editorial commendation from coast to coast, and I think it might not be a bad idea, before we went too far with the consideration of this, if we got out that statement and looked over what we had already said to the American people about these hearings.

Of course, I call the committee's attention to the fact that we are now engaged in delicate, most delicate, negotiations in Korea. I will not attempt to draw any or make any predictions, rather, of what effect this might have—the committee's action might have—in this regard, what the effect would be with respect to those negotiations.

However, it strikes me that any sensible man knows that this is not a time to rock the boat.

I would like to know, if I could, how many members of the committee have met and joined in this statement which, I take it, they would like to make the basis of a report by the committee. Can you tell me that, Senator?

Senator BRIDGES. There are eight Senators who have told me that they would affix their signatures to this report, without reservation. There are several more who have indicated their interest in it, but have made no definite statement, and I think that the interest expressed in general, about the report, might total close to half of the joint committees.

Senator MCMAHON. Are the eight members now committed, members of the minority?

Senator BRIDGES. They happen to be; yes.

Senator MCMAHON. This report has not been submitted—this document has not been submitted—to all members of the committee for their examination?

Senator BRIDGES. No; it has not.

Senator CAIN. Would the Senator yield for one brief observation, the Senator from Connecticut?

Senator MCMAHON. Yes.

Senator CAIN. I would like to say with reference to what you have indicated about the minority, that those of us who have studied and committed this problem to paper, particularly sought to embarrass no member, Senator McMahon, of the majority.

We have studied and put our views in concise form, following which those views were circulated in a reasonably general way to members of the majority.

Senator MCMAHON. I thank the Senator for his tender regard for my sensibilities, but I assure him I would not have been embarrassed if there had been submitted to me the views that the Senator has in regard to these proceedings.

Senator CAIN. They were submitted not to the Senator from Connecticut, to the best of my knowledge, but to other members, to some of the members, of the majority.

Senator MCMAHON. I again regret that I was a pariah, along apparently with some of the rest of my colleagues, who were not permitted to drink at this fount of wisdom.

Senator CAIN. I think the answer to that is, if I may speak most frankly and very honestly on the subject, that we studied this problem from the questions and answers that were submitted by all Senators, and it happens that this report, from my point of view anyway, does not subscribe to some of the views and opinions expressed by the Senator from Connecticut, and we saw no point in laboring the question.

Senator MCMAHON. Not even to the point of letting me find out how much of this document, which I assume is quite lengthy—how many pages does it contain?

Senator CAIN. It includes appendixes and so on. The pages devoted to the report itself are about 40, I think. I can be more accurate.

Senator MCMAHON. Well, it might be a page or two there in which I might find myself in agreement, and that would have been a net gain for the Senator.

Senator CAIN. Fifty-two pages, and I do know that the Senator from Connecticut will find it very easy and convenient in the next hour or so to begin to peruse the report if he sees fit.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, might I add my little bit in this discussion? I hope personally there will be no formal report filed by the committee. I say that because that will mean that there will be majority views and minority views, and they will be divergent views, and it would seem to me that that would be confusing, and lead to no good result.

We unanimously agreed to that very fine statement that the chairman drew up.

I do believe that any individual member, if he wants to do it, either as a group or as an individual, should be entitled to state his views and that, I believe, it would be of value to have the views being filed in one volume.

I believe that mostly everybody in this country who has had any interest in this subject has pretty well made up his mind.

I think it would be very unfortunate to have a majority and minority report.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think, Senator, it could be confined to two?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think it might be confined to two, with a whole lot of individual comments.

Mr. Chairman, just to present the thing so that it may be thrashed around, I move that the joint committee file no formal report as the report of the committee; that no views be stated as the majority or minority, views, but that members be permitted before September 1 to file their views and conclusions with the chairman; that said views be gathered in one volume, and request be made of the Senate to publish them.

Senator BYRD. Would the Senator add to that that they transmit papers and records of the hearings to the Senate for their information?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would be glad to add that.

Chairman RUSSELL. That would be in accord with Senator Gillette's statement.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, may I add in this connection that this very excellent statement that the chairman prepared, and the joint committee unanimously agreed to, is a report not as an agent to the

Congress, but to the American people, and the first statement that was made in connection with it, the chairman's statement, on the floor of the Senate was:

> Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, at a meeting of the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations on yesterday, the committees unanimously approved the issuance of a statement to the American people. This statement is not to be interpreted as a report of the committee on any aspect of the issues of the MacArthur hearings.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

Senator GILLETTE. It was expressly designated that it was not a report from the committee.

We are an agent, and we should, in my opinion, make a report. And, as I stated before, it is obvious that we could not agree on a report, and I agree with Senator Saltonstall that it would serve no purpose in having a majority and minority report, but that we should make a formal report saying that we held the meetings over this protracted period of time, and these hearings represent the facts that we developed, and then we discharge our duty.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is, as I understand it, Senator Gillette, embraced within this motion, if Senator Saltonstall accepts the suggestion of Senator Byrd, that no formal report on the issues be filed, but that this statement and all of the record of our hearings be transmitted to the Senate.

Senator GILLETTE. To the Senate.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

Senator GILLETTE. I would be in accord with that.

Chairman RUSSELL. And the record of the hearings certainly discloses how many days we have met, how many witnesses appeared. All of that speaks for itself, and if we transmit the papers, which would include this statement that we issued, and all of the formal testimony, and all the documentary evidence submitted during the course of the hearings to the Senate, that is in the nature of action by the committee in reporting to the parent body.

Senator GILLETTE. That would meet with my approval, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Senator Saltonstall's motion is sort of a double-barrel one in reverse, an opposing reciprocal engine type of motion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield? I thank the Senator for that description of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say that in all kindness, and in all courtesy, without trying to aim to be caustic, but from my viewpoint, he has two hostile propositions in his motion.

In the first place, I think the committee should make a report, so that if I should vote "No" on his motion, I would be voting for the committee to make a report.

The second proposition of his motion is that individual members should be permitted to file their own views. I am in favor of that proposition, but if I vote "No" on his motion, it might be interpreted that I was opposed to individual members voting to express their own views.

Now, I would prefer to vote on the Senator's proposition in two questions: No. 1, should the committee make a report, upon, which I should vote "Yes," and I mean I would vote in favor of the committee's making a report.

No. 2: Should individual members, either as individuals or collectively, be authorized to give their own individual views in this matter, and I should vote "Yes" on that.

It would make little difference to me whether it was called a minority report or not; that would be a minor thing, a matter of terminology.

Therefore, it is difficult for me to vote on the Senator's motion because I am against one proposition—that is, his statement that the committee should make no report—and I am for his other proposition in his motion that individuals should be permitted to file their views.

Chairman RUSSELL. I find myself impaled on one horn of that dilemma almost every day in the Senate, where I am against certain propositions that are in the bill, but I have to decide whether what I want to favor in the bill outweighs that to which I am opposed.

I do not think there is any bill that I have ever voted on that I approved in toto in every line and every paragraph.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wonder if the Senator would separate his motion?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would be very glad to.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Iowa has been around here a long time, and he is familiar with the situations that exist.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I appreciate the opening comments of the Senator, because he used some statements that I did not think I was capable of forming such ideas, and I would be glad to separate it or throw the motion up for discussion and amendment, and discarding it, if you wanted to do so, but I did it because I think it was my idea how we should proceed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It occurs to me that there are two clear-cut propositions here on which members may divide—I mean members may divide equally on each of these two propositions.

One is, Shall the committee make a report—that is one. I have a position on that.

No. 2 is, Should individual members be authorized to give their individual views, and I have a position on that.

If the Senator can separate his motion, I think we could meet each proposition according to each member's individual opinion.

Senator BRIDGES. Would it not be brought to a head, Mr. Chairman, if I should move to substitute for the Saltonstall motion a simple motion that the committee do make a report? We can vote on that, and then——

Senator BYRD. In essence, though, what we are doing or propose to do is to make a report.

Senator McMAHON. Pardon me, Senator?

Senator BYRD. In transmitting all this information to the Senate, that is in the nature of a report. It may not be a complete report or a detailed report, but it is a report.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, may I have just a word?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. It is rather dating back to what was said here previously—it was my understanding that the majority of the committee, when we got through with the hearings, felt that there was to be no formal report.

However, some of us felt that there should be a report, and before we went to Europe, one or two meetings were held in relation to formulating the matter and studying the record.

We understood those who were not called in were not in favor of making a report.

Now, as individual Senators, we exercise our right, I believe, without any thought that we were doing anything behind the back of the committee. Personally, I feel, and I felt very seriously on this whole MacArthur matter, probably because MacArthur meant considerable to my State, and geography has something to do with one's convictions; and I felt that he got a rotten deal from start to finish. I am frank to put it in that vulgar language.

I felt that for the committee not to make a report—and yet that was the general consensus of what went out over the papers and every place else—was contrary to my own personal opinion, so I was very happy to talk things over with my associates, and that was how that came about.

Work was done when we were in Europe, and then we had to see what had been accomplished. This is not said in any sense of apology, but rather so that there can be no misunderstanding of the personal integrity and desire of we who feel that we are responsible to our people, to make a report.

I question whether with the difference of opinion that was expressed throughout the entire sessions here—and I so stated in the beginning rather jocularly—I do not think there would be agreement—I doubt whether you can get a committee report. You could probably get a division on it. So my own thought has been that there was a pretty firm conviction or decision that there was not going to be a report. Now, that is basic with me.

Second, some of us felt there should be a report by us if the committee was not going to make a report, and so we got under way.

There might be a number of differences in our own report on minor matters, but it was the general consensus among us—and I am one who joined, and would be happy to have anyone else come in on this report.

I understand through some inadvertance it has reached the press, when it was not supposed to, and some comments have already started.

Just one other point, Mr. Chairman: Because it was suggested by the Senator from Connecticut that there might be something in the report that would have serious implications in relation to the foreign situation, I would like to say that I do not think so. I think there were two big issues: One, whether there was justification—factual justification, not legal justification—for the discharge or for the handling of MacArthur in the way he was handled; and the other was more or less a review of the far eastern policies, and I think that most of the facts there are not in dispute. But you can draw different conclusions therefrom and I suppose some of our conclusions would be, in the minds of some of our associates, in error, but we do not think so.

If the committee wants to make a report, I think you should discuss what you mean by a report, whether you mean what Senator Byrd says or whether you mean an attempt to state the facts and draw conclusions which might, as Senator Russell says, take considerable time, and so forth.

If that had been our intention, we should have been working on that, as our little group has been working on our report.

Senator McMahon. It has been working as a group on the report?

Senator WILEY. Off and on.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green. If you will excuse me, Senator, I wish first to state that at the last meeting we had of this committee, which was held on June 27, I brought to the attention of the committee the question of the making of a report.

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

Chairman RUSSELL. I brought to the attention of the committee the question of whether or not we should undertake to make a detailed report expressing conclusions on these issues, and just as I brought this up, there was a call over in the Senate, and the members of the committee decided, as the record will show, that they should go to the floor. They were having a vote.

Shortly thereafter, the majority of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee went to Europe and, of course, no action could be taken in their absence.

Subsequent to their return, almost immediately after their return, legislation was submitted on the European aid program, and joint hearings have been in progress since then, so I did not know that any action had been taken as to whether or not there would be a formal vote.

I did conclude before the hearings were closed, as an individual, that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to go into conclusions on these issues, because it would take this committee weeks to discuss it, and then we would not be in agreement.

All right now, Senator Green.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chariman, it seems obvious to me, at least, that what differences of opinion have been expressed are based on different constructions of what the word "report" means.

If a report means simply a statement of bare facts, such as we have held so many meetings, and we have had so many witnesses who have appeared, and we forward therewith copies of the hearings with the appendixes, that is one thing.

If it means that we have got to include deductions to be drawn from the evidence, conclusions as to policy and as to facts, that means an entirely different thing.

I personally believe that it would be very unfortunate at the present time in view of the world situation for us to have any more public disagreements than are absolutely necessary.

As the chairman has stated, it is a critical situation in the Far East, and it is not only deductions which could properly be drawn by differences of opinion being expressed, but it is differences which will be drawn improperly as well.

We know perfectly well that Soviet Russia will put every wrong construction it can on apparent differences on the part of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, and think that it exists as a whole.

They will say that we are divided in our opposition to their actions in the Far East, or elsewhere.

So, personally, it would seem to me to be unfortunate to have these differences appear, and if they must appear, then they should be made as unofficial as possible.

As it has been proposed in various quarters, personally it would seem to me the way to avoid this is to have just this factual report, such as I suggest, without any conclusions or deductions whatever, and we will leave it to the individuals to supplement it as they see fit with any statements they want to make, although I hope that we will not indulge in any general discussion of these matters pro and con at this time in the situation of world affairs as they are. And, therefore, I should be in favor of Senator Saltonstall's motion to report, if that is what it means. I am for it if he will state that is what he means.

But if it means a minority report, a majority report, and conclusions to be drawn, I would be against it because it may be very unfortunate.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield?

Senator GREEN. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I distinctly said in my motion that no views be stated as the majority views.

Senator GREEN. But you also stated, if I listened correctly or understood it correctly, that these other differences of opinion were to be made a part of or annexed to it or published with it, and that, I think, would be very unfortunate.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I made a separate statement that members be permitted to file their views as individuals.

Senator GREEN. Of course, that they will have anyhow, but I doubt whether they should, and I do not think they ought to be incorporated in it or published as a part of the publication of the committee.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, will a substitute for the Saltonstall motion be entertained? I offer the following: That the joint committee shall issue a formal report to include conclusions on issues involved; that the report be transmitted to the Senate, together with the factual record of the hearings, and the same be done by September 1, 1951.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, you have heard the substitute, which is in order.

Before we vote, Senator Saltonstall, do you wish to read your proposition so that the committee will be clear as to what is involved?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, my motion, to which Senator Bridges has now made a substitute, is this: That the committee transmit and report to the Senate for its information the hearings and the records and the appendixes of its hearings; that the committee file no further report; that no views or conclusions be stated as the majority or minority views, but that the members be permitted before September 1 to file their views and conclusions with the chairman; that said views be gathered in one volume and request be made of the Senate to publish them.

Senator GREEN. Would the Senator be willing to strike the latter clause?

Senator SALTONSTALL. "Said views be gathered in one volume"?

Senator GREEN. Yes, or that they be able to file their views.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, my thought behind that, Senator Green—and this motion, of course, is subject to any views that you may have—my idea behind that was that it was fairer to every individual to have all the views published in one volume.

Senator Green. Yes, but you would be—if we undertook to do that, I think that would be very unfortunate to have those views published, and to emphasize the official character of the differences.

I am perfectly willing to leave it to every individual the question as to what views he wishes to express separately or with other Senators, but I think this report ought to conclude the work of this committee, and the committee ought to be discharged and not have anything more to do with it in promulgating the views of individual members. Let them do it themselves.

Senator Cain. Senator Green, you, sir, think it would be unfortunate to have the differences made public. The Senator from Washington, with every respect for your view, takes a completely contrary one.

It is my feeling, sir, that whatever the convictions are of the members of this committee would result in a more healthful situation throughout the country.

Senator Green. But there will not be anything in this report, as I understand it, that Senator Saltonstall and I both advocate, to show any differences.

Senator Cain. Well, it is my opinion—that is why I gave a different view— that if there are substantial differences no harm will result from making those differences available in these unusual times to the public.

Senator Green. It seems to me—I am sorry I cannot agree—I think it would have a very unfortunate result abroad.

Senator Long. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that we proceed first to consider the substitute, and then it would be in order to consider the Saltonstall motion. If that is the case, it would be in order for Senator Green to move for a division of Senator Saltonstall's motion so that we could vote on it by sections.

Chairman Connally. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Connally.

Chairman Connally. I appreciate the significance of the Saltonstall motion, and I think that is about the only way out of this situation.

Now, those who want to make a report, a report on what? We had no bill before us, we had no resolution before us; we just simply said that we were going to hear this testimony.

Well now, the thing to do is to report this testimony to the Senate and say, "Here it is. This is all we have done. We have voted on no conclusion, we took no action," and it seems to me that the course for us to pursue is simply to report back to the Senate—if you want to call it a report—that we had these hearings, and here is the testimony, and leave everybody to draw their own conclusions, because we had really nothing before us in the way of legislation, resolution, or bill. We just simply had the witnesses before us, and having the witnesses before us, we took their testimony and recorded it, "and here, Mr. Senate, is the result."

I am in sympathy with the Saltonstall motion.

Now, so far as individual views, I do not think there is any harm in letting them be individual views. They can file their individual views here with the committee, and publish them in the hearings if they want to, but so far as any formal action of a minority, I do not approve.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you concluded, Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Yes; that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. I believe Senator Hunt addressed the Chair.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought you addressed me.

Senator HUNT. I want to comment briefly on the two motions before us.

I find myself in agreement with the motion presented by Senator Saltonstall, and along the lines discussed by the senior Senator from Texas.

We were not directed, as I remember it, by the Senate, to even hold these hearings. There is no resolution to hold hearings on, and I do not know that the Senate has made any formal request on the committee to make a report.

Aside from that, Mr. Chairman, every bit of information with reference to these hearings that could possibly be made available to the people has been made available, and perhaps has been made more broadly, showing more than any committee hearings since I have been a member of this body.

Any report, whether it be a committee report, with majority and minority views, or whether it be an individual report, would be something where we would only be attempting, honestly so, to place the evidence before the people in such light as we see the situation in.

In other words, a report on this matter would be a report where we would attempt to formulate the thinking of the American people as a result of these hearings.

Now, as I say, the American people have the hearings; they have already digested the contents, and I do not think at this time it is a good thing for our country and for us to present to the people what I would term honestly slanted views that would further divide our people at this time, more than they are at this time already divided. I think it would be a mistake.

The American people now have all the information; they are capable of thinking for themselves, and I believe this is one time when we ought to leave them alone and let them make their own conclusions and draw their own conclusions and do their own thinking.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief, but since this is such an important matter, it seems to me that everyone should express how he feels about it.

At the conclusion of this record I was very much concerned about a report and just what a report could cover and what it would cover and, frankly, I leaned toward the idea that there should be one.

Then the chairman came out with those excellent statements, that I think are a landmark in American history. It was so well received by the membership of the committee and so well received by the Senate, by the other Members of the Congress, and by the American people that it changed the atmosphere entirely in my mind, and I concluded from that that the presentation of this proof to the American people, together with this statement, and the presentation of it to the world, so far as that is concerned, was a most excellent place to leave this matter resting.

I am further confirmed in that by what has happened since. That has settled down in the people's minds, I think, and then we have this additional fact here.

I see no one suggesting that any report is needed for the purpose of legislation, for the purpose of passing on a treaty, for the purpose of forming any future policy. But in addition to that, we have this matter pending over there in Korea. It is related in a way to these facts, of course. But to go back into all these old facts seems to me like with reference to this matter in Korea that we must look to the future.

We are going to have this Japanese treaty, which is pending here, at San Francisco, and it brings up all this Asiatic matter again, and for us to be at loggerheads here about a report, except what is covered here by the Saltonstall resolution, it seems to me like it would be a most serious mistake, and I am very much of the opinion to present these facts, together with the sentiments of this joint statement, and then look to the future rather than to the past should be what we should do, particularly in view of these Korean negotiations and the Japanese treaty.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain is recognized.

Senator CAIN. My memory tells me, sir, that at the time the committee, by unanimous action, adopted the joint committee statement, that the chairman made it most clear that one should not consider that statement to be a committee report in any way, shape, or form. Is my memory correct?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is essentially correct. I stated two or three times, and I have just refreshed my recollection from the record, that this was in no sense a report upon the issues involved in this hearing.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; which the substitute motion of the Senator from New Hampshire would result in taking action on.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is correct.

I stated it was not a statement on the issues involved; that it did not undertake to deal with the issues involved.

It was a statement in the nature of a reassurance to the American people that we were strong enough to stand these divisions that are manifest here in this committee today. That was what it was intended for.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, after hearing this discussion, I feel that the right line is to follow Senator Saltonstall's motion.

I do not think, on reflection, that the committee, as such, should make a report. I think a majority and a minority report would be most unfortunate. On the other hand, I feel it would be a grave mistake if we simply said there would be no comment on this thing at all, and I think that individual members of the committee are justified in expressing their views, and I would like to see done what Senator Saltonstall suggested, to have compiled the views of the groups or individuals.

I participated in the discussion with some of my colleagues, and I think we have come to certain conclusions that are of value.

I do not agree with Senator Green that that would make for controversy. That would only be the expression of individual views and would be a great contribution to the whole situation in the country.

My feeling is that the committee, as such, should not make a formal report. There should be no majority and minority views, but that we should submit, as has been suggested by both Senator Gillette and Senator Byrd to the Congress, the record of these hearings, and just a statement that we are submitting the results of our study, and we are also submitting the individual views of members of the committee who desire to submit such views.

It seems to me that is the orderly way to do it, and that is the result of a great deal of thought and a great deal of study by all of us.

I would feel, I think, remiss if I did not state that I was called upon, in the light of my feeling in the matter, to express in a dignified way the conclusions I had come to.

If others want to do that, that is a contribution to a very important subject. I feel that the Saltonstall motion is proper. I favor the Saltonstall motion.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon.

Senator McMahon. Senator Smith, I assume that you would not approve of a procedure whereby all the members of the committee would not have an opportunity to examine the views of other members?

Senator Smith. No, I am in favor of that. I think every member of the committee should examine the views of others if they want to, and comment on them, and associate themselves with their views. I would like to accommodate everybody's views.

If the Senator from Connecticut has any views, I would like to hear them.

Senator McMahon. I thought you would feel that way.

The Senator from Connecticut feels that Senator Stennis made a very excellent statement. He stated many things for which a report was not needed.

He might have stated that, perhaps, it is conceivably desired to have some statements for our future campaigns. I am not interested in that. I would like to help the general fulfill his desire which he made before the Congress to "fade away."

That has been proceeding in a very healthy way and at a very healthy rate in the last few months, and, of course, we will now proceed, I suppose, through the statements of views, in dredging it up again. But if that is the desire, so be it.

Speaking only for myself, I shall try to so couch my views as comport with the evidence and facts.

I shall support the motion of Senator Saltonstall.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, might we have a roll call?

Chairman Russell. We certainly may.

Senator Smith. What are we voting on?

Chairman Russell. The first question is on the substitute proposed by the Senator from New Hampshire.

Senator Green. May that be read?

Senator BRIDGES. That the joint committee shall issue a formal report to include conclusions on the issues involved or——

Senator GREEN. I cannot hear you.

Senator BRIDGES. That the joint committee shall issue a formal report to include conclusions, and that this report be transmitted to the Senate, together with the Russell declaration and the factual record of the hearings by September 1, 1951.

Senator GREEN. Did you say to include conclusions?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, we go into the details of the issue, Senator, and we express conclusions and views on it. That is what it means. It is a question of whether or not you want to make a report in the ordinary sense of the term or whether you do not.

Senator GREEN. That is the fundamental difference between that and the Saltonstall resolution.

The CLERK. Mr. George?

Chairman CONNALLY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Green?

Senator GREEN. No.

The CLERK. Mr. McMahon?

Senator McMAHON. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Fulbright?

Chairman RUSSELL. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator CONNALLY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Wiley?

Senator WILEY. I pass. I do not quite understand the motion. I pass.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, the Senator is excused from casting a vote on this question.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith?

Senator SMITH. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Lodge?

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Tobey?

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Brewster?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Byrd?

Senator BYRD. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Kefauver?

Senator JOHNSON. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hunt?

Senator HUNT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Stennis?

Senator **Stennis**. No.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Long?

Senator **Long**. No.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Bridges?

Senator **Bridges**. Aye.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator **Saltonstall**. No.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Morse?

Senator **McMahon**. No.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Knowland?

Senator **Knowland**. Aye.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Cain?

Senator **Cain**. Aye.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Flanders?

Senator **Flanders**. No.

The **Clerk**. Mr. Chairman Russell?

Chairman **Russell**. No.

The **Clerk**. Senators recorded in the affirmative are Messrs. Hickenlooper, Brewster, Bridges, Knowland, and Cain.

Senators recorded in the negative are Messrs. George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Smith, Mr. Chairman Connally, Mr. Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, Flanders, and Chairman Russell.

Chairman **Russell**. The question recurs to the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator **Cain**. I have a question, sir. Did the Senator from Massachusetts split his motion into two parts as had been suggested?

Chairman **Russell**. No, but I had not announced the vote formally, and I suppose I had better do that. On this motion, the Bridges substitute, the ayes are 5, and the nays are 18.

Senator **Green**. How many?

Chairman **Russell**. Eighteen. The substitute is, therefore, lost.

The question recurs to the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator **Green**. May I in that connection ask whether he had decided to separate it or not?

Senator **Saltonstall**. On the question of filing the views in one volume?

Senator **Green**. Yes.

Senator **Saltonstall**. I would prefer not to. If the Senator from Rhode Island makes that as a motion to amend my motion and it is carried, of course, it prevails. I would prefer.

Senator **Green**. Then I will do that in that respect.

Senator **Flanders**. Will the motion as presented by the Senator from Massachusetts be read, please?

Chairman **Russell**. Well, the motion is as follows: That the committees transmit and report to the Senate for its consideration the hearings and the records with their appendices; that the committee file no further report.

Senator **Smith**. File what?

Chairman **Russell**. File no further report; that no views or conclusions be stated as a majority or minority view, but that members be permitted before September 1 to file their views and conclusions with the chairman, and that such views be gathered in one volume, and request be made of the Senate to publish the same.

Now, as I understand Senator Green's motion——

Senator GREEN. I offer as an amendment that the last two lines be stricken out.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Rhode Island moves to strike "but that members be permitted before September 1 to file their views and conclusions with the chairman."

Senator GREEN. I have no objection to that.

Chairman RUSSELL. You move to strike "and that said views be gathered in one volume."

Senator GREEN. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. "And that request be made to publish the same.

Senator GREEN. The idea is that that gives a sort of formal recognition to this controversy, which I think is undesirable from the point of view of the welfare of the country.

Senator BYRD. What would become of the views that are filed with the chairman?

Senator BRIDGES. They will be published individually.

Senator GREEN. I have no objection to that.

Senator BRIDGES. They would be a separate thing.

Senator GREEN. That just gives a volume of controversy to the public and may be misunderstood, especially abroad.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, you think they ought to be published separately, or are you opposed to publishing them at all?

Senator GREEN. We should not publish them at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I thought. It would be discouraging to the fellow who submitted his views.

Senator GREEN. I would like the views of the chairman on this. It seems to me that the filing of this report ought to end the work of the committee, and that the committee goes out of existence.

Senator BYRD. Will you agree with the filing of them with the chairman, and including them in the appendices of the record? What would happen to them if they were not published?

Senator GREEN. That is it. I do not think that they ought to file them, and then there would not be a committee to file them with.

Senator BYRD. If we passed a resolution to file them, and then we bury them——

Senator GREEN. They can publish them themselves. I hope they will not.

Senator BYRD. It seems to me that if you include them in the appendix, which is already provided, they will be transmitted to the Senate.

Senator GREEN. I will change my amendment and make it that they are at liberty to file their views or publish their views; put it that way.

Chairman CONNALLY. I object. I do not mind their publishing them and filing them; that is all right, but I do object to putting them in one volume, because, if you do that to all of them, it will be construed by a lot of people as if that was a minority report.

Senator BYRD. But you do not object to including them in the appendix.

Chairman RUSSELL. There will be more than one, I can assure you of that, Senator.

Chairman CONNALLY. I do not mind their being in the appendix, but as individual statements.

Senator BYRD. But a number of Senators could sign the same statement.

Chairman CONNALLY. I understand. The point I am making is that if you put them all in one volume, why, they will construe it as a minority report.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I made that suggestion so as to be fair to every member of the committee, so that he can get the same opportunity and the same publicity, if you will, as every other member, whether he was one of 8 or 10 or whether he was an individual.

Another argument for it is that if anybody wants to take the time and trouble—we will take the New York Times as an example or the Washington Post—they have got all the views together at one time and in one place, and that from the men who heard all the testimony and all the evidence, and they are not minority or majority views in any way, but it gives the different ideas of everybody who was responsible for hearing that evidence, in one place.

The other thing would be that each Member of the Senate will either file his report by making a speech on it, or if he wants to put it in the appendices it is better than not doing it at all.

Senator BYRD. If you put the views in the appendices, they are bound to be all together anyway.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would rather have it in the appendices.

Senator BYRD. It seems to me that is better than having a formal one volume.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I will accept Senator Byrd's amendment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just to clarify this thing, if several members of the committee as individuals desire to express the same identical views in a substantial report, does this motion mean that they have to publish just the same individual document in multiple publications?

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, no. The Chair will never construe it that way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let us say that if five or six or seven or eight or nine say, "I agree with this publication."

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It was my intent that those 8 or 10 men should be able to sign one report.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; that is what I understand.

Senator GREEN. That means, Mr. Chairman, there would be a majority report, a minority report, or, perhaps, several majority reports or several minority reports, and they will probably come down in the last analysis to one, a majority report, and a minority report, and I think that is very unfortunate.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I accept Senator Byrd's amendment.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Will the Senator accept this as an amendment? That the committee file no further report——

Senator MCMAHON. A little louder, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. That the committee file no further report after filing the hearings, and so forth; that no views or conclusions be stated as the majority or minority views, but that members—not individuals—members can join together, I think, any way they please, and be permitted before September 1 to file their views and conclusions with the chairman, and that said views be gathered in the appendices, which already is provided in the first clause to be published.

I cannot see how anyone could object to that, instead of having one volume which would have given undue emphasis.

Senator GILLETTE. Will the chairman state the question as it is modified so we will know what we are voting on?

Chairman RUSSELL. Do I understand this alters the text that you are undertaking to amend?

Senator GREEN. Will you read it again?

Chairman RUSSELL. That the committee transmit and report to the Senate for its information the hearings and the records with their appendices; that the committee file no further report; that no views or conclusions be stated as a majority or minority view or conclusions, but that members be permitted before September 1 to file views and conclusions with the chairman, and that said views be gathered in the appendices.

I think if you are going to change that it would be better to say "be printed in the appendices."

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I merely want the record to be clear on this situation. Of course, the appendix may not be published for some considerable period of time. I would not want it understood that either any individual Senator or any group of Senators who may desire to do so are in any way limited from expressing their views prior to that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, there is no restraint that this committee could or should undertake to place on any member.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

Senator HUNT. I should like to ask unanimous consent of the joint committee that in the formal report this motion, if it is carried, of Senator Saltonstall's be made a part of the report.

Chairman RUSSELL. All of today's hearings and all of the statements of the committee today will be printed in the final report.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I think you misunderstood my intentions. I mean in the formal report that is made to the Congress.

Chairman RUSSELL. To the Senate

Senator HUNT. Senator Saltonstall's——

Chairman RUSSELL. This will be the report that will accompany the hearings and the records, Senator.

Senator HUNT. I would like verbatim for the Senator's motion to be in the formal report that we give to the Congress.

Chairman RUSSELL. This the formal report.

Senator HUNT. You do not quite grasp what I have in mind.

Senator BYRD. General Mudge says the appendix is already in galley form.

Senator KNOWLAND. I have to catch a train, and I will leave my proxy with Senator Bridges. The only thing I wanted to be clear on was that the committee would not consider that any individual member or any group of Senators who desire to make their views known were limited from doing so awaiting the publication of the appendix.

Senator MCMAHON. I wish to be heard on that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Byrd. I understand from General Mudge that the appendix is in galley proof, and will be printed immediately, is that correct, General?

Senator Knowland. I wanted the record to be clear on that.

Senator Hunt. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to belabor this point of mine, please, but——

Senator McMahon. Senator Knowland, I am going to be against that. I want you to know that before you go.

Senator Hunt. I wish to state that I believe the resolution by Senator Saltonstall should be made part of the report that you make to Congress.

Chairman Russell. That is the only report we are going to make.

Senator Hunt. I want the wording of the motion in the report.

Senator Byrd. It says that no further report can be made.

Senator Hunt. What I am trying to get at——

Chairman Russell. I cannot understand how you are going to do more if it is a report than incorporate it in the report.

Senator Hunt. I want it to be made very clear to the public, and that is the proper way to do it, that this is neither a majority or a minority report, by virtue of a motion by this body, by this committee.

Senator Byrd. It says so.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, this entire record will be in the report, including the motion.

Chairman Russell. That the committee—just a moment, gentlemen, and then I will undertake to recognize all Senators—that the committee's view is that the committees transmit and report to the Senate for its information the hearings and the records, with their appendixes; that the committee file no further report; that no views or conclusions be stated as a majority or minority view; that members be permitted before September 1 to file their views and conclusions with the chairman, and that said views and conclusions be printed in the appendix.

Senator Green. Mr. Chairman?

Senator Hunt. That will be printed in the formal report that we make to the Congress?

Chairman Russell. No, sir. This will be attached to this record and transmitted to the Congress as the report.

Senator Johnson. That is the report.

Senator Byrd. That will be the beginning of the report.

Senator Hunt. I want to look very carefully when the report is on my desk to see if that wording is contained in the report that is laid on my desk by the Senator.

Senator Green. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Connally was seeking recognition, and then Senator Cain wishes to be recognized.

Chairman Connally. Does it say they will state those views by September 1?

Chairman Russell. That is right.

Now, Senator Cain?

Chairman Connally. And it says their views?

Chairman Russell. That is right.

Chairman Connally. Well, you did not read it that way to start with.

Chairman RUSSELL. September 1 to file their views and conclusions; I read it four or five times.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My understanding of this motion is that its adoption will permit the Senator from Washington or any other member of the joint committee to file his own views today or any other time prior to and including, I suppose, September 1, and from the minute the motion is adopted, it makes every Senator a free agent to make whatever comments he wishes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course.

Senator McMAHON. Can I comment on that?

Chairman RUSSELL. I will recognize the Senator from Connecticut as soon as the Senator from Rhode Island has concluded.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very unfortunate wording. You say that it shall not be a majority or minority report, and you merely make provision where it should be a majority and minority report. It makes us almost ridiculous. That is the reason I move to strike out the latter phrase.

Senator BYRD. Senator, how are you going to keep a Senator from having an opinion?

Senator GREEN. I do not want to keep him from having an opinion; I want him to be limited to his individual discretion as to whether he wants to make it public or not, but I do not think this committee ought to further that by saying in one place that we do not want a majority and minority report, and immediately make a provision whereby there will be a majority and minority report.

Senator BYRD. A man makes an individual expression, he has an individual opinion, and that is neither a minority nor a majority in the sense that we use those terms.

Senator GREEN. We ought not to have anything to do with that, Senator, that is the point. We ought to let them express their views. I hope they will not, but they ought to—they have the right to. Every Senator can express his views in any way he chooses, on the radio, in the press, in magazine articles, on the stump, anyway, and he can say anything he wants to. But we ought not to add that they can file it and have it printed as a part of the report, that is my point.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Connecticut, who is seeking recognition.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, there is a great deal of truth in what the Senator from Rhode Island said. I certainly am the last to deny any Senator or try to deny the right to express his views.

I see the purpose of the comments of the Senator from California and the Senator from Washington. They wish to go out of this meeting and hand out to the press the views which they have arrived at after caucusing with those who have subscribed to them.

I regard that as most unfortunate.

Chairman CONNALLY. Let me ask you a question.

Senator McMAHON. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield?

Senator McMAHON. I yield.

Chairman CONNALLY. Suppose we do not do anything about it? What is to prevent them from doing any such thing? They could go out and hand out that statement and say that it represents the views of eight members, and so forth, and so on, irrespective of what we do here.

Senator McMahon. I agree that is what can be done, and I don't deny their right.

I am protesting that way, however, of exercising their privilege, if you want to call it that.

Chairman Connally. I grant you that.

Senator McMahon. You and I and all the rest of the members of this committee sat here pretty religiously and heard this testimony, and we were to be called together to determine whether or not this committee would make a report.

Now, I have not been busy caucusing with you or with the members of the majority trying to frame up any views. I came here ready to discuss whether or not we should express any views, and I find now that a junta has met and caucused, and have arrived at some views which they have not seen fit to express to you or to me, but now wish to run out and give to the press. I think common courtesy would demand that if this is what they intend to do that they should grant to the rest of us the right to write out our views and release them all together. But that is not what they want to do.

They want to jump the gun, and I just want the record to show what they are trying to do.

Chairman Connally. There is nothing to prevent them from doing it. They jump the gun every day here in the press.

Chairman Russell. Let us have order.

Senator Cain. Mr. Chairman, this observation, sir, will take just a minute, but my friend, the Senator from Connecticut, has made reference to the Senator from California and the Senator from Washington.

Now, the one and more members of this joint committee to which the Senator from Connecticut has referred, have devoted hours and days and weeks of thought and study and conviction to the preparation of their views. Those views were committed to paper, as I have pointed out to the Senator from Connecticut, more than a month ago.

Senator McMahon. I did not get them.

Senator Cain. Out of courtesy and consideration and in the name of just common decency, no word with reference to the substance of those intended views has been discussed in the press.

We came this morning to find out what the wishes of the committee were to be.

The committee, by a substantial majority, has said that it intends to issue no report. Neither Senator Knowland nor I or anybody else have criticised the decision. But from now on we will feel perfectly at liberty to make it known how we felt about those long weeks of hearings.

Senator Long. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest before we finally close these hearings, that this document here by Mr. Harriman, I think, should be made a part of the record.

Chairman Russell. That and a statement by General Chennault and a statement received by Senator Smith have all been adopted for the purpose of being printed in the record.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, what are we voting on now, the Saltonstall substitute?

Senator **Green.** I had an amendment. Perhaps you have not heard it.

Chairman **Russell.** Yes, sir, I heard one, but the amendment was changed. If you will suggest your amendment again now, you want to strike out that "said views be printed in the appendix."

Senator **Green.** That is right.

Chairman **Russell.** Gentlemen, you have heard the amendment of the Senator from Rhode Island. Those who favor the amendment will say "aye."

Senator **Green.** Aye.

Senator **McMahon.** Aye.

Chairman **Russell.** Those opposed will say "No."

(There was a chorus of "noes.")

Chairman **Russell.** The "noes" appear to have it.

The question recurs to the original Saltonstall motion, and the clerk will call the roll.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** Is that according to Senator Byrd's discussion a moment ago?

Chairman **Russell.** I shall read it again.

Senator **Smith.** Just read it again.

Chairman **Russell.** That the committees transmit and report to the Senate for its information the hearings and the records with their appendixes; that the committee file no further report; that no views or conclusions be denominated as the majority or minority views or conclusions, but that members be permitted before September 1 to file their views and conclusions with the chairman, and that said views be printed in the appendix.

The clerk will call the roll.

The **Clerk.** Mr. George?

Chairman **Connally.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. Green.

Senator **Green.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. McMahon?

Senator **McMahon.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. Fulbright?

Chairman **Russell.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. Sparkman?

Chairman **Connally.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. Gillette?

Senator **Gillette.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. Wiley?

Senator **Wiley.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Senator Smith?

Senator **Smith.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper.** Aye.

The **Clerk.** Mr. Lodge?

(No response.)

The **Clerk.** Mr. Tobey?

(No response.)

The **Clerk.** Mr. Brewster?

(No response.)

The **Clerk.** Mr. Chairman Connally?

Chairman **Connally.** Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Kefauver?

Senator JOHNSON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hunt?

Senator HUNT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Long?

Senator LONG. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Morse?

Senator MCMAHON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Knowland?

Senator BRIDGES. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Cain?

Senator CAIN. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Flanders?

Senator FLANDERS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman Russell?

Chairman RUSSELL. Aye.

The CLERK. Senators recorded in the affirmative are Messrs. George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Chairman Connally, Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, Flanders, and Chairman Russell.

Senators recorded in the negative are Messrs. Bridges, Knowland, and Cain.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. May I, sir, offer to you the views on the question before us as they come from the junior Senator from Washington?

Senator GREEN. What is the vote?

Chairman RUSSELL. The vote on this motion was "ayes" 20, and "nays" 3, and the motion, therefore, prevails. The Senator may file his views, to be printed in the appendix.

(NOTE.—This, and other material submitted in response to the committee resolution set forth above, appear in the appendix in the order of submission, beginning on p. 3558.)

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show at this point, show clearly, that my vote of "aye" on this motion is rather a difficult one because I have clearly stated, and I still maintain, that the committee should file a report, so that when I vote "aye" on the question it does not mean that I approve that part of the Saltonstall motion which says they should file no report.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean this is better than nothing at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I voted "aye" on the theory and for the reason that the motion having been defeated, the motion of Senator

Bridges a moment ago, I am supporting the idea of individuals filing their own individual views.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentleman, I wish to say just one word. This is probably the last formal meeting that we will have in a very historic hearing.

I do wish again—and this is not just being repetitious—to express to the members of this committee my appreciation and my admiration for the objective manner in which we have pursued these hearings.

It is nothing short of amazing that when men's emotions have been as deeply stirred as they were by these events, that the hearings should have been so free from bitterness and personalities as these have been.

I hope that the long hours that we have spent here will redound to the benefit of the American people, and in preserving the institutions of government that we all love.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask this joint committee to give favorable consideration to a statement that we all are grateful to the chairman for the able and fair and very splendid, very splendid, manner in which he has conducted these hearings from the very outset, until he made this last general statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate that.

Senator SMITH. I would like to second that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not make my statement to try to invoke any compliments, but I did it because I feel in my heart that every member of these two committees has measured up to the very best traditions of the Senate.

Chairman CONNALLY. I was going to suggest that I put the motion. All in favor say "aye."

(There was a unanimous expression of "ayes.")

Chairman CONNALLY. Opposed, "no."

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. I thank you, gentlemen, and the committee is now adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIX

Referred to on hearing page No.	Letter designation	Title of document	Person requesting or submitting document	Page
110	A	Excerpt from United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records, 294th Plenary Meeting, Saturday, October 7, 1950, at 10:45 a. m. (p. 230 Sir Benegal N. Rau (India) speaking.	Senator Kefauver ✓	3171
275	B	Official release by the U. S. S. R. Information Bulletin with reference to Treaty between Soviet Russia and Red China, February 14, 1950; also the expression of mutual friendship and the agreement with reference to the Chinese Shantung Railway.	Senator Kefauver	3171
447	C	Excerpt from the speech of Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., February 12, 1951, as printed in the Congressional Record Appendix (February 15, 1951).	Senator McMahon	3176
457	D	President Truman's order recalling General MacArthur, and supporting documents.	Senator Smith	3179
458	E	Excerpt from "United States Relations With China" (pp. 605, 606, 607), annexes to chapter V: "The Mission of General George C. Marshall, 1945–47 (61)," President Truman to the Special Representative of the President to China (Marshall).	Senator Smith	3183
655	F	Editorial from the New York Times, Saturday, May 12, 1951, entitled "China and the UN."	Senator Smith	3185
660	G	Extract from the Washington Post, Friday, May 11, 1951, entitled, "MacArthur Views on Message Given."	Senator Sparkman	3186
678	H	Extract from Congressional Record (Senate, May 3, 1951, pp. 5484, 5485), re citations given to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek by the Government of the United States.	Senator Knowland	3187
935	I	Message of General MacArthur to Veterans of Foreign Wars (New York Times, August 29, 1950).	✓ Senator Knowland	3187
1001	J	Address by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, at the China Institute Dinner, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City, at 8 p. m., "Chinese-American Friendship" Friday, May 18, 1951.	Senator Brewster	3190
1086	K	Directives, orders, and memoranda sent to General MacArthur by the Department of Defense containing restrictions imposed on him in the conduct of the campaign.	Senator Russell ✓	3192

Referred to on hearing page No.	Letter designation	Title of document	Person requesting or submitting document	Page
1086	L	Articles from two London newspapers, the Observer, Sunday, April 8, 1951, "Britain asks United States to explain"; and the Sunday Times, March 25, 1951, "UN drafting truce invitation to Chinese forces in Korea."	Senator Knowland	3193
1 6	M	Casualty figures	General Collins	3196
1280 32	N	Communiqué No. 15, United Nations Report No. 12, February 23, 1951.	Senator Knowland	3197
1767	O	"Authority of the President to repel the attack in Korea" (extract from appendixes contained in Union Calendar No. 22) (background information on the use of United States Armed Forces in foreign countries) appearing therein at p. 49, entitled "I. Memorandum of July 3, 1950, prepared by the Department of State on the authority of the President to repel the attack in Korea."	Secretary Acheson	3198
1809	P	Action on the Chinese representation question in United Nations and specialized agency bodies (January 13, 1950, to May 22, 1951).	Senator Sparkman	3204
1816	Q	Speech of Hon. Robert A. Taft (Republican, Ohio) June 28, 1950, entitled "The Korean crisis."	Senator Brewster	3210
1936	-------	Memorandum referred to herein shown as appendix O.		
2045	R	Speech by Senator Brewster on floor of the Senate, June 5, 1951 (Congressional Record, pp. 6297–6302).	Senator Brewster	3217
2071	S	Editorial from Life magazine, September 10, 1945, entitled "Peace in Asia" subtitle "The Moscow treaties give China her first real chance to complete an old revolution."	Senator McMahon	3228
2205	T	Excerpt from Congressional Record, June 11, 1948 (p. 7846) showing vote on Senate Resolution 239.	Senator Sparkman	3230
2221	U	Secretary Acheson's statement to the United Nations on the future of Formosa.	Senator Kefauver Senator Saltonstall	3231
2489	V	Three letters which appeared in the Congressional Record of the Eighty-first Congress, second session, as follows: May 10, 1950, Congressional Record, p. 6851, letter dated March 3, 1950, addressed to Dr. H. H. K'ung by Alfred Kohlberg; May 10, 1950, Congressional Record, p. 6851, letter dated May 8, 1950, addressed to Mr. Kohlberg by T. V. Soong; May 10, 1950, Congressional Record, p. 6851, letter dated March 8, 1950, addressed to Mr. Kohlberg by H. H. K'ung.	Senator Knowland	3232

Referred to on hearing page No.	Letter designation	Title of document	Person requesting or submitting document	Page
2490	W	Resolutions by Senator Cain offered in the Senate on April 17, 1951, and accompanying statements. One resolution provides for declaration of existence of a state of war between the North Korean regime, the Chinese Communist regime, and the Government of the United States, and second resolution provides for the orderly withdrawal of Armed Forces of the United States from Korea.	Senator Cain	3233
2566	X	Summary of remarks made by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer before joint meeting of State Council and all Ministers of the National Government August 22, 1947.	Senator Russell	3238
2601	Y	Statement of Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, April 26, 1950.	Mr. Louis A. Johnson	3242
2602	Z	Statement of Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in connection with the appropriation estimates for the fiscal year 1951.	Mr. Louis A. Johnson	3245
2603	AA	Statement of Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, July 25, 1950.	Mr. Louis A. Johnson	3250
2941	BB	Comments by Gen. Patrick J. Hurley about 1,000 pages of white paper, August 7, 1949.	General Hurley	3255
3016	CC	Letter addressed to Senator Knowland dated June 9, 1951, from Henry A. Wallace.	Senator Knowland	3257
	DD	Letter from Acting Secretary Robert A. Lovett, Department of Defense, dated May 17, 1951, to Chairman Richard B. Russell of the Senate Armed Services Committee, with enclosures, supplementing testimony given by General Marshall on the subject of United States casualties in Korea.		3258
	EE	Letter from Felix E. Larkin, general counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated May 22, to Chairman Russell, enclosing distribution list of copies of Wake Island notes, requested by Senator Knowland.		3297
	FF	Letter from Senator Styles Bridges to Chairman Russell, dated May 2, 1951, enclosing resolution of the Senate of the Illinois General Assembly to be included in the record of the hearings.		3298

Referred to on hearing page No.	Letter designation	Title of document	Person requesting or submitting document	Page
	GG	Letter from Sidney Aberman, secretary of the War Resistors League of New York, dated May 2, 1951, addressed to Chairman Russell.		3298
	HH	Letter from Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger, USN, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, 90 Church St., New York, dated June 27, 1951, to Chairman Russell, supplementing testimony with reference to bombing of bases in Manchuria and the blockade by United Nations rather than the United States Naval Forces.		3299
	II	Japanese Imports and Exports from and to Communist China and Hong Kong, January 1950 to February 1951.	Senator Sparkman	3301
1459	JJ	Aircraft, in Philippines December 7, 1941.	Senator Fulbright	3305
1398	KK	Reply from Department of the Air Force, dated June 13, 1951, to request for information concerning estimates of the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force regarding the minimum number of Air groups necessary to protect this country.	Senator Johnson	3307
	LL	Cumulative list of information requested of the Department of State or Secretary Acheson during the hearings and not previously supplied. (*See also* appendix vv.)		3308
	MM	(*a*) Letter from H. Alexander Smith to the Secretary of State, dated November 4, 1949. (*b*) Letter from H. Alexander Smith to the Secretary of State, dated December 27, 1949. (*c*) Report of visit to the Far East, September and October 1949, by Senator H. Alexander Smith, member, Committee on Foreign Relations. (*d*) Statement by the executive council of the American Federation of Labor, dated May 18, 1951, entitled "For a Bipartisan Policy in the Far East."		3314
	NN	Statement of W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, regarding our wartime relations with the Soviet Union, particularly as they concern the agreements reached at Yalta.		3328
	OO	Letter dated June 20, 1951, and statement from Maj. Gen. Claire Lee Chennault (retired) United States Army, supplementing testimony and giving his on-the-spot views and comments on the proposals which have been put forward for bringing to a conclusion the war in Korea.		3342

Referred to on hearing page No.	Letter designation	Title of document	Person requesting or submitting document	Page
	PP	Compilation of certain published information on the military situation in the Far East.	--------------------	3351
	QQ	Individual views of certain members (Senators Bridges, Hickenlooper, Cain, Knowland, Smith of New Jersey, Wiley, Flanders, and Brewster) of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations relating to hearings held on dismissal of General MacArthur and the military situation in the Far East. Also statements of Senators Lodge and Saltonstall on above report.	--------------------	3558
	RR	Individual views of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.	--------------------	3659
	SS	Individual views of Senator Wayne Morse.	--------------------	3662
	TT	Letter from Secretary of Defense to chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Aug. 17, 1951, re text of all of General MacArthur's statements which are regarded as having significance in connection with his dismissal, and a full explanation as to why it is contended that each of these statements was considered to be in violation of directives or in conflict with known policies of the United States.	--------------------	3665
	UU	Letter from Acting Secretary of Defense to Chairman of Committee on Armed Services, Aug. 16, 1951, re intelligence study concerning the effect of Russian entry into the war against Japan.	--------------------	3667
	VV	Letter from Acting Secretary of Defense to Chairman of Committee on Armed Services, Aug. 31, 1951, re information requested of Secretary of State. (*See also* appendix LL.)	--------------------	3668
	WW	Conversion table showing stenographer's transcript page numbers with printed hearing page numbers.	--------------------	3679

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

(Referred to on p. 110)

EXCERPT FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIFTH SESSION, OFFICIAL RECORDS, 294TH PLENARY MEETING, SATURDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1950, AT 10:45 A. M., PAGE 230, SIR BENEGAL N. RAU (INDIA) SPEAKING:

"49. Whatever may be the strict technical interpretation of this clause, it has been widely regarded as authorizing, if not positively, at least by implication, the United Nations forces to enter North Korea, and to remain there until the unification of Korea has been completed and stability achieved. If such is the intention of the draft resolution—and there is a widespread impression that it is—then the draft resolution authorizes the United Nations forces not only to cross the 38th parallel but to remain in North Korea for a somewhat indefinite period of time, because no one knows how long unification may take.

"50. My government fears that the result may be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of conflict. Our fears may turn out to be wrong, but each government has to judge the situation upon the best information at its disposal and to act accordingly. Thus we view with the gravest misgivings the particular recommendation that I have mentioned."

APPENDIX B

(Referred to on p. 275)

OFFICIAL RELEASE BY THE U. S. S. R. INFORMATION BULLETIN WITH REFERENCE TO TREATY BETWEEN SOVIET RUSSIA AND RED CHINA, FEBRUARY VD, VTEJ; ALSO THE EXPRESSION OF MUTUAL FRIENDSHIP AND THE AGREEMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE CHINESE SHANTUNG RAILWAY

SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY AND AGREEMENTS ARE CONCLUDED IN MOSCOW

(The following Soviet-Chinese communiqué has been issued on the signing of a treaty and agreements between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China:)

Negotiations were recently held in Moscow between J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R., and A. Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., on the one hand, and Mr. Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and Mr. Chou En-lai, Prime-Minister of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the other, during which important political and economic questions on relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were considered.

These negotiations, which proceeded in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendly mutual understanding, confirmed the desire of both parties to strengthen and develop in every way relations of friendship and cooperation between them, as well as their desire to cooperate for the purpose of insuring universal peace and the security of the nations.

The negotiations ended in the signing in the Kremlin on February 14 of:

1. A Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China;
2. An agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalny, in accordance with which, after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, the Chinese Changchun Railway is to be handed over to the complete ownership of the People's Republic of China, and Soviet troops are to be withdrawn from Port Arthur;
3. An agreement on the granting by the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the People's Republic of China of long-term economic credits for paying for deliveries of industrial and railway equipment from the U. S. S. R.

The aforementioned Treaty and agreements were signed in behalf of the U. S. S. R. by A. Y. Vyshinsky, and on behalf of the People's Republic of China by Mr. Chou En-lai.

In connection with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance and the agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dalny, Mr. Chou En-lai and A. Y. Vyshinsky exchanged notes to the effect that the respective Treaty and agreements concluded on August 14, 1945, between China and the Soviet Union have become invalid, and also that both Governments affirm a full guarantee of the independent position of the Mongolian People's Republic as a result of the referendum of 1945 and of the establishment with it of diplomatic relations by the People's Republic of China.

Simultaneously, Mr. Chou En-lai and A. Y. Vyshinsky also exchanged notes on the decision of the Soviet Government to hand over gratis to the Government of the People's Republic of China property acquired by Soviet economic organizations from Japanese owners in Manchuria, and also on the decision of the Soviet Government to hand over gratis to the Government of the People's Republic of China all buildings of the former military cantonment in Peking.

The full texts of the aforementioned Treaty and agreements are as follows:

Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China;

Filled with determination jointly to prevent, by the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression.

Imbued with the desire to consolidate lasting peace and universal security in the Far East and throughout the world in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations organization;

Profoundly convinced that the consolidation of good neighborly relations and friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and China;

Resolved for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and appointed as their plenipotentiary and representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China—Chou En-lai, Prime minister of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China;

Who, after exchange of their credentials, found in due form and good order, agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness in the spirit of sincere cooperation to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world, and will do all in their power to achieve the speediest implementation of these tasks.

ARTICLE II

Both the High Contracting Parties undertake by means of mutual agreement to strive for the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, jointly with the other Powers which were allies during the Second World War.

ARTICLE III

Both High Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude any alliance directed against the other High Contracting Party, and not to take part in any coalition or in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE IV

Both High Contracting Parties will consult each other in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of the Soviet Union and China, being guided by the interests of the consolidation of peace and universal security.

ARTICLE V

Both the High Contracting Parties undertake, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual interests, and also mutual respect for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party—to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to render each other every possible economic assistance, and to carry out the necessary economic cooperation.

ARTICLE VI

The present Treaty comes into force immediately upon its ratification; the exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Peking.

The present Treaty will be valid for 30 years. If neither of the High Contracting Parties gives notice one year before the expiration of this term of its desire to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for another five years and will be extended in compliance with this rule.

Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

Signed:

By Authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
A. Y. Vyshinsky.

By Authorization of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China,
Chou En-lai.

Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dalny

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China state that since 1945 radical changes have occurred in the situation in the Far East, namely, Imperialist Japan suffered defeat, the reactionary Kuomintang Government was overthrown; China has become a People's Democratic Republic, and in China a new, People's Government was formed which has united the whole of China, carried out a policy of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, and proved its ability to defend the state independence and territorial integrity of China, the national honor and dignity of the Chinese people.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China maintain that this new situation permits a new approach to the question of the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalny.

In conformity with these new circumstances, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China have decided to conclude the present agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalny.

ARTICLE I

Both High Contracting Parties have agreed that the Soviet Government transfers gratis to the Government of the People's Republic of China all its rights in the joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway, with all the property belonging to the Railway. The transfer will be effected immediately upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952.

Pending the transfer, the now existing position of the Soviet-Chinese joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway remains unchanged; however, the order of filling posts by representatives of the Soviet and Chinese sides, upon the coming into force of the present Agreement, will be changed, and there will be established an alternating filling of posts for a definite period of time (Director of the Railway, Chairman of the Central Board, and others).

As regards concrete methods of effecting the transfer, they will be agreed upon and determined by the Governments of both High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE II

Both High Contracting Parties have agreed that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from the jointly utilized naval base of Port Arthur and that the installations in this area will be handed over to the Government of the People's Republic of China immediately upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952, with the Government of the People's Republic of China compensating the Soviet Union for expenses incurred in the restoration and construction of installations effected by the Soviet Union since 1945.

For the period pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the transfer of the above installations, the Governments of the Soviet Union and China will appoint an equal number of military representatives for organizing a joint Chinese-Soviet Military Commission which will be alternately presided over by both sides and which will be in charge of military affairs in the area of Port Arthur; concrete measures in this sphere will be determined by the joint Chinese-Soviet Military Commission within three months upon the coming into force of the present Agreement and shall be implemented upon the approval of these measures by the Governments of both countries.

The civil administration in the afore-mentioned area shall be in the direct charge of the Government of the People's Republic of China. Pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the zone of billetting of Soviet troops in the area of Port Arthur will remain unaltered in conformity with the now existing frontiers.

In the event of either of the High Contracting Parties being subjected to aggression on the part of Japan or any state which should unite with Japan and as a result of this being involved in military operations, China and the Soviet Union, may, on the proposal of the Government of the People's Republic of China and with the agreement of the Soviet Government, jointly use the naval base of Port Arthur in the interests of conducting joint military operations against the aggressor.

ARTICLE III

Both High Contracting Parties have agreed that the question of Port Dalny must be further considered upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

As regards the administration in Dalny, it fully belongs to the Government of the People's Republic of China.

All property now existing in Dalny provisionally in charge of or under lease to the Soviet side, is to be taken over by the Government of the People's Republic of China. For carrying out work involved in the receipt of the aforementioned property, the Governments of the Soviet Union and China appoint three representatives from each side for organizing a joint commission which in the course of three months after the coming into force of the present agreement shall determine the concrete methods of transfer of property, and after approval of the proposals of the Joint Commission by the Governments of both countries will complete their implementation in the course of 1950.

ARTICLE IV

The present agreement comes into force on the day of its ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Peking.

Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

Signed:

BY AUTHORIZATION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
A. Y. VYSHINSKY

BY AUTHORIZATION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CHOU EN-LAI

Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on Granting Credits to the People's Republic of China

In connection with the consent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to grant the request of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on giving China credits for paying for equipment and other materials which the Soviet Union has agreed to deliver to China, both Governments have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics grants the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China credits, calculated in dollars, amounting to 300,000,000 American dollars, taking 35 American dollars to one ounce of fine gold.

In view of the extreme devastation of China as a result of prolonged hostilities on its territory, the Soviet Government has agreed to grant credits on favorable terms of one percent annual interest.

ARTICLE II

The credits mentioned in Article I will be granted in the course of five years, as from January 1, 1950, in equal portions of one-fifth of the credits in the course of each year, for payments for deliveries from the U. S. S. R. of equipment and materials, including equipment for electric power stations, metallurgical and engineering plants, equipment for mines for the production of coal and ores, railway and other transport equipment, rails and other material for the restoration and development of the national economy of China.

The assortment, quantities, prices, and dates of deliveries of equipment and materials will be determined under a special agreement of the parties; prices will be determined on the basis of prices obtaining on the world markets.

Any credits which remain unused in the course of one annual period may be used in subsequent annual periods.

ARTICLE III

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China repays the credits mentioned in Article I, as well as interest on them, with deliveries of raw materials, tea, gold, American dollars. Prices for raw materials and tea, quantities and dates of deliveries will be determined on the basis of prices obtaining on the world markets.

Repayment of credits is effected in the course of 10 years in equal annual parts—one-tenth yearly of the sum total of received credits not later than December 31 of every year. The first payment is effected not later than December 31, 1954, and the last on December 31, 1963.

Payment of interest on credits, calculated from the day of drawing the respective fraction of the credits, is effected every six months.

ARTICLE IV

For clearance with regard to the credits envisaged by the present agreement the State Bank of the U. S. S. R. and National Bank of the People's Republic of China shall open special accounts and jointly establish the order of clearance and accounting under the present agreement.

ARTICLE V

The present agreement comes into force on the day of its signing and its subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Peking.

Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts have equal force.

Signed: BY AUTHORIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
A. Y. VYSHINSKY
BY AUTHORIZATION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CHOU EN-LAI

APPENDIX C

(Referred to on p. 447)

EXCERPT FROM THE SPEECH OF HON. JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR., FEBRUARY 12, 1951, AS PRINTED IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—APPENDIX (FEBRUARY 15, 1951)

Now, let us examine what we are doing today from a practical standpoint.

We appear to have solidified our position along the Han River in the vicinity of the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea. That theater occupies approximately 200,000 of our troops, with Japan as a base of operations.

On Formosa to the south, the recognized Government of the Republic of China, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, still holds out, together with its anti-Communist army of 800,000 troops. Despite the fact that the only Government of China that we officially recognize is the generalissimo's government, the administration in Washington refuses to back the generalissimo and his fighting forces. In fact, President Truman in his official announcement on Korea on June 27, 1950, declared that we were sending the Seventh Fleet to Formosa to prevent any more air and sea operations by the generalissimo's forces against the Chinese Reds, thus inactivating the 800,000 troops on the island.

On the Chinese mainland, anti-Communist guerrilla bands continue to make raids on the Chinese Reds. Approximately 1,500,000 anti-Communist Chinese guerrillas are engaged in these sorties.

In French Indochina, a so-called volunteer Communist army, composed substantially of Chinese Reds, engages a French force. The French have approximately 150,000 fighting men operating in that area.

In the balance of Asia, the operations of the Chinese Reds are a constant threat to the security of Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and India.

In Europe the forces of the Soviet Union and its puppet states are comparatively quiescent. However, military men are generally in agreement that the Soviet Union, with its 200 Red army divisions, could roll all the way to the English Channel on the west and to the Pyrenees on the south unless a miraculous rearmament program were undertaken by the free nations of Europe. At the present time, the free nations of the world combined could not muster more than 60 divisions to stop a Soviet advance in continental Europe.

Two nations in Europe are on the outside looking in. Yugoslavia, a former satellite, has broken with the Soviet Union, and Tito casts an occasional friendly glance at the western powers. Spain, the guardian of the Pyrenees and one of the strongest military powers in Europe today, remains isolated from the free nations, anti-Communist though the Franco regime is.

That briefly is the practical situation. Just where do we go from here?

Apparently it is the aim of the administration in Washington, as it has been for the past 5 years, to put our eggs in the European basket. We are told that American troops should be put on the continent of Europe. We are at this moment sending more and more military supplies to the members of the North Atlantic community. We are sending food to Tito. We are in consultation with the governments of Western Europe and their military leaders.

Everyone knows that we must have an effective aid program for Europe. Everyone knows that we must not, if we can possibly prevent it, allow the resources and productive capacity of the free European nations to fall into Communist control. It is essential to have a program that meets this problem.

But I protest with every resource at my command the formulation of any over-all strategy which virtually ignores the focal point of our trouble today—Asia. And I might add that Republicans in countless numbers, myself included, have been protesting such a policy, such a strategy, for years. Our protests date all the way back to 1943 when the first secret decisions were reached by the administration in Washington to give its blessings to the Chinese Communists as a political force in the Orient, as opposed to our great ally, the established government of the Republic of China.

How many Americans recall that on December 15, 1945, President Truman publicly announced to the world that unless the Republic of China admitted Chinese Reds to its government, American aid would be cut off? How many Americans recall that the aid was cut off and that General Marshall was sent to China to make sure that the troops of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stopped their attacks on the Chinese Reds? How many Americans recall the protests against this policy made by such outstanding experts as General Wedemeyer, Patrick J. Hurley, and William C. Bullitt? How many people recall that General MacArthur declared that our failure to help the Republic of China may be "the single greatest blunder in the history of the United States"?

Stop and think.

We abandoned the anti-Communist forces of Asia once, and the Reds took over China. Are twe going to make that same mistake twice?

America has suffered 50,000 casualties in Korea. Mr. Truman says we are going to stay in Korea.

Are we going to leave 200,000 American boys stranded in Korea? Or does some master planner think the pressure can be taken off them by deploying other hundreds of thousands of American boys to the scene in Europe?

If we really want to take the pressure off our forces in Korea, and if we want to diminish the threat of a Soviet sweep across Europe, why, may I ask, do we not employ the 800,000 anti-Communist Chinese troops on Formosa?

There is no question whatsoever about the desire and the eagerness of the Generalissimo and his troops to join in battle against the Chinese Reds. When the Korean conflict broke out, the Generalissimo, within a week, offered to transport immediately 33,000 troops from Formosa to Korea. We turned him down cold.

Why?

Our State Department claimed that we did not want to antagonize the Chinese Reds and bring them into the conflict.

Well, the Generalissimo's troops are still on Formosa, but our boys have been fighting the Chinese Reds since last November.

The State Department's reasoning is no longer valid today, if it was ever valid.

What could be sounder logic, both strategically and militarily, than to allow the anti-Communist forces of the Generalissimo on Formosa to participate in the war against the Chinese Reds? Why not let them open a second front in Asia?

Let us consider the possibilities:

First. There is good reason to believe that the Chinese Reds could not support a two-front war. They have neither the railroads nor the highways nor the transportation to supply a force fighting in Korea and another on the Chinese mainland, where presumably the troops of the Generalissimo would infiltrate if we gave them the necessary material aid.

Second. There is excellent reason to believe that if the Generalissimo's 800,000 fighting men reached the mainland of China tomorrow, they would double the size of their army within six to eight weeks by the addition of anti-Communist guerrilla forces already fighting the Reds in South China.

Third. The opening up of a second front on the Chinese mainland by the forces of the established government of China, operating from Formosa, would not only take the pressure off our forces in Korea, but would reduce the pressure on the French in Indochina and the Communist threat to Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Europe.

Fourth. According to responsible military opinion—yes, right in our own Pentagon—the establishment of a second front on China's mainland by the armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is not only feasible and practical with aid from us, but it would be the cheapest operation that we could promote in the terms of dollars and manpower.

The forces of the Generalissimo are mostly battle tested, and they are as well trained as the Chinese Reds. Their needs to make a second-front operation successful fall mainly in the categories of ammunition, transportation, planes, tanks, and food. The Generalissimo has planes and tanks, but he would need more. The Generalissimo has a navy, but it needs replacement parts and servicing.

Whether the second front would be opened up by an invasion of the mainland or whether it would be built up by a series of commando raids and night landings would depend on the number and strength of the Chinese Red forces in that area. For such purposes the Generalissimo already has assembled miscellaneous craft, but his operations would be much more successful if the United States provided amphibious craft, landing barges, and PT boats.

In addition, it would be desirable to have American experts to help train the Generalissimo's officers and men. Shipments of food—a critical item in Asia—would be a prime necessity.

What kind of logic is it that lets our soldiers die in Korea when, by shipping the proper supplies to the Generalissimo, a second front could be opened in China without a single GI being forced to place a foot on the soil of the Chinese mainland?

Certainly, if the Soviet Union can employ its puppet states to fight its wars even against their will, then the United States can call on its friends who are not only willing but begging for the opportunity.

Certainly we want a united and militarily strong Europe. Certainly we are willing to provide equipment and possibly some of the manpower necessary to achieve that goal.

But let us not place all our eggs in the European basket. Let us remember that we have friends in Asia and that we are fighting a war in Asia at this very moment.

If it is right for American boys to fight Chinese Reds in Korea, what can be wrong with American help to the anti-Communist Chinese fighting the Reds on their own soil?

What are we in Korea for, to win or to lose?

If we are in Korea to win, then we should do everything possible to bring that victory about. If we are not in Korea to win, then this administration should be indicted for the murder of thousands of American boys.

Some persons may ask: If a second front in Asia can be opened at very small cost to ourselves and without employing American troops, why haven't our generals done it?

The answer is that we do have military people who favor the employment of the anti-Communist forces of the Republic of China. There is good reason to believe that General MacArthur favors such an operation. There is good reason to believe that there are people in the Pentagon who favor such an operation.

Why hasn't a second front been opened? The reason is that the State Department is preventing it, the same State Department crowd that cut off aid to the Government of China back in 1946, thus allowing China to fall into Communist hands. Can anyone expect the State Department to admit 5 years too late that it was wrong? Can anyone expect the State Department to accept the blame for the fact that American boys are now being killed by Chinese Reds?

No; the State Department, as now constituted, is never going to permit a single soldier from Formosa to participate. Why? Because it would mean that the State Department would finally have to admit that we should have supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek all along.

If we want to develop a true global strategy that will wipe out the Communist threat of world domination, if we want a strategy that will save Europe and save Asia at the same time, if we want a strategy that will help save American lives not only in Korea, but wherever the next so-called police action may occur, then I say to you that we must clean out the State Department from top to bottom, starting with Dean Acheson.

The master planners in the Kremlin have had their eye on Asia for a quarter of a century. All anyone has to do is to read the writings of Lenin, Stalin, or the Daily Worker. William Z. Foster, the head of the Communist Party in the United States, wrote in the Daily Worker on December 2, 1945, "the war in China is the key to all problems on the international front."

Hitler in Mein Kampf stated emphatically that Asia was the key to the world situation. Tojo knew that Asia was the key to the world situation. Military strategists of many governments have declared the same thing time and time again.

Almost everybody knows it except our State Department.

Time is running out in Asia. How long do you think 1,500,000 anti-Communist guerrillas can hold out against superior forces? How long will it be before the bottoms rust out of Chiang Kai-shek's small navy? How long will it be before his guns, tanks, and planes are completely outmoded? How long will it be before the Chinese Reds have perfected their defenses to such an extent as to make a second front impossible?

No; time is not on our side. If we permit the State Department's bankrupt policies to prevail, time will have run out completely. While more thousands of American boys die on foreign soil.

The people of Greece will never forget that the shipment of 50 of our Navy's Helldiver bombers was their salvation back in 1946. Those 50 planes, together with only 3 American military men to train Greek fliers, and a mere handful of mechanics to teach the Greeks to service the planes, turned the tide against the Communist forces in Greece.

Certainly, if we could afford to gamble in Greece and achieve such wonderful results, we can afford to take a chance on Formosa.

A little can go a long way if it is effectively applied. Successful policies are not measured in billions of dollars, millions of foot soldiers, and thousands of planes. The true measure is how effectively those dollars, those men, and those planes are employed. Nor is the measure of good government its multitude of controls and edicts, or the scarcities and hardships it imposes, or the lavishness of its spending and the harshness of its taxes.

Don't you think it is about time Washington learned that?

Yes, in this crisis, we need leadership and sound policies as we have never needed them before. As Americans, everyone of us must act in the full meaning of good citizenship. We must look to the year of 1952 for deliverance. It is up to every American to help obtain this leadership by promoting widespread discussion of the issues and the most careful selection of political candidates in both parties. Each of us can help; each of us should participate to the utmost.

As we near the end of this day of tribute to Abraham Lincoln, let us borrow from his wisdom, his simple principles, and his frugality. Let us remember that it was the clear, high-principled thinking of Lincoln that saved the Union, and let us realize that without clarity of thought, without actions based on fundamental principles, without the moral values that he embraced, we cannot save the world we live in.

We have more than an opportunity. We have a duty. God grant us the wisdom and the strength to perform it.

APPENDIX D

(Referred to on p. 457)

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ORDER RECALLING GENERAL MACARTHUR AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Message relieving General MacArthur of command, April 10, 1951

I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, United States Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message.

Statement of the President relative to the relief of General MacArthur, April 10, 1951

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur December 6, 1950

[From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan (and other commanders):

"1. The President, as of 5 December, forwarded a memo to all Cabinet members and to the Chairman, N. S. R. B.; Administrator, E. C. A.; Director, C. I. A.; Administrator, E. S. A.; and Director, Selective Service, which reads as follows:

" 'In the light of the present critical international situation, and until further written notice from me, I wish that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. This applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington.

" 'No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

" 'No speech, press release, or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

" 'In addition to the copies submitted to the Departments of State or Defense for clearance, advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be submitted to the White House for information.

" 'The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people, but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government.'

"2. He also forwarded the following to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense:

" 'In addition to the policy expressed in my memorandum of this date to the heads of departments, concerning the clearance of speeches and statements, I wish the following steps to be taken:

" 'Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States.'

"3. The above is transmitted to you for guidance and appropriate action."

Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 20, 1951

[From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

20 March, 1951.

To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan.
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th Parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for U. N. forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.

Statement of General MacArthur, March 24, 1951

[From New York Times, March 24, 1951. *Note*.—As reprinted in New York Times, April 12, 1951, this statement is dated at Tokyo "25 March 1951." See also Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3940]

Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply caused by our 'round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain, and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain, and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery, and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications, and transportation are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists, as in our case, and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.

Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 24, 1951

[From the New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

MARCH 24, 1951.

To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan.
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff, personal for MacArthur.

The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December.

The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions.

Letters exchanged by Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., and General MacArthur, March 1951

(1) Letter from Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., to General MacArthur, March 8, 1951:

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938]

OFFICE OF THE MINORITY LEADER,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., March 8, 1951.

General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command.

MY DEAR GENERAL: In the current discussions of foreign policy and over-all strategy many of us have been distressed that, although the European aspects have been heavily emphasized, we have been without the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command.

I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for the safety of the world that policies of the United States embrace the broadest possible strategy and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not weaken our position in Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N. Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea.

I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on a radio hook-up.

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect you command is enormous. May success be yours in the gigantic undertaking which you direct

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Jr.

(2) Reply thereto by General MacArthur, March 20, 1951:

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938. See also Daily Congressional Record, April 5, 1951, p. 3482]

GENERAL HADQUARTERS,
SUPREME COMMANER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
Tokyo, Japan, March 20, 1951.

Hon. JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Jr.,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MARTIN: I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce, as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomatic there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am

Faithfully yours,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Comment upon relief of General MacArthur by Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, April 12, 1951

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, pp. 3940–3941]

In clarification of news dispatches from the United States making reference to the President's directive of December 6 enjoining against the issuance of public statements on foreign policy without reference to the State Department for clearance, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, of General MacArthur's staff, today pointed out the following:

1. The directive of December 6 was not directed to General MacArthur personally but was directed to all executive agencies of the Government.
2. Immediately after its receipt General MacArthur submitted a proposed communique to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who informed him, among other things, that it was not necessary to submit communiques referencing military operations.
3. The President, in a press conference in January, appeared to this headquarters to specifically define General MacArthur's authority, but denied that there was any curb on his authority "to speak freely on the Korean War."
4. Furthermore, the directive of December 6, by its terms and spirit, was interpreted at this headquarters as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiqués, correspondence, or personal conversations with others.
5. The general feels that he has complied meticulously with all directives he has received, not only recently, but throughout his entire military service.
6. The general has interpreted both his statement of March 24 and his letter to Congressman Joseph Martin, dispatched from here 4 days prior thereto, as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within the area of his uncontested authority to speak. The one bore no slightest relationship to the other.
7. The reference to arms for reserve elements of the Republic of Korea was taken from a top-secret message of early January while the Army's retrograde movement from Seoul was in progress and conditions indicated the possibility of evacuation. Subsequently, when our initiative had been reassumed, General MacArthur, within his capability to arm, authorized a 25-percent increase in each Republic of Korea division, the increase to be in infantry riflemen. It was obviously quite beyond the capability of this theatre to arm and equip 500,000 more Koreans. Their utilization, therefore, became a matter of political policy under the global military-assistance program.

APPENDIX E

(Referred to on p. 458)

[Excerpt from "United States Relations With China" (pp. 605, 606, 607) Annexes to Chapter V: "The Mission of General George C. Marshall, 1945–47 (61)," President Truman to the Special Representative of the President to China (Marshall)]

ANNEXES TO CHAPTER V: THE MISSION OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, 1945–47

President Truman to the Special Representative of the President to China (Marshall)

WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 15, 1945.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On the eve of your departure for China I want to repeat to you my appreciation of your willingness to undertake this difficult mission.

I have the utmost confidence in your ability to handle the task before you but, to guide you insofar as you may find it helpful, I will give you some of the thoughts, ideas, and objectives which Secretary Byrnes and I have in mind with regard to your mission.

I attach several documents which I desire should be considered as part of this letter. One is a statement of United States policy toward China which was, I understand, prepared after consultation with you and with officials of the Department. The second is a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the War Department in regard to China. And the third is a copy of my press release on policy in China. I understand that these documents have been shown to you and received your approval.

The fact that I have asked you to go to China is the clearest evidence of my very real concern with regard to the situation there. Secretary Byrnes and I are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. It is my desire that you, as my Special Representative, bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States to this end.

Specifically, I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

It is my understanding that there is now in session in Chungking a Peoples' Consultative Council made up of representatives of the various political elements, including the Chinese Communists. The meeting of this Council should furnish you with a convenient opportunity for discussions with the various political leaders.

Upon the success of your efforts, as outlined above, will depend largely, of course, the success of our plans for evacuating Japanese troops from China, particularly north China, and for the subsequent withdrawal of our own armed forces from China. I am particularly desirous that both be accomplished as soon as possible.

In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic field, and military assistance (I have in mind the proposed U. S. military advisory group which I have approved in principle), that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.

I am anxious that you keep Secretary Byrnes and me currently informed of the progress of your negotiations and of obstacles you may encounter. You will have our full support and we shall endeavor at all times to be as helpful to you as possible.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN.

(Enclosure.)

Memorandum by Secretary Byrnes.

(WASHINGTON) December 9, 1945.

For the War Department.

The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said:

"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, when as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are now without any voice in the government of China.

This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will not be solved by the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other faction."

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his Special Representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above. Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China.

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:

(1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops;

(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater;

(3) Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance;

(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

Appendix F

(Referred to on p. 655)

[Editorial, the New York Times, Saturday, May 12, 1951]

China and the UN

In his testimony before the Senate committees inquiring into the dismissal of General MacArthur, Secretary Marshall declared that it was his "very decided impression at the present time" that the United States should use its veto power to kill any attempt to admit the Chinese Communist regime into the United Nations. He emphasized again that, while the United States would exclude that issue from any Korean armistice negotiations to bar appeasement or reward for aggression, we could not prevent some other country from raising the question, or avoid discussion of it. He refused to go into the "technical part" of the problem of administration. But he made it plain that in his view "we should never yield" on it.

This raises the question whether the Administration is changing its views on that issue, as it has been changing them on certain others, or whether there is, in fact, some differences, at least in emphasis, between the Pentagon and the State Department. For it has been the State Department view, expressed by Secretary Acheson before Senate and House Members as long ago as March 31, 1950, and maintained over since, that while the United States would oppose the seating of Red China under coercion, we would not veto that action, and that if the majority should vote against us we would accept the judgment of the majority. In taking that stand the State Department held that the right to veto membership in the United Nations applies only to the admission of countries, and that since China is already a member of the United Nations, the issue of which regime should represent it is only a *procedural* question, which is not subject to the veto.

It is worth noting, we believe, that the Charter provides for the admission, not of countries, but of *states*, and that the Chinese *state* which was made an original member of the United Nations was the "Republic of China." That state still exists; its Government resides in Formosa; and we as well as the majority of the United Nations members still recognize it and have rejected all attempts to oust it from any United Nations organ. The British contend that it is "China" which is a United Nations member and that therefore there can be no question of admitting the Peiping regime, which is supposedly in control of most of China. But the Peiping regime represents a new *state*, calling itself the "People's Republic of China." That state is at least as different from the other as were some of Hitler's puppet states from the conquered states which we and the British continued to recognize though their Governments were in exile. And the admission of new states to the United Nations is subject to the veto.

As to whether the new state is actually in control of China is at least a moot question in view of the rising terror in that country and the continued guerrilla warfare, which suggest that the civil war born of Communist aggression is by no means over. Certainly there is no reason for indecent haste to bury the old and hail the new.

But the decisive factor, morally, if not legally, is that the "Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China" has been condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor in Korea, that it is waging actual war against the United Nations, and that the United Nations has undertaken enforcement action against it. The Charter specifically provides that membership in the United Nations is open only to "peace loving" states which accept the obligations of the Charter and are willing and able to carry them out, and that any member against whom enforcement action is under way may be suspended, and even expelled, if it persists in violating the principles of the Charter. To admit the "People's Republic of China" while it is in fact waging war against the United Nations, and until it has given proof of the qualifications demanded by the Charter, would therefore be a stultifying repudiation of fact and logic.

The final answer to this question must still be given by Secretary Acheson. We trust that when he does appear before the Senate committees he will be able to revive his previous stand and subscribe to the views advanced by Mr. Marshall, which are certainly in keeping with those of the overwhelming majority of the American people.

Appendix G

(Referred to on p. 660)

[Extracted from the Washington Post, Friday, May 11, 1951]

MacArthur Views on Message Given

New York, May 10 (UP).—General MacArthur's spokesman said today that until January 13 this year MacArthur believed Washington officials wanted "our forces" evacuated from Korea and made a "scapegoat" for "some political advantage."

Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's aide, said a January 13 message from President Truman was the Government's first clear statement to MacArthur to "hold" in Korea.

Whitney charged that the message, as paraphrased in testimony yesterday by Secretary of Defense Marshall, had been "misunderstood," and made to read as an order limiting MacArthur's freedom to fight the war.

Before receiving the message, said Whitney, MacArthur and his command had been led to believe the Administration wanted to evacuate the Eighth Army from Korea, pretending the enemy forced an evacuation which would be used as an international political weapon.

MacArthur "wasn't going to use the Eighth Army as a scapegoat," Whitney said.

"You must understand that prior to the receipt of this message it appeared to be the prevailing view in Washington that our forces should be evacuated from Korea as soon as diplomatic discussions then under way in the United Nations had been concluded," Whitney said.

"It seemed to be the prevailing view of the authorities in Washington that if the evacuation was conducted as the result of enemy pressure some political advantage would be served."

Just what this political purpose might have been was not indicated, but Whitney made it clear he was talking about a basis for future political moves against the Communist aggressor.

In his testimony yesterday Marshall said the January 13 message "mainly covered foreign policy aspects," and that it cautioned MacArthur to use "great prudence" in fighting the Chinese Communists to avoid spreading the Korean war.

MacArthur believed, Whitney said, that the message differed from previous directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it directed him to "hold" indefinitely in Korea.

He said MacArthur construed it as the President's implication that he "desired our position in Korea be held indefinitely and that this was a reversal of the views he (MacArthur) had previously received from Washington."

Whitney said the purport of the message "seems to have been misunderstood" following Marshall's testimony.

"The press handling of this message suggests its purpose was the imposition of the existing restrictions upon the command's freedom of military action," Whitney declared.

"The purpose of the message was to outline to General MacArthur the benefits which would accrue if a successful resistance in Korea was sustained. The message stated it was not to be taken in any sense as a directive."

Appendix H

(Referred to on p. 678)

[Extracts from Congressional Record, Senate, May 3, 1951, pp. 5484, 5485]

Distinguished Service Medal

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander in Chief of the Military Forces of the Republic of China, performed distinguished services from May 1943 to September 1945 by leading his beleagured nation's fight against the onslaught of the Japanese invader. Beset by seemingly insuperable handicaps imposed by shortages of aircraft, modern weapons, and other vital material, he stood firm, inspiring the Chinese armies to contain and inflict heavy casualties upon more than a million hostile troops in the vast reaches and forbidding terrain of China. His determined attempts to drive the enemy from his native land culminated in a powerful campaign which was forcing the Japanese back when hostilities were terminated by the enemy's surrender. Through his courage, resourcefulness, statesmanship, and unassailable conviction that eventual victory would reward his suffering fellow countrymen, Generalissimo Chiang made a contribution of major proportion to the success of the United Nations.

Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander in Chief of Chinese Military Forces. For extraordinary fidelity and exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services while in a position of the highest responsibility as Generalissimo and Supreme Commander in Chief of the valiant military forces of the Republic of China, while engaged in a great war, as the champion of liberty and freedom against one of the common enemies of the United Nations. His noble and inspiring achievements as the miiltary leader of his country have culminated in the unification of the Chinese people, thereby making possible their successful resistance of the enemy's onslaught and contributing in a high degree to the ultimate freedom of the world from the shackles of Japanese domination and the fear of aggression.

Appendix I

(Referred to on p. 935)

Message of General MacArthur to Veterans of Foreign Wars

[From New York Times, August 29, 1950]

Your inspiring message of the 17th has moved me deeply and I trust that you will convey to all of my comrades-in-arms of the Veterans of Foreign Wars assembled on the occasion of our Fifty-first Annual National Encampment my assurance that their confidence and support will give this command much added strength to meet the tests of battle which lie immediately ahead.

Tell them that I am happy to report that their successors in arms now engaging the enemy along our battle lines in South Korea are exemplifying that same high standard of devotion, fortitude, and valor which characterized their own march to victory when they themselves engaged in combat in the field.

From senior commanders down through all ranks, their tactical skill, their invincible determination, and their fighting qualities against a fanatical foe, well trained, expertly directed, and heavily armed have upheld our country's finest traditions.

Toward victory, however difficult the road, they are giving an account of themselves which should make every American heart beat with pride and infinite satisfaction.

A New Battle Line

In view of misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific, I believe it in the public interest to avail myself of this opportunity to state my views thereon to you, all of whom, having fought overseas, understand broad strategic concepts.

To begin with, any appraisal of that strategic potential requires an appreciation of the changes wrought in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines.

That salient was not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack us. The Pacific was a potential area of advancement for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All of this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it.

Indeed, it acts as a protective shield to all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area we control to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free Allies. From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostock to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful with our control of the sea lanes and the air over these lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modern ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would come to failure.

A Peaceful Lake

Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader—it assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.

It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression. If we hold this line we may have peace—lose it and war is inevitable.

The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of this defensive perimeter, 100 to 150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly segments—Okinawa and the Philippines—than any point in continental Asia.

At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration of the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities.

An enemy force utilizing those installations currently available could increase by 100 percent the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa as compared to operations based on the mainland and at the same time could direct damaging air attacks with fighter-type aircraft against friendly installations in the Philippines, which are currently beyond the range of fighters based on the mainland. Our air supremacy at once would become doubtful.

As a result of its geographic location and base potential, utilization of Formosa by a military power hostile to the United States may either counterbalance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front-line position.

Formosa in the hands of such a hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counteroffensive operations by friendly forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.

This unsinkable carrier-tender has the capacity to operate from ten to twenty air groups of types ranging from jet fighters to B–29-type bombers as well as to provide forward operating facilities for short-range coastal submarines.

In acquiring this forward submarine base, the efficacy of the short-range submarine would be so enormously increased by the additional radius of activity as to threaten completely sea traffic from the south and interdict all set lanes in the Western Pacific. Submarine blockade by the enemy, with all its destructive ramifications, would thereby become a virtual certainty.

Should Formosa fall and bases thereafter come into the hands of a potential enemy of the United States, the latter will have acquired an additional "fleet" which will have been obtained and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost than could its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tenders.

Current estimates of air and submarine resources in the Far East indicate the capability of such a potential enemy to extend his forces southward and still maintain an imposing degree of military strength for employment elsewhere in the Pacific area.

A Historical Function

Historically, Formosa has been used as a springboard for just such military aggression directed against areas to the south. The most notable and recent example was the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 it played an important part as a staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys. The supporting air forces of Japan's Army and Navy were based on fields situated along southern Formosa.

From 1942 through 1944 Formosa was a vital link in the transportation and communication chain which stretched from Japan through Okinawa and the Philippines to Southeast Asia. As the United States carrier forces advanced into the Western Pacific, the bases on Formosa assumed an increasingly greater role in the Japanese defense scheme.

Should Formosa fall into the hands of a hostile power, history would repeat itself. Its military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to breach and neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific basin.

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia.

Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grant that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership—to quickly turn on a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation—and they underestimate the Oriental mentality. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment, for few of its people fail accurately to appraise the safeguard such determination brings to their free institutions.

To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy. It would shift any future battle area 5,000 miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents, our own home coast; it would completely expose our friends in the Philippines, our friends in Australia and New Zealand, our friends in Indonesia, our friends in Japan, and other areas, to the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery against liberty, for atheism as against God.

The decision of President Truman on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all of the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

APPENDIX J

(Referred to on p. 1001)

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, AT THE CHINA INSTITUTE DINNER, WALDORF-ASTORIA HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY, AT 8 P. M., E. D. T., FRIDAY, MAY 18, 1951

CHINESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

For release at 8:00 p. m., E. D. T., Friday, May 18, 1951. Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way

I should like, first of all, to congratulate the China Institute on its quarter century of splendid public service and to compliment you who are responsible for this timely chance to recall the warm friendship which has marked the relations between the Chinese and American people throughout the last two centuries.

Something of what we have in mind this evening is contained in a Concurrent Resolution which passed the Senate on May 4 and which is now before the House of Representatives, which reads in part:

"*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring)*, That the Congress of the United States reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, and declares—

"That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood; and

"That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war."

Despite the artificial barriers which now separate us from most of the peoples of China, we meet to reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for the people of China.

Most of you here this evening are better qualified than I to explore the origins and elements of Chinese-American friendship. Over the centuries this friendship has come to be taken for granted; cordial sentiments between a free China and a free America became strong and durable because they were constantly nourished by common purposes and common practical interests.

We and the Chinese, for example, have had a vital interest in the peace of the Pacific. Each of us wants security on our Pacific flank and wants to be able to look across those vast waters to find strength, independence and good will in its great neighbor on the other side. It was inevitable that the driving force of Japanese militarism would sooner or later bring China and America together to oppose it, just as we had moved forty years earlier to support China's independence and integrity against threats from Europe. The same issues are now posed again—and are made more difficult to deal with because foreign encroachment is now being arranged by Chinese who seem to love China less than they do their foreign masters.

We meet here this evening to reaffirm our friendship with the Chinese people—but not merely as a routine and elegant expression of good will. For the friendship we have taken for granted for so long is now being attacked with every available weapon by those who have come to power on the mainland of China. Their sustained and violent effort to erase all evidence of this friendship bears powerful witness to the validity and strength of the bonds between our two peoples. American influence among the Chinese people is intolerable to those in power in Peiping and Moscow because they know, and quite rightly, that the idea of national and individual freedom which is at the heart of American political thought is the greatest threat to their own evil purposes.

Is the message of this meeting this evening to our friends in China prompted solely by narrowly conceived American interests? That important American interests are involved, there can be no doubt. But our historical relations with China have always reflected a high regard on our part for Chinese interests and it is these we ask our friends in China now to consider.

The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Communist world there is room for only one master—a jealous and implacable master, whose price of friendship is complete submission. How many Chinese, in one community after another, are now being destroyed because they love China more than the Soviet Union? How many Chinese will remember in time the fates of Rajk, Kostov, Petkov, Clementis and all those in other satellites who discovered that being Communist is not enough for the conspirators of the Kremlin?

The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, mass slaughter, banishment as forced labor to Manchuria, Siberia, or Sinkiang, the arbitrary seizure of property, the destruction of loyalties within the family, the suppression of free speech—these are the facts behind the parades and celebrations and the empty promises.

The territorial integrity of China is now an ironic phrase. The movement of Soviet forces into Sinkiang, the realities of "joint exploitation" of that great province by Moscow and Peiping, the separation of Inner Mongolia from the body politic of China, and the continued inroads of Soviet power into Manchuria under the cloak of the Korean aggression mean in fact that China is losing its great northern areas to the European empire which has stretched out its greedy hands for them for at least a century.

Are our Chinese friends reflecting upon the maps of China now being published on the mainland which show Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and areas in the west and southwest as something distinct from China? Are our friends in China impressed by trade-union buttons appearing on the streets of Peiping which no longer show Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia on the map of China? Have the authorities in Peiping themselves fully considered what it means for them to have Soviet troops on Chinese soil, in the light of the experience of the miserable satellites of eastern Europe?

The peace and security of China are being sacrificed to the ambitions of the Communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure of foreign aggression which cuts across the most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people. This action stands condemned by the great world community in which the Chinese people have always aspired to play a worthy role.

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese youth are being sacrifieced in a fiery furnace, pitting their waves of human flesh against the fire power of modern weapons—and without heavy equipment, adequate supply or the most elementary medical attention. Apart from Korea, the Chinese are being pressed to aggressive action in other areas—all calculated to divert the attention and energies of China away from the encroachments of Soviet imperialism upon China itself.

I find it hard to believe that the Chinese people will acquiesce in the kind of future which their masters are now preparing for them. I find it impossible to believe that our friends in China have given up their desire to live at peace with their neighbors, to play a major role as a peaceful member of the international community of nations, to trade freely with all the world, to improve their own conditions in accordance with their own needs, aspirations and traditions, to maintain their independence as a nation, to preserve their territorial integrity and to live out their lives in dignity and with respect of their fellow men.

Events in China must surely challenge the concern of Chinese everywhere—in Formosa, on the mainland and in overseas communities. There is a job to be done for China which only the Chinese can do—a job which will require sustained energy, continued sacrifice and an abundance of the high courage with which so many Chinese have fought for so long during the struggles of the past decades. The rest of us cannot tell them exactly what is to be done or how. We cannot provide a formula to engage the unity of effort among all Chinese who love their country. But one thing we can say—as the Chinese people move to assert their freedom and to work out their destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes, they can count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts of the world.

It is not my purpose, in these few moments this evening, to go into specific elements of our own national policy in the present situation. But we can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities in Pieping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. It is entitled only to the fruits of its own conduct—the fruits of aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselessly embarked.

We recognize the National Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. Under the circumstances, however, such aid in itself cannot be decisive to the future of China. The decision and the effort are for the Chinese people, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of China.

If the Chinese people decide for freedom, they shall find friends among all the peoples of the earth who have known and love freedom. They shall find added strength from those who refuse to believe that China is fated to become a land of tyranny and aggression and who expect China to fulfill the promise of its great past.

APPENDIX K

(Referred to on p. 1086)

DIRECTIVES, ORDERS, AND MEMORANDA SENT TO GENERAL MACARTHUR BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTAINING RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON HIM IN THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, May 23, 1951.

HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On Tuesday, May 8, 1951, you asked me the following question:

"General, can you supply for the record the directives and orders and memoranda sent to General MacArthur by the Department of Defense containing these restrictions or any restrictions that were imposed on him in the conduct of the campaign?" (p. 911 of the testimony).

I have had the Joint Chiefs of Staff examine their records and I have been supplied with the following paraphrased excerpts of all military directives and orders sent to General MacArthur containing restrictions, either direct or indirect, on the conduct of the campaign in Korea. These excerpts are arranged in chronological order and have been paraphrased in such a way that they may be printed in the record of the hearings.

As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a large number of messages to General MacArthur on a wide variety of problems incident to the campaign in Korea. In response to your question, however, the following excerpts relate only to directives and orders containing restrictions:

"(*a*) On 25 June 1950 General MacArthur was informed that, to assist in evacuating United States dependents and noncombatants (names to be furnished by the United States Ambassador in Korea), he could take action by Air and Navy to prevent the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area from falling into unfriendly hands.

"(*b*) On 26 June 1950, at the direction of the President, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) was authorized to utilize Navy and Air Force elements of the Far East Command to attack all North Korean military targets (troop columns, guns, tanks) south of the 38th parallel in order to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. In the same dispatch he was authorized to use naval forces of the Far East Command in the coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea without restriction.

"(*c*) On 29 June 1950 CINCFE was authorized to extend his operations into North Korea against air bases, depots, tank formations, troop columns, and other purely military targets. He was cautioned that special care would be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the Manchurian and Soviet borders. Utilization of Army forces was limited to communications and other essential service units, except that the employment of Army combat and service forces, as might be required to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan, was authorized.

"(*d*) On 30 June 1950 the limitation on the employment of Army forces imposed on 29 June 1950 was rescinded.

"(*e*) On 1 July 1950 instructions were issued to CINCFE stating that he should be careful that in establishing a naval blockade of Korea his forces stay well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and the U. S. S. R.

"(*f*) On 28 August 1950 instructions were issued to CINCFE that particular care should be taken that United States aircraft not violate Soviet or Chinese territory or territorial waters.

"(*g*) On 8 September 1950 a message was dispatched to CINCFE stating that, for the present, no further attacks should be made against Rashin.

"(*h*) On 26 September 1950 CINCFE was directed that his Air Force units would be employed only against objectives which had bearing on the tactical situation.

"(*i*) On 27 September 1950 a directive was sent to CINCFE which stated that his forces would not cross the Soviet or Manchurian borders under any circumstances, that only Korean ground force units would be used in the northeast province bordering the Soviet Union and the area along the Manchurian border, and that support of U. N. operations north or south of the 38th parallel would not include air or naval action against Manchurian or Soviet territory.

"(*j*) On 6 November 1950 CINCFE was directed to postpone until further orders bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. Later the same day he was authorized to go ahead with planned bombing near the frontier but was cautioned that his forces must be extremely careful to avoid violating Manchurian territory and air space.

"(*k*) On 29 December 1950 CINCFE was directed to conduct a ground defense from successive positions generally as outlined in a message from CINCFE to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was told that, subject to the primary consideration of safety to the forces under his command, he would inflict on the enemy such damage as was possible.

"(*l*) On 9 January 1951 his instructions of 29 December 1950 were confirmed with an additional reference to his basic mission of protecting Japan. He was told further that favorable action would not be taken at that time on certain of his proposals as follows:

"(1) Strengthening of our effort in Korea.
"(2) Blockade of China coast.
"(3) Naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China.
"(4) Obtaining Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison in Formosa.

"(*m*) On 21 February 1951 CINCFE was told that the restriction regarding Rashin, which had been imposed on 8 September 1950, must remain in effect for the present.

"(*n*) On 1 March 1951 the request of the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, transmitted by CINCFE, to destroy the North Korean electrical power complex, including plants on the Yalu River, was disapproved."

Faithfully yours,

(S) G. C. MARSHALL.

APPENDIX L

(Referred to on p. 1086)

[The Observer, 22, Tudor Street, London, E. C. 4, Sunday, April 8, 1951]

BRITAIN ASKS UNITED STATES TO EXPLAIN

STRONG EXCEPTION TO MAC ARTHUR LETTER—FEAR OF CHANGES IN POLICY

(By Our Diplomatic Correspondent)

The British Government has taken the strongest possible exception to General MacArthur's letter to Mr. Joseph Martin, the Republican Party leader, favouring the use of Nationalist Chinese troops from Formosa and interpreted as foreshadowing an extension of the war to the mainland of Asia.

Our Embassy in Washington has been asked to get a full explanation of how it is possible for such a statement, in complete variance with agreed policy, to be made by a serving officer.

The British had understood that the American Administration fully agreed with the policy of not extending the war far beyond the 38th Parallel unless military conditions made it essential. Now there is some doubt in Whitehall whether, in spite of the White House statement that there is no change in policy towards Formosa and the use of Nationalist troops, Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson will be able to resist pressure for changes in policy from General MacArthur and his Republican Party adherents.

The reference by the Minister of State, Mr. Kenneth Younger, in a speech yesterday, to "such irresponsible statements as seem to come out at frequent intervals from highly placed quarters, without the authority of the United Nations, or indeed of any member Government," is regarded as a mild version of what the Cabinet really thinks about General MacArthur's statements.

It is also expected that Mr. Morrison will take the opportunity provided by numerous Parliamentary questions this week to make it clear how strongly the Government deprecates the intrusion of General MacArthur into politics.

AVOIDING CHECK TO OPERATIONS

The General's action is all the more galling because agreement between the British and American Governments over the question of crossing the 38th Parallel and over the importance of limiting the war in Korea had been virtually reached before General MacArthur sent his letter.

The consultations now going on in Washington on a declaration of United Nations aims in Korea have revealed differences between Britain and America, but only on questions of form and timing, not on any point of substance in future policy.

The main disagreement has been over the timing of any announcement. The British view is that a moderate statement now, during the lull, would seize the "psychological moment" of which the Foreign Secretary has spoken. The American view appears to be that it might hamper military operations to issue any statement at this moment when there are indications of a strong Chinese offensive. It is known that General MacArthur, who gave a warning of this offensive recently, strongly opposes issuing any such joint statement.

"IRRESPONSIBLE STATEMENTS" ON KOREA

Mr. Kenneth Younger, Minister of State, referred at a Labour conference in Cardiff yesterday to "natural differences of policy" between Britain and the United States.

He added: "Our biggest difference with the Americans is, of course, in our attitude towards China, and here I am bound to say that the Peking government have not done much to help us convince our American friends that we are right and they are wrong.

"We shall, however, persist in our efforts to give Communist China every chance to take her place in the world and in the United Nations.

"NOTHING HARMFUL

"People say that the door has been closed by our condemnation of the Chinese as aggressors. I doubt it. Their attitude depends much more on the military situation, otherwise why did they refuse the Indian cease-fire proposals before Christmas when no one had called them aggressors?

"United Nations aims in Korea have been made clear and there is nothing in them which the Chinese can regard as harmful to themselves.

"Neither we nor they should, therefore, be misled by such irresponsible statements as seem to come out at frequent intervals from highly placed quarters, without the authority of the United Nations, or indeed of any member Government."

On our "extremely bad" relations with Russia, Mr. Younger said: "I doubt whether the Soviet Government wants war, and I am certain the Soviet people do not. Many of the factors which drove previous dictators to war are lacking. Nor shall we exaggerate the strength of the Soviet bloc."

[The Sunday Times, an independent journal, Kemsley House, London, W. C. 1, Sunday, March 25, 1951]

UN Drafting Truce Invitation to Chinese Forces in Korea

ACCEPTANCE WOULD OPEN WAY TO FAR EASTERN SETTLEMENT

(From O. H. Brandon, representative of the Sunday Times)

WASHINGTON, *Saturday.*

An implied invitation to Communist China to seek a negotiated settlement of the Korean conflict will be issued here within the next few days. It will be in the form of a public statement on United Nations intentions.

> Although this policy statement, now being drafted, will, in effect, be a reiteration of the aims already enunciated by the United Nations, it will be designed also to reassure Peking that, while unification of Korea remains a basic political objective, it is not the object of the present military campaign.

The declaration will also remind Peking that agreement for a cease-fire based on stabilization of the present front lines could not only lead to a settlement of the Korean conflict, but would open the door to negotiations for a general settlement of Far Eastern problems.

Officials here hope that the difference between the present military situation and that existing when the Good Offices Committee of the General Assembly made its first offer may help to modify the Chinese attitude.

HALT NEAR PARALLEL

There can be little doubt that the United Nations ground forces will seek to disengage themselves from the enemy as soon as they have attained defensible positions on or about the 38th Parallel. Should the Chinese then refrain from further aggressive action, ground fighting would cease and a *de facto* cease-fire on the ground would operate.

The nations concerned are fully agreed, however, that in the absence of a cease-fire agreement the United Nations air forces would continue to pound and harass the enemy in North Korea.

There is much evidence that the American public is now taking a more balanced view than it did a few weeks ago, and that, if a cease-fire could be agreed, there would be little objection to the United States entering into negotiations with the Chinese Communists.

MacArthur Order on Crossing Parallel

(From Richard Hughes, Representative of the Sunday Times)

TOKYO, *Saturday.*

On his return from a flying visit to Korea today General MacArthur said that he had directed the American Eighth Army to cross the 38th Parallel again "if and when its security makes it tactically advisable."

"The Parallel has never had any military significance," he added. "Our naval and air forces cross it at will, and ground forces have done so in the past.

"Our troops maintain the initiative and the enemy continues to withdraw. Enemy supply lines are taking terrible punishment from naval and air bombardment. There is no heavy fighting, and the United Nations army is in fine spirit and fettle."

With South Korea almost all back in United Nations hands, he concluded, signs of reconstruction were quickening and Seoul, the Southern Capital, was "beginning to resume some evidence of life."

Asked whether there had been any developments after his earlier statement, in which he expressed readiness to meet the Chinese Commander in Chief to try to arrange a truce, he replied: "There was no contact."

Latest reports from Korea show that, in the centre of the front, United Nations armoured forces are within two miles of the 38th Parallel, and that the link-up between ground forces and the American paratroops dropped at Munsan, 20 miles northwest of Seoul, had virtually broken organized Communist resistance.

CRITICAL ATTITUDE OF U. N. DELEGATIONS

(From Rodney Campbell, Representative of the Sunday Times)

NEW YORK, *Saturday.*

Western delegations to the United Nations, particularly that of the United States, expressed considerable resentment here today that General MacArthur should express himself so freely on matters that both the United States administration and the United Nations feel lie outside his jurisdiction as Allied Commander.

General MacArthur's statements that the United Nations' action against the Chinese mainland would bring about the collapse of Communist China caused most of the criticism heard here today. Most diplomats approached praised his attempt to make contact with the Communist field commander in Korea. This reflects the view of most key members of the world organisation that a cease-fire and peaceful settlement are more advisable and more feasible objectives in the present phase of the campaign than the merest suggestion of a major war against the Chinese.

The United States delegation handles the MacArthur statement with kid gloves, declining direct comment on it, but assuring other delegations that Washington had no intention of asking the United Nations to authorize expansion of the war to China.

APPENDIX M

(Referred to on p. 1286)

CASUALTY FIGURES

Battle casualties are defined as all casualties directly due to combat or which are sustained as a result of going to or returning from a combat mission.

They are grouped into 14 categories.

The World War I and II casualty figures are battle casualties only. They were for the Army and Air Corps.

	Deaths	Wounded	Prisoners	Missing	Totals
World War I	50, 475	193, 611	4, 423		248, 509
World War II	237, 049	571, 822	114, 558	25, 145	948, 574
Total	287, 524	765, 433	118, 981	25, 145	1, 197, 083

World I and II figures on what we have called nonbattle casualties were:

	World wide	
	Total admissions (disease and injury)	Total deaths
World War I	3, 814, 533	63, 710
World War II	17, 320, 812	74, 640
Total	21, 135, 345	148, 350

APPENDIX N

(Referred to on p. 1320)

TWELFTH REPORT, FEBRUARY 23, 1951

I herewith submit Report No. 12 of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for period 16 through 31 December, inclusive. Korean releases Nos. 732 through 775 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Combined operations: Apart from the continuation of our Naval blockade and unremitting air interdiction of enemy troops and supply concentrations in North Korea, the period from 16 to 31 December was consumed by the United Nations Command with the readjustment of our ground positions along the Kaesong-Yongyong-Hwachon-puypyongni defense line made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war and by the enemy in build-up operations preparatory to offensive action aimed at the conquest of all of Korea. These tactical readjustments have been conducted with great skill by local commanders and unparalleled coordination among the several areas. My communiqué No. 15 of 26 December publicly reporting on these operations is repeated here for the record of the United Nations Command:

"This amphibious movement of the 10 Corps from the Hungnam sector to a juncture with the 8th Army has been successfully completed with but light casualties and no matériel loss. This operation has been conducted with great skill and coordination by Army, Navy, and Air Commanders concerned and exemplary courage and marked efficiency have characterized the conduct of all personnel. It has completed the readjustment of our positions made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war. The real text [test] of the United Nations Command was when it was suddenly and without the customary notice of belligerency confronted by this new power in overwhelming force and yet survived without marked diminution of its strength and resources or loss of its fluidity of movement and maneuver. This it has done and has come through well.

"With the successful close of this phase of our operations, I believe it pertinent to review briefly the military events of the recent past. In the latter days of October our forces were advancing from the south and northeast in columns of pursuit to destroy the North Korea remnants and complete the prescribed mission of restoring order and unification to all of Korea. The end of the campaign was clearly in sight, when some of our units met with surprise assault by Chinese Communist elements of unknown organization and strength. In the face of this new force the Eighth Army was withdrawn to a closely integrated front, to there await the logistical build-up which would permit resumption of our advance in attack formation. Meanwhile, every effort was made to assess enemy strength and intentions in light of this new reinforcement repeatedly and publicly declared by Chinese Communist authorities to be only on an individual volunteer basis. Political intelligence failed to penetrate the iron curtain and provide no substantial information of intent. Field intelligence was handicapped by the severest limitations. Aerial reconnaissance beyond the border, which was the normal source of field intelligence, was forbidden. Avenues of advance from border sanctuary to battle area, only a night's march, provided maximum natural concealment. No intelligence service in the world could have surmounted such handicaps to determine to any substantial degree enemy strength, movements, and intentions. This left ground reconnaissance in force as the proper, indeed the sole, expedient. Not until 24 November did our logistical position permit resumption of forward operations. We hoped that the Army would be opposed by no more than token Chinese force to support previous commitments but short of a full Chinese commitment to major operations.

"Political reassurances that the United Nations Command would not violate the international border were universally believed to have failed to convince the Chinese authorities. The free world wanted the integrity of our purpose fully understood and accordingly renewed assurances were publicly given by me as military commander upon the resumption of our advance that the Eighth Army would be returned to its home station in Japan just as soon as the Korean border area had been cleared of hostile elements. This but expressed our hopes—indeed the hopes of all men of good will—through reemphasis of our military objectives. Unfortunately in some quarters it has been otherwise interpreted and my intent misrepresented. Our advance was the final test of Chinese intentions. Events subsequently have disclosed that neither political nor military reassurances could have had the slightest influence upon the momentous decision underlying Red China's commitment of her forces to war.

"The Eighth Army and affiliated United Nations units met powerful enemy resistance along the entire line—resistance which unmasked the fiction of 'volunteer' participation and disclosed the massive deployment of the Fourth Chinese Field Army, an important segment of the entire Chinese Communist military strength, in a formation of 9 corps abreast in columns of divisions to an aggregate of 27 divisions, with elements of the Third Field Army discovered in initial deployment immediately to the rear. Despite their initial valiant resistance, some of the ROK (Republic of Korea) forces were overwhelmed by this massive array. This exposed the Eighth Army's right flank and required its withdrawal. These withdrawal operations, made in accordance with plans previously prepared against any such eventuality, were skillfully conducted without loss of cohesion and with all units remaining intact. The gallant Second Infantry Division and the equally gallant Turkish brigade being directly exposed by the gap torn through ROK forces took the heaviest attendant pressure, but the enemy, caught off balance in the midst of build-up operations, had not yet developed the strength to enable exploitation of the break-through which would have imperiled the Eighth Army. Fortunate presence of the 10 Corps on the enemy's flank forced him to divide his forces and thus further weaken his offensive capabilities achieved at that time of his build-up operations against the Eighth Army.

"In its broad implications I consider that these operations, initiated on 24 November and carried through to this redeployment, have served a very significant purpose—possibly in general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted during the course of the Korean campaign. The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command but without attaining a decision. Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or even to detect we did not achieve the United Nations objective. But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed before too late secret political and military decisions of enormous scope and threw off balance enemy military preparations aimed at surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces with one mighty extended blow.

"No command ever fought more gallantly or efficiently under unparalleled conditions of restraint and handicap, and no command could have acquitted itself to better advantage under prescribed missions and delimitations involving unprecedented risk and jeopardy."

Possibly of greatest political significance throughout these tactical displacement operations has been the avidity with which North Korean citizens have sought sanctuary behind the United Nations lines. There is little doubt but that given the opportunity practically the entire North Korean population would have migrated south in search of such sanctuary. Without the slightest hesitancy they have made clear their complete aversion to Communist rule and their fervent desire at whatever hazard for refuge within the protection of the United Nations. They welcomed our forces as liberators when we went in and sought to withdraw with us when we withdrew. Historically, this exemplifies the popular dread of Communist tyranny—the reason such rule may only survive in a totalitarian police state.

APPENDIX O

(Referred to on pp. 1767, 1936)

[Extract from Appendixes contained in Union Calendar No. 22 (Background Information on the use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries), appearing therein at page 49, entitled "I. Memorandum of July 3, 1950, prepared by the Department of State on the authority of the President to repel the attack in Korea"]

AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO REPEL THE ATTACK IN KOREA

This memorandum is directed to the authority of the President to order the armed forces of the United States to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea.

As explained by Secretary Acheson to the press on June 28, as soon as word of the attack on Korea was received in Washington, it was the view of the President and of all of his advisers, that the first responsibility of the Government of the United States was to report the attack to the United Nations.

Accordingly, in the middle of the night of Saturday, June 24, 1950, Ambassador Gross, the United Nations Deputy Representative at the Security Council of the United Nations, notified Mr. Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations, that armed forces from North Korea had commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea.

A meeting of the Security Council was immediately called on Sunday, June 25, at the request of the United States. The Council at that meeting adopted a resolution, presented by the United States, calling on the North Korean authorities to cease hostilities and to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel (which separates North Korea and the Republic of Korea). The resolution also requested the United Nations Commission on Korea to observe such withdrawal and to keep the Security Council informed on the execution of the resolution. Finally it called on all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of the resolution and to refrain from assisting the North Korean authorities.

A report from the United Nations Commission for Korea received on June 26 indicated that the Security Council resolution had been completely disregarded by North Korea and that the armed invasion of the Republic of Korea was continuing.

The President accordingly on June 27, 1950, made an announcement pointing out that Communism had defied the orders of the Security Council issued to preserve international peace and security and stating that he had therefore ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. Since the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would directly threaten the security of the Pacific area and United States forces there, he also ordered the Seventh fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. Further, he directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened, that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated as well as military assistance to the French forces and those of the Associated States in Indo-China, and that a military mission be despatched to provide close working relations with the forces in Indo-China. The President stated that he knew that all members of the United Nations would consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the United Nations Charter and he instructed Ambassador Austin, the United States Representative to the Security Council, to report the steps he had taken to the Council.

This Ambassador Austin did on the afternoon of June 27, saying that he was happy and proud to report that the United States was prepared as a loyal member of the United Nations to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea. He presented to the Council a draft resolution which *inter alia* noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security and recommended that United Nations members furnish such assistance to the Republic as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security. The resolution was forthwith adopted by the Security Council at the same meeting on June 27.

Secretary Acheson at his news conference on June 28 emphasized that the actions of the United States had been taken in support of the United Nations. After June 25, he said, "All action in Korea has been under the aegis of the United Nations."

The President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States has full control over the use thereof. He also has authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. Since the beginning of United States history he has upon numerous occasions utilized these powers in sending armed forces abroad. The preservation of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace is a cardinal interest of the United States. Both traditional international law and Article 39 of the United Nations Charter and the resolution pursuant thereto authorize the United States to repel the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.

The President's control over the armed forces of the United States is based on Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides that he "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."

In *United States* v. *Sweeny* the Supreme Court said that the object of this provision was "evidently to vest in the President the supreme command over all the military forces, such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war" (157 U. S. (1895) 281, 284).

That the President's power to send the armed forces outside the country is not dependent on Congressional authority has been repeatedly emphasized by numerous writers.

For example, Ex-President William Howard Taft wrote:

"The President is made Commander in Chief of the army and navy by the Constitution evidently for the purpose of enabling him to defend the country against invasion, to suppress insurrection and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use of the army for any of these purposes, the action would be void. * * * Again, in the carrying on of war as Commander in Chief, it is he who is to determine the movements of the army and of the navy. Congress could not take away from him that discretion and place it beyond his control in any of his subordinates, nor could they themselves, as the people of Athens attempted to, carry on campaigns by votes in the market-place" (Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 1916, pp. 128–129).

Professor Willoughby writes:

"As to his constitutional power to send United States forces outside the country in time of peace when this is deemed by him necessary or expedient as a means of preserving or advancing the foreign interests or relations of the United States, there would seem to be equally little doubt, although it has been contended by some that the exercise of this discretion can be limited by congressional statute. That Congress has this right to limit or to forbid the sending of United States forces outside of the country in time of peace has been asserted by so eminent an authority as Ex-Secretary Root. It would seem to the author, however, that the President, under his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and his general control of the foreign relations of the United States, has this discretionary right constitutionally vested in him, and, therefore, not subject to congressional control. Especially, since the argument of the court in *Myers* v. *United States* with reference to the general character of the executive power vested in the President, and, apparently, the authority impliedly vested in him by reason of his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it is reasonable to predict that, should the question be presented to it, the Supreme Court will so hold. Of course, if this sending is in pursuance of express provisions of a treaty, or for the execution of treaty provisions, the sending could not reasonably be subject to constitutional objection" (the Constitutional Law of the United States, 1929, Vol. III, p. 1567).

In an address delivered before the American Bar Association in 1917 on the "War Powers Under the Constitution," Mr. Hughes stated that, "There is no limitation upon the authority of Congress to create an army and it is for the President as Commander in Chief to direct the campaign of that Army wherever he may think they should be carried on." He referred to a statement by Chief Justice Taney in *Fleming* v. *Page* (9 How. 615), in which the Chief Justice said that as Commander in Chief the President "is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command" (S. Doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7).

At the time the approval of the Treaty of Versailles was under consideration in the Senate, there was under discussion a reservation to article 10, presented by Senator Lodge, to the effect that "Congress * * * under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States." Senator Walsh of Montana stated in debate on November 10, 1919, that the statement was a recital of "What is asserted to be a principle of constitutional law." He said that if—

"* * * any declaration of that character should ever be made by the Senate of the United States, it would be singularly unfortunate. It is not true. It is not sound. It is fraught with the most momentous consequences, and may involve disasters the extent of which it is hardly possible to conceive.

"The whole course of our history has been a refutation of such a declaration, namely, that the President of the United States, the Chief Executive of the United States, the Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States, has no power to employ the land or naval forces without any express authorization upon the part of Congress. Since the beginning of our government, our Navy has been sent over the seven seas and to every port in the world. Was there ever any congressional act authorizing the President to do anything of that kind?"

He stated that our Navy travels the sea "in order to safeguard and protect the rights of American citizens in foreign lands. Who can doubt that the President has no authority thus to utilize the naval and land forces of the United States?"

Mr. Borah stated:

"I agree fully with the legal or constitutional proposition which the Senator states, and I hope this [reservation] will be stricken out. It is an act of supererogation to put it in. It does not amount to anything. It is a recital which is not true. It can not change the Constitution, and it ought not to be there. * * * It would simply be vain and futile and, if I may say so, with due respect to those who drew it, the doing of an inconsequential thing." (58 Cong. Rec., pt. 8, p. 8195, Nov. 10, 1919, 66th Cong., 1st sess.).

Not only is the President Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, but he is also charged with the duty of conducting the foreign relations of the United States and in this field he "alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." (*United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al.*, 299 U. S. (1936) 304, 319.)

Obviously there are situations in which the powers of the President as Commander in Chief and his power to conduct the foreign relations of this country complement each other.

The basic interest of the United States is international peace and security. The United States has throughout its history, upon orders of the Commander in Chief to the armed forces, and without Congressional authorization, acted to prevent violent and unlawful acts in other states from depriving the United States and its nationals of the benefits of such peace and security. It has taken such action both unilaterally and in concert with others. A tabulation of 85 instances of the use of American armed forces without a declaration of war was incorporated in the Congressional Record for July 10, 1941 (App. A). See also the Appendix to the pamphlet by James Grafton Rogers entitled "World Policing and the Constitution" published in 1945 by the World Peace Foundation.

It is important to analyze the purposes for which the President as Commander in Chief has authorized the despatch of American troops abroad. In many instances, of course, the armed forces have been used to protect specific American lives and property. In other cases, however, United States forces have been used in the broad interests of American foreign policy, and their use could be characterized as participation in international police action.

The traditional power of the President to use the armed forces of the United States without consulting the Congress was referred to in debates in the Senate in 1945. Senator Connally remarked:

"The historical instances in which the President has directed armed forces to go to other countries have not been confined to domestic or internal instances at all." Senator Millikin pointed out that "in many cases the President has sent troops into a foreign country to protect our foreign policy * * * notably in Central and South America." "That was done," he continued, "in order to keep foreign countries out of there—was not aimed at protecting any particular American citizen. It was aimed at protecting our foreign policy." To his remark that he presumed that by the Charter of the United Nations we had laid down a foreign policy which we could protect, Senator Connally replied that that was "absolutely correct." He added:

"I was trying to indicate that fact by reading the list of instances of intervention on our part in order to keep another government out of territory in this hemisphere. That was a question of carrying out our international policy, and not a question involving the protection of some American citizen or American property at the moment" (Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. 91, part 8, November 26, 1945, p. 10967).

During the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900–1901 the President sent about 5,000 troops to join with British, Russian, German, French, and Japanese troops to relieve the siege of the foreign quarters in Peking and reestablish the treaty status. This was done without express Congressional authority. In defining United States policy at the time Secretary of State Hay said:

"* * * The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and, fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (V, Moore's Digest of International Law, p. 482. See also Taft, op. cit., pp. 114–115; Rogers, op. cit., pp. 58–62.)

After the opening up of Japan to foreigners in the 1850's through the conclusion of commercial treaties between Japan and certain Western Powers, antiforeign disturbances occurred. In 1863 the American Legation was burned following previous attacks on the British Legation. The Commander of the U. S. S. *Wyoming* was instructed to use all necessary force for the safety of the legation or of Americans residing in Japan. Secretary of State Seward said that the prime objects of the United States were: "First, to deserve and win the confidence of the Japanese government and people, if possible, with a view to the common interest of all the treaty powers; secondly, to sustain and cooperate with the legations of these powers, in good faith, so as to render their efforts to the same end effective" (V, Moore's Digest of International Law, pp. 747–748).

In 1864 the Mikado, not recognizing the treaties with the Western powers, closed the Straits of Shimonoseki. At the request of the Tycoon's Government (opposed to the Mikado) American, British, French, and Netherlands forces in a joint operation opened the straits by force. The object of the Western powers was the enforcement of treaty rights, with the approval of the government that granted them (V, Moore's Digest, p. 750; S. Ex. Doc. 58, 41 Cong. 2 Sess.).

Again in 1868 a detachment of Japanese troops assaulted foreign residents in the streets of Hiogo. One of the crew of the *Oneida* was seriously wounded. The safety of the foreign population being threatened, naval forces of the treaty powers made a joint landing and adopted measures to protect the foreign settlement (Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1868, p. XI).

Former Assistant Secretary of State James Grafton Rogers has characterized these uses of force as "international police action," saying: "They amounted to executive use of the armed forces to establish our own and the world's scheme of international order. Two American Presidents used men, ships, and guns on a large and expensive scale" (World Policing and the Constitution, published by the World Peace Foundation, 1945, pp. 66, 67).

In 1888 and 1889 civil war took place in Samoa, where the United States, Great Britain, and Germany had certain respective treaty rights for the maintenance of naval depots. German forces were landed, and the German Government invited the United States to join in an effort to restore calm and quiet in the islands in the interest of all the treaty powers. The commander of the United States naval forces in the Pacific was instructed by the Secretary of the Navy that the United States was willing to cooperate in restoring order "on the basis of the full preservation of American treaty rights and Samoan authority, as recognized and agreed to by Germany, Great Britain, and the United States." He was to extend full protection and defense to American citizens and property, to protest the displacement of the native government by Germany as violating the positive agreement and understanding between the treaty powers, but to inform the British and German Governments of his readiness to cooperate in causing all treaty rights to be respected and in restoring peace and order on the basis of the recognition of the Samoan right to independence (I, Moore's Digest of International Law, pp. 545–546).

On July 7, 1941, the President sent to the Congress a message announcing that as Commander in Chief he had ordered the Navy to take all necessary steps to insure the safety of communications between Iceland and the United States as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts and that American troops had been sent to Iceland in defense of that country. The United States, he said, could not permit "the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere." For the same reason, he said, substantial forces of the United States had been sent to the bases acquired from Great Britain in Trinidad and British Guiana in the South to forestall any pincers movement undertaken by Germany against the Western Hemisphere (Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. 87, part 6, July 7, 1941, p. 5868).

Thus, even before the ratification of the United Nations Charter, the President had used the armed forces of the United States without consulting the Congress for the purpose of protecting the foreign policy of the United States. The ratification of the United Nations Charter was, of course, a landmark in the development of American foreign policy. As noted above, Senator Connally and Senator Millikin agreed that the President was entitled to use armed forces in protection of the foreign policy represented by the Charter. This view was also expressed in the Senate debates in connection with the ratification of the Charter. For example, Senator Wiley, made the following pertinent statement:

"It is my understanding, according to the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, that the terms 'agreement or agreements,' as used in article 43, are synonymous with the word 'treaty.' On the other hand, I recognize that Congress might well interpret them as agreements brought about by the action of the Executive and ratified by a joint resolution of both Houses. These agreements would provide for a police force and the specific responsibility of each nation. But outside of these agreements, there is the power in our Executive to preserve the peace, to see that the 'supreme laws' are faithfully executed. When we become a party to this charter, and define our responsibilities by the agreement or agreements, there can be no question of the power of the Executive to carry out our commitments in relation to international policing. His constitutional power, however, is in no manner impaired" (Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. 91, July 27, 1945, p. 8127–8128).

An even fuller exposition of the point was made by Senator Austin, who stated:

"Mr. President, I am one of those lawyers in the United States who believe that the general powers of the President—not merely the war powers of the President but the general authority of the President— are commensurate with the obligation which is imposed upon him as President, that he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That means that he shall take all the care that is required to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

"Of course, there are other specific references in the Constitution which show that he has authority to employ armed forces when necessary to carry out specific things named in the Constitution, but the great over-all and general authority arises from his obligation that he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That has been true throughout our history, and the Chief Executive has taken care, and has sent the Armed Forces of the United States, without any act of Congress preceding their sending, on a great many occasions. I have three different compilations of those occasions. One of them runs as high as 150 times; another of them 72 times; and so forth. It makes a difference whether we consider the maneuvers which were merely shows of force as combined in the exercise of this authority—as I do—or whether we limit the count to those cases in which the Armed Forces have actually entered upon the territory of a peaceful neighbor. But there is no doubt in my mind of his obligation and authority to employ all the force that is necessary to enforce the laws.

"It may be asked, How does a threat to international security and peace violate the laws of the United States? Perhaps, Mr. President, it would not have violated the laws of the United States previous to the obligations set forth in this treaty. Perhaps we have never before recognized as being true the fundamental doctrine with which I opened my remarks. But we are doing so now. We recognize that a breach of the peace anywhere on earth which threatens the security and peace of the world is an attack upon us; and after this treaty is accepted by 29 nations, that will be the express law of the world. It will be the law of nations, because according to its express terms it will bind those who are nonmembers, as well as members, and it will be the law of the United States, because we shall have adopted it in a treaty. Indeed, it will be above the ordinary statutes of the United States, because it will be on a par with the constitution, which provides that treaties made pursuant thereto shall be the supreme law of the land.

"So I have no doubt of the authority of the President in the past, and his authority in the future, to enforce peace. I am bound to say that I feel that the President is the officer under our Constitution in whom there is exclusively vested the responsibility for maintenance of peace" (Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. 91, July 26, 1945, pp. 8064–8065).

Action contrary to the Charter of the United Nations is action against the interests of the United States. Preservation of peace under the Charter is a cornerstone of American foreign policy. President Truman said in his inaugural address in 1949:

"In the coming years our program for peace and freedom will emphasize four major courses of action.

"First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness."

In the Korean situation the resolution of the Security Council of June 25 determined, under Article 39 of the Charter, that the action of the North Koreans constituted a breach of the peace and called upon "the authorities in North Korea (a) to cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) to withdraw their armed forces to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel." It also called upon "all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." This is an application of the principles set forth in Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter, which states: "All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action which it takes in accordance with the present Charter. * * *" The Security Council resolution of June 27, passed after the North Korean authorities had disregarded the June 25 resolution, recommended "that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." This recommendation was also made under the authority of Article 39 of the Charter.

The President's action seeks to accomplish the objectives of both resolutions.

The continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities would have meant that the United Nations would have ceased to exist as a serious instrumentality for maintenance of international peace. The continued existence of the United Nations as an effective international organization is a paramount United States interest. The defiance of the United Nations is in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations to bring about a settlement of the problem. It is a threat to international peace and security, a threat to the peace and security of the United States and to the security of United States forces in the Pacific.

These interests of the United States are interests which the President as Commander in Chief can protect by the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States without a declaration of war. It was they which the President's Order of June 27 did protect. This order was within his authority as Commander in Chief.

JULY 3, 1950.

APPENDIX P

(Referred to on p. 1809)

ACTION ON THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION QUESTION IN UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCY BODIES, JANUARY 13, 1950, TO MAY 22, 1951—ADDENDUM, MAY 22, 1951, TO JUNE 12, 1951

Action on the Chinese Representation Question in United Nations and Specialized Agency Bodies (January 13, 1950, to May 22, 1951)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

September 19, 1950:

(a) Indian resolution to seat Chinese Communists rejected, 16 states voting in favor, 33 against (US), 10 abstentions.

(b) Soviet resolution to exclude Chinese National Representatives rejected, 10 states voting in favor, 30 against (US), 8 abstentions.

(c) Soviet resolution to invite Chinese Communists to take part in the work of the General Assembly rejected, 11 states voting in favor, 37 against (US), 8 abstentions.

(d) Canadian resolution adopted, first paragraph by 38 votes (US) to 6, with 11 abstentions, second paragraph by 42 votes (US) to 8, with 6 abstentions. This resolution (1) established a Special Committee to consider the Chinese representation question and report with recommendations to the General Assembly after the Assembly had considered an agenda item on the general problem of recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member state; and (2) provided that, pending a decision by the Assembly on the report of the Special Committee, the Chinese National representatives should be seated with the same rights as other representatives.

September 23, 1950: Soviet proposal that the credentials of the Chinese National representatives not be recognized as valid rejected, 7 states voting in favor, 40 against (US), 3 abstentions.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBSIDIARY BODIES

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

April 11, 1950: Chairman's ruling that Soviet proposal to unseat Chinese National Member was out of order sustained, US voting to sustain the ruling.

Committee of Twelve (Committee to study ways and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments might be co-ordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission.)

February 14, 1951: U. S. proposal to postpone discussion of a Soviet proposal to unseat the Chinese National Representative and seat a Chinese Communist until the General Assembly had taken action on the Chinese representation issue adopted, 9 states voting in favor (U. S.), 1 against, 2 abstentions.

Credentials Committee

September 21, 1950: Soviet proposal that the credentials of the Chinese National Delegation should not be recognized as valid rejected, 6 states voting against (U. S.), 2 in favor, 1 abstention.

Headquarters Advisory Committee

April 5, 1951: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese Communist to participate as the representative of China out of order; ruling sustained, 10 states voting in favor (U. S.), 4 against.

International Law Commission

June 5, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to unseat Dr. Shushi Hsu (Chinese Nationalist) out of order on the ground that the Commission was composed of individuals elected by the General Assembly to serve in a personal capacity and not as government representatives; ruling sustained, 10 Members voting in favor (U. S.), 1 against.

Peace Observation Commission

March 16, 1951: U. S. proposed that the Commission adjourn debate on Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese Communist to participate until the Chinese representation matter had been settled by the General Assembly and on the understanding that a Chinese Nationalist would continue to sit on the Commission; proposal adopted, 9 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against, 3 abstentions.

SECURITY COUNCIL

January 13, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative rejected, 3 states voting in favor, 6 against (U. S.), 2 abstentions.

August 1, 1950: President (Soviet representative) ruled that the Chinese National Representative did not represent China and could not, therefore, take part in the Council meetings; ruling rejected, 3 states voting in favor, 8 against (U. S.).

August 3, 1950: President (Soviet representative) proposed inclusion in the Council's agenda of an item entitled "Recognition of the Representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China;" proposal rejected, 5 states voting for inclusion, 5 against (U. S.), 1 abstention.

SECURITY COUNCIL SUBSIDIARY BODIES

Commission for Conventional Armaments

April 27, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative rejected, 3 states voting in favor, 4 against (U. S.), 4 abstentions.

Military Staff Committee

January 19, 1950: Decided not to consider a Soviet resolution to exclude the Chinese National Representative on the ground that the Security Council alone was competent to decide the membership of the Committee; 4 states, including the U. S., supported this decision.

Six-Power Consultations on Atomic Energy

January 19, 1950: Canadian motion that Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative be considered out of order adopted, 5 states voting in favor (U. S.), 1 against.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

February 7, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative rejected, 3 States voting in favor, 10 against (U. S.), 5 abstentions.

October 12, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative and invite a Chinese Communist rejected in a divided vote; the first paragraph by 7 votes in favor, 11 against (U. S.); the second paragraph by 6 votes in favor, 11 against (U. S.), 1 abstention.

February 20, 1951: Philippine Representative moved adjournment of debate on the Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative and seat a Chinese Communist until the General Assembly had taken action on the Chinese representation issue; Philippine motion adopted, 12 states voting in favor (U. S.), 6 against.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEES AND SPECIAL BODIES

Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations

January 23, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative rejected, 1 state voting in favor, 3 against (U. S.), 1 abstention.

Ad Hoc Committee on Organization and Operation of the Economic and Social Council and its Commissions

December 18, 1950: Chairman ruled a Soviet motion to exclude the Chinese National Representative and invite a Chinese Communist to participate out of order; ruling sustained, 6 states voting in favor (U. S.), 1 abstention.

Committee on Procedure

January 16, 1950: Chairman ruled a Soviet resolution to exclude the Chinese National Representative out of order; ruling sustained, 6 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against, 1 abstention.

Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems

January 16, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative rejected, 2 states voting in favor, 6 against (U. S.), 3 abstentions.

Interim Commiteee on Program of Meetings

March 10, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude Chinese National Representative rejected, 1 state voting in favor, 2 against (U. S.), 2 abstentions.

Technical Assistance Committee

February 5, 1951: Chairman ruled that the Committee was not competent to decide upon the Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative and invite a Chinese Communist to participate; ruling sustained, 11 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against.

United Nations Technical Assistance Conference

June 12, 1950: Yugoslav resolution to invite Chinese Communist to attend the Conference rejected, 8 states voting in favor, 26 against (U. S.), 13 abstentions.

International Children's Emergency Fund Executive Board

March 3, 1950: Chairman ruled a Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative in order; ruling rejected, 6 states voting to sustain (U. S.), 10 against, 5 abstentions.[1]

June 19, 1950: Chairman ruled that the Board was not competent to consider a Yugoslav resolution to invite a Chinese Communist; ruling sustained, 9 states in favor, 3 against (U. S.), 6 abstentions.[1]

November 27, 1950: Chairman (Poland) recommended that the Board seat a Chinese Communist as the representative of China; recommendations rejected after two tie votes, 12 states in favor, 12 against (U. S.), 1 abstention. Soviet motion to discount the vote of the Chinese National Representative and declare the Chairman's recommendation adopted rejected, 5 states voting in favor, 19 against (U. S.), 0 abstentions.

February 9, 1951: U. S. proposed adjournment of debate on Soviet proposal to invite Chinese Communist to participate; U. S. motion adopted, 18 states voting in favor (U. S.), 5 against, 2 abstentions.

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[1] U. S. voted that the Board was competent to consider this proposal on procedural grounds; the United States Representative was instructed to vote against the substance of the proposal and would have done so if it had been put to the vote.

February 13, 1951: Chairman ruled that debate on the Soviet proposal would not be resumed unless a decision to that effect was taken by the Board; ruling sustained; 15 states voting in favor (U. S.), 5 against, 3 abstentions.

May 22, 1951: U. S. proposal to adjourn debate on the Chinese representation issue for the present session of the Board adopted, 16 states voting in favor (U. S.), 5 against. 4 abstentions.

International Children's Emergency Fund Executive Board, Program Committee

February 7, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude Chinese National Representative out of order; ruling sustained, 5 in favor (U. S.), 2 against. 1 abstention.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL COMMISSIONS AND SUBCOMMISSIONS

Commission on Human Rights

March 27, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order; ruling sustained, 13 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against, 0 abstentions.

April 16, 1951: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude Chinese National Member and invite a Chinese Communist out of order; ruling sustained, 8 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 3 abstentions.

Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press

May 15, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order; ruling sustained, 8 states voting in favor (U. S.), 1 against.

Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities

January 16, 1950: French motion that a Soviet proposal to expel the Chinese National Member was out of order adopted, 9 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

December 1, 1950: Soviet Proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative and invite a Chinese Communist rejected, 5 states voting in favor, 9 against (U. S.), 1 abstention.

April 10, 1951: U. S. proposal to adjourn the debate on the Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese Communist to participate adopted, 10 states voting in favor (U. S.), 4 against.

Commission on the Status of Women

April 30, 1951: Commission decided not to discuss a Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member and seat a Chinese Communist, 8 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 1 abstention.

Economic, Employment and Development Commission

January 18, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order; ruling sustained, 9 states voting in favor (U. S.), 4 against, 2 abstentions.

May 14, 1951: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member and seat a Chinese Communist out of order; ruling sustained, 12 states voting in favor (U. S.), 5 abstentions.

Economic, Employment and Development Commission, Subcommission on Economic Development

April 17, 1950: U. S. motion that the Commission regard the Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order adopted, 3 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against, 2 abstentions.

Fiscal Commission

May 7, 1951: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member and invite a Chinese Communist to participate out of order; ruling sustained, 11 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 1 abstention.

Population Commission

May 22, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order; ruling sustained, 7 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against, 0 abstentions.

April 23, 1951: Motion declaring the Soviet resolution to exclude the Chinese National Member and seat a Chinese Communist inadmissible adopted, 7 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 1 abstention.

Social Commission

April 3, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Members out of order; ruling sustained, 12 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 0 abstentions.

March 19, 1951: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member and seat a Chinese Communist out of order; ruling sustained, 11 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 1 abstention.

Statistical Commission

May 8, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order; ruling sustained, 6 states voting in favor (U. S.), 2 against, 2 abstentions.

May 7, 1951: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member and invite a Chinese Communist out of order; ruling sustained, 10 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 1 abstention.

Statistical Commission, Committee on Statistical Classification

May 2, 1950: Chairman rules Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order; ruling sustained, 3 states voting in favor (U. S.), 1 against, 1 abstention.

Transport and Communications Commission

March 27, 1950: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Member out of order; ruling sustained, 11 states voting in favor (U. S.), 4 against.

March 19, 1951: Chairman ruled Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese Communist to participate in Commission's meeting out of order; ruling sustained, 9 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 1 abstention.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

May 16, 1950: Chairman submitted resolution recommending that it was the wish and desire of the Commission that the matters set forth in the Soviet proposal (to exclude the Chinese National Representative and seat a Chinese Communist) be decided by a higher body; resolution adopted, 8 in favor (U. S.), 1 against, 4 abstentions.

February 28, 1951: Chairman (Burma) ruled a Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative and seat a Chinese Communist in order; ruling rejected, 5 states voting to sustain, 8 against (U. S.), 1 abstention.

Committee on Industry and Trade

May 9, 1950: Chairman ruled a Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative and seat a Chinese Communist in order; ruling rejected, 2 states voting to sustain, 13 against (U. S.).

February 15, 1951: Chairman ruled a Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative and seat a Chinese Communist out of order; ruling sustained, 13 states voting in favor (U. S.). 4 against, 0 abstentions.

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

June 1, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representative rejected, 1 state voting in favor, 9 against (U. S.), 2 abstentions.

November 22, 1950: Soviet proposal to exclude Chinese National Representative and invite a Chinese Communist rejected, 2 states voting in favor, 9 against (U. S.), 1 abstention.

January 30, 1951: U. S. proposal to postpone consideration of Soviet proposal to exclude Chinese National Representative and invite a Chinese Communist until the General Assembly has acted on the Chinese representation issue adopted, 10 states voting in favor (U .S.), 2 against, 0 abstentions.

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

International Labor Organization, 33rd Annual Conference

June 7, 1950: Chairman ruled that a Polish proposal to unseat the Chinese National Representative must be referred to the Credentials Committee, Credentials Committee reported favorably on Chinese National credentials.

International Telecommunications Union—International High Frequency Broadcasting Conference

April 4, 1950: Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese Communist to participate as the sole representative of China rejected, 14 states voting in favor, 24 against (U. S.), 12 abstentions.

Administrative Council

September 4, 1950: Yugoslav proposal to seat a Chinese Communist rejected, 2 states voting in favor, 9 against (US), 2 abstentions.

April 16, 1951: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representatives and seat a Chinese Communist rejected, 5 states voting in favor, 9 against (US), 3 abstentions.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. General Conference

May 30, 1950:

(a) Report of the Credentials Committee recommending provisional seating of Chinese National Representative pending final decision by the Conference adopted, 32 states voting in favor (US), 1 against, 1 abstention.

(b) Czech proposal recommending exclusion of Chinese National Representatives rejected, 4 states voting in favor, 30 against (US), 14 abstentions.

(c) Yugoslav proposal recommending exclusion of Chinese National Representatives rejected, 4 states voting in favor, 29 against (US), 13 abstentions.

Universal Postal Union—Executive and Liaison Committee

May 15, 1950: Swiss resolution to admit a Chinese Communist *for that session* adopted, 6 states voting in favor, 5 against (US), 4 abstentions. Committee also decided that prior to its next session (May 1951) it would consult all UPU Member States on the Chinese representation issue via a referendum.

April 30, 1951: Result referendum announced as follows: 33 states voted for the seating of representatives of the Chinese National Government; 23 states voted for the seating of the representatives of the Chinese Communist regime; 13 states abstained; 17 states failed to vote.

May 21, 1951: US proposal to seat Chinese National representatives adopted. 10 states voting in favor (US), 6 against, 3 abstentions.

Joint Meeting of Universal Postal Union and International Air Transport Association[2]

January 25, 1951:

(a) US resolution to postpone consideration of the Chinese representation question until the General Assembly had taken action and to seat a Chinese Nationalist, pending such consideration, rejected, 3 states voting in favor (US), 5 against, 3 abstentions, 1 unmarked ballot.

(b) Soviet proposal to seat a Chinese Communist adopted, 5 states voting in favor, 3 against (US), 3 abstentions, 1 unmarked ballot.

February 5, 1951: Czech resolution opposing US proposal to reopen discussion of the Chinese representation issue adopted, 6 states voting in favor, 3 against (US), 3 abstentions.

World Meteorological Organization—1st Congress

March 19, 1951: Accepted credentials of Chinese National Representatives, 23 states voting in favor (US), 9 against, 2 abstentions.

Annual Joint Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

September 7, 1950: Czech resolution to exclude the Chinese National and seat a Chinese Communist rejected, US voting against.

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[2] Special *ad hoc* conference and not a permanent body of the UPU.

Action on the Chinese Representation Question in United Nations and Specialized Agency Bodies, (Addendum, May 22—June 12, 1951)

Trusteeship Council

June 5, 1951: U. S. motion to postpone indefinitely dicussion of Soviet proposal to seat a Chinese Communist adopted, 11 states voting in favor (U. S.), 1 against, no abstentions.

Universal Postal Union—Technical Transit Committee

June 6, 1951: U. S. proposal to seat a Chinese Nationalist adopted, 8 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 5 abstentions.

International Telecommunications Union—Consultative Committee for International Radio

June 6, 1951: Decided not to include in agenda Soviet proposal to exclude Chinese Nationalist and seat Chinese Communist; 24 states voting in favor (U. S.), 5 against, 1 abstention.

Appendix Q

(Referred to on p. 1816)

THE KOREAN CRISIS CAUSED BY WAVERING FOREIGN POLICIES OF ADMINISTRATION

Speech of Hon. Robert A. Taft, of Ohio, in the Senate of the United States, June 28, 1950

AN OUTRAGEOUS ACT OF AGGRESSION

Early on Sunday morning, June 25, the Communist-dominated Republic of North Korea launched an unprovoked aggressive military attack on the Republic of Korea, recognized as an independent nation by the United Nations. On the same day the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea from forces from North Korea, and determining that this action constituted a breach of the peace. The resolution called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, for the withdrawal of the armed forces of North Korea to the thirty-eighth parallel, and for the United Nations Commission on Korea to make informational reports; and called "upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." This resolution was adopted by a vote of nine members, Russia being absent, and Yugoslavia abstaining.

The attack did not cease, and on Tuesday, June 27, the President issued a statement announcing that he had "ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support." He also announced that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and that he had directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened, and that military assistance to the Philippine Government and the forces of France and the associated states in Indochina be accelerated.

On the same day, last night, the United Nations adopted another resolution definitely recommending "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area." This vote was adopted by seven members of the Security Council; Yugoslavia voting "no," and India and Egypt refraining from voting, Russia still being absent. American air and sea forces have moved into Korea and are partaking in the war against the northern Korea Communists.

No one can deny that a serious crisis exists. The attack was as much a surprise to the public as the attack at Pearl Harbor, although, apparently, the possibility was foreseen by all our intelligence forces, and should have been foreseen by the administration. We are now actually engaged in a de facto war with the northern Korean Communists. That in itself is serious, but nothing compared to the possibility that it might lead to war with Soviet Russia. It is entirely possible that Soviet Russia might move in to help the North Koreans and that the present limited field of conflict might cover the entire civilized world. Without question, the attack of the North Koreans is an outrageous act of aggression against a friendly independent nation, recognized by the United Nations, and which we were instrumental in setting up. The attack in all probability was instigated by Soviet Russia. We can only hope that the leaders of that country have sufficient judgment to know that a world war will result in their own destruction, and will therefore refrain from such acts as might bring about such a tragic conflict.

A FORTUNATE CHANGE OF POLICY

Mr. President, Korea itself is not vitally important to the United States. It is hard to defend. We have another instance of communism picking out a soft spot where the Communists feel that they can make a substantial advance and can obtain a moral victory without risking war. From the past philosophy and declarations of our leaders, it was not unreasonable for the North Koreans to suppose that they could get away with it and that we would do nothing about it.

The President's statement of policy represents a complete change in the programs and policies heretofore proclaimed by the administration. I have heretofore urged a much more determined attitude against communism in the Far East, and the President's new policy moves in that direction. It seems to me that the time had to come, sooner or later, when we would give definite notice to the Communists that a move beyond a declared line would result in war. That has been the policy which we have adopted in Europe. Whether the President has chosen the right time or the right place to declare this policy may be open to question. He has information which I do not have.

It ssems to me that the new policy is adopted at an unfortunate time, and involves a very difficult military operation indeed—the defense of Korea. I sincerely hope that our Armed Forces may be successful in Korea. I sincerely hope that the policy thus adopted will not lead to war with Russia. In any event, I believe the general principle of the policy is right, and I see no choice except to back up wholeheartedly and with every available resource the men in our Armed Forces who have been moved into Korea.

If we are going to defend Korea, it seems to me that we should have retained our Armed Forces there and should have given, a year ago, the notice which the President has given today. With such a policy, there never would have been such an attack by the North Koreans. In short, this entirely unfortunate crisis has been produced first, by the outrageous, aggressive attitude of Soviet Russia, and second, by the bungling and inconsistent foreign policy of the administration.

NOT A BIPARTISAN POLICY

I think it is important to point out, Mr. President, that there has been no pretense of any bipartisan foreign policy about this action. The leaders of the Republican Party in Congress have never been consulted on the Chinese policy or Formosa or Korea or Indochina. Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee and of the Armed Forces Committee were called to the White House at 10:30 a. m. on June 27, and were informed with regard to the President's statement, but, of course, they had no opportunity to change it or to consult Republican policy committees in either the House of Representatives or the Senate.

I hope at a later time to put into the RECORD a historical statement of the position of various Republican leaders on the general question of China policy, showing that it is very different indeed, from what the President has heretofore advocated, and that, in general, it is more in accord with what he is now proposing.

CONGRESS NOT CONSULTED

Furthermore, it should be noted that there has been no pretense of consulting the Congress. No resolution has ever been introduced asking for the approval of Congress for the use of American forces in Korea. I shall discuss later the question of whether the President is usurping his powers as Commander in Chief. My own opinion is that he is doing so; that there is no legal authority for what he has done. But I may say that if a joint resolution were introduced asking for approval of the use of our Armed Forces already sent to Korea and full support of them in their present venture, I would vote in favor of it.

THE ATTACK INVITED BY PAST ADMINISTRATION POLICY

I have said that the present crisis is produced by the bungling and inconsistent policies of the administration.

First, we agreed to the division of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel giving the Russians the northern half of the country, with most of the power and a good deal of the industry, and leaving a southern half which could not support itself, except on an agricultural basis. This was in line with a very foolish policy which paid for Russian assistance against Japan, which we did not need, by presenting Russia with the Kurile Islands, half of Sakhalin Island, and the control of Manchuria. The agreement was a part of the sympathetic acceptance of communism as a peace-loving philosophy, which has made Russia a threat to the very existence of the world.

Second, the Chinese policy of the administration gave basic encouragement to the North Korean aggression. If the United States was not prepared to use its troops and give military assistance to Nationalist China against Chinese Communists, why should it use its troops to defend Nationalist Korea against Korean Communists? That certainly must have seemed a fairly logical conclusion to those who have inaugurated this aggression. The Communists undoubtedly considered that Korea was very much less important than China to the United States, and that they could get away with their grab of Korea, as the Chinese Communists got away with theirs in China. The general policy of doing nothing in China was reaffirmed by Secretary Acheson in a speech before the National Press Club as recently as January 12 of this year.

I read from the New York Herald Tribune's account of that speech:

"Secretary of State Dean Acheson accused the Soviet Union today of planning dismemberment of China. He said the United States could exploit the eventual resentment of Asian peoples over this aggression only by avoiding foolish adventures such as intervention on Formosa."

I might suggest that intervention in Korea from a military standpoint is a good deal more foolish an adventure than intervention on Formosa.

According to the New York Herald Tribune:

"Soviet Russia, using new methods, new skills, and new concepts to cloak imperialist aggression, already had swallowed Outer Mongolia and has nearly completed the absorption of Manchuria, Secretary Acheson said. He charged Moscow with similar designs on the areas of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang.

"In a major policy speech before the National Press Club, Secretary Acheson said the United States was helpless to prevent this dismemberment. He made it clear that the State Department's future plans for checking the spread of Soviet influence through Asia would depend mainly on the righteous wrath and anger of Chinese and other Asiatics over Russian encroachments."

No doubt the North Korean Communists were quite prepared to take a chance on that "righteous wrath and anger" of the Chinese and perhaps of other Koreans, which might perhaps develop some 10 years from today.

According to the account in the New York Herald Tribune, Secretary Acheson also said:

"For its own security the United States must and shall maintain armed forces in Japan, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) and the Philippines. But no such line of containment could be drawn in southern and southeast Asia, where the United States had no direct responsibilities and only limited opportunities for action.

"He said we would fight if Japan, Okinawa, or the Philippines were attacked.

"But we could give no such guaranty to southern and southeast Asia."

In other places he made it equally clear that neither Formosa nor Korea was included behind the line upon which the United States would stand.

Just for my own satisfaction, I read:

"He jabbed sarcastically at Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican, of Ohio, who charged in the Senate yesterday that President Truman and Secretary Acheson had forsaken the policy of containing communism by their refusal to save Formosa."

This is quoting Secretary Acheson.

"To say that the main motive of American foreign policy was to halt the spread of communism was putting the cart before the horse. The United States was interested in stopping communism chiefly because it had become a subtle instrument of Soviet imperialism."

There is nothing, apparently, against communism.

"American intervention on Formosa would obscure the issue * * *. At his White House press conference, President Truman also took a slap at Senator Taft. Observing that Senator Taft was entitled to his opinion, President Truman added: 'I didn't know he was a military expert, though'."

Secretary Acheson made a statement to the Foreign Relations Committee at about the same time. To the Foreign Relations Committee he said the United States would have an impregnable defense line in the Far East, without Formosa.

"Secretary Acheson was quoted as making the suggestion to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations yesterday. According to the Senator from Texas [Mr. Connally], the Secretary said Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines were the American line of security in the western Pacific, and that with bases on this line the position would be impregnable. He said he would not speak for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he gave the impression that he knew something of their views. He strongly reaffirmed President Truman's stand against sending military forces or military advice to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa, and he said that he alone was responsible for the State Department's confidential guidance message of December 23, telling its officials abroad to prepare for the loss of Formosa to the Communists.

"Acheson said that several important problems had come to a head since Congress adjourned 3 months ago. One of them was possible American recognition of Communist China. On this point he reminded Senators that the Communists now control all of China except a few isolated areas, which the Administration saw no need for haste in recognizing. He said American recognition would depend on future events, including assurances that Chinese Communists would protect the safety of American citizens and obey international law. He distinctly stated that beyond the line laid down the United States could not assure the rest of the Far East against attack."

With such a reaffirmation of our Far Eastern policy, is it any wonder that the Korean Communists took us at the word given by the Secretary of State? If we were contemplating the recognition of Communist China, as the Secretary clearly indicated, then ccertainly they could well think that if they could once occupy Korea, they could look forward to recognition by the United States of a Communist Korea.

Third, Mr. President, our action in Korea itself invited attack. We withdrew our troops from Korea, because it was said that it was impossible to defend Korea on a military basis. We did, however, declare that we would give armed assistance to Korea. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 authorized the President "to furnish military assistance to the Republic of Korea," and, in the second supplemental appropriation act passed October 28, 1949, $10,500,000 was set aside to carry out the provisions of the authorization.

Assistant Secretary Webb testified specifically, both before the House and Senate, that the appropriation was sought for the purpose of helping Koreans to deter external aggression.

As a matter of fact, however, apparently no part of this appropriation, other than $200, has ever been spent to give military assistance to the Republic of Korea. I talked today with an American Army officer who has been in an important position in Korea for 3 years. He told me that we had never kept our promises to the Koreans, either as to economic assistance or as to military assistance, and that, as a matter of fact, except for the arms left behind, we have sent no military assistance to the Koreans.

Furthermore, that has been the official policy of the Administration, contrary to the grounds on which they sought the money, through Secretary Webb's testimony and the request for appropriation. They have actually adopted the policy of only giving aid for internal security. The President's own statement makes that clear. The President's statement says, as will be noted:

"In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security—"

He did not follow the policy which was authorized by Congress. He did not use the money which was given him for the purpose of opposing external aggression.

The policy has been—and it was so testified yesterday before one of the Senate committees by the generals in charge—simply to give them the money to maintain internal security.

Certainly the fact of our policy toward the arming of South Korea was well known to the North Koreans, and certainly it was a policy which invited the attack which has occurred.

Furthermore, our general position about Korea I think was reasonably expressed by the distinguished Senator from Texas in an interview appearing in the May 5 report of the United States News. The Senator was asked:

"Question. Do you think the suggestion that we abandon South Korea is going to be seriously considered?

"Asnwer. I am afraid it is going to be seriously considered because I'm afraid it's going to happen, whether we want it or not. I'm for Korea. We're trying to help her—we're appropriating money now to help her. But South Korea is cut right across by this line—north of it are the Communists, with access to the mainland—and Russia is over there on the mainland. So that whenever she takes a notion she can overrun Korea just like she probably will overrun Formosa when she gets ready to do it. I hope not, of course.

"Question. But isn't Korea an essential part of the defense strategy?

"Answer. No. Of course, any position like that is of some strategic importance. But I don't think it is very greatly important. It has been testified before us that Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary. And, of course, any additional territory along in that area would be that much more, but it's not absolutely essential."

So we have the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate of the United States announcing to North Koreans that we are not going to bother with South Korea, they can go ahead, and that we have no policy which in any way involves an effort to prevent their occupation of South Korea.

Fourth, the attitude of the administration with regard to the defense of Formosa emphasized clearly the policy of nonintervention in Asia beyond the line laid by Secretary Acheson.

The President made that clear in the statement which he issued on January 5. We would do nothing whatever about Formosa. He said:

"Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice even to Chinese forces on Formosa."

And Secretary Acheson made that doubly clear when he appeared before the committee. I have referred to the fact that he left Formosa outside the line which was defined, with the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan. Acheson took responsibility for a State Department directive sent to its representatives in the Far East, which directive contained interesting statements of policy. The documents said that false impressions of the island's military value should be countered. This was an instruction to our representatives in the Far East. It says that "Formosa has no special military significance," that it is strictly a Chinese affair. I read:

"In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we (the members of the State Department) should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would (A) Accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime; (B) involve the United States in a long-term venture, producing at best a new area of bristling and stalemate and at worst possible involvement in open warfare.

"Loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation."

Mr. Acheson indicated, further, that America might recognize Communist China, but that American recognition would depend on future events, including assurances that the Chinese Communists would protect the safety of American citizens and obey international law. If the administration was contemplating recognition of Communist China after they had seized China, why not hope for recognition of Korean Communists after they had seized Korea?

In his Press Club speech he attacked those of us who suggested that the United States at least ought to prevent Communist attacks on Formosa. I read from the Cleveland Plain Dealer of January 12:

"To say that the main motive of American foreign policy was to halt the spread of communism was putting the cart before the horse. The United States was interested in stopping communism chiefly because it had become a subtle instrument of Soviet imperialism."

It is fairly obvious that it is far easier to defend Formosa without becoming involved in war than it is to defend Korea or Indochina without becoming involved in war.

The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Connally] also violently attacked my suggestion that we defend Formosa, on the ground that it might result in war, and I think his words on January 9 are well worth reading. He said this:

"The Senator from New Jersey did not say a word about defending Korea in his statement in the press. He sided with the Senator from Ohio and former President Mr. Hoover, in wanting to send the Navy. For what purpose? Our Navy has guns, it has airplanes, it has all the armament that goes to make up a great battle machine. Why does the Senator want to send it over there? Is it to play ping-pong? No; he wants to send it over there to fight somebody, he wants to send it over there to kill somebody, he wants to send the Navy over there to fight Communists, and thereby run the risk of plunging this Nation into world war III—world war III, with all its horrors, with all its misery, and all the wreck and ruin which would come to our people if they were provoked in any way to plunge the United States again into a world war."

Certainly the Korean Communists could well think that if that be the attitude of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of this body, we would not go to war in Korea, which is a far more difficult job and requires a much more strenuous and dangerous operation than would the defense of Formosa.

The distinguished Senator from Texas went on to say:

"No, Mr. President, I shall not favor sending a single American boy with a gun in his hand to Formosa to settle a civil war six or seven thousand miles away from his home, in order to appease the political ambitions and the oratorical frothings of Senators in the United States Senate. I am not going to favor that, and I know the American people do not want us to do it."

Certainly, Mr. President, the Senator from Texas has changed his mind, because what we are now doing in Korea, which he approves thoroughly, apparently, is far more dangerous to American lives than would be the mere protection of Formosa by the United States Navy.

I read further:

"Mr. President, it is my belief that if we did what certain Senators propose, if we should go into Formosa and occupy it, we would have a liability on our hands instead of an asset. * * *

"Mr. President, I want the Senators who are so violent in their views, who are so prolific in their statements, who are so verbose in their oratory about Formosa, to tell us what they would do, what they ask the United States Government to do, what they ask the people to do. I want them to tell us what American boys they want to send to Formosa. I want them to tell the parents of those boys how many American boys they would send to Formosa to bleed and to die and to be buried in the jungle soil 7,000 miles away."

Mr. President, those were, indeed, eloquent words, but the Senator apparently is now prepared to send American boys in any number to Korea, where we have a far more difficult task than we would have in Formosa.

The Senator from Texas went on to say:

"Mr. President, I am not for sending them. I shall fight such a proposal, and I know that the American people will fight it. Therefore I shall propound to every Senator who speaks on this question hereafter the question whether he favors that sort of a policy or whether he does not."

The Senator from Texas has a hard time following the vagaries of the present administration's foreign policies, but he is always faithful to the administration and continues to support any action which the Secretary of State suggests to the President, whatever that action may be.

Mr. President, in my opinion, we should long ago have declared a definite policy. In certain areas we may have to undertake an actual defense with American troops. In other areas we can perhaps undertake only to furnish arms without any agreement on our part to go to war. Everyone agrees that our ultimate aim is the peace of the world. The most dangerous threat to that peace is the kind of wavering foreign policy which this country has maintained.

I welcome the indication of a more definite policy, and I strongly hope that having adopted it the President may maintain it intact.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS REPUDIATED SECRETARY ACHESON

In the President's statement there is a direct repudiation of the policies of Secretary Acheson declared in January of this year. The use of United States air and sea forces in Korea overrules the policy of American withdrawal and the defense of the Okinawa-Japanese line. The statement that "the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area," is directly contrary to the statement of Secretary Acheson that Formosa has no military value and that "we are not going to get involved militarily in any way on the island of Formosa."

The President now says that the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations. This is a direct overruling of Secretary Acheson's position on January 5 to the effect that it was wholly unnecessary to wait for a treaty with Japan because Formosa's position had been definitely settled by the Cairo and Potsdam agreements.

The furnishing of military assistance to Indochina contradicts Secretary Acheson's statement that all the United States could do in Southeast Asia was to provide advice and assistance when asked, and that the responsibility was not ours.

Mr. President, since I approve of the changes now made in our foreign policy, I approve of the general policies outlined in the President's statement. I feel that we must back up our troops, where they have been sent by the President, with unstinted support. Whether the President chose the right time for his new policy, or the right place, can be discussed in the future. I suggest, however, that any Secretary of State who has been so reversed by his superiors and whose policies have precipitated the danger of war, had better resign and let someone else administer the program to which he was, and perhaps still is, so violently opposed.

HAS THE PRESIDENT ANY LEGAL RIGHT TO SEND ARMED FORCES TO KOREA?

Mr. President, I have only a few words to say on the legal right of the President's act.

Although I should be willing to vote to approve the President's new policy as a policy, and give support to our forces in Korea, I think it is proper and essential that we discuss at this time the right and power of the President to do what he has done. I hope others will discuss it, because I have not thoroughly investigated the question of the right and the power of the President to do what he has done.

His action unquestionably has brought about a de facto war with the Government of northern Korea. He has brought that war about without consulting Congress and without congressional approval. We have a situation in which in a far distant part of the world one nation has attacked another, and if the President can intervene in Korea without congressional approval, he can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America. Presidents have at times intervened with American forces to protect American lives or interests, but I do not think it has been claimed that, apart from the United Nations Charter or other treaty obligations, the President has any right to precipitate any open warfare.

It is claimed that the Korean situation is changed by the obligations into which we have entered under the Charter of the United Nations. I think this is true, but I do not think it justifies the President's present action without approval by Congress. I stated when we were discussing the bill to implement the United Nations Charter that I felt that once the American representative on the Security Council voted in favor of using armed forces then the President was entitled to go ahead and use those forces without further action by Congress. I objected to the bill because it gave the President unlimited power to tell our representative on the Security Council how he must vote so that he could commit the country to the use of armed forces without congressional authority. I felt that giving the President the right to tell our representative on the Security Council how he should or should not vote, in effect gave him the right to put the United States into war, provided the other sections of the bill were complied with.

Section 6, however, dealt particularly with the time in which armed forces may be used to support the United Nations. What it says is this:

"The President is authorized to negotiate a specal agreement or agreements wth the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate act or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and securty in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements."

So, we have enacted the circumstances under which the President may use armed forces in support of a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations. The first requisite is that we negotiate an agreement to determine what forces shall be used, and in what quantity, and that the agreement be approved by Congress. No agreement has ever been negotiated, of course, and no agreement has ever been presented to Congress. So far as I can see, and so far as I have studied the matter, I would say that there is no authority to use armed forces in support of the United Nations in the absence of some previous action by Congress dealing with the subject and outlining the general circumstances and the amount of the forces that can be used.

Other questions arise out of the United Nations Charter which I think should be explored. At least, they should be debated by this body.

Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on all matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The word "veto" was never used in the United Nations Charter. It simply provides that there must be the concurring votes of the five permanent members. In this case Soviet Russia has not voted. They never even appeared at the meeting. It is suggested, I understand, that gradually, under the practice adopted, a veto must be expressed by a negative vote; even though that seems directly contrary to the language of article 27. I am not a student of that subject. I merely suggest that the question, and the fact that Korea is not a member of the United Nations, ought to be explored and debated very fully by the Senate. I do not think there is any immediate rush about it. I merely do not like to have this action go by with the approval of the Senate, if it is what it seems to me, namely, a complete usurpation by the President of authority to use the Armed Forces of this country. If the incident is permitted to go by without protest at least from this body, we would have finally terminated for all time the right of Congress to declare war, which is granted to Congress alone by the Constitution of the United States.

APPENDIX R

(Referred to on p. 2045)

SPEECH BY SENATOR BREWSTER IN SENATE, JUNE 5, 1951 (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, PP. 6297–6302)

A GUIDEBOOK TO 10 YEARS OF SECRECY IN OUR CHINA POLICY

[Congressional Record, June 5, 1951]

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I want to put the Senate on its guard.

Yesterday, June 4, 1951, was the third day of Secretary Acheson's appearance as a witness before the joint committee investigation of the circumstances of General MacArthur's recall.

During this third day's appearance Secretary Acheson presented what he called a somewhat extended statement on United States policy in regard to China.

This statement must be regarded as one of the most remarkable State Department documents to be issued during the 175 years of our history. It is a miracle of contrived confusion.

There are two things in it which I wish to call to the Senate's instant attention.

The first concerns the Secretary's extraordinary remarks about the Wedemeyer report.

The second concerns Mr. Acheson's denial that any State Department Foreign Service officers believed that Chinese Communists were simply agrarian reformers.

First, about the Wedemeyer report. This passage of Secretary Acheson's remarks will be found on page 4869 of the transcript of the hearings for June 4, 1951. I will read it verbatim:

"General Wedemeyer went to China and returned. He made recommendations, which are printed in the white paper, in which he recommended assistance of economic and military equipment for a 5-year period, which would require congressional authorization.

"Although his actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that.

"However, General Wedemeyer recognized the desirability and importance of avoiding direct United States involvement in the civil war in China by stating:

" 'Although advice indicated above—that is, technical military advice—' does provide advice indirectly to tactical force, it should be carried on outside operational areas to prevent the criticism that American personnel are actively engaged in fratricidal warfare."

"There are other recommendations in the Wedemeyer report which I shall not dwell upon at the present time. We are now directing our attention to the aid part of it."

Mr. President, the key sentences in this astounding statement of Secretary Acheson's are these:

"Although his actual recommendations do not call for military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that."

Do not call for military aid, Mr. President! A more bare-faced distortion I have never read.

I shall now read a passage from General Wedemeyer's report, his exact words, taken from page 814 of the white paper. I commence reading at that point in the conclusions where General Wedemeyer states what must be done to prevent defeat at the hands of the Communists. He says:

"In order to preclude defeat by Communist forces, it is necessary to give the National Government sufficient and prompt military assistance under the supervision of American advisers in specified military fields.

"American military aid to China should be moral, material, and advisory. It should be an integrated element of our world-wide policy of military assistance to certain nations. China should take the initial step of inviting the United States to provide such aid.

"American military aid to China, ground, sea, and air, would, if appropriately supervised, contribute to gradual development of stability in the Far East and lessen the possibility of a Communist-dominated China."

If this passage which I have read does not mean military aid, I would be interested to know what it does mean, Mr. President.

Then for what possible purpose did the Secretary make this distortion?

Now for the agrarian reformers.

On pages 4921 and 4922 of the transcript of hearings for June 4, 1951, Senator Smith of New Jersey made this statement:

"Senator SMITH. But as I read the white paper, just about the time General Marshall went out there, and when all these things were developing, some of our own representatives in China, representing the State Department there, were arguing, in favor of the Chinese Communists, it was an agrarian revolution."

On page 4923 of the transcript, Secretary Acheson replies to Senator Smith:

"So far as this agrarian revolution is concerned—to state a negative is a very difficult thing to do—I do not know of any State Department people, in the sense of our Foreign Service officers or departmental officers who thought that the Communists were merely agrarian reformers. They understood they were Communists, and in these reports that you have referred to you will see several times that they refer to their Moscow training and their Marxist rigidity."

Mr. President, this is a very remarkable statement. I do not see how it can be construed in but one or another of two ways. It is either outright prevarication, or else the Secretary is ignorant of what State Department Foreign Service officers were doing and saying in those years.

There is now in the State Department Foreign Service a man named Raymond Paul Ludden. From 1938 on he held numerous Foreign Service positions in China. He was a language officer at Peiping, a vice consul at Canton, second secretary at Chungking, and so forth, until in 1948 he was consul general at Canton. Mr. Ludden's peculiar part in our China policy finally roused outside attention and discretion has now seen fit to move him out of the limelight and into the shadow of Brussels where he is now counselor of our Embassy there.

In the Philadelphia Inquirer for March 23, 1945, we find an interview with Mr. Ludden, written by Alexander Kendrick. The interview took place in Washington just after Mr. Ludden had returned from a 7-month trip into Red China.

I quote from the interview:

"The slogan of the Chinese peasants in the Communist area is. 'A full belly, a warm back, and no one kicking us around,' but the so-called Communists are agrarian reformers of a mild democratic stripe more than anything else, the American observer asserted."

Does this interview, Mr. President, with Mr. Ludden refresh Mr. Acheson's twilight memory?

Many Members of the Senate were startled 3 weeks ago when the Assistant Secretary of State, in charge of Far Eastern affairs, Dean Rusk, in a speech made at the China Institute dinner in New York City, seemed to imply a change of United States policy toward China—Department of State Press Release No. 460, May 17, 1951, Dean Rusk speech, Chinese-American Friendship, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, May 18, 1951.

I say, "seemed to imply," Mr. President, for I have cerefully examined the text of this address and I can find no categorical statement in it that the United States will exercise all its powers and influence against the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. The speech seems to denounce the Chinese Communists. The speech seems to say that we will stand by the National Government now established in Formosa.

Less than a year ago, on June 14, 1950. Dean Rusk told the World Affairs Council Conference at the University of Pennsylvania that the Chinese revolution "does not aim at dictatorship"—The China Story, page 121; see also Senator McCarthy, Congressional Record, April 24, 1951, page 4378.

Three weeks ago he told the China Institute that—

"The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, mass-slaughter, banishment as forced labor to Manchuria, Siberia or Sinkiang, the arbitrary seizure of property, the destruction of loyalties within the family, the suppression of free speech— these are the facts behind the parades and celebrations and the empty promises."

Does the quotation I have just read sound like dictatorship? It certainly does. Yet a year ago Mr. Rusk said there was no aim at dictatorship. The most charitable explanation is that these gentlemen have been getting educated. But are they to be considered more worthy of trust today than they were during the 6 years last past when constantly they have been misapprehending the tendencies and the ideology of the so-called Chinese Communist "agrarian reformers"?

Does this seeming change of mind on the part of Mr. Rusk, a State Department official speaking officially, really mean a change of policy on the part of the administration?

Mr. President, I have already said that I have searched his speech from end to end, and despite all the adjectives Mr. Rusk used to decorate his statement, I do not find a firm and solid sentence anywhere in it.

In effect, Mr. President, the speech bears all the marks of a statement colored to give an impression, an appearance, that the administration is beginning to bow to the storm of public opinion. Yet there is no evidence that the administration has really shifted ground at all. The Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, apparently would be warranted in his very definite and positive statement that this speech by Mr. Rusk indicates no change in policy at all. Yet every newspaper in the country, so far as my knowledge goes, editorially and otherwise interpreted the speech as a radical change of policy. What cunning use of language, that they should be able, apparently, to deceive the entire press of the United States when Dean Rusk made his statement, and yet Mr. Acheson could blandly assure us that the speech indicated no change at all.

Mr. Rusk refers sourly to the empty promises of the Chinese Communists. Certainly, as a State Department official, he must be able to recognize an empty promise when he sees one.

Mr. President, if Secretary Acheson or Mr. Rusk want to know why confidence in them has disappeared, if they want to know why the country believes the administration morally and intellectually bankrupt, this Rusk speech will help to explain.

It appears, Mr. President, that no one in the State Department is willing to speak simply, directly, and truthfully. They will not come clean.

Mr. President, just a few days ago the American Society of Newspaper Editors held their annual meeting here in Washington. At that meeting, on April 21, 1951, the society's committee on freedom of information brought in a report. Said the committee:

"We editors have been assuming that no one would dispute this premise: That when the people rule, they have a right to know all their Government does. This committee finds appalling evidence that the guiding credo in Washington is just the opposite; that it is dangerous and unwise to let information about government leak out in any unprocessed form."

Mr. President, what the American Society of Newspaper Editors is now reporting officially, the Congress has been learning through bitter experience over a period of more than a decade.

The congressional power to investigate, which is the last-ditch authority of the national legislature, has been repeatedly defied by the Executive. Subpenas have been ignored. Files have been withheld. Examples will occur to all. I need not recall them.

The senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. Ferguson] on the floor of the Senate made an elaborate analysis of executive secrecy and censorship in a study of the iron curtain at home, appearing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 7, 1948, at page 10190 and following.

Mr. President, the fundamental issue of our time is whether this Nation shall go Communist or whether we shall struggle through with our individual freedom, both intellectual and economic, battered perhaps, but still intact.

Underneath the surface of our daily lives this grim battle is going on night and day. Sometimes the battle is spectacular—as in the Berlin airlift. Sometimes it is an obscure struggle in the local of a labor union. Sometimes it is silent smothering and strangulation done by a Government information officer.

Mr. President, the suspicion of Communist infiltration and influence in our Government first arose long ago. I need not recall the incidents which first aroused and then deepened this suspicion to conviction. Such incidents are legion.

Similarly, Mr. President, the tendency toward secrecy in the operation of the executive branch began years ago. I need not recall examples of this, either. They are bitterly familiar to us all.

There were numerous reasons for this effort toward secrecy. I do not say that Communist influence and activity were the only reasons. But they were important ones.

Some of all this has now been proven in the courts, but much yet remains shrouded, half concealed, and not clear.

For some years now the President and his subordinates have been speaking harsh words about communism and the Soviet Union. But the people remain unconvinced.

Why?

Because, Mr. President, the administration has never yet come forward and revealed honestly and fully the truth about Communist influence and infiltration in our Government and in our foreign policy.

In no phase has the determination to operate secretly been more pronounced than in the China policy, and it is in respect to the China policy that the suspicions of our people are most deeply seated.

We have reached a pass, Mr. President, where the administration simply is not believed, no matter what it says about the Far East.

There is not a Member of the Congress who does not know how devious the conduct of the China policy has been. Everyone knows how often the anxious inquiries of Representatives and Senators of both parties have been shortchanged, evaded, and flouted.

Mr. President, we had an amazing spectacle within the present week, when a document in the nature of a directive issued by the State Department to 450 officials all over the world was sought to be kept from public view on the simple plea that it did not tell the truth. That was the plea of avoidance made by the Secretary of State—namely, that a document duly processed through the State Department and issued as a directive for instructions to all those officials should not become known to the public because it was a deliberate falsehood from beginning to end.

Mr. President, Socrates a long time ago was asked what was the penalty of being a liar. To the young man who made that inquiry, Socrates replied, "Not to be believed when you tell the truth." That is the tragic situation in which the State Department now finds itself, Mr. President. When it is attempting through the Voice of America to tell the people of the world the truth about the American way of life and America rallying to defeat the Communist attempt to destroy our liberties, the State Department is suspected of indulging in deliberate misrepresentations and untruths. How can they expect to establish confidence with a record of that character written into their own administration of the Department?

I want to pay tribute also to those Senators on both sides who decided that it was time that the people were entitled to know the facts and who voted to make the document public, over the very severe opposition of the Secretary of State.

Sometimes, Mr. President, events may turn on a book. Occasionally we learn the truth when some publication helps to make further concealment and suppression impossible.

Recall the persecution of Alfred Dreyfus. To conceal a piece of treachery in the French Army, suspicion was unjustly cast upon Captain Dreyfus, and an anti-Semitic crusade was trumped up to make the false charges stick. Over a period of months and years suspicions accumulated that a monstrous piece of injustice had been done, but it was not until Zola's I Accuse was published in Clemenceau's newspaper that a real beginning was made to get at the truth.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BREWSTER. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is making a very impressive speech, and I congratulate him upon the public service he is performing in helping to put together at one place this strange evolvement of the so-called Chinese policy. I was particularly impressed by this last few remarks about the importance of avoiding any unnecessary secrecy in our foreign affairs, certainly from the standpoint of keeping Congress and the people informed about them. I wonder whether the Senator would agree with me that, in these days when the Communists are so very obviously using every conceivable tactic and technique to infiltrate the State Department as well as other departments and agencies of the Government, the very fact that secrecy is employed serves the purpose of the Communists, whether or not they have any part in shaping the patterns of secrecy; because, by concealing what is going on, it is then possible for Communists, when they get into positions within the State Department, as they have done in the past, to divert and direct the policies without having the great patriotic pressure of the Congress and the people brought to bear to refute their fallacious policies?

Mr. BREWSTER. It is certaintly true that in a great Republic such as ours the only protection of our liberities and our future must be the fullest publicity consistent with what may be determined, in certain very limted instances, to require that confidence be observed. I think it is profoundly gratifying that the two committees, sitting jointly, have indicated so clearly their determination to bring into the light of day everything possible, unless there is a clear showing that the public interests would be very seriously and adversely affected. I pay tribute to the Senators on both sides of the aisle who have rallied to that standard in seeking the service of their country and of the world.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield further, I should like to associate myself, in the paying of that tribute, because, across the party lines, in the matter of disclosing to the American people what was in the so-called Formosa papers, the was an overwhelming vote in the direction of making it public, and every step by which we curtail information unnecessarily creates a new opportunity for espionage agents and Communists in government to carry out their nefarious practices.

Mr. BREWSTER. There is no question about it, and I appreciate the Senator's observation.

Three weeks ago a book was published that may, by chance, be of as great assistance in dragging forth the truth about the China policy as Zola's article was in the exposure of the persecutors of Dreyfus.

The book to which I refer is called The China Story. It was written by Freda Utley, an English journalist who is now an American citizen.

This book is an analysis of Communist influence on the far-eastern foreign policy of the United States. That is, it analyzes Communist influence on our Foreign Service officers, on our journalists, on our State Department, and on the administration generally in respect to our China policy.

It is interesting, I think, to note that in the 3 weeks which have elapsed since its publication it has, in its field, already become one of the best sellers, apparently indicating a very profound desire of the American people to find out more about the motivation of our foreign policy, particularly with regard to the Orient.

If this book does not contain the whole story, it contains the most complete account to date and should be required reading for every voter in this country. But there is a strange story within a story involved here, and it is that story which I wish to call to the attention of the Senate. This book, as a documentation of our policy in China, I think may well be read along with the address delivered yesterday by the Secretary of State before the two committees, sitting jointly, in order that there may be explored some of the points which were possibly overlooked by those who briefed the Secretary of State regarding his address. He is necessarily dependent upon his staff officers, and may not be too severely criticized for not being completely briefed on many things which occurred, as indicated in some of the questions which have already been asked him.

By accident, Miss Utley is one of the pivots on which this story turns. To make the story clear it will be necessary to identify the author a little more fully.

She is an Englishwoman, educated at London University and the London School of Economics. In 1927 she became a member of the British Communist Party. A year later she married a Russian and subsequently went to Moscow. There she and her husband lived for some 6 years until, one night, the secret police arrested her husband and took him away. He was never seen again.

I shall not pursue this lady's biography much further except to say that by the time she managed to get out of the Soviet Union with her child in 1936 she had learned that Communist Russia was not the hope of mankind.

Miss Utley was admitted to this country by private law 372 of the Seventy-eighth Congress, approved September 27, 1944. She had to wait 5 years after immigrating to become a citizen. This private bill was necessitated because she stated frankly when she came in that she had been a member of the British Communist Party from 1928 to 1931. Last August she became an American citizen.

Having to earn a living, she found employment with the London News-Chronicle and went out to the Far East in 1938 to report the Japanese-Chinese War, then in its second year.

It was at Hankow in 1938 that this disillusioned woman first collided with a group of individuals who were then almost unknown in the United States but who subsequently became famous far and wide as pleaders, rationalizers, and apologists for the Chinese Communist cause.

If the lady's education in communism had not been achieved by the process of going through the wringer in Moscow, it was certainly completed in China at the hands of this heterogeneous band of zealots.

Who were they?

Col. Joseph Stilwell, military attaché, was one of them. He was unaware that events would presently make him a general and Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek.

Still another was Agnes Smedley, who believed that communism was the salvation of the world and who had long been singing the praises of the Chinese Communists in the American left-wing press.

It is interesting to note that Miss Smedley has just been deified by the Communists in Peking within the past month as one of the saints of their cause.

Still another was John Davies, then United States consul at Hankow, later to rise to high position in the State Department and to achieve great influence over the China policy.

Still another was Edgar Snow, not yet but soon to be celebrated as a sort of left-wing Richard Harding Davis.

There were numerous others in this group—and the number grew as time went on. The common interest of all was a fascination for the Chinese Communists and a growing hatred for the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

At that moment, in 1938, very few people in the United States were aware of the existence of this group in China. Here in Washington attention was absorbed in the persistence of unemployment, in the fact that deficit spending was becoming a permanent policy, and that Hitler was turning Europe upside down. China was getting a minimum of attention.

Suddenly, in 1938, a rocket shot up in the shape of a book by Edgar Snow. It was called Red Star Over China and was an exultant account of life among the Chinese guerrillas and the exploits of the Communist Eighth Route Army.

This book, acclaimed as a best seller, may be said to have been the opening gun in what subsequently became a tremendous effort to impress the general American public—as apart from the left wing—with the virtue, courage, bravery, and humanity of the Chinese Communists.

Today as the reports of purges, mass executions, and tortures come pouring in from China, we see that communism in China is like communism everywhere: cruel, merciless, malignant, and deadly.

I have said that by accident Miss Utley is one of the pivots on which this story turns.

Why is this?

It is because 13 years ago, she began to report the truth about the Chinese Communists. Because she did, she was thoroughly browbeaten and villified for her pains. She went out and back to China several times and not only worked as a journalist but wrote books about what she had seen in China. With what result? While American writers who were sympathetic with the Chinese Communists were being applauded in the press, Miss Utley was sniped at and treated with contempt. She came from the wrong side of the tracks and she was told to go back to the intellectual shanty town where she belonged.

In other times, in other circumstances, Mr. President, all this might have been like a dozen other literary teapot tempests that make life interesting in the publishing business, but to which the general public pays small concern.

But in this instance there is a difference. For years the administration, preoccupied with Europe, had given minor attention to the Far East.

Chiang Kai-shek had been fighting the Japanese intermittently since 1931 and after 1937 in a full-scale war. Most of the time he was simultaneously waging a civil war against the Chinese Communists. Very little was done about it.

Then came Pearl Harbor and overnight Chiang Kai-shek became an essential ally. He must be aided with arms, money, and advice to help carry the war with Japan to victory.

Who was sent out as General and Chief of Staff but Joseph Stilwell, the former military attaché. Who became General Stilwell's political advisers? John Davies, John Service, Raymond Ludden, and John Emerson. Who became counselor of our Embassy at Chungking? John Carter Vincent.

So the diplomatic positions were occupied.

A little later who began to command space in American print? Not only such scholars as Owen Lattimore. Not only such Communist war horses as Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong. Not only such journalistic heroes as Edgar Snow. There were many others, including Guenther Stein, Harrison Forman, Jack Belden, Richard Lauterbach, Mark Gayn, and Theodore White.

Here on the one side were the Foreign Service officers and, on the other, their friends, the scholars and the journalists.

Here in this heterogeneous group the germ of the fatal coalition idea which subsequently became the basis of United States China policy was cultivated and promoted.

We know, from the Stilwell Papers, edited by Theodore White, how intense General Stilwell's feelings were. Stilwell was an honest, brave, and highly competent soldier in the field. His willingness to share hardships with his men won their devoted loyalty. But politically Stilwell was a naive and trusting soul, easily persuaded. He became convinced that the Chinese Communists were wonderful people and that Chiang Kai-shek was unmitigated evil. This put Stilwell in a position where, notwithstanding his bravery and his generosity, he could make political decisions that had dreadful consequences.

It was my fortune as a member of the Truman committee to be sent by the then Senator Truman on a trip around the world which brought us, under the chairmanship of the present distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Russell], to Kunming where I first met General Stilwell, who flew down from Chungking to meet us. The tragic relationship between General Stilwell and General Chennault was a matter that was incredible to believe if we had not actually observed it. His feeling, not only against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, but also toward General Chennault was very difficult to understand. We were surprised when we went from the airfield where we had landed to find General Stilwell's chair vacant, because when we got back to the airport we found him sitting in his Ford car on the airfield refusing even to sit down and break bread with his brother officer in Kunming because of the bitterness of feeling. What the rights of that situation were, I am not able to say, but the tragic consequences of it, in the absolute lack of confidence between the Generalissimo, General Stilwell, and General Chennault, was a tragic illustration of the things which subsequently ensued.

We know now that Chiang's demand for Stilwell's recall was the Generalissimo's last desperate throw of the dice. We know now that General Wedemeyer's brief term as Chief of Staff in succession to Stilwell was the last time that there was a realistic effort made to deal with Chiang's plight in respect to the Communist threat. We know now that the promises made to Chiang at Cairo in 1943 were betrayed at Yalta in 1945. We know now that the coalition policy which General Marshall was sent out to impose in 1945 was the policy which, by indirection, could do nothing else than aid the Chinese Communist cause.

Mr. President, I have said that the administration has taken every possible opportunity to suppress the whole truth about what they were doing in China.

Because total suppression is difficult we have been able to deduce the outlines of what they were up to. A thousand details we do not yet know, but the broad outlines since 1945 are clearly visible and many of those outlines Miss Utley has been able, in her book The China Story, to fill in.

What was and is the main effort? To do everything possible to back out of our commitments to Chiang Kai-shek. The administration simply did not dare to break with him openly and completely so they had to do it piecemeal. They welshed on the promises made at Cairo, they demanded that Chiang take Communists into his government, they embargoed the shipment of arms to him. The crown of the work was the statement of Secretary Acheson on May 31, 1950, that we would not use the veto to prevent the seating of Red China in the United Nations—Washington Star, June 1, 1950; see also pages 3 and 4 of the mimeograph transcript of Acheson's address to Members of Congress in the Library of Congress Auditorium, May 31, 1950. Acheson made the statement in reply to a question by Representative Judd.

This diplomatic game of now-you-see-it-now-you-do-not has been going on full blast since 1945.

Mr. President, I have said that the administration has taken every possible opportunity to suppress the whole truth about what it was doing in China.

In full stride with the diplomatic campaign came an outpouring of books and magazine articles from the group that got their start in Hankow in 1938, the group that so thoroughly disagreed with Miss Utley, the group that gained new recruits as the years went by, the group that by 1945 were in a position to make a terrific impact on United States opinion.

As Owen Lattimore put it in the New York Times on June 22, 1947:

"From Edgar Snow's Red Star to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished. It is noteworthy that the recent and current trend of good books about China, well documented and well written, has been well to the left of center."

Mr. Lattimore was quite right. The list was more than noteworthy.

In general, though not in every detail, these books assumed a common pattern arguing two fundamental points;

First. The government of Chiang Kai-shek is vicious, corrupt, decadent, and tyrannical.

Second. The Chinese Communist movement is healthy, vigorous and in most respects, an admirable effort to attain justice and liberation.

In some way or other—I do not pretend to know how it was done—the authors of these books managed to endorse each other's wares with remarkable success. Often they reviewed one another's books. It was all very skillful. The praise was glowing, but a spoonful of criticism was often put in to give the right tint of impartiality. A master propagandist could not have done a better job.

And where this crowd really went to town was when they swung the hatchet on the few authors and journalists who tried to warn Americans of the Communist peril.

Mr. President, to show that this charge is not idle and irresponsible, I have prepared two tables. These tables list the bulk of the nonfiction books on China, published in the United States from 1945 through 1950, as they were reviewed in two of the most influential book-review mediums in this country—the New York Times Weekly Book Review and the New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review. Novels are excluded from the list, along with poetry, children's books, and technical works. What we have here are the principal nonfiction works on China as they have been reviewed during the past 6 years.

The tables give the title of the book, the author, the reviewer, and the date of publication of the review.

I recommend to the social historian who has claims to impartiality a close inspection of these tables and of the reviews themselves. He will find them a revelation.

Mr. President, I do not wish to take up the Senate's time unduly, so I ask unanimous consent that the two tables be inserted in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Nonfiction books on China published and revised in the United States, 1945–50, inclusive

NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

Book	Author	Reviewer	Date
Solution in Asia	Owen Lattimore	Edgar Snow	Feb. 25, 1945
Report From Red China	Harrison Forman	do	Mar. 11, 1945
China Among the Powers	David N. Rowe	do	May 20, 1945
China's Crisis	Laurence K. Rosinger	T. A. Bisson	July 29, 1945
The Challenge of Red China	Gunther Stein	Nathaniel Peffer	Oct. 28, 1945
My Twenty-Five Years in China	J. B. Powell	Annalee Jacoby	Dec. 16, 1945
Thunder Out of China	Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby.	John K. Fairbank	Oct. 27, 1946
China's Destiny	Chiang Kai-shek	do	Feb. 9, 1947
Look South to the Polar Star	Holger Cahill	Annalee Jacoby	Do.
No Peace for Asia	Harold Isaacs	do	May 18, 1947
The Unfinished Revolution in China	Israel Epstein	Owen Lattimore	June 22, 1947
The Revolt of Asia	Robert Payne	Robert Shaplen	Sept. 28, 1947
China Awake	do	John K. Fairbank	Oct. 19, 1947
Last Chance in China	Freda Utley	Harold Isaacs	Nov. 23, 1947
The Stillwell Papers	Edited by Theodore White.	Ira Wolfert	May 23, 1948
The United States and China	John K. Fairbank	Annalee Jacoby	July 11, 1948
Changing China	Harrison Forman	do	Nov. 14, 1948
China, the Land and the People	Gerald F. Winfield	John K. Fairbank	Dec. 12, 1948
Way of a Fighter	General Chennault	Annalee Jacoby	Jan. 30, 1949
Russia's Race for Asia	George Creel	Nathaniel Peffer	Mar. 13, 1949
The Situation in Asia	Owen Lattimore	Stuart Lillico	Apr. 10, 1949
China Shakes the World	Jack Belden	Nathaniel Peffer	Oct. 23, 1949
The Chinese Conquer China	Anna Louise Strong	Henry R. Lieberman	Nov. 13, 1949
Pivot of Asia	Owen Lattimore	Stuart Lillico	Mar. 26, 1950
Dateline: China	Hollington K. Tong	Robert A. Smith	Apr. 23, 1950
Ordeal by Slander	Owen Lattimore	R. L. Duffus	July 30, 1950
Peking Diary	Derk Bodde	Nathaniel Peffer	Oct. 29, 1950
Mao Tse Tung	Robert Payne	do	Do.
Two Kinds of Time	Graham Peck	do	Nov. 5, 1950
China and the Soviet Union	A. K. Wu	Robert Payne	Dec. 3, 1950
Blunder in Asia	Harrison Forman	Stuart Lillico	Dec. 10, 1950

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE BOOK REVIEW

China Among the Powers	David N. Rowe	Eleanor Lattimore	Feb. 18, 1945
Solution in Asia	Owen Lattimore	A. T. Steele	Feb. 25, 1945
China After Seven Years of War	(Various authors)	Gunther Stein	Mar. 4, 1945
Report From Red China	Harrison Forman	Floyd Taylor	Mar. 18, 1945
The Chinese Labor Movement	Nym Wales (Mrs. Edgar Snow).	Eleanor Lattimore	Apr. 8, 1945
China's Crisis	Laurence K. Rosinger	Owen Lattimore	July 15, 1945
The Challenge of Red China	Gunther Stein	do	Oct. 14, 1945
My Twenty Five Years in China	John B. Powell	do	Nov. 11, 1945
Earthbound China	Hsiao-Tung Fei and Chih-I-Chang.	Eleanor Lattimore	Nov. 25, 1945
China in the Sun	Randall Gould	Richard Watts, Jr	Jan. 27, 1946
Chungking Listening Post	Mark Tennien	Eleanor Lattimore	Mar. 10, 1946
Our Neighbors, the Chinese	Vaughan White	do	May 5, 1946
China and America	Foster Rhea Dulles	Owen Lattimore	June 2, 1946
Sun Yat-Sen	Stephen Chen and Robert Payne.	Richard Watts, Jr	July 14, 1946
Messages of Chiang Kai-shek	Chiang Kai-shek	Owen Lattimore	Oct. 20, 1946
Thunder Out of China	Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby.	Richard Watts, Jr	Oct. 27, 1946
China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory.	Chiang Kai-shek	Owen Lattimore	Feb. 16, 1947
The Big Yankee (Carlson)	Michael Blankfort	Richard Watts, Jr	Mar. 2, 1947
Stalin Must Have Peace	Edgar Snow	Joseph Barnes	May 18, 1947
No Peace for Asia	Harold Isaacs	Owen Lattimore	June 22, 1947
The Revolt of Asia	Robert Payne	A. T. Steele	Sept. 28, 1947
Danger From the East	Richard Lauterbach	Owen Lattimore	Nov. 23, 1947
Last Chance in China	Freda Utley	do	Nov. 30, 1947
Donald of China	E. A. Selle	do	Feb. 8, 1948
The Stilwell Papers	Edited by Theodore White.	Harold R. Isaacs	May 30, 1948
The United States and China	John K. Fairbank	do	July 11, 1948
Two Years With the Chinese Communists.	Claire and William Band.	Owen Lattimore	Do.
Way of a Fighter	General Chennault	Harold R. Isaacs	Jan. 30, 1949
The Situation in Asia	Owen Lattimore	Edgar Snow	Apr. 10, 1949
Russia's Race for Asia	George Creel	Christopher Rand	May 8, 1949
China Shakes the World	Jack Belden	Owen Lattimore	Oct. 23, 1949
The Chinese Conquer China	Anna Louise Strong	John K. Fairbank	Nov. 13, 1949
Pivot of Asia	Owen Lattimore	do	Mar. 19, 1950
Dateline: China	Hollington K. Tong	A. T. Steele	May 7, 1950
Ordeal by Slander	Owen Lattimore	John K. Fairbank	July 30, 1950
Two Kinds of Time	Graham Peck	Harold R. Isaacs	Oct. 29, 1950

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, last year when Owen Lattimore came to write his book called Ordeal by Slander in which he gave his version of his activities and his connection with the Tydings investigation, he said that when he first learned of the charges made against him he recognized them at once as accusations which had been made for years, by one Alfred Kohlberg, whom he described as "a millionaire fanatic who for years had spent a lot of money trying to work up pressure for all-out aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Lattimore described Mr. Kohlberg's activities as chief member of what he called the China lobby. Mr. Lattimore discussed the dubious propaganda organizations with which this so-called China lobby was connected.

Mr. President, I know very little about Mr. Kohlberg and his doings, but I must say that, when compared with what the left wing could do in flooding the market with pro-Chinese Communist material, Mr. Kohlberg is a babe in the woods. These tables prove it.

The tables demonstrate the remarkable success of this effort to explain in glowing terms the Chinese Communist cause.

We find in the New York Herald Tribune that when Mrs. Edgar Snow writes a book, Mrs. Owen Lattimore reviews it in highly favorable terms. Later the favor is returned when Mr. Snow favorably reviews a book by Mr. Lattimore—the Chinese Labor Movement, by Nym Wales—Mrs. Edgar Snow—was reviewed April 8, 1945, by Eleanor—Mrs. Owen Lattimore. The Situation in Asia, by Owen Lattimore was reviewed by Edgar Snow, April 10, 1949. Both reviews appeared in the New York Herald Tribune weekly book review.

Sometimes the connections are not quite so intimate, but when the sentiment of the book is right, the endorsement is forthcoming.

Listen to Owen Lattimore in the Herald Tribune for July 11, 1948, reviewing a book called Two Years With the Chinese Communists, by Claire and William Band.

"This book"—

Says Mr. Lattimore—

"is of primary importance to Americans whose tax money is being spent on economic subsidy to the Kuomintang and, as Secretary Marshall has admitted in a devastating phrase, military aid 'far beyond previous congressional knowledge.'"

Where and when, Mr. President, did Secretary Marshall say that military aid was being furnished the Kuomintang "far beyond previous congressional knowledge"? If there is any subject that Members of Congress have struggled to get full and complete information about it is military aid to China. And no line of questioning has brought more congressional frustration.

So much for the reviews in the Herald Tribune. Let us turn for a moment to some of the reviews in the New York Times.

Here we have Nathaniel Peffer on October 28, 1945, reviewing Guenther Stein's The Challenge of Red China. Says Mr. Peffer:

"There is something in Communist China that captures the imagination of all sorts and conditions of men * * * it must be emphasized that Mr. Stein is a competent reporter and that he documents his facts."

Mr. President, let us recall the later revelations of the competent Guenther Stein. In February 1949, the Army published a report prepared by General MacArthur's staff, stating that they had come upon the records of the Soviet spy, Richard Sorge, who was tried by the Japanese during the war. The Japanese had discovered, according to the records, that Sorge, Agnes Smedley, and Guenther Stein had been members of a Russian Communist spy ring in Asia.

Let us recall further, Mr. President, some of the strange things that happened after this report from MacArthur's staff was published.

In the first place, Guenther Stein, who was in the United States at the time, fled the country within 24 hours. Flight is usually considered a confession of guilt.

Miss Smedley, the old Communist war horse from the Hankow days of 1938, took a different tack. She wrote to President Truman and asked him to force MacArthur to apologize or waive immunity so that she could sue for libel.

What happened then, Mr. President, was very mysterious. So far as is publicly known General MacArthur never apologized nor waived immunity but the Army here in Washington did a strange thing. It issued what, in effect, was a retraction and said it had no proof to back up the charges that Agnes Smedley had been a member of the alleged spy ring. This whole episode is another chapter in our China policy that is still buried in darkness. For full details of the MacArthur report, the flight of Stein and the retraction made by Miss Smedley, see the New York Times as follows: February 11, 1949, page 1; February 12, 1949, page 4; February 19, 1949, page 1.

It is not to be supposed, Mr. President, that this trusty band could hit the bull's eye every time. A score of 100 percent was perfection not quite to be achieved.

For example, in the course of 6 years, in the Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, two volumes on China are reviewed by the reliable Arch Steele, the far eastern correspondent. Similarly in the New York Times we can discern some skepticism in three reviews by Stuart Lillico. Other examples might be given.

But, by and large, Mr. President, the boys and girls who, in the old-time phrase, were determined to carry the message to Garcia, scored a triumph. On the whole it was as successful a selling job for communism as has ever been done here.

But what, Mr. President, happened to the few scattered reporters who were determined, like Miss Utley, to report the facts? Never, Mr. President, was hatchet work better done.

Listen to Owen Lattimore in the Herald Tribune 4 years ago—November 30, 1947—reviewing an earlier book of Miss Utley's called Last Chance in China. Says Mr. Lattimore:

"As for the Chinese themselves, Miss Utley's wide ranging personal references spread through the whole book an atmosphere of tale-bearing about dirty linen."

Here we have the tomahawk smash at the author's skull. Again says Mr. Lattimore, and I quote him again:

"Miss Utley recklessly describes the late General Stilwell as having 'surrounded himself with Communist sympathizers'."

Was that so reckless a charge, Mr. President? Let him answer who knows the truth and the whole truth about John Service and the Amerasia case.

I shall not explore these book review tables further, Mr. President. He who wishes to examine them will find ample confirmation of what I say. Nathaniel Peffer applauds Jack Belden and damns George Creel. The Lattimores beat the drum for their favorites and use the knife on anti-Communists. Richard Watts sings the praise of Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China, and, when finally Owen Lattimore writes his Ordeal by Slander, his friend John K. Fairbank, of the Harvard faculty, manages to write a front-page review in which he conceals the fact that he was one of the participants in organizing the Lattimore defense publicity campaign. To such depths has academic integrity declined.

But now, and at last, Mr. President, one of the journalists who went out to China years ago has written a book to open the eyes of her countrymen. Here in Miss Utley's The China Story is piled up a mountain of evidence about how the most appalling tragedy in the history of our foreign policy was engineered.

The bitterest phrase in our language today is this: "The Chinese Communists are just agrarian reformers." We know who put it over. And Miss Utley tells us how it was done.

Ten years ago Edgar Snow wrote a book called The Battle for Asia. In this book there is a passage in which Mr. Snow permitted himself to speak more frankly than later he did. And this passage, oddly enough, deals with Miss Utley. I have said that by accident she was one of the pivots on which this strange and terrible story of journalism and diplomacy turned. I think this passage proves it. Let me quote it in conclusion—pages 289–291, The Battle for Asia, by Edgar Snow, New York, 1951.

Mr. Snow describes how Miss Utley came out to Hankow in 1938 and how he met her. She was, said Mr. Snow, "a sheep strayed from the Comintern fold, of which she had been a follower for some years before the intervention of a personal catastrophe destroyed her enthusiasm. She had a keen political mind, and her recent release from her obligations to Moscow had left her in a back swing of cynicism which gave to her remarks and judgment a highly pungent quality."

Then, said Mr. Snow:

"In her search for a faith she had fallen back upon resurging dreams of a new liberating force in western capitalism."

Is that so much a dream, Mr. President? Confronted by the black and bloody tyranny of a totalitarian world, what other dream is there than that western ideas of individual liberty may develop a new and liberating force?

But let me finish with Mr. Snow's strangely frank passage:

"My personal feeling in the matter is that liberals who build up hopes that the Communists of China are 'different' and 'only reformers' and have abandoned revolutionary methods to achieve their program, are doomed to ultimate disillusionment. These men [that is, the Chinese Communists] are nationalists because they are in a nationalist united-front phase of revolution, but their religion remains international socialism, and if conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they believe necessary in order 'to stay on the locomotive of history'."

Mr. President, that the Chinese Communists were out to promote international socialism is what the author of The China Story has been trying to tell Americans for 10 years. It is what our State Department chose not to believe. Will The China Story do for us what Zola's I Accuse did for Dreyfus?

Mr. President, it is my earnest hope that in some measure this book may serve to balance American thinking and information upon the most profound issues with which our generation—or perhaps any generation of Americans—has thus far been faced.

APPENDIX S

(Referred to on p. 2071)

[Life, September 10, 1945]

PEACE IN ASIA

THE MOSCOW TREATIES GIVE CHINA HER FIRST REAL CHANCE TO COMPLETE AN OLD REVOLUTION

Twelve days after Japan gave up, there was announced in Moscow and Chungking an agreement which was as great a victory for common sense as the defeat of Japan was for armed might. The Soong-Stalin treaties contain less ammunition for pessimists than any diplomatic event of the last 20 years. The signatures of two men have done as much to assure peace as all our Flying Fortresses. An extravagant statement? Consider.

FILLING A VACUUM

Long before it happened, the inevitability of Japan's defeat was causing thoughtful people to wonder what would take Japan's place in the Asiatic power balance. For principles and goodwill are not enough to keep the peace in a world of nation-states, which are impelled by an obscure biology of their own. Asia, the home of half the human race, contained only one strong modern nation—Japan. Her attempt to organize and lead Asia proved a bloody fiasco. Must Asia then relapse into the semicolonial subservience which had tempted and corrupted her European masters for more than a hundred years? Since China was a great power by Franklin Roosevelt's courtesy only, pessimists could see nothing in Asia but the same old vacuum and battleground. This time it would be the scene of conflict between these two new superstates, Russia and the U. S.

Affairs in China certainly supported this prognosis. A strong Chinese Communist Party, loyal to Moscow, was aligned against the Nationalist government, backed by the U. S., and both sides talked freely of civil war. That war could have become a disguised war between Russia and the U. S.—a prelude, like Spain. Two weeks ago, intelligent men could not dismiss the possibility of that calamity. Today, they can.

Two strong and subtle men, both revolutionaries since youth, sat down in Moscow and discovered that each needed and wanted a long peace to complete his particular revolution. So they negotiated out every major issue between Russia and China.

China gave up her ancient claim of sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, which has in fact been a Russian satellite since the early '20s. China's right to Manchuria (now occupied by Russian troops), which had been confirmed by the Cairo Declaration, is now also confirmed by Russia, although the Russian-built Manchurian railways are subjected once more to an effort at joint control.

Russia gets special rights in Dairen and a naval base in Port Arthur; this will warrant an extra toast to Stalin by the shade of Peter the Great. Most important, though perhaps least surprising, Russia promises nonintervention in Chinese affairs, thus pulling the rug from under the Chinese Communists and deflating their recently ballooning claims to equality with the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

As soon as the terms were announced, the Communists stopped calling Chiang "the fascist dictator"; he is now "President Chiang" in their press. Their leader, Mao Tseh-tung, who had ignored two invitations to discuss China's future with Chiang, accepted the third, signing himself "your younger brother" in courteous Chinese style. In Chungking Mao and Chiang are now laying the basis for that future. It is extremely bright.

VINDICATION OF THE U. S.

Certainly Americans have cause to call it bright. For the present prospects of China are a vindication of American policy in Asia for almost 50 years.

The territorial and political integrity of China has been a cardinal plank in our Asiatic platform since John Hay's day. We have wavered on it, God knows; there have been plenty of influential Americans who thought Japan, not China, was our real Oriental friend. But the older policy prevailed. And today China, whose territorial and political integrity has been either a mockery or a question mark for a century, is at last within sight of this goal. For the first time China's fate rests in Chinese hands.

To American ears it sounds strange to hear T. V. Soong or Chiang Kai-shek call themselves "revolutionaries." They have been in power so long they seem more like elderly bureaucrats. During the past year especially their regime has been subjected to such a barrage of unfavorable propaganda that many Americans, especially so-called "liberals," think of Chiang only as a bloody tyrant, the Franco of the East. They find it hard to rejoice in the triumph of a "fascist" regime.

Such "liberalism" is short-winded indeed. As Pearl Buck said last summer, "There has never been any real danger of China's going fascist and there is none now." One of the incidental boons of China's victory is that Americans will now begin to rediscover the real nature of the Chinese revolution. They will learn that the Chinese have some strong political ideas and talents all their own.

Last week, when Chiang and Mao Tseh-tung began their talks, Chiang opened up with the significant remark, "We can now return to the days of 1924." That was the eve of modern China's second or Great Revolution, a revolution based on close alliance with civilization's other pariah, the Soviet Union. In those days Sun Yat-sen, a close student of Marx, was adapting Marxism to Chinese uses, and young Chiang Kai-shek, his heir, was building a revolutionary Chinese army with the help of Russian mentors. By 1926 the leaders of China knew more about Communism than most leaders of the West know now.

The first upshot of this knowledge was that when the Chinese Communists, up to then members of the Kuomintang coalition, began gesturing for power in 1927, Chiang beat them to the punch and suppressed them with Oriental ferocity. He had known all along that his revolution and theirs, however parallel, were not the same. The break lasted for nine years. At the end of that time Chiang's revolution was so near success that Japan, in order to forestall it, started the war.

To Chiang the end of the war means one thing above all: that the first of Sun Yat-sen's three principles, the first stage of the revolution, is now complete. Nationhood is achieved. To be sure, China has suffered so terribly that the internal consolidation of her new sovereignty—getting a workable currency, reviving ordinary trade, tightening administrative controls—will take time, not to mention foreign (i. e., American) aid. But the thing to remember is that the next objectives of the revolution are already laid out. They were laid out long ago by the sainted Sun Yat-sen.

His second and third principles are democracy and economic well-being. During the war democracy and civil rights in China have suffered badly from the one-party rule of the Kuomintang, a rule euphemistically known as the "period of political tutelage." But Chiang has promised, and every Chinese knows, that that period will come to an end. Chinese politics, gradually reviving, will not divide on the goals of the revolution; they will divide on whether Sun's goals can be reached faster this way or that. In these political struggles the Communists can play a legitimate part, at least until they try another putsch. For democracy, land reform, industrialization and other Sun Yat-sen objectives suit the Communists' present book.

SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN

Peace, lively but genuine peace, is therefore the outlook. But the most fruitful thing about this peace, especially to Americans, may well be the intellectual rediscovery of that old revolution of Sun Yat-sen. It will be almost like something new under the sun; something new, moreover, in the jejune field of political science, which needs it. It is as different from Marxism, the last great new political idea, as day from night.

Sun Yat-sen, although he borrowed heavily from Marx, parted company with Marx on the fundamental nature of man. Sun believed that man is inherently a social being and that his jen, or social nature, is far more important in determining how he lives than the question of who owns the means of production. Thus if China tends toward socialism it will be without the gloomy doctrinaire ruthlessness that marked the Russian experiment. The political philosophy of the Chinese revolution is fundamentally sunny, humane, and pragmatic, like the Chinese people.

The Chinese people, as their friend Paul Linebarger once put it, "are perhaps the only people in the world with enough finesse about 'face' to save the Communist face." Their political philosophy, to a world weary of materialism, may serve the same turn for Marxists everywhere. It may even break the West of its stale habit of seeing all politics in terms of Left and Right.

In any case, it is one of the great political philosophies—on paper. To watch it move from paper into the living fabric of a great new nation is one of the things that will make the next few decades worth living.

APPENDIX T

(Referred to on p. 2205)

EXCERPT FROM CONGRESSIONAL RECORD OF JUNE 11, 1948, PAGE 7846, SHOWING VOTE ON SENATE RESOLUTION 239

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll.

Mr. MALONE. I have a pair with the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Robertson], who is unavoidably absent on official business. If he were present he would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote I would vote "nay."

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. KEM (after having voted in the negative). I have a pair with the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCarthy], who is unavoidably detained, and who, if present, would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote I would vote "nay." I, therefore, withhold my vote.

Mr. WHERRY. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Bushfield], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Jenner], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse], and the Senator from Maine [Mr. White] are necessarily absent. If present and voting, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] and the Senator from Maine [Mr. White] would vote "yea."

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Capehart] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Taft] is necessarily absent from the city.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Reed] and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Robertson] are detained on official business. If present and voting, the Senator from Kansas and the Senator from Wyoming would vote "yea."

The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] is unavoidably detained. If present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey would vote "yea."

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Bricker], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Brooks], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Buck], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Moore], and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Wiley] are detained on official business.

Mr. BARKLEY. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Chavez], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Lucas], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMahon], the Senator from Montana [Mr. Murray], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Stewart] are absent on important public business.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. Magnuson] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCarran], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Tydings], and the Senator from New York [Mr. Wagner] are necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Lucas], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCarran], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMahon], the Senator from Washington [Mr.

Magnuson], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Stewart], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Tydings], and the Senator from New York [Mr. Wagner] would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 64, nays 4, as follows:

YEAS—64

Aiken
Baldwin
Ball
Barkley
Brewster
Bridges
Butler
Byrd
Cain
Capper
Connally
Cooper
Cordon
Donnell
Downey
Dworshak
Eastland
Ecton
Ellender
Feazel
Ferguson
Flanders
George
Green
Gurney
Hatch
Hawkes
Hayden
Hickenlooper
Hill
Hoey
Holland
Ives
Johnson, Colo.
Johnston, S. C.
Kilgore
Knowland
Lodge
McClellan
McFarland
McGrath
McKellar
Martin
Maybank
Millikin
Myers
O'Conor
O'Daniel
O'Mahoney
Nevercomb
Russell
Saltonstall
Sparkman
Stennis
Thomas, Okla.
Thomas, Utah
Thye
Tobey
Umstead
Vandenberg
Wherry
Williams
Wilson
Young

NAYS—4

Langer
Pepper
Taylor
Watkins

NOT VOTING—28

Bricker
Brooks
Buck
Bushfield
Capehart
Chavez
Fulbright
Jenner
Kem
Lucas
McCarran
McCarthy
McMahon
Magnuson
Malone
Moore
Morse
Murray
Reed
Robertson, Va.
Robertson, Wyo.
Smith
Stewart
Taft
Tydings
Wagner
White
Wiley

So the resolution (S. Res. 239) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

APPENDIX U

(Referred to on p. 2221)

Excerpt From Opening Speech of Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson to the United Nations in September 1950, Concerning Formosan Discussion

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF FORMOSA

On June 9 Senator Saltonstall and Senator Kefauver asked Secretary Acheson to include in the Appendix of the Record so much of his speech to the United Nations last fall as concerns the future of Formosa (Transcript p. 5848–49).

Relevant portions of Secretary Acheson's address to the General Assembly on September 20 follow:

"The aggressive attack upon the Republic of Korea created the urgent necessity for the military neutralization of the island of Formosa. The President of the United States, in announcing on June 27th the measures taken to effect this neutralization, emphasizing that these measures were to prevent military attack either by mainland forces against Formosa or by forces from Formosa against the mainland. The President made it clear, at that time and on several subsequent occasions, that these measures were taken without prejudice to the future political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position or privileges with respect to Formosa.

"It is the belief of my Government that the problem of Formosa and the nearly eight million people who inhabit it should not be settled by force or by unilateral action. We believe that the international community has a legitimate interest and concern in having this matter settled by peaceful means.

"Accordingly, the United States delegation proposed that the General Assembly should direct its attention to the solution of this problem under circumstances in which all concerned and interested parties shall have a full opportunity to express their views, and under which all concerned parties will agree to refrain from the use of force while a peaceful and equitable solution is sought.

"We shall therefore request that the question of Formosa be added to the agenda, as a matter of special and urgent importance."

APPENDIX V

(Referred to on p. 2489)

LETTER IN CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

[Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., May 10, 1950, p. 6851]

MARCH 3, 1950.

DR. H. H. K'UNG,
DR. T. V. SOONG,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR FRIENDS: Having been on a mission to the west coast, from which I returned last week, I have just noticed an item on page 11 of Newsweek for February 6, reading as follows:

"The administration has an ace up its sleeve in case criticism of its Formosa and China policy becomes too hot. It is ready to disclose how Chinese Nationalists officials sold out their country by transferring personal funds and assets to the United States. The Treasury has the names and figures at its fingertips."

There have been many such articles in the press in the past. You have both told me that you would be pleased if the State Department or the Treasury gave out the figures, as statements such as the above are a gross exaggeration as far as you both are concerned.

While this item does not mention your names, in the public mind such charges as this constantly repeated are always attached to your names.

The investigation of the State Department by a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate is due to start next Wednesday. May I have your permission to advise members of that committee that you are both agreeable to having information referred to above made public? I ask this because in the past the responsible officials in the Treasury Department told me that they were under obligation to the individuals concerned not to make such information public. If you would both authorize publication of the information, this obligation on their part would cease.

With kindest personal regards and hoping that you may see the advantages that would accrue from complete revealment of the truth, I beg to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

ALFRED KOHLBERG.

[Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., May 10, 1950, p. 6851]

NEW YORK, *May 8, 1950.*

MY DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: Thank you for your letter of May 5, calling my attention to Mr. Constantine Brown's column of May 3 in the New York Journal American.

When you originally wrote me on March 3, suggesting that I permit you to quote me as having no objection to official release of the record of my total holdings in the United States, I then replied that I did not choose to dignify the untruthful attacks by pro-Communists in the American press by any notice on my part.

However, when a man of Mr. Constantine Brown's reputation for integrity makes the same statements, I feel constrained to have you advise your friends in the United States Government that I have no objection to the publication by the United States Treasury or State Department of my total holdings in the United States.

Again thanking you for your interest, and with cordial regards,

Faithfully yours,

T. V. Soong.

[Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., May 10, 1950, p. 6851]

Bank of China,
New York Agency,
New York, N. Y., March 8, 1950.

Mr. Alfred Kohlberg,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Kohlberg: I thank you for your letter of March 3 in which you inform me that there appeared an item in the February 6 issue of Newsweek reading as follows: "The administration has an ace up its sleeve in case criticism if its Formosa and China policy becomes too hot. It is ready to disclose how Chinese Nationalist officials sold out their country by transferring personal funds and assets to the United States. The Treasury has the names and figures at its fingertips."

You also inform me that the investigation of the State Department by a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate is due on Wednesday, the 8th of this month, and ask me wheher I am agreeable to having information in the hands of the Treasury Department made public regarding the personal funds and assets I have in this country, should the matter of personal funds and assets of former Nationalist officials who have come to this country to live in the last few years be brought into discussion in the inquiry on the policy and actions of the Washington administration in respect to China. To your question, although I cannot speak for others, I give the answer that I shall be perfectly agreeable to making public by the State Department or Treasury Department the factual figures on the personal funds and assets I have in this country based on actual accounts, if this action is judged by them to be pertinent and relevant to the discussion.

One point I wish to make clear is that I resigned and retired from public office in China 5 years ago, and I was called to this country 2½ years ago to be with my wife, owing to her illness. Since then, owing to the Communist trouble, I have lost all my businesses and properties in China. What I was able to salvage was barely enough for the maintenance of myself and family for the time being. This will serve, I am sure, to clarify my personal position as an ordinary resident in this country.

I want to express my appreciation of your kindness and interest in an old friend to bring up the above matter for my attention at this time, thus giving me an opportunity to clarify my present position.

With kindest regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

H. H. K'ung.

Appendix W

(Referred to on p. 2490)

APR, 17, 1951

Declaration of Existence of a State of War Between North Korea Regime, the Chinese Communist Regime, and the Government of the United States

Mr. Cain. Mr. President, out of order and for proper reference, I send to the desk a joint resolution and ask that it be read for the information of the Senate.

There being no objection, the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 62) declaring that a state of war exists between the North Korean regime and the Chinese Communist regime on the one side and the Government and the people of the United

States on the other side, and making provisions to prosecute such war was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and read, as follows:

"Whereas the United States and other nations of the United Nations have been engaged for more than 9 months in carrying out the United Nations mandate to suppress the aggression against the Republic of Korea; and

"Whereas the aggressors in Korea have been supported by the Chinese Communist regime which has furnished them with manpower and military supplies and a sanctuary in Manchuria from which to carry on air and other hostile operations; and

"Whereas the support furnished to the aggressors by the Chinese Communist regime has prevented a successful termination of the police action in Korea and has had the effect of converting such police action into a war in which the nations of the United Nations are opposed by the North Korean regime and by the Chinese Communist regime; and

"Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has found that the Chinese Communist regime has engaged in aggression in Korea; and

"Whereas the Chinese Communist regime has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; and

"Whereas more than one million casualties have been suffered by the opposing forces on the Korean Peninsula; and

"Whereas the military and naval forces of the United States alone have suffered more than sixty thousand casualties in the course of operations in carrying out such mandate; and

"Whereas the President of the United States in his address to the Nation on Far East Policy, delivered on April 11, 1951, stated that we were "fighting a limited war in Korea"; and

"Whereas all attempts by arbitration to terminate the war in Korea have failed and it has become evident that the only way successfully to terminate such war is conclusively to defeat the forces of the North Korean regime and of the Chinese Communist regime: Therefore be it

"*Resolved, etc.*, That the state of war between the United States on the one side and the North Korean regime and the Chinese Communist regime on the other side which has thus been thrust on the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire military and naval forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the North Korean regime and the Chinese Communist regime; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States."

ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM KOREA

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, out of order and for proper reference, I send to the desk a second joint resolution and ask that it be read for the information of the Senate.

There being no objection, the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 63) providing for the orderly withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the United States from Korea, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and read, as follows:

"Whereas the President of the United States has committed the Armed Forces of the United States to a war in the Far East without the Congress having declared war as required under our Constitution; and

"Whereas both the present commanding general of our forces in the Far East, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, and the previous commander of such forces, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, have publicly indicated that a stalemate is the inevitable result of the present management of such war by the executive heads of our Government; and

"Whereas American casualties in such war are more than sixty thousand, a total greater than the total number of troops committed in such war by the other United Nations; and

"Whereas more than one million casualties have been suffered by the opposing forces in Korea; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has admitted that the announced goal of the United Nations and of the Government of the United States to liberate and unify Korea has been abandoned; and

"Whereas the other United Nations have heretofore failed to commit any significant armed forces to the Korean War, despite the fact that 53 of the United Nations voted for the suppression of aggression in Korea; and

"Whereas some of the nations which voted to undertake the Korean operation are now intent upon a program of appeasement, including surrender of Formosa to the Chinese Communists, and the abandonment of the Nationalist Republic of China; and

"Whereas our Armed Forces have been attacked by Chinese Communist forces but have been prevented by directives of the executive heads of our Government from striking at the enemy in a manner designed to protect our forces from annihilation; and

"Whereas the President has publicly stated that a mass offensive by the enemy in Korea can be anticipated this spring: Therefore be it

"*Resolved, etc.*, That the President shall take such action as may be necessary immediately to accomplish an orderly withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the United States from Korea."

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Washington will address himself but very briefly to the two joint resolutions which have just been sent to the desk. Each of the resolutions tells its own plain, blunt story. Both resolutions speak clearly so that all the world may hear.

Mr. President, I speak in my own right as a Senator of the United States and as an American citizen. I am expressing my own views, and what I must say has not been approved or denied by the political party of which I am privileged and very proud to be a member.

During a period like the one which surrounds America and the free world find themselves in today, it is good to be able to speak as an American without reference to or any concern or regard for politics. I am anxious to offer a particular point of view to as many Americans as wish to subscribe to it. My appeal is directed as much to independents and to Democrats as it is to Republicans. Fundamentally, my appeal to reason is directed to our Nation.

No one argues any longer that the United States and her allies are not engaged in a bitter large-scale war against the forces of North Korea and Communist China. Almost everybody agrees that war exists in Korea. I simply find it strange and totally incomprehensible that our leaders and our political parties are seemingly much more concerned with politics as usual—we have been listening to a great deal of that in the last hour and a half—and with the political fortunes of 1952, than they are with striving for complete victory in Korea.

Our administration committed American forces to the Korean conflict in June 1950. That was more than 9 months ago. If that conflict was a police action, whatever that might have meant, when it was undertaken almost 10 months ago, it certainly became a war when the Red forces of China crossed the Yalu River in force last November. Yet the Democrat administration, which committed our forces to action without declaration of war by Congress, is daily insistent, as was so recently stated by the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR], that it is the peace party, while the Republican Party, which was confronted by the Korean conflict only after it was initiated, is extremely fearful that the administration will be successful in having Americans generally believe that the Republican Party is a war party.

On this occasion I have absolutely no interest in either party, and much less interest in who is going to do what to whom in 1952.

The joint resolutions which I have introduced offer two alternatives to the free world and to the United States of America. The joint resolutions, when reduced to their fundamental purpose, provide that we shall either prosecute the Korean War with all the might, determination, and power at our command, or shall withdraw our forces—and do it now—from a battlefield some 8,000 miles away, in order that the forces may live to fight, if required, but with some purpose, some other day. The joint resolutions are an encouragement for America and our allies, of whom there are 52, either to put up, if all of us wish to support the mission which was given to the free forces in Korea last June, or, to use an American expression—and properly so—to shut up, if the free forces are now of the opinion that their collective effort is inadequate and insufficient to carry out their mission.

Mr. President, no one told the 52 nations last June that they were to initiate a police action, which grew into a war. No one but they themselves have defined the reasons why it seemed important and necessary to enter Korea last June. The United Nations mission in Korea has been simply that of restoring Korea to a position in which she would be free, united, and self-controlled.

Mr. President, I sat here for the better part of an hour late this afternoon listening with keen attention to every word uttered by the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Kerr]. I waited for him to define, as I have in one sentence, what we are doing in Korea. It was not possible for him to do so, because the mission which freedom gave itself has been abandoned. To carry out the mission, the Allied Supreme Commander was instructed to crush and to repel the aggressors. After 9 months of conflict the Allied forces have not crushed the enemy; nor has the enemy been destroyed or expelled from Korea. There is absolutely no likelihood, after 9 months of war, that he will be.

What seems now to be a fact is that the United Nations are no longer determined to carry out their mission in Korea. Instead, the free forces are seemingly willing to fight a series of holding actions, in an effort to resist the enemy in his determination to drive the free forces into the sea. The joint resolutions which I have introduced say only that the United Nations must live up to their intentions of last June, or that the United Nations and the United States would be well advised to admit their loss of a large-scale but single battle against the sordid and vicious tyranny of Communist aggression, and withdraw from a field of battle on which the free forces admit they can never secure a military victory.

In his message to the Nation on Wednesday, April 11, the President of the United States warned America of an impending mass offensive by the enemy, while advising, at the same time, that the free nations had no thought of molesting the enemy in any way, except as the enemy crossed the Yalu River to be physically present and actually to fight on the Korean Peninsula. During 9 months of conflict, the free forces have never yet molested the enemy in his sanctuary north of the Yalu River.

The administration has recently notified that enemy that regardless of the destruction he intends to launch against the free forces, he is not to be molested or bothered with in the future. Our enemy has never been either stupid or militarily inept. He takes full advantage of the amazingly unusual and probably unexpected opportunity which has been given to him by the administration.

South of the Yalu River this afternoon stand some several hundred thousand Americans and their allied fighting brothers-in-arms. If one or the other of the joint resolutions which have been introduced is not passed, I will tell the Senate what the several hundred thousand Americans and their allies can look forward to. They can look forward to death, without hope of ultimate victory. They can look forward to wounds, without purpose. It is my view that these men are not expendable. To the extent that I could I would fight anyone or everyone who might dare to say, as so many Americans by implications these days do say, and as some Senators have said, that the men who are fighting there now, like their brothers who have died in 9 months, continue to be expendable in support of the policy of futility and ultimate appeasement, which the administration has recently advanced to America and to the free world.

Mr. President, I think it is not so bad to die in wartime. In the past many men have died and in the future many more men will die, in wartime. But it is unnecessary and it is the greatest tragedy of all, Mr. President, to expose American youngsters, and some of their elders, too, to the prospect of dying without purpose and without ultimate hope of victory at arms. I never thought I would live to see the day when my fellow Americans would be committed into a jackpot, without any opportunity to fight for survival, in terms of a victory which will come only after we have expelled the aggressor from all of Korea, and that land has been given back to the Koreans. That was our purpose last June. That is not our purpose now. Were it still our purpose, our gallant young men would die without complaint or regret.

The Supreme Commander of the free forces in Korea, who has but recently been relieved of his responsibility, and the present Supreme Commander, have both stated that, under the circumstances which exist and which have existed for some months in Korea, nothing more than a stalemate and a continuing war, in which men die on both sides of the line without accomplishing anything, can be expected. Some other Americans can fight that type of war, but not the junior Senator from Washington. I say for those commanders, whose voice we have not yet seen fit to listen to or to consider seriously, that never in the history of the United States have we committed men to ceaseless daily battle without a goal and without any hope of eventual victory.

The Senator from Washington wishes to conclude the present war at the earliest possible moment. I do not want to see the present war grow into a larger war. I am, however, satisfied that unless we take the risks involved in striving to win the war in which we are now engaged, we have no right, in the Congress or out of the Congress, further to sacrifice the lives and strength of America's youth, who are the last hope we have. In my own mind I am satisfied that we can be victorious in Korea only by convincing the enemy that we shall conquer him if the war continues. When the enemy comes to know that the collective strength and determination of the free nations is much stronger than anything he now possesses or ever can possess, then the enemy can be offered, or he will offer, terms which are acceptable and which will return Korea to the Koreans. As I go about and confer with and listen to my colleagues, I find them to be frightened mainly by one thing. They know that the Congress is charged by the Constitution with declaring war. The distinguished Senator from Delaware [Mr. Frear], who now occupies the chair, knows that the Congress is charged by the Constitution with declaring war. Every Senator knows that to be so. Senators and other friends with whom I have recently conversed know that America is at war. They know that the Congress ought to recognize that fact by declaring war. But the thing which frightens them is that any declaration of war against our enemies, against those who have already injured beyond repair approximately 60,000 Americans and a number of our allied friends, is largely to be construed by most Americans as meaning that large land armies will be committed on the Continent of Asia.

Many of my colleagues know better than that. Many of my colleagues know that if total war took place between all of Red China and all of the United States, America would not seek to win that war by committing large land forces in China. What frightens my colleagues—and they are very human—is that people will believe that land armies will be required in any acknowledged conflict with Communist China. Against this fear of uninformed public opinion many of my colleagues are seemingly willing to let the war continue in Korea for an indefinite period—it has been going on now for some months—without having the Congress legitimatize our participation in that war.

I speak today because I am appealing as best I can to the conscience, the integrity, and the strength of the Congress. I am insisting that since the President has stated that we are at war in Korea, the Congress must either further that war so that it may be successful, or the Congress must declare that the war is to be called off. As of now it is an undeclared war. If the Congress continues to fail to pursue either one of these two courses, then the Congress—which includes fine men from both political parties and from every section of the United States—will have lost its right to question the management of the war in Korea or to protect the lives and assist the efforts of the thousands of Americans who are engaged in the war. If the Congress does not recognize and live up to its responsibility, then the Congress will have abdicated its obligations and placed the war entirely where it has been for almost 10 months—in the hands of our Chief Executive. No man who has ever lived has ever possessed the wisdom, the experience, the intelligence, or the endurance which is required for managing a war on his own individual responsibility.

The war which now confronts America and the free world has been going on for months. During each day of the week and of every month some 200 Americans have been killed, wounded, or reported as missing in action. That has been happening daily for 9 months. We can assume that from the time the Senate met today, at noon, until now, 100 of our fellow citizens, who are not getting anywhere have died or have been destroyed or lost in action, fighting in the hope that soon the Congress and the administration would assume a joint responsibility the result of which would be the definition of a purpose to justify the misery and agony in Korea.

If we are to remain in the war every one of us must bear his share of the responsibility for the conduct of the war. I know of no way in which this obligation can be assumed other than through a declaration of war, through facing up to what we are in, which is a war, and doing what the Constitution says ought to be done, that is, declaring war or declaring that we ought to remove ourselves from that area of the world in which we are today involved in war.

In about 10 months of the war America has suffered approximately 60,000 casualties. We do not feel them very much on the floor of the Senate. We are 8,000 miles away from where the bullets hurt and the flesh is torn. But it does no harm constantly to remind ourselves of what is happening elsewhere, in the hope that we can do a better job at home.

In about 10 months of war, about a million casualties have been suffered by all the forces, Allied and enemy, and by the civilians who have been burned up and overrun by war. The Korean War, when one considers the area in which it has been waged, is just about the biggest war of all time. How big must this war become before the Congress of the United States decides to make it both legal and effective? Today it remains both illegal and ineffective.

Mr. President, I have said before, and I wish to repeat, that I am far from certain that the free nations of the world are half so determined to protect themselves against Communist aggressors and to restore peace to the face of the earth as the forces of aggression are determined to destroy freedom and peace forever.

One of the two joint resolutions which I have introduced would have the free nations of the world agree to commit all of their forces and personnel to a conflict which each of them—53 nations—openly entered into some 10 months ago, in order that those particular forces and the 53 nations may soon accomplish their mission, which was to make of Korea a free, unified, and self-controlled nation.

The other joint resolution would permit the same nations to withdraw from Korea so that they might continue to debate the question, as we do here, of where freedom wants to go tomorrow.

As for me, sir, there is not now, nor will there ever be, any middle ground. Freedom, to which I pledge my allegiance, must either fight and sacrifice, struggle and die, to survive; or freedom—and I think now again of Korea—must withdraw in the hope that another opportunity to be successful will be afforded.

APPENDIX X

(Referred to on p. 2566)

SUMMARY OF REMARKS MADE BY LT. GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER BEFORE JOINT MEETING OF STATE COUNCIL AND ALL MINISTERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AUGUST 22, 1947[1]

TAXATION

Approximately 80 percent of the people of China are hard-working peasants, their crops are visible and officials can easily appraise the amounts the peasants are able to give toward government. Corrupt officials in many instances take more than the peasants are able to give and this results finally in the peasants leaving the land and forming bandit groups.

In contrast to the taxation of peasants, Chinese businessmen and rich Chinese resort to devious and dishonest methods to avoid payment of proper taxes to their Government. It is commonly known that Chinese business firms maintain two sets of books, one showing the true picture of business transactions and the other showing a distorted picture so that they do not pay as much tax as they should.

MILITARY

For the first year after the war, in my opinion, it was possible to stamp out or at least to minimize the effect of Chinese Communists. This capability was predicated upon the assumption that the Central Government disposed its military forces in such a manner as to insure control of all industrial areas, food-producing areas, important cities, and lines of communication. It was also assumed that the Central Government appointed highly efficient and scrupulously honest officials as provincial governors, district magistrates, mayors, and throughout the political and economic structure. If these assumptions had been accomplished, political and economic stability would have resulted, and the people would not have been receptive, in fact, would have strongly opposed the infiltration or penetration of communistic ideas. It would not have been possible for the Chinese Communists to expand so rapidly and acquire almost undisputed control of such vast areas. I believe that the Chinese Communist movement cannot be defeated by the employment of force. Today China is being invaded by an idea instead of strong military forces from the outside. The only way in my opinion to combat this idea successfully is to do so with another idea that will have stronger appeal and win the support of the people. This means that politically and economically the Central Government will have to remove corruption and incompetence from its ranks in order to provide justice and equality and to protect the personal liberties of the Chinese people, particularly of the peasants. To recapitulate, the Central Government cannot defeat the Chinese Communists by the employment of force, but can only win the loyal, enthusiastic, and realistic support of the masses of the people by improving the political and economic situation immediately. The effectiveness and timeliness of these improvements will determine in my opinion whether or not the Central Government will stand or fall before the Communist onslaught.

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[1] Transmitted by the Ambassador in China (Stuart) to Secretary Marshall, Nanking, August 25, 1947.

During the war while serving as the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff, I tried to impress upon all Chinese military officials the importance of reestablishing excellent relationships between officers and enlisted men. I explained that officers must show sincere interest in the welfare of their men both in times of war and in peace. Wounded must be evacuated from the battlefield and cared for in hospitals or aid stations. Officers should visit their men in the hospital and find out if they can help them in any way. Officers should play games with their soldiers such as basketball and soccer. The junior officers should know all of their men in the unit by name. They should talk to them and encourage them to discuss their problems. Explain to them why they are fighting. Explain the objectives of their Government and encourage open discussions. This will create a feeling of mutual respect and genuine affection. Discipline acquired through fear is not as effective as discipline acquired through affection and mutual respect. It would be so easy for the Chinese officers to win the respect and admiration of their men who are simple, kindly, and brave and who will gladly endure hardships and dangers if they are properly led and cared for.

CONSCRIPTION

I have received many reports that the conscription of men for military service is not being carried out honestly or efficiently. Again, as in taxation, peasants are expected to bear the brunt of conscription, although in the cities there are thousands and thousands of able-bodied men, who should be under the conscription laws eligible for military service. Rich men's sons by the payment of money avoid conscription and the sons of rich men are being sent to school abroad instead of remaining here to help their country in a time of great crisis.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN

I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of establishing and maintaining good relationship between military forces and the civilian population. Officers and men in the army and air corps should be very careful to be courteous, friendly, cooperative, and honest in all of their contacts with civilians. In Manchuria I was told by many sources that the Central Government armies were welcomed enthusiastically by the people as deliverers from Japanese oppression. Today, after several months of experience with these Central Government armies, the people experience a feeling of hatred and distrust because the officers and enlisted men were arrogant and rude. Also they stole and looted freely; their general attitude was that of conquerors instead of that of deliverers. In Formosa the reports are exactly the same, alienating the Formosans from the Central Government. All of this is a matter of discipline. Of course if the officers themselves are dishonest or discourteous, one can hardly expect the enlisted men to be otherwise. Good relations between the military forces and the civilians are absolutely essential if the Central Government expects to bring about successful conclusion of operations against the Communists. At first the Communist armies were also crude and destructive and made the people hate them, but in the past few weeks, they have adopted an entirely new approach which requires their officers and men to be very careful in all their relations with civilian communities. You can understand therefore how important it is that your own military forces adopt steps immediately to improve the conditions that I have mentioned.

Promotion in the military service should be by merit and merit alone. Older officers or incompetent ones should be retired and relieved. The retired officers should realize that they must make room for the younger ones and they must accept retirement patriotically and philosophically. There are entirely too many generals in the Chinese Army. Most of them are not well-educated and are not well versed in modern combat. Generals should never be used in civilian posts of responsibility, for example, as governors, mayors, and magistrates, except perhaps as Minister of Defense. Military men should not be permitted to belong to a particular political party. After the constitution goes into effect on December 25, they should be permitted to cast a vote, in other words, exercise the right of suffrage, but no military men should be permitted to hold Government office or be active members of a political party.

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

I have carefully studied the existing organization of the Government. In my opinion a definite clear-cut delineation of the authorities and functions of each major division of the Government from the State Council on down to subdivisions of the ministries, is urgently required. At present there is an overlapping of responsibilities and authorities causing frictions and inefficiencies. Also a tremendous streamlining program is necessary within each Government ministry or bureau. There are entirely too many employees, this would effect economy in manpower and in funds and I am sure would bring about efficiency. In studying your Government organization, for example, I could not determine the exact authority and function of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan with regard to the enactment of legislation. There must be a streamlined organization and clearcut enunciation in the duties of all of the ministries and bureaus of the Government. In April a year ago I discovered that there were well over 60 sections in the National Military Council with duplicating functions and conflicting authorities. There was little coordination between the various groups or sections. Actually there were some groups within the National Military Council that were handling matters which had nothing whatsoever to do with antional defense matters. Today in the Ministry of Defense we have grouped 60 sections under 6 general heads and reduced the personnel about 50 percent. Actually over 75,000 individuals were eliminated.

CORRUPTION

One hears reports on all sides concerning corruption among Government officials, high and low and also throughout the economic life of the country. With spiraling inflation, the pay of Government officials both in civil service and in military service is wholly inadequate. I am sure that persons who are presently practicing dishonest methods would never consider doing so were it not for the fact that they receive insufficient remuneration to meet the bare necessities of life. Many of them are not trying to acquire vast fortunes, but are just trying to provide a standard of living commensurate with their position. On the other hand, certain rich families, some of whom have relatives in high positions of the Government, have been greatly increasing their fortunes. Nepotism is rife and in my investigations I have found that sons, nephews, and brothers of Government officials have been put in positions within the Government, sponsored firms, or in private firms to enable them to make huge profits at the expense of their Government and their people. It would be interesting and revealing if you would conduct an investigation into various large banking organizations and other newly created business organizations, to ascertain how much money has been made by such organizations and to what individuals or groups of individuals the money has been paid. To reduce corruption, it will be necessary to establish an index of the standard of living and as the exchange rises the pay of civil service and military service must be increased accordingly. I should emphasize that I am sure many patriotic and selfless Chinese are eking out a bare existence under difficult conditions. They are a great credit to China. However, it must be very discouraging to them to realize that many who already had amassed great fortunes have taken advantage of the present unfortunate situation in China to increase their wealth.

NATIONAL ASSETS AND RESOURCES

I have just completed an extensive tour in England and on Continental Europe. I made a survey of conditions in those areas such as I have just completed in China. The people in Europe are hungry. They have very limited fuel to keep them warm and to run the utilities such as electric power and to provide water. It is difficult for them to obtain as much as 1,500 calories a day, which is barely enough to keep a healthy person moving about. Here in China there are untold resources, food, raw materials, and manpower. It should be at once apparent that organization and honest, efficient administration will strongly contribute to alleviate your problems.

There are approximately 10 million Chinese citizens living abroad. These Chinese in many instances are financially able to help their country in this time of dire necessity. Also there are many Chinese here in China who have vast sums of money invested abroad. They should be required to make a complete report on their holdings in securities and capital goods. It has been conservatively estimated in America that they could raise at least one billion United

States dollars from these sources. China is far from bankrupt in a financial sense or with regard to material resources. China is practically bankrupt in spiritual resources. If the people of China really love their country and want it to emerge strong and united, they should be prepared to come forward and make any sacrifice, including their lives if necessary. Again I should like to emphasize that it is predominantly the poor people, the peasants, who are making great sacrifices and predominantly the rich class who are not coming forward to assist their country.

PUNISHMENT AND SECRET POLICE

I have had reported to me many instances of misdirection and abuse in meting out punishments to offenders political or otherwise. In Formosa there are many so-called political offenders who are still in prison without any charges or sentences. Some have been released but only after paying large sums of money and being required to sign a statement to the effect that they were guilty of an offense against the Government. Actually in their hearts and minds they did not feel that they were guilty of such offense. Secret police operate widely, very much as they do in Russia and as they did in Germany. People disappear. Students are thrown into jail. No trials and no sentences. Actions of this nature do not win support for the Government. Quite the contrary. Everyone lives with a feeling of fear and lose confidence in the Government.

RESTORATION AND REVITALIZING CHINESE ECONOMY

State ownership should be discouraged. Many Japanese Government and private Japanese properties in Formosa, Manchuria, and other parts of China have been taken over by the Central Government. This was perfectly normal procedure, but the Government should dispose of these properties as quickly as possible to private individuals or groups to encourage free enterprise. It should be a standing rule that persons in Government service, civil or military, should not participate in speculative businesses, in banking, and commercial enterprises.

FINAL REMARKS

The Government should not be worried about criticism. I think constructive criticism should be encouraged. It makes the people feel that they are participating in Government; that they are members of the team. I have mentioned earlier the terrible economic conditions that exist in England. Criticism of the Government is expressed freely in meetings on the streets and in the press and on the radio. This is in my opinion a healthy condition. The Government should point out that it is made up of human beings who are of course fallible and can make mistakes. The Government should emphasize, however, that once the mistakes are pointed out, effective steps will be taken to remedy them. The Government should publish information freely concerning expenditures, taxation. Let all the people know how much income tax each individual, particularly wealthy people and big business firms are paying. Announce publicly when any official or any individual has been guilty of some crime or offense and also indicate the punishment meted out. By the same token, announce publicly the accomplishment or good work of individual Government activities. All of these matters would contribute to confidence on the part of the people in the Government. They want to know what is going on and they have a right to know. Open and public official announcements on the part of the Government will also serve to stop malicious conjectures and adverse propaganda of opponents of the Government.

I realize that many of the ideas that I have expressed are quite contrary to Chinese tradition. However, I have carefully studied the philosophy of Confucius and I am sure that all of these ideas are in consonance with the fine principles of conduct that he prescribed. I have confidence in the good, sound judgment and in the decency of the bulk of the Chinese peoples. I hope sincerely that you will accept my remarks in the same spirit in which they were given, namely, in the interest of China. Anything that I can do to help China become a strong, happy, and prosperous nation, I would gladly do. Anything I could do to protect the sovereignty of China and to insure her a place of respect in the eyes of the world in the family of nations, I would gladly do.

ADDITIONAL POINTS

1. A sign of general frustration on the part of Chinese officialdom.
2. Generalissimo's dabbling in all strata of government.
3. Weak Executive Yuan.
4. Urge closer relationship with the Generalissimo who should encourage criticism.

Appendix Y

(Referred to on p. 2601)

Statement of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson Before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, April 26, 1950

Mr. Chairman, I have read with much interest the testimony of General Eisenhower before this committee, and I should like to begin my testimony by discussing some of the areas General Eisenhower touched upon.

First, let me discuss Alaska construction. Last October, Congress made available approximately $130,000,000 for construction in Alaska. In addition, public works authorizations pending before the Congress, and proposed supplemental appropriations requests under the one line item for military public works in the President's budget, contain approximately $100,000,000 more for Alaska construction—and the enactment of these pending bills, when added to the $130,000,000 mentioned above, gives us a total of approximately $230,000,000 for military public works and housing in Alaska during the 1950 and 1951 building seasons. I want to emphasize that the availability of the additional $100,000,000 is dependent on congressional enactment of S. 2440—the military public works bill that has been before the Congress for some time. When this $100,000,000 is made available by the Congress—and I hope it will be made available speedily—we will have a total of $230,000,000 for Alaska construction, and this will enable us to launch as large a housing program as the highly seasonal construction picture in Alaska will permit, and is based upon our plans for providing adequate housing for military forces of the size which the Joint Chiefs of Staff intend to maintain in Alaska.

Second, when he appeared before this committee, General Eisenhower stated that he had been closely associated with the budget that is before you, from January to July of last year but that he had not been closely associated with the budget since July. This is true. As compared with the levels that had been contemplated in July, and within the $13 billion ceiling established by the President, a number of significant increases in military forces and matériel procurement for fiscal year 1951 were made. The July planning ceiling for aircraft procurement during fiscal year 1951 was $1,800,000,000—$1,100,000,000 for the Air Force, and $700,000,000 for the Navy. At that time, General Eisenhower expressed to me the hope that I might be able to increase the amount allocated to the Air Force for aircraft procurement. As a result of changes between early July and the time the President submitted the 1951 budget, this amount was increased by $200,000,000—with the result that $2,000,000,000 was requested for aircraft procurement—$1,350,000,000 for the Air Force (that is, $250,000,000 more than the July figure) and $650,000,000 for the Navy. In order to round out the picture, particularly in the light of the apparent decrease of $50,000,000 for naval aircraft procurement, it should be added that there was a $79,000,000 increase over the original allocation for antisubmarine warfare equipment, together with the provision of funds for 700,000 additional flying hours for combat type units in the Navy.

With respect to the Army, the dollar figures reflect an increase in Army matériel procurement of $41,000,000, as compared with the July level. This $41,000,000 figure includes $10,000,000 for new type signal equipment for the mobile striking forces: $17,500,000 for heavy ordnance, including special type prime movers; and $7.8 million for modernized portable bridges and other new engineer equipment. In this general connection, mention should also be made of increases in the amounts recommended for Army civilian components. Specifically, there were increases of $5,000,000 to rebuild and modernize equipment for the National Guard, and there was provision for an increase of $16,000,000 to cover the cost of armories for the National Guard and the Organized Reserve.

Thirdly, as I have already stated, the amount in the President's budget for the Navy includes a readjustment to increase by $79,000,000 the amount originally allocated for antisubmarine equipment last July. Specifically, the amount originally alocated was $40,000,000—and after Admiral Sherman became Chief of Naval Op rations he asked for and received (from savings made in the budget) an increase of almost 200 percent in the amount of funds allocated to antisubmarine warfare equipment.

Fourth, the field of intelligence: As General Eisenhower stated to the committee, this is not a field where large sums of money are involved, nor is it a field which lends itself to discussion in open session. I shall be glad to discuss the matter in greater detail in executive session, if the committee should so desire.

The fifth and final field is industrial mobilization. At the present time, our plans in this regard are already well-advanced, and the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense, working in conjunction with the National Security Resources Board, has revised the plans we have heretofore made, in order that the revised plans may be submitted to the President at an early date. One product of our current planning in this regard was the publication, last week, of the 1930 edition of our Production Allocation Manual. It is my opinion that the portion of the industrial mobilization picture which is the responsibility of the Department of Defense is adequately provided for, by the funds included in the President's budget—an amount totaling approximately $100,000,000. In its broader aspects, of course, industrial mobilization is by law the responsibility of the National Security Resources Board. I am sure that Secretary Symington, in his new capacity as Chairman of that Board, will leave no stone unturned in his quest for constant improvement in our plans for industrial mobilization.

The points I have just been discussing have been addressed, in the main, to General Eisenhower's testimony before this committee. With your permission, I should like to turn now to a more general subject—to be exact, I should like to discuss the adequacy of the military budget in the light of world conditions. This will be the first time that I have been able to discuss this subject as candidly as I would like—and it is only the highly encouraging outcome of our recent conference of Defense Ministers at The Hague, coupled with the progress that has been made in some studies to which I will refer in a moment, which permits me to discuss the subject publicly at this time. It was this factor—and in particular, the point at which we have now arrived in our defense consultations under the North Atlantic Pact—which prompted Assistant Secretary McNeil to request that the appearance before this committee by the Secretary of Defense be delayed until after The Hague Conference.

In beginning my discussion of this subject, I would like to go back to last September. Immediately after the President's announcement, on September 23, that there had been an atomic explosion in the U. S. S. R.—which was a date somewhat in advance of the date we had anticipated—we began a reevaluation of our own military requirements. Almost simultaneously with this development, the President directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, as a working committee of the National Security Council, to conduct a broad reevaluation of our national program, in the light of our international commitments and in the light of the constantly changing world situation.

Some of the results of the reevaluations mentioned above are already known to this committee. Specifically, the President's decision to proceed with the construction of the H-bomb was based in part on the studies described above. In addition, many of the steps we have taken in furtherance of the North Atlantic Pact and the military-aid program implementing that pact have been based on the continuing studies I have already mentioned.

I would not like to leave the impression that these studies are completed. Indeed, in the broad sense, studies of this nature are never completed, for both the State and the Defense Departments must continuously review foreign policy and the military strength that goes hand in hand with it. In making continuing reviews of this type, we have the advantage of the very excellent organizational arrangements Congress has provided, through the vehicles known as the National Security Council—and I refer particularly to the language used by Congress in assigning to the National Security Council the duty "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security."

The point at which we have arrived at the present time can be described as follows: Based on the work already done by the Council of Foreign Ministers, by the Council of Defense Ministers, and by the Chiefs of Staff, of the North Atlantic Pact nations, we have, for the first time, a fairly clear picture of the collective military requirements of the North Atlantic community of nations. We have also appraised recent events which make it entirely possible that appropriations in excess of those which have been requested for the current year will be required in succeeding years, not only for our own military forces but also for the military-aid program. Just as it is possible that in future years this Nation will have to devote an increased percentage of its total budget to these items, it is also possible that our partners in the North Atlantic Pact will be required by the force of events, and by the force of our collective planning as well, to take similar action. The events to which I allude include the Soviet atomic explosion, the fall of China, the serious situations in southeast Asia, the break in diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and deteriorating relations with other satellite countries, the Soviet assumption of control over the armed forces of Poland, Soviet naval expansion, the increased Soviet pressures in Germany, the recent attack on a naval aircraft in the Baltic, and the recent Soviet demands relative to Trieste.

None of this presents a happy prospect; but the cold war is not a happy circumstance. The only satisfaction that I can personally derive from the situation lies in the fact that our own Military Establishment is well on the road to becoming a stronger and more powerful organization, and one which—as circumstances require—can utilize increased appropriations in a manner which will provide substantially increased combat effectiveness, whereas, even as recently as 1 year ago, large sums of money out of any increased appropriations would have been drained off in the form of unnecessary overhead. It is particularly important that the Armed Forces maintained by the United States shall at all times provide a sound base on which can be built a Military Establishment of increased size, should circumstances so require—for our mobilization in time of emergency depends for its success upon the soundness of the forces in being which constitute our mobilization base. Speaking to this point in chapter IV of the semiannual report which I submitted to Congress on February 28, I said:

"Before the services could make effective use of their money, therefore, it was essential that they 'get into condition.' Even if additional amounts of money had been added to their budget, large percentages of it would have failed to produce added military strength. * * * Our watchword must be economy and efficiency in every activity—with the size of our Military Establishment on as stable a basis as possible, subject to such increases or decreases as the international situation may warrant."

In this connection, I should like to stress the fact that the economy program, far from being laid aside, is made even more necessary by the world conditions and circumstances to which I have referred. The economy program, on which we are all engaged as a team, and on which we have had such excellent cooperation and support from this committee, is to be carried on with undiminished vigor because we must continue to eliminate overhead in applying our resources to building up combatant forces. Indeed, the economy program—which has been misinterpreted and misconstrued in some quarters—is one of the principal tools used by the Department of Defense in channeling funds into the combatant forces where such funds can be used to give us added strength, and away from such wasteful expenditures as unnecessary overhead, costly duplication, and unwarranted overlaps.

The composite picture which I wish to leave with you is based in the main on the continuing reevaluations referred to above. It is based also on recent studies I have directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make in the field of aircraft procurement—a field which is, as General Eisenhower pointed out in his testimony here, one of the areas of vital importance to which we have given, and propose to continue to give, close attention. But as General Eisenhower pointed out in his very valuable testimony before this committee, aircraft procurement is only one of the areas to which serious and continuing attention must be devoted, among the other areas, as enumerated by General Eisenhower and as discussed by me a few moments ago, being antisubmarine warfare, tank and heavy ordnance procurement, Alaska construction, industrial mobilization, and intelligence.

In connection with the question of aircraft procurement, and in view of the reevaluation made of the world situation to which I referred a few minutes ago, I have had further discussions with my immediate assistants and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I recommend that there be added to the amounts submitted to the Congress by the President in January an additional amount of $200 million in contract authorization for aircraft procurement for the Air Force, and an amount of $100 million in contract authorization for aircraft procurement for the Navy and $50 million in cash for conversion and operation of additional destroyers and small ships needed for antisubmarine defense. This recommendation has the approval of the President. (This $50 million cannot be spent during the current fiscal year and therefore cannot be met out of the savings we have heretofore made. Accordingly, it will require an additional appropriation.)

In addition, arrangements have been completed under which Marine aviation, during fiscal 1951, will include 16 Marine air combat squadrons, instead of the 12 squadrons that were contemplated when the Budget was submitted in January. The additional four squadrons that are to be maintained will be financed by means of economies elsewhere in the budget, and no additional appropriations are required for this purpose.

The defense budget as reported out by the House Committee on Appropriations reduced the amount recommended in the President's budget message by approximately $200 million. We consider that the items cut out which total this amount are of vital importance, particularly in view of the present world situation, and we earnestly recommend that these items be restored by your committee.

For similar reasons, we are adding to the procurement program for the Department of the Army, out of savings made elsewhere, a sum of $24 million to help speed up the research and development for certain weapons, particularly antitank weapons.

With respect to all of the foregoing, there is one point that I want to emphasize, and it is this: These increased amounts for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are for "hardware," and nothing else. The additional $200 million for the Air Force, for example, is to be used for planes—and not for extra people, or extra overhead, or extra anything else. The same is true of the money for the Army and Navy. What we need is hardware—and what I am outlining to you, therefore, is a program that is addressed exclusively to the procurement of hardware.

In conclusion, I should like to comment on a situation which seems to me to be remarkable. I have reference to the fact that this year's budget for the Military Establishment, with very little variation, has received the approval of the Executive Office of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Appropriations Committees of the Congress, and other responsible persons, such as General Eisenhower, In other words, there has been substantial unanimity of opinion on a vital point, namely, the fact that the world in which we live requires military expenditures of approximately the amount which the President submitted to the Congress last January. Consider for a moment how unusual it is to find that all of the responsible authorities who have spoken to this subject have been in complete agreement on more than 95 percent of the military budget. The House Appropriations Committee has suggested some reductions; General Eisenhower has suggested the possibility of some increases. But even taking the maximum of these suggestions—both on the minus and on the plus side—there has been no suggested variation which would affect the military budget in an amount greater than 4 percent. I call this fact to your attention in closing because I think that it constitutes the best argument that I could possibly present as to the fundamental soundness of the budget which is before us.

APPENDIX Z

(Referred to on p. 2602)

13 MARCH 1950.

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, LOUIS JOHNSON, BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1951

I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss, in broad outline, the military budget for fiscal year 1951.

Work was commenced on this 1951 budget over a year ago. The President and the late Secretary of Defense Forrestal requested General Eisenhower to come to Washington and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making recommendations of the forces and matériel requirements upon which this budget could be based. Discussions of this problem were based upon decisions as to the roles and missions for each Service, reached at Key West and Newport in March and August of 1948. Beginning in December 1948, General Eisenhower and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reexamined our military requirements in this light as well as in terms of the strategic situation. These preliminary discussions culminated in a second Key West conference in May 1949, in which I participated.

As a result of these extended studies and discussions, General Eisenhower made recommendations as to the composition of the forces which should be maintained and the major matériel requirements which should be provided in fiscal year 1951. The forces and major matériel requirements to be provided by the budget before you are essentially those that he recommended. Each of the military departments formulated and submitted on 1 August 1949 a preliminary budget on this basis. After a preliminary review by my staff these preliminary budgets were consolidated and presented to the President on 15 August, 30 days in advance of the deal line for such presentation.

Just prior to the submission by the military departments of their preliminary budgets, the President advised that $13 billion in new obligational authority could be allocated for Department of Defense military functions under the over-all Federal Budget for 1951. This $13 billion does not include $500 million for stockpiling of strategic materials, which is included in the appropriation of the Treasury Department.

At the time of submission of the preliminary estimates on 1 August 1949, certain items were still not settled. Under General Bradley's leadership the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to address themselves to these items. Consideration also was given to the further recommendations of each of the three military departments, with the result that adjustments coninued to be made. After consultation with the Bureau of the Budget, final determinations were made in December—with subsequent approval by the President for incorporation in the Budget.

The estimates of the military departments on August 1, 1949, upon which the fiscal year 1951 budget was based, provided for certain forces and major matériel procurement within a $13 billion total. We profited greatly, however, by the hearings we held as the work on the savings program, and the work on the budget proceeded to its final phase during November and December, during which time the representatives of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force presented the needs of their respective establishments.

Because of these conferences and the savings and economies instituted in fiscal 1950, as well as the elimination of unnecessary or doubtful items, the plans for 1951 have been modified to provide significantly more powerful military forces within the same dollar requirements. As compared with the estimates made by the military departments on August 1, Navy strength has been increased by three attack carriers, three carrier air groups, one cruiser, and one battleship in reduced commission. There will be two marine divisions instead of six battalion landing teams. The Army will be organized into ten divisions rather than nine, and will also have two additional antiaircraft battalions. The Air Force will increase the number of planes per group in three additional bomber groups.

Also, since August 1, 1949, $150 million was added to aircraft procurement for the Air Force and $50 million for the Navy. In addition to the 200-percent increase in the allocations for antisubmarine warfare equipment, 700,000 hours were added for flying in combat-type units in the Navy, and Army civilian component allocations were increased by $6 million for armories for the Organized Reserve. Army matériel procurement was increased by $41 million, including $10 million for new type signal equipment for the mobile striking forces of the Army, $17.5 million for heavy ordnance, including special prime movers, and $7.8 million for modernized portable bridges and other new engineer equipment.

Despite this strengthening of the military services, over and above that thought possible last August, I would be less than candid if I did not point out that the 1951 budget, which you have before you, does not provide all the military forces the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe should be maintained if only the military point of view were to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the President's budget because they recognize the importance to national security of the maintenance of a sound economy. Consideration was given to all such factors by the President in submitting to the Congress a military budget within the $13 billion figure which we are discussing today.

The budget provides for a total of 1,507,000 man-years of military personnel—630,000 for the Army, 461,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps, and 416,000 for the Air Force.

Under these recommendations for the Army, this Budget will provide 10 divisions, 48 antiaircraft battalions, and other combat and service units. Complementing the active Army will be the National Guard with 350,000 personnel and the Organized Reserve with 255,000 in regular training.

The Navy under these recommendations will operate an active naval fleet of 652 ships, including 238 combatant ships. Two Marine Corps divisions will be maintained. A total of 5,900 aircraft will be operated by the active forces, and 2,500 by the reserve forces. Supplementing the Navy and Marine Corps will be 204,850 members of the Naval Reserve and 50,772 of the Marine Corps Reserve in regular training.

It is contemplated that the active Air Force will be organized into 48 groups and 13 separate squadrons, approximately its present strength. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve will be organized into 27 groups and 25 base wings, respectively. A total of 8,800 airplanes, from trainers to heavy bombers, will be operated by the active Air Force, and in addition 3,400 by the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

The planned standard of maintenance of military installations is comparable to present standards. The amounts allocated for this purpose are less, however, because of the reduction in the number of stations and the reduction in the number of civilian personnel assigned to maintenance tasks.

Funds necessary for maintenance and operation of the equipment used by the military forces will be continued at about the present level—although in certain areas increased emphasis will be given to improvement in the maintenance of equipment and in training standards.

The budget contemplates the employment, from authority requested in this budget, of approximately 140,000 fewer civilian personnel than in 1950. While the number of civilian personnel released up to this time is now approximately 163,000, it should be remembered that a portion of those which have been released were paid from prior years and Civil Functions appropriations and that some additional reductions within the military departments will be necessary in order to live within the funds requested in this budget for civilian employment.

Aircraft procurement as provided for in this budget will permit the continuation of approximately a $2.0 billion annual program. The $2.0 billion will permit us to place orders in fiscal year 1951 for 2,200 aircraft, 1,383 for the Air Force, and 817 for the Navy.

Primarily as a result of authorizations granted in prior years, 2,713 aircraft are scheduled for delivery in 1950–1,732 for the Air Force, and 981 for the Navy. This will require the expenditure of $1,700,000,000 this year. Deliveries of new aircraft in 1951 are estimated at 2,297—1,383 for the Air Force, and 914 for the Navy—requiring the expenditure of $2 2 billion in fiscal year 1951. Cash payments for aircraft on order lag the provision of procurement authority by one to three years, depending on the type of aircraft involved. Because aircraft procurement was at a much lower level two years ago, our cash payments are now showing a substantial increase.

If new authority for aircraft and related procurement as requested in the budget is approved by the Congress, it is estimated that we will have as of 1 July 1950 total unexpended authorizations for aircraft and related procurement of $5.6 billion. Of this sum approximately $3.5 billion will be unfinanced contract authority for which cash appropriation will be required in 1952 and succeeding years.

While no provision has been made for the laying down of new vessels for this year, shipbuilding work under prior authority will continue in fiscal 1951 at about a $300 million rate. (This action for next year is not to be interpreted as meaning that a reasonably adequate shipbuilding program, including new starts, will not be provided for in future budgets.)

Other major procurement, such as guns, guided missiles, trucks, tanks, and other ordnance, engineering, and electronic items will be increased by a little over 20 percent as compared with the procurement program for these items in fiscal year 1950.

This procurement, combined with that authorized by the Congress in the last two fiscal years, will provide a continued flow of improved equipment which will assure us that the combat units will be better equipped a year or two years from now than they are today.

The continuation of the procurement program in this budget also makes a substantial contribution to our industrial mobilization potential—and this is further improved by the allocation of approximately $100 million for care and maintenance of our reserve plants, reserve machine tools, and for planning for increased production in those areas where production would have to be expanded quickly in case of an emergency.

We have continued Research and Development at almost the $600 million level of 1950. This program is extremely important in our peacetime effort and we consider that adequate emphasis must be placed on new methods and techniques to keep us in the forefront of scientific progress. During the past year the Research and Development Board has accomplished a great deal through the review and elimination of unnecessary projects. We expect to intensify this critical examination during the next year. As there are new projects of high priority continually being presented for integration into the Research and Development program, the program should become increasingly effective.

While funds for stockpiling of strategic and critical materials are not included in the $13 billion budget for the Department of Defense, we consider this a matter of vital importance in the total mobilization picture, and of primary importance in an emergency. As the President stated in his message to the Congress, $500 million additional authority has been requested in the 1951 budget. This amount, when combined with the authority made available last year, will permit the continuation of an orderly stockpiling program through the next fiscal year.

In the closing days of the first session of this Congress, provision was made for certain military public works, particularly in Alaska and Okinawa. The budget, as recommended by the President, contains no detailed request for additional public works funds, although the contingent item of $371 million anticipated the later submission of such a program. However, since the submission of the budget to the Congress, a 1951 public works program which calls for $300 million of the contingency item has been developed. It is expected that this program will be submitted for your consideration during the current hearings.

This budget provides $11,400,000 for the operation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Research and Development Board, the Munitions Board, and other Boards and staffs. This is $50,000 less than the funds provided for the current fiscal year. Numerous additional requirements—such as the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the Civilian Components Policy Board—have been met, and pay increases for civilian personnel have been absorbed within this smaller total.

In the course of your hearings at this session, your Committee will find reflected in the detailed estimates reduced dollar requirements for many functions and activities of the Department of Defense. These reduced requests reflect what we have already done in absorbing increased costs and in effecting savings and reductions, and what we confidently feel we can do in the coming year in providing support for an effective military force at a lesser cost.

In summary I would like to sketch in broad outline the results of our efforts to achieve our common objectives. This budget contemplates, as stated in the President's Message:

> That, "total personnel assigned to combat forces will be the greatest since the completion of demobilization following Warld War II."
>
> That, $2.0 billion will be available for aircraft procurement—about the same as the volume of orders placed under fiscal year 1949 authority and planned for use in fiscal year 1950.
>
> That, military personnel will be slightly less in total number than in 1950—but requiring almost the same allocation of funds.
>
> That, the National Guard and the Air National Guard will be continued throughout fiscal year 1951 on a level program at the strengths attained during the current fiscal year—and that the Organized and Volunteer Reserve forces will be continued at approximately the current level.
>
> That, with the exception of shipbuilding, and aircraft procurement mentioned above, other major procurement will be increased.
>
> That, Research and Development and Industrial Mobilization will be continued at about the same level as in fiscal year 1950.

This is the defense structure for which we request $13 billion this year as compared with the $14.2 billion which was requested last year. In my opinion forces of the relative readiness to be maintained will provide a sufficiency of defense during the period covered by this budget. In my opinion, also, it is the minimum amount which should be provided for the Department of Defense in 1951.

Two weeks ago I sent to the Chairman of the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees a chapter of my first semi-annual report to the Congress under the provisions of the National Security Act amendments of 1949. This chapter deals with savings, absorbed costs and reductions. Because the primary emphasis of this chapter is upon economy, and because the full report will not be delivered by the printers until the end of this month, I advised the respective Chairman that "elsewhere in the report I have discussed the strengthening of our national security—for in all that we do security comes first, and economy comes second."

Where do we stand with respect to national security?

We are farther ahead today than ever in our peacetime history. We are tailoring our defense to fit today's situation. We are getting into condition. We are converting fat to muscle. We are releasing civilians and men in uniform whose jobs do not contribute directly to national defense. By getting rid of what we no longer need for national defense, we get that much more money with which to meet our pressing requirements for combat forces. We are taking officers away from desks and assigning them to the field for combat training. We are approaching the problem of reserves realistically, and are setting up a strong nucleus capable of orderly, rapid expansion in an emergency. We are getting more defense value out of every appropriated dollar than ever before.

The Army is stronger today than at any time since the end of the war. General J. Lawton Collins, its Chief of Staff, has recently stated that:

"We have units that are ready to move right now in case of aggression; we have the best men in the Army today that we have ever had in peacetime and, although we have a number of critical equipment problems yet to solve, I can assure you that our troops, with the equipment that they have, would give a good account of themselves if we were attacked. The recent reduction in our occupation commitments has enabled us to concentrate more of our efforts upon strengthening the combat units which form the hard core of our fighting force. We are giving our divisions and other combat units more officers and men, some items of better weapons and equipment, and improved training under field conditions."

On December 31, the Army had 4,400 more men in combat units than it had in such units on July 1, 1949. Much of this increase in combat effectiveness was made possible by savings in the use of undue numbers of personnel for administrative and overhead purposes. This 4,400 increase in the number of men in combat units is even more striking when it is borne in mind that the total number of men in the Army decreased by almost 20,000 men during this period.

As for the Navy, let me repeat what Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, recently put in a special message to all Navy personnel:

"Navy Department is exerting every effort to translate available appropriations into maximum fighting strength and mobilization potential. Savings made are generally available for increasing the state of readiness of authorized forces. Economies already effected have permitted increasing previously planned fleet strength by one large carrier and one cruiser, to provide additional equipment for antisubmarine warfare, and to augment general readiness. Planned economies are an important contributing factor in retaining two additional Marine battalions."

Over-all, the readiness of the Navy has been improved and the active fleet is "ready to go." It is manned at 67 percent of wartime strength with trained personnel who seek to make a career of the Navy. This represents a substantial improvement over the situation 18 months ago when a larger active fleet in number of men and ships was manned at only 61 percent of wartime strength with many of the ships either immobilized or in a reduced operational status because of heavy turn-over of personnel and a serious imbalance in the skills and occupations required.

And, as for the Air Force, it is in the highest state of combat readiness since the war. Secretary Symington and General Vandenberg, the latter having only recently returned from an extensive tour of foreign stations, advise me that the spirit of officers and men is high. General Vandenberg states the combat readiness of the Air Force units he inspected was unexcelled at any time since the demobilization at the end of the war.

In our Air Force of today and as planned for 1951, we have 416,000 men manning 48 groups. These 48 groups constitute the Air Force portion of the balanced peacetime forces approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the budget for fiscal year 1951. Due to organizational changes and the assignment of additional aircraft to certain groups, the so-called "48 group" Air Force has greater effective strength than did a "48 group" Air Force of a year or two ago.

The forces we already have in being, plus what our potential allies are developing, should tend to discourage aggressive action by any potential enemy. For the security and the peace of the world look not only to American manpower, American industry, and American weapons, but also to the potential of all of our partners under the North Atlantic Pact who have joined with us for the defense of our common idea.

APPENDIX AA

(Referred to on p. 2603)

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LOUIS JOHNSON BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JULY 25, 1950

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the last time I appeared before this committee was April 26, 2 months before the Republic of Korea was invaded. At that time I said:

"The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, as a working committee of the National Security Council * * * have also appraised recent events which make it entirely possible that appropriations in excess of those which have been requested for the current year will be required in succeeding years, not only for our own military forces but also for the military-aid program. Just as it is possible that in future years this Nation will have to devote an increased percentage of its total budget to these items, it is also possible that our partners in the North Atlantic Pact will be required by the force of events, and by the force of collective planning as well, to take similar action. The events to which I allude include the Soviet atomic explosion, the fall of China, the serious situations in southeast Asia, the break in diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and deteriorating relations with other satellite countries, the Soviet assumption of control over the armed forces of Poland, Soviet naval expansion, the increased Soviet pressures in Germany, the recent attack on a naval aircraft in the Baltic, and the recent Soviet demands relative to Trieste.

"None of this presents a happy prospect; but the cold war is not a happy circumstance. The only satisfaction that I can personally derive from the situation lies in the fact that our own Military Establishment is well on the road to becoming a stronger and more powerful organization, and one which—as circumstances require—can utilize increased appropriations in a manner which will provide substantially increased combat effectiveness, whereas, even as recently as 1 year ago, large sums of money out of any increased appropriations would have been drained off in the form of unnecessary overhead. It is particularly important that the Armed Forces maintained by the United States shall at all times provide a sound base on which can be built a Military Establishment of increased size, should circumstances so require. * * *"

Gentlemen, circumstances do so require. That is my reason for being here today, in support of supplemental appropriations in the amount of $10.5 billion.

I know that all of you are familiar with the contents of President Truman's message of last Wednesday. That document presents, better than anything I might say, the reasons for our request for this supplemental appropriation. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Honorable Carl Vinson, said of the President's message that it was a "firm message which will be heartening to all Americans." In making this statement, Chairman Vinson added:

"I want especially to say that I am delighted to know, from the President's message and from my own contacts with the Defense Department, that what has been recommended has the complete and unstinted support of all the civilian and military leaders of the Defense Department. This is a splendid example of teamwork and efficiency in the Defense Department. * * *"

I am extremely grateful to Chairman Vinson for his generous support. It is entirely accurate to state that this supplemental appropriation has the unanimous approval and support of the civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense.

The appropriation problems with which this committee, the Congress, and the Department of Defense have had to deal in recent months have not been easy ones. I know of no better summation of these problems than the one which your chairman, George Mahon, made on the floor of the House in support of this committee's recommended budget for 1950. You will recall that on that occasion, Chairman Mahon said: "If war comes soon, we are appropriating too little. If we have miscalculated the dangers, if the threat of war is just a deceptive mirage on the horizon, we are appropriating too much. * * *"

The dilemma described by Chairman Mahon was a dilemma which confronted not only this committee and the Department of Defense, but also the President and the people of the United States. It was not a new dilemma. My predecessor as Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, outlined this dilemma very aptly in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 21, 1948, about a year prior to the time that I became Secretary of Defense on March 28, 1949. On that occasion, Secretary Forrestal quoted the following excerpt from a memorandum he had received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Based solely on military considerations, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the administration should advocate a balanced Military Establishment commensurate with the 70 air-group program for the Air Force. * * * The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize, however, that the phrasing of this balanced Army, Navy, and Air Force program) must be made responsive to such other factors as the capability of the aircraft industry to expand, the impact of the cost of the program on the national economy, and the calculated risk which can be accepted in the light of changing world politico-military situations."

After quoting the foregoing memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Forrestal then went on to make the following statement:

"I think that I can say to you, therefore, that the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force—as well as the Senate and the House of Representatives, I feel sure—are all in agreement, *as a military matter*, on the desirability of what the Joint Chiefs have described as 'a balanced Military Establishment commensurate with the 70 air-group program.'

"The Joint Chiefs * * * have also reported to me that a force of the recommended size would require, in fiscal 1949, additional appropriations in excess of $9 billion. * * *

"In my opinion, the Joint Chiefs were entirely correct in addressing themselves exclusively to the military considerations. That is their job. But they were equally correct in pointing out that other considerations—'the impact of the cost of the program on the national economy,' for example—are factors which the President and the Congress must consider.

"The impact on the economy of an additional $9 billion program is a matter that deserves—and will, I am sure, receive—the most careful attention by both the President and the Congress.

"My insistence, throughout the consideration of these matters, has been that they must be considered in a rational and organized manner—and not on a basis of emotional reaction. * * *

"If the Congress and the President should ultimately decide that the military considerations, at this juncture in world history, outweigh the fiscal considerations—then we should, by all means, embark on the $9 billion additional program. But if the Congress and the President should ultimately decide that a program of somewhat lesser magnitude is required—in the interest of national solvency and in the interest of avoiding, so far as possible, allocations, rationing, price controls, and a host of other restrictions—then we should proceed in such a manner that we will get the most national security for each dollar we spend. * * *

"Bearing in mind over-all considerations such as those I have just been discussing, and after receiving the Joint Chiefs' $9 billion recommendation of April 14, 1948, I asked the Joint Chiefs this supplementary question: Granted the military desirability of the $9 billion program, what program would the Joint Chiefs recommend—in the general vicinity of $3 billion—as the most effective military program within the limits of the funds that will probably be available to us?

"Yesterday, I received the unanimous reply of the Joint Chiefs—and I again emphasize the unanimity of the reply. Their specific recommendation—on the more limited basis envisioned by my more recent question—was that the $3 billion program should be increased by $481 million. * * *

"The program I am here discussing, therefore, is a program which would increase the original 1949 budget request by $3,481,000,000. * * *"

The $3,481,000,000 which Secretary Forrestal recommended, when added to the 1949 budget as originally submitted, gave a total recommended military budget of $13,507,000,000 for the fiscal year 1949. In other words, the dilemma presented by the competing military and economic considerations was resolved at the 13½ billion level.

The President, his advisers in the executive branch of the Government, and the Congress solved the dilemma at that time by deciding that the fiscal considerations were equally as important as the military. The substance of that decision has been repeatedly ratified by the President, his advisers in the executive branch of the Government, and the Congress, all of whom reflected the will of the people of the United States.

At the outset of my remarks today, I quoted from my testimony of April 26. You will recall that my concluding remarks on April 26 dealt with the same dilemma I have just been discussing. On that occasion, I said:

" * * * this year's budget for the Military Establishment, with very little variation, has received the approval of the Executive Office of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Appropriations Committees of the Congress, and other responsible persons such as General Eisenhower. In other words, there has been substantial unanimity of opinion on a vital point—namely, the fact that the world in which we live requires military expenditures of approximately the amount which the President submitted to the Congress last January. Consider for a moment how unusual it is to find that all of the responsible authorities who have spoken to this subject have been in complete agreement on more than 95 percent of the military budget. The House Appropriations Committee has suggested some reductions; General Eisenhower has suggested the possibility of some increases. But even taking the maximum of these suggestions—both on the minus and on the plus side—there has been no suggested variation which would affect the military budget in an amount greater than 4 percent. I call this fact to your attention * * * because I think that it constitutes the best argument that I could possibly present as to the fundamental soundness of the budget * * *."

One month ago the Republic of Korea was invaded. The action of the United Nations, supported by the United States, called for the use of troops, ships, and aircraft to repel this criminal aggression which threatened the peace of world and the security of our own country. In the light of the actual fighting that is now in progress, we have reached the point where the military considerations clearly outweigh the fiscal considerations.

However, in our efforts to get the most efficient use of our military appropriations we have not had to deal with the same sort of competing considerations as those I have just been discussing. For all of us were equally determined to get maximum preparedness out of every dollar appropriated—and this determination to get the maximum return on the defense dollar will continue to govern our actions.

In enacting the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, the Congress added language specifically addressed to this point, and required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress, twice each year, "itemized statements showing the savings of public funds and the eliminations of unnecessary duplications and overlappings that have been accomplished pursuant to the provisions of this act."

Carrying out this congressional mandate has been the steadfast policy of the Department of Defense, and a prime condition of our efforts in this regard has been the elimination of unnecessary overhead, with a simultaneous improvement in the combat potential of the Armed Forces. Indeed, the over-all combat potential of our Armed Forces was at a higher level on June 25—the day the Republic of Korea was invaded—than had been the case at any time since postwar demobilization was completed.

I realize that the foregoing sentence could be regarded as a fine, glittering generality, so I would like to make it concrete. For that purpose, I will use specific illustrations.

In the case of the Navy, what the fleet is doing today would not have been possible 2 years ago. In March of 1948, just after the Communists staged a coup in Czechoslovakia, Secretary of Defense Forrestal was gravely concerned about the readiness of the Active Fleet. In a memorandum which he received on March 23, 1948, the following significant statement appears: "As of March 22, there are 111 vessels of the Active Fleet immobilized and 66 reduced to limited operations (or a total of 177) by insufficient personnel. * * * In addition, most of the operating Active Fleet vessels are under peacetime allowance."

The situation was one of the factors which led Secretary Forrestal to request the supplemental appropriation of $3,481,000,000, which I have already discussed above. This situation was also one of the factors which has led the Department of Defense to advocate a greater fighting strength for each ship, even at the expense of reducing the total number of ships in the Active Fleet. The ships we need are ships that can float and fight. A ship that only floats is a liability instead of an asset. On June 25, when the Republic of Korea was invaded, every ship in the Active Fleet was capable of getting under way and moving into action. Off the shores of Korea, we are being provided with daily illustrations of the readiness of the ships in our Active Fleet.

In the semiannual report which I recently submitted to the Congress, I discussed the general situation I have been describing above in these words:

"Over-all, the readiness of the Navy has been improved and the Active Fleet is 'ready to go.' It is manned at 67 percent of wartime strength with trained personnel who seek to make a career of the Navy. This represents a substantial improvement over the situation 18 months ago when a larger Active Fleet in number of men and ships was manned at only 61 percent of wartime strength with many of the ships either immobilized or in a reduced operational status because of heavy turn-over of personnel and a serious imbalance in the skills and occupations represented."

In the case of the Air Force, there has been a substantial increase in our actual combat potential. In chapter IV of the semiannual report which I submitted to Congress last February, I discussed this point in the following words:

"* * * it is worth noting that on January 1, 1948, the Finletter Commission recommended 70 groups manned by 401,000 men. On that date the report also noted that the Air Force stood at 337,000 men for 55 programed groups. * * *

"* * * the size of a 'group' is subject to change. As President Truman has pointed out, 'The number of groups is a somewhat misleading measure of airpower since the character, size, number of aircraft, and other elements of the group are not fixed but constantly changed as conditions require.' An example of the type of change to which the President referred is the programed size of each B-36 heavy bombardment group—which stood at 18 planes per group less than a year ago, and which stands at 30 planes per group today. In this connection it should also be noted that the programed size of nine groups which stood at 30 B-29's or B-50's per group 2 years ago, stand at 45 today. In addition, these groups include 20 B-29-type tankers which increase the effective range of each individual bomber.

"In our Air Force of today and as planned for 1951, we have 416,000 men manning 48 groups, but due to the organizational changes noted above, these 48 groups, according to Air Force estimates, are equivalent to 52½ groups of the size envisaged in the previous concept of the 70-group program."

I should also like to comment briefly on the situation with respect to the Army. In March of 1948, the Army's strength was 542,000. The Army's budgeted strength for the current fiscal year was 630,000, prior to the supplemental request which the President submitted to Congress yesterday. In addition to this increase in numbers, there has been a further increase arising out of the fact that proportionately more men are now in combat units, and proportionately less men are in noncombat categories. In my semiannual report, I pointed out that "this increase in combat effectiveness was made possible by savings in the use of undue numbers of personnel for administrative and overhead purposes." Between March 1948 and June 1950 the actual manpower strength of the Army's mobile striking force in the continental United States—the general reserve—has increased by 165 percent.

As this committee knows, all of the top officials of the Department of Defense—both civilian and military—have been seriously concerned lest even the increased strengths I have been describing should be inadequate to meet the needs of world conditions. In order to do everything possible to meet this situation, we set up a Defense Department Management Committee, immediately after the enactment of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. To assist this committee in carrying out the recommendations of the Hoover Commission with respect to the Department of Defense, we employed the management engineering firm of Robert Heller and Associates. The first paragraph of the directive of the management committee reads as follows: "Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, I have established a Defense Management Committee. The mission of the committee is to bring about progressively better use of defense dollars through elimination of nonessential expenditures, and through improved management, in order to release funds for increasing combat effectiveness, and to provide opportunities to curtail over-all costs."

The expanded program which the President submitted to Congress yesterday makes it all the more necessary that we obtain the maximum return for every dollar that we are investing in our national defense. This gives added point to a matter I mentioned here on April 26, when I said: "Our mobilization in time of emergency depends for its success upon the soundness of the forces in being which constitute our mobilization base."

The forces in being which make up our Army, Navy, and Air Force constitute a sound base. To that base, we recommend that you now add a total active duty strength in the neighborhood of 600,000 men—making a total of some 2,100,000 men.

Earlier this year this committee considered requests for a program covering all activities of the Department of Defense, approximating $13,300,000,000. Yesterday the President submitted a supplemental estimate in the amount of $10,500,000,000. The recommended revised budget, in the aggregate amount of $23,800,000,000, would accomplish the purpose of financing the costs of the Korean campaign, as well as providing for the early expansion of the military forces to cope with the present international situation.

The supplemental estimate includes $3,063,000,000 for the Army, $2,649,000,000 for the Navy, $4,535,000,000 for the Air Force, and $240,000,000 for establishment-wide activities of the Defense Department.

About 59 percent of the supplemental request, or $6.2 billion, has been included for guns, tanks, ships, aircraft, ammunition, and other major procurement items. (Of this total about $3,344,000,000 is for aircraft—$40 million for the Army, $620 million for the Navy, $2,684,000,000 for the Air Force—and $185 million is for shipbuilding.)

About 24 percent, or $2.5 billion, would go for the operation and maintenance of the facilities and equipment for the regular operations of the Armed Forces, including the sharply increased demands for consumption-type matériel in the Korean campaign. (About one-half of the $2.5 billion would go for consumption-type matériel.)

About 13 percent, or $1.35 billion, would go for the pay and allowances of military personnel, including their food, subsistence, and travel.

Of the balance, $174 million is for military construction—$4 million for the Army and $170 million for the Air Force.

Exclusive of costs for guardsmen and reserves on active duty, $33 million has been provided for the National Guard, Officers Reserve Corps, and the ROTC program of the Army.

One hundred and twenty million dollars has been included for research and development, $70 million for industrial mobilization, and $50 million has been allocated for contingencies.

As the President stated in his message transmitting the supplemental request, certain program changes will undoubtedly be necessary in order properly to prosecute the campaign in Korea. For this reason authority is being requested to adjust by 10 percent any single appropriation by transfer from other appropriations. This would permit the necessary adjustments either in the Korean support or in the build-up phase contemplated by these estimates. I have instructed Assistant Secretary McNeil to keep this committee currently informed of all such actions which we find necessary.

I want to emphasize that this is not a call for full mobilization. It is a call to increase our strength in being, in order to enable us to support the United Nations' action in Korea and to build up our strength elsewhere to meet the threat to world peace.

The supplemental request before you rests on two principal factors: First, the requirements for land, naval, and air forces needed by General MacArthur successfully to prosecute the campaign in Korea; and second, the need to build up the strength of our forces over and above those committed to the Korean campaign.

The plans covering the build-up of our forces are based upon studies which began immediately after the President's announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion last September. You will recall that I discussed these studies when I testified here on April 26.

Because of the events in Korea the minimum desired forces which these studies showed to be required—normally a matter that would have been provided for in next year's budget—are being requested at this time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement and fully support the forces planned for the build-up in our strength, and are also in complete agreement as to the forces to be provided in support of the Korean campaign.

The action in Korea is a battle of supply and the distances involved are great. As a result, we must expect difficult problems and slow progress. The Military Establishment which we are asking you to expand, however, is a sounder mobilization base than the United States has ever had before. By reason of the ground work laid by my predecessor and the efforts of officers and civilians in all the agencies of the Department of Defense—the spirit of teamwork within the Department has grown tremendously. We have today a closely knit team of land, naval, and air forces. The swift decisions during the past 4 weeks to coordinate the combat efforts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Far East are striking examples of the benefits of unification in an emergency.

Our Military Establishment has been geared to provide a sound mobilization base and a swift striking force in case of a third world war. In addition, we have had to be prepared to meet, to the extent that we could, the first shock of an act of calculated local aggression. The latter test has been met with unprecedented speed in Korea. We are now in the process of backing our shock troops with the necessary reinforcements. We are asking you to supply the men and equipment to replace those being used in the Far East and additional strength to prepare for the possibility of future emergencies. I am sure that all of us will meet the challenge of the aggressor with the same undaunted spirit as that shown by our fighting men in Korea.

The witnesses who follow me will give the details of the program we recommend. It is a program designed to bring the action in Korea to a successful conclusion; it is also a program designed to promote world peace by deterring further aggression. It is the sort of program to which I referred on April 12 this year when I gave the founder's day speech at my alma mater, the University of Virginia.

Speaking in Charlottesville that day, I said:

"I have every confidence in our ultimate success. We shall face facts as they are and shall fit our defense plans and our manpower and munitions requirements to meet them. Our defense plans, however, are not rigid. They are not the laws of Medes and Persians. They are flexible and adaptable to changing conditions. They are under constant study and review. If we become convinced that our present means are insufficient to meet the exigencies of the day and the probable threats of tomorrow, we shall not be too humble to ask for more; and if we find them more than adequate we shall not be too proud to ask for less. We shall always seek for truth and we shall take fitting means to meet the truth."

Gentlemen, I shall be glad to attempt to answer any questions you may have.

APPENDIX BB

(Referred to on p. 2941)

A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT ONE THOUSAND PAGES OF WHITE PAPER

[For release for Sunday papers and radio, August 7, 1949]

By Patrick J. Hurley

I have just received and hurriedly read the more than 1,000-page State Department white paper. The paper is a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who have engineered the overthrow of our ally, the National Government of the Republic of China, and aided in the Communist conquest of China.

The white paper seems to indicate that the State Department has recovered the five or six suitcases full of State Department documents that were given or sold to the pro-Communist Amerasia magazine. The white paper certainly is now quoting aforesaid documents that were not available to me when I testified in December 1945 before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The American people have had an opportunity to read most of the Chambers-Hiss documents. Why can't the public have an opportunity to see the Amerasia papers pertaining to China, and have an explanation of the reasons why the officials arrested by the FBI in the Amerasia case were released and whitewashed by the State Department?

My directive from President Roosevelt in keeping with the American policy in China, was to prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China; keep the Chinese Army in the field, and to unify all anti-Japanese armed forces and bring them under the control of the National Government. There were, of course, numerous other directives but the foregoing are sufficient for the purpose of showing the failure of the white paper to really tell what happened in China. Most of the quotations attributed to me occurred during the war when Russia was our ally and we were attempting to unify all the military forces in China to defeat Japan. I was, of course, attempting to get the Communists to agree to the policy of my Government.

Beginning on page 87 and ending on page 92, under the title of "American Chargés Recommendations," the State Department does disfigure the recommendation made by American Chargé at Chungking, Mr. George Atcheson. The recommendations were made in my absence and were intended to destroy the National Government of the Republic of China, by arming the Chinese Communist Party whose purpose it was to overthrow the Government which I was directed to uphold. Fortunately, when the pro-Communists of the State Department called me on the carpet all primed to make me accept the Atcheson proposal, I was furnished a copy of the Atcheson cable which I now have before me. I quote from the Atcheson report:

"* * * The President should inform the generalissimo in definite terms that the *military necessity* requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists * * *."

Atcheson definitely recommended the arming of the Communists whose purpose it was to overthrow our ally, the National Government of the Republic of China. Now the question arises who were the pro-Communists in the Embassy at Chungking?—and I am quoting again from George Atcheson's message:

"This telegram has been drafted with the assistance and agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this Embassy."

According to Atcheson, every official in the American Embassy in China was in favor of arming the Chinese Communists whose purpose it was to overthrow our ally, the Government of China, which I was directed to uphold. At the close of the Atcheson report, the State Department very kindly adds:

"General Hurley strongly opposed the course of action recommended above (by Chargé Atcheson) and it remained the policy of the United States to supply military matériel and financial support only to the recognized Chinese National Government."

What the white paper does not show is that I was called on the carpet with a full array of the pro-Communists of the State Department as my judges and questioners, to defend the American policy in China against "every official of the American Embassy in China." I won over all of their criticism for one reason only. President Roosevelt sustained my position and said it was in keeping with the traditional American policy in China. Nearly all the officials relieved by me in China because they were pro-Communist are now in the State Department—presumably writing alibi white papers.

Let me for a moment discuss a more deep-seated disagreement which I have with the present American foreign policy. It is truly stated in the white paper that I nearly always agreed with the announced policy of the President and the various Secretaries of State. I criticized the wide discrepancy between the policy stated by the highest officials and the policy made effective throughout the world by the State Department. The policy of the highest officials and the State Department are not alike. They are very different policies. Let us look at the record:

On November 26, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded an agreement by Japan that:

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking."

Secretary Hull's policy was in keeping with the traditional American policy in China. My disagreement was not with the policy stated by President Roosevelt or President Truman or Secretary Hull. It was with the policy made effective all over the world by the State Department. For instance, the Atlantic Charter adopted before we entered the war provides that:

The nations: "Seek no aggrandizement, territorial, or other."

And again,

The nations: "Respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live."

There were other provisions of the Charter, but these two are enough for the point I am making. Britain and Russia, the United States and China, and 45 other nations, adopted the Atlantic Charter as a statement of the objectives for which we were fighting. That was Roosevelt's policy and I was for it. Later, Britain and Russia attempted to secede from the principles they had agreed to in the Atlantic Charter. At President Roosevelt's direction, I prepared at Teheran what is known as the Iran Declaration. The Iran Declaration, over the signatures of Churchill for the United Kingdom, Stalin for Soviet Russia, and Roosevelt for the United States, under date of December 1, 1943, reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic Charter as the objectives for which the United Nations were fighting.

Then came the Yalta Conference. President Roosevelt was a sick man at Yalta. The State Department officials took over. The secret agreements at Yalta surrendered every principle of the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration. My controversy concerning Yalta began when I said ours is a Government by the people, and the people cannot form correct conclusions if they are not given all the facts. I demanded the publication of the secret Yalta Agreements.

Now let us find what the secret Yalta Agreements did to China. I was not present at Yalta. China was not represented at Yalta. A secret agreement was signed by Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt giving Russia a preeminent right in the Chinese-Manchurian Railways. The Yalta secret agreement gave Russia a preeminent right in the port of Dairen in China. The Yalta secret agreement gave Russia the naval base of Port Arthur in China. All of these concessions to Russia were in violation of America's traditional policy in China and in violation of China's right to territorial integrity and political independence.

The Yalta secret agreement is the blueprint for Communist conquest of China. The import of the white paper to the effect that we were compelled to meet these demands of Russia because we were afraid of what Russia would do about our war with Japan, is not a satisfactory reason for our entering into the secret agreements of Yalta. At that time the United States had on the land, on the seas, and in the air, the greatest military power ever assembled on this earth. America's military power at the time of Yalta was invincible. The United States did not need Russia. Russia dared not oppose the United States. Japan was already defeated before Russia reached the Japanese front. The surrender of all of these rights to Russia in China was legally and morally unjustified, and no white paper will ever be able to change the history of America's diplomatic failure in China.

The white paper does not attempt to define for the American people the present American policy in China.

APPENDIX CC

(Referred to on p. 3016)

LETTER TO SENATOR KNOWLAND FROM HENRY A. WALLACE

FARVUE SOUTH SALEM NEW YORK

JUNE 9, 1951

HON. WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: I wish to thank most heartily for introducing so promptly and fairly into the hearings my wire to you of June 5, 1951. In the New York Times of June 8 appears a copy of the transcript of hearings including my wire. Apparently Western Union made some mistakes in transmittal and I am therefore sending you herewith the correct copy and expressing the wish that the clerk of the committee may use the correct wire instead of the somewhat mangled version in which there are some obvious mistakes:

"In the June 5 issue of the New York Times is a report of conversation between you and Secretary Acheson regarding my trip to China in 1944. You quote from John Carter Vincent's report on my conversation with Chiang to the effect that I said the American Communists were taking a patriotic attitude in the United States in 1944. What I actually said was that the American Communists were going all out to support the war effect in the United States against Japan and Germany and I could not see why Chinese Communists should not be as eager to defeat the Japanese as the American Communists. It seemed to me common sense to assume that the attitude of Communists in all countries would be the same with regard to defeating Germany and Japan. For your information I may say that neither Roosevelt nor I had the slightest illusion as to what the American Communists stood for from August 1939 till June 22, 1941. Both of us stood for help to Finland during that period. I talked with the President of the Farm Bureau and the Master of the Grange about organizing food shipments to Finland while she was fighting Russia. You and I know the American Communists in 1944 were going all out to support the war effort against Germany and Japan. Their reason for doing so is something else.

"Either John Carter Vincent's report of my conversation with Chiang conveys a false impression or my original language was not sufficiently clear. Superficially the American Communists were acting in 1944 as patriotic Americans in supporting the common war effort as approved by the United States Senate against Germany and Japan. Of course everybody knows American Communists were probably doing it for Russia's sake not our sake. Secretary Acheson and Secretary Marshall know this as well as you and I but apparently Secretary Acheson must have been momentarily confused by your question or he could not have replied as he did that my views was at variance with that of the State and War Departments. In your cross questioning of both Marshall and Acheson you have endeavored to make it a part of the record that we tried to bring about a coalition government in 1944. That is not true. What Roosevelt tried to do was to bring about unity of effort to defeat the Japanese. I made it repeatedly clear to Chiang in 1944 that the United States Government was not interested in the Chinese Communists but in the prosecution of the war against the Japanese. We were interested in Chiang making sufficient changes in the postwar period to avoid such a catastrophic upset as eventually took place. I outlined my views on this subject in a report to Roosevelt which was printed in full in the January 19, 1950, issue of the New York Times. For your information and for the record—pursuant to a request by Chiang for a liaison between himself and Roosevelt I wired Roosevelt on June 28, 1944, suggesting that he consider General Wedemyer in this capacity. I trust you may find it possible to make this wire a part of the hearings.

"(Signed) HENRY A. WALLACE."

Again thanking you most warmly for the courtesy,
I am sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. A. WALLACE.

APPENDIX DD

LETTER FROM HENRY A. LOVETT TO CHAIRMAN RUSSELL

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, May 17, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As a means of supplementing testimony given by General Marshall on the subject of United States casualties in Korea, and pursuant to his agreement to furnish various additional figures and information on this subject, I am forwarding the following:

1. A complete set of cumulative weekly reports on battle casualties, by services, for the period August 25, 1950 (covering the period since June 25) to May 11, 1951.

2. A complete set of weekly increases in battle casualties for the period August 25, 1950, to May 11, 1951.
3. A statement of the relative percentage losses of our troops in Western Europe in World War II and in Korea.
4. A statement of the ratio of United States casualties to Communist casualties in Korea.
5. A statement of the ratio of the Allied and German casualties in Western Europe.

As General Marshall indicated in this testimony, statistics involving World War II casualties are difficult to present accurately because of the incompleteness of the data available, especially that relating to enemy losses. The statements which are being presented represent the best estimates obtainable from the data at hand.

The Korean casualty figures presented for United States troops in each case do not include frostbite cases.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT, *Acting Secretary.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1102–50

SEPTEMBER 1, 1950, REPORT OF UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 2 [1]

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin for the period through midnight, Friday, August 25:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	6, 886	6, 567	27	194	98
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	503	294	10	73	26
3. Killed in action, total	443	343	9	66	25
4. Wounded in action, total	3, 889	3, 740	13	127	9
a. Died of wounds	60	51	1	7	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	3, 829	3, 689	12	120	8
5. Missing in action, total	2, 554	2, 484	5	1	64
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	70	54	0	0	16
c. Captured or interned	48	46	0	0	2
d. Current missing	2, 436	2, 384	5	1	46

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Aug. 25, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

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[1] Summary No. 1, dated Aug. 7, 1950, differed in form and content from this and subsequent summaries

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1112-50

SEPTEMBER 6, 1950, REPORT OF UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 3

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin for the period through midnight, Friday, September 1:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force[1]
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	8, 957	8, 244	28	589	96
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	682	534	10	109	29
3. Killed in action, total	599	465	9	97	28
4. Wounded in action, total	5, 366	4, 861	14	482	9
a. Died of wounds	83	69	1	12	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	5, 283	4, 792	13	470	8
5. Missing in action, total	2, 992	2, 918	5	10	59
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	94	78	0	0	16
c. Captured or interned	50	48	0	0	2
d. Current missing	2, 848	2, 792	5	10	41

[1] Air Force figures reflect a revision of the number previously reported as "current missing" (item 5d), as follows: The elimination of 2 duplications, and the subsequent determination that 3 persons originally reported as missing had been killed in action.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Sept. 1, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result o enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 1162–50

SEPTEMBER 20, 1950, REPORT OF UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 4

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin for the period through midnight Friday, September 15, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	13, 911	12, 876	33	876	126
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	1, 858	1, 652	12	165	29
3. Killed in action, total	1, 684	1, 500	11	145	28
4. Wounded in action, total	8, 709	7, 961	18	721	9
a. Died of wounds	174	152	1	20	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	8, 535	7, 809	17	701	8
5. Missing in action, total	3, 518	3, 415	[1] 4	10	89
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	148	132	0	0	16
c. Captured or interned	50	48	0	0	2
d. Current missing	3, 320	3, 235	4	10	71

[1] Revised to exclude 1 previously reported case which was subseqiuently reclassified as noncombat.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Sept. 15, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 1206–50

SEPTEMBER 29, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 5

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin for the period through midnight Friday, September 22, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items, 3, 4, and 5)	17, 220	16, 087	44	951	138
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	2, 441	2, 221	14	175	31
3. Killed in action, total	2, 211	2, 016	13	152	30
4. Wounded in action, total	11, 050	10, 226	26	787	11
a. Died of wounds	230	205	1	23	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	10, 820	10, 021	25	764	10
5. Missing in action, total	3, 959	3, 845	5	12	97
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	167	151	0	0	16
c. Captured or interned	50	48	0	0	2
d. Current missing	3, 742	3, 646	5	12	79

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Sept. 22, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release — No. 1232–50

October 5, 1950, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 6

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, September 29, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	20, 756	19, 290	89	1, 237	140
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	2, 954	2, 660	24	225	45
3. Killed in action, total	2, 660	2, 403	23	190	44
4. Wounded in action, total	13, 953	12, 853	54	1, 035	11
a. Died of wounds	294	257	1	35	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc)	13, 659	12, 596	53	1, 000	10
5. Missing in action, total	4, 143	4, 034	12	12	[1] 85
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	193	177	0	0	16
c. Captured or interned	73	71	0	0	2
d. Current missing	3, 877	3, 786	12	12	[1] 67

[1] The decrease from the previous report results from the fact that 14 persons previously reported as missing were subsequently determined to have been killed and are now so reported.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Sept. 29, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release — No. 1255–50

October 11, 1950, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 7

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, October 6, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	24, 163	21, 741	136	2, 127	159
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	3, 614	3, 134	34	399	47
3. Killed in action, total	3, 242	2, 825	31	340	46
4. Wounded in action, total	16, 661	14, 806	75	1, 769	11
a. Died of wounds	372	309	3	59	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	16, 289	14, 497	72	1, 710	10
5. Missing in action, total	4, 260	4, 110	30	18	102
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	311	292	2	0	17
c. Captured or interned	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	3, 842	3, 714	28	18	82

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight, Friday, Oct. 6, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 1288–50

OCTOBER 19, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 8

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, October 13, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	26,083	22,838	196	2,880	169
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,036	3,394	42	549	51
3. Killed in action, total	3,618	3,056	39	473	50
4. Wounded in action, total	18,129	15,606	127	2,385	11
a. Died of wounds	418	338	3	76	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	17,711	15,268	124	2,309	10
5. Missing in action, total	4,336	4,176	30	22	108
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	366	347	2	0	17
c. Captured or interned	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	3,863	3,725	28	22	88

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Oct. 13, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 1321–50

OCTOBER 25, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 9

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, October 20, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	26,701	23,140	252	3,133	176
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, 5a, and 5b)	4,125	3,455	44	572	54
3. Killed in action, total	3,682	3,099	40	490	53
4. Wounded in action, total	18,682	15,891	170	2,610	11
a. Died of wounds	442	355	4	82	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	18,240	15,536	166	2,528	10
5. Missing in action, total	4,337	[1] 4,150	42	33	112
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Captured, subquently died	1	1	0	0	0
c. Returned to military control	403	384	2	0	17
d. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
e. Current missing	3,826	[1] 3,661	40	33	92

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Oct. 20, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1361–50

NOVEMBER 2, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 10

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notification to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, October 27, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	27,610	23,987	284	3,142	197
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, 5a, and 5b)	4,403	3,718	44	575	66
3. Killed in action, total	3,934	3,337	40	492	65
4. Wounded in action, total	19,346	16,511	202	2,621	12
a. Died of wounds	467	379	4	83	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	18,879	16,132	198	2,538	11
5. Missing in action, total	4,330	[1] 4,139	42	[1] 29	120
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0	0	0
b. Captured, subsequently died	2	2	0	0	0
c. Returned to military control	450	431	2	0	17
d. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
e. current missing	3,771	[1] 3,602	40	[1] 29	100

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Oct. 27, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to the time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 1385–50

NOVEMBER 9, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 11

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, November 3, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	28,235	24,565	286	3,185	199
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,655	3,954	44	589	68
3. Killed in action, total	4,159	3,547	40	505	67
4. Wounded in action, total	19,793	16,924	204	2,653	12
a. Died of wounds	492	403	4	84	1
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	19,301	16,521	200	2,569	11
5. Missing in action, total	4,283	[1] 4,094	42	[1] 27	120
a. Died	4	4	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	500	480	2	0	18
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	3,672	[1] 3,506	40	[1] 27	99

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, November 3, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1411–50

November 16, 1950, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 12

The Department of Defense today announced the following report on battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, November 10, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	28,881	24,989	311	3,375	206
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,798	4,049	49	627	73
3. Killed in action, total	4,283	3,629	43	540	71
4. Wounded in action, total	20,251	17,216	214	2,808	13
a. Died of wounds	511	416	6	87	2
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	19,740	16,800	208	2,721	11
5. Missing in action, total	4,347	4,144	54	27	122
a. Died	4	4	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	517	497	2	0	18
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	3,719	3,539	52	27	101

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Nov. 10, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1444–50

November 24, 1950, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 13

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, November 17, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	29,996	25,677	320	3,756	243
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,993	4,150	50	706	87
3. Killed in action, total	4,461	3,721	43	612	85
4. Wounded in action, total	21,096	17,740	222	3,117	17
a. Died of wounds	528	425	7	94	2
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	20,568	17,315	215	3,023	15
5. Missing in action, total	4,439	4,216	55	27	141
a. Died	4	4	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	528	508	2	0	18
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	3,800	3,600	53	27	120

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Nov. 17, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1444–50

NOVEMBER 30, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 14

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, November 24, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	31, 028	26, 627	328	3, 829	244
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	5, 307	4, 442	50	725	90
3. Killed in action, total	4, 755	3, 996	43	628	88
4. Wounded in action, total	21, 662	18, 246	229	3, 170	17
a. Died of wounds	548	442	7	97	2
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	21, 114	17, 804	222	3, 073	15
5. Missing in action, total	4, 611	4, 385	56	31	[1] 139
a. Died	4	4	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	546	526	2	0	18
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	3, 954	3, 751	54	31	[1] 118

[1] These figures represent a reduction from those previously reported as a result of subsequent determination that certain missing persons had been killed in action.

NOTE. These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Nov. 24, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1484–50

DECEMBER 7, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 15

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, December 1, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	32, 442	27, 940	335	3, 907	260
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	5, 616	4, 724	50	747	95
3. Killed in action, total	5, 038	4, 255	43	647	93
4. Wounded in action, total	22, 337	18, 837	236	3, 246	18
a. Died of wounds	573	464	7	100	2
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	21, 764	18, 373	229	3, 146	16
5. Missing in action, total	5, 067	4, 848	56	[1] 14	149
a. Died	5	5	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	621	600	2	0	19
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	4, 334	4, 139	54	[1] 14	127

[1] These figures represent a reduction from those previously reported as a result of subsequent determination that certain missing persons had been killed in action.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, December 1, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 1510–50

DECEMBER 14, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 16

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, December 8, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	33, 878	28, 713	366	4, 517	282
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	5, 870	4, 874	52	844	100
3. Killed in action, total	5, 258	4, 395	45	721	97
4. Wounded in action, total	23, 477	19, 421	263	3, 774	19
a. Died of wounds	607	474	7	123	3
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc)	22, 870	18, 947	256	3, 651	16
5. Missing in action, total	5, 143	4, 897	58	22	166
a. Died	5	5	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	630	609	2	0	19
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	4, 401	4, 179	56	22	144

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Dec. 8, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 1552–50

DECEMBER 21, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 17

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, December 15, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	36, 421	30, 633	392	5, 102	294
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	6, 180	5, 078	54	945	103
3. Killed in action, total	5, 518	4, 563	47	808	100
4. Wounded in action, total	25, 587	21, 053	285	4, 227	22
a. Died of wounds	657	510	7	137	3
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	24, 930	20, 543	278	4, 090	19
5. Missing in action, total	5, 316	5, 017	60	67	172
a. Died	5	5	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	658	633	2	0	23
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	4, 546	4, 275	58	67	146

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Dec. 15, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occured up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 1575–50

DECEMBER 28, 1950, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 18

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, December 22, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	38, 325	32, 066	429	5, 524	306
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	6, 432	5, 186	59	1, 079	108
3. Killed in action, total	5, 742	4, 650	51	936	105
4. Wounded in action, total	27, 012	22, 166	315	4, 509	22
a. Died of wounds	684	530	8	143	3
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	26, 328	21, 636	307	4, 366	19
5. Missing in action, total	5, 571	5, 250	63	79	179
a. Died	6	6	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	705	679	2	0	24
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	4, 753	4, 461	61	79	152

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Dec. 22, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 20–51

JANUARY 5, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 19

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, December 29, 1950:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	40, 176	33, 184	458	6, 212	322
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	6, 761	5, 377	60	1, 216	108
3. Killed in action, total	6, 031	4, 826	52	1, 048	105
4. Wounded in action, total	27, 997	22, 578	338	5, 059	22
a. Died of wounds	716	537	8	168	3
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	27, 281	22, 041	330	4, 891	19
5. Missing in action, total	6, 148	5, 780	68	105	195
a. Died	14	14	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	720	694	2	0	24
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	5, 307	4, 968	66	105	168

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Dec. 29, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 44–51

JANUARY 10, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 20

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, January 5, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	42, 713	34, 730	465	7, 186	332
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7, 023	5, 530	62	1, 309	122
3. Killed in action, total	6, 247	4, 966	54	1, 108	119
4. Wounded in action, total	29, 306	23, 054	343	5, 886	23
a. Died of wounds	759	547	8	201	3
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc)	28, 547	22, 507	335	5, 685	20
5. Missing in action, total	7, 160	6, 710	68	192	[1] 190
a. Died	17	17	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	744	717	2	0	25
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	6, 292	5, 872	66	192	[1] 162

[1] Previously reported figures were revised as the result of subsequent determination that certain missing persons had been killed in action.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Jan. 5, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 91–51

JANUARY 18, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 21

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, January 12, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	45, 137	36, 956	496	3, 332	353
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7, 303	5, 786	64	1, 321	132
3. Killed in action, total	6, 509	5, 208	56	1, 116	129
4. Wounded in action, total	29, 951	23, 544	372	6, 008	27
a. Died of wounds	772	556	8	205	3
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	29, 179	22, 988	364	5, 803	24
5. Missing in action, total	8, 677	8, 204	68	208	197
a. Died	22	22	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	822	795	2	0	25
c. Current captured	108	105	0	0	3
d. Current missing	7, 725	7, 282	66	208	169

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Jan. 12, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 133–51

January 24, 1951, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 22

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, February 2, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	46, 201	37, 953	519	7, 369	360
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7, 499	5, 971	67	1, 325	136
3. Killed in action, total	6, 693	5, 385	58	1, 118	132
4. Wounded in action, total	30, 251	23, 792	393	6, 039	27
a. Died of wounds	780	560	9	207	4
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	29, 471	23, 232	384	5, 832	23
5. Missing in action, total	9, 257	8, 776	68	212	201
a. Died	26	26	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	844	816	2	0	26
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	8, 280	7, 830	66	212	172

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Jan. 19, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 172–51

February 1, 1951, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 23

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, January 26, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	46, 814	38, 522	528	7, 395	369
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7, 739	6, 195	73	1, 329	142
3. Killed in action, total	6, 897	5, 575	64	1, 122	136
4. Wounded in action, total	30, 615	24, 127	399	6, 061	28
a. Died of wounds	796	574	9	207	6
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	29, 819	23, 553	390	5, 854	22
5. Missing in action, total	9, 302	8, 820	[1]65	212	205
a. Died	46	46	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	873	842	3	0	28
c. Current captured	107	104	0	0	3
d. Current missing	8, 276	7, 828	[1]62	212	174

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Jan. 26, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notification of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release — No. 197–51

FEBRUARY 7, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 24

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, February 2, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	47,388	38,995	546	7,475	372
2. Total deaths (sums of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7,905	6,351	74	1,338	142
3. Killed in action, total	7,014	5,683	65	1,130	136
4. Wounded in action, total	30,941	24,365	414	6,134	28
a. Died of wounds	811	588	9	208	6
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc)	30,130	23,777	405	5,926	22
5. Missing in action, total	9,433	8,947	67	[1] 211	208
a. Died	80	80	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	902	872	[1] 2	0	28
c. Current captured	109	106	0	0	3
d. Current missing	8,342	7,889	65	[1] 211	177

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Feb. 2, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release — No. 229–51

FEBRUARY 15, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 25

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, February 9, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	48,035	39,500	566	7,588	381
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8,154	6,572	82	1,355	145
3. Killed in action, total	7,245	5,891	73	1,143	138
4. Wounded in action, total	31,395	24,711	426	6,227	31
a. Died of wounds	826	598	9	212	7
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	30,569	24,113	417	6,015	24
5. Missing in action, total	9,395	[1] 8,898	67	218	212
a. Died	83	83	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	912	881	2	0	29
c. Current captured	111	108	0	0	3
d. Current missing	8,289	[1] 7,826	65	218	180

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Feb. 9, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 256–51

FEBRUARY 21, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 26

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, February 16, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	49, 132	40, 449	592	7, 687	404
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8, 346	6, 755	83	1, 360	148
3. Killed in action, total	7, 408	6, 045	74	1, 148	141
4. Wounded in action, total	32, 230	25, 451	449	6, 299	31
a. Died of wounds	853	625	9	212	7
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to United States, etc)	31, 377	24, 826	440	6, 087	24
5. Missing in action, total	9, 494	8, 953	69	240	232
a. Died	85	85	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	955	922	2	0	31
c. Current captured	110	107	0	0	3
d. Current missing	8, 344	7, 839	67	240	198

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Feb. 16, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to, that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 285–51

FEBRUARY 28, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 27

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, February 23, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	50, 675	41, 951	[1] 590	7, 728	406
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8, 612	7, 017	83	1, 363	149
3. Killed in action, total	7, 639	6, 274	74	1, 150	141
4. Wounded in action, total	33, 401	26, 598	[1] 447	6, 325	31
a. Died of wounds	888	658	9	213	8
b. Other (current wounded returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	32, 513	25, 940	[1] 438	6, 112	[1] 23
5. Missing in action, total	9, 635	9, 079	69	253	234
a. Died	85	85	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	969	937	2	0	[1] 30
c. Current captured	110	107	0	0	3
d. Current missing	8, 471	7, 950	67	253	201

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Feb. 23, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 315–51

March 7, 1951, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 28

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, March 2, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	52,448	43,598	596	7,838	416
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8,853	7,246	83	1,375	149
3. Killed in action, total	7,857	6,485	74	1,157	141
4. Wounded in action, total	34,692	27,786	453	6,424	[1] 29
a. Died of wounds	911	676	9	218	8
b. Other (current wounded returned to duty, evacuated to the United States etc.)	33,781	27,110	444	6,206	[1] 21
5. Missing in action, total	9,899	9,327	69	257	246
a. Died	85	85	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	980	948	2	0	30
c. Current captured	110	107	0	0	3
d. Current missing	8,724	8,187	67	257	213

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Mar. 2, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 347–51

March 14, 1951, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 29

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, March 9, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	54,649	45,550	606	8,069	424
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	9,123	7,485	84	1,405	149
3. Killed in action, total	8,101	6,700	75	1,185	141
4. Wounded in action, total	36,108	28,989	462	6,625	32
a. Died of wounds	937	700	9	220	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc	35,171	28,289	453	6,405	24
5. Missing in action, total	10,440	9,861	69	259	251
a. Died	85	85	0	0	0
b. Returned to military	1,011	979	2	0	30
c. Current captured	110	107	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9,234	8,690	67	259	218

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Mar. 9, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 375–51

MARCH 21, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 30

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, March 16, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items, 3, 4, and 5)	55, 814	46, 438	620	8, 328	428
2. Total deaths (sum of items, 3, 4a, and 5a)	9, 379	7, 706	84	1, 440	149
3. Killed in action, total	8, 335	6, 904	75	1, 215	141
4. Wounded in action, total	36, 893	29, 538	475	6, 848	32
a. Died of wounds	959	717	9	225	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to United States, etc.)	35, 934	28, 821	466	6, 623	24
5. Missing in action, total	10, 586	9, 996	70	265	255
a. Died	85	85	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 027	995	2	0	30
c. Current captured	110	107	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9, 364	8, 809	68	265	222

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Mar. 16, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 410–51

MARCH 29, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 31

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight, Friday, March 23, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	57, 120	47, 450	628	8, 602	440
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	9, 602	7, 888	86	1, 474	154
3. Killed in action, total	8, 511	7, 047	77	1, 241	146
4. Wounded in action, total	37, 918	30, 311	480	7, 095	32
a. Died of wounds	1, 004	754	9	233	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	36, 914	29, 557	471	6, 862	24
5. Missing in action, total	10, 691	10, 092	71	266	262
a. Died	87	87	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 063	1, 031	2	0	30
c. Current captured	111	108	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9, 430	8, 866	69	266	229

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Mar. 23, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 443–51

APRIL 4, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 32

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, March 30, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	58,550	48,673	633	8,794	450
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	9,865	8,138	86	1,485	156
3. Killed in action, total	8,753	7,279	77	1,249	148
4. Wounded in action, total	39,023	31,230	485	7,276	32
a. Died of wounds	1,025	772	9	236	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to United States, etc.)	37,998	30,458	476	7,040	24
5. Missing in action, total	10,774	10,164	71	269	270
a. Died	87	87	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1,094	1,062	2	0	30
c. Current captured	112	109	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9,481	8,906	69	269	237

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight, Friday, Mar. 30, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 479–51

APRIL 12, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 33

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin accumulated for the period through midnight Friday, April 6, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	59,396	49,463	634	8,826	473
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10,080	8,319	99	1,502	160
3. Killed in action, total	8,941	7,449	77	[1] 1,263	152
4. Wounded in action, total	39,590	31,768	486	7,303	33
a. Died of wounds	1,040	783	10	239	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to United States, etc.)	38,550	30,985	476	7,064	25
5. Missing in action, total	10,865	10,246	71	[1] 260	288
a. Died	99	87	[1] 12	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1,109	1,077	2	0	30
c. Current captured	113	110	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9,544	8,972	[1] 57	[1] 260	255

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Apr. 6, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 517–51

APRIL 18, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 34

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, April 13, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	60, 775	50, 694	645	8, 946	490
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10, 363	8, 588	100	1, 514	161
3. Killed in action, total	9, 195	7, 692	78	1, 272	153
4. Wounded in action, total	40, 681	32, 739	495	7, 414	33
a. Died of wounds	1, 068	808	10	242	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	39, 613	31, 931	485	7, 172	25
5. Missing in action, total	10, 899	10, 263	72	260	304
a. Died	100	88	12	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 141	1, 108	2	0	31
c. Current captured	113	110	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9, 545	[1] 8, 957	58	260	270

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Apr. 13, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release No. 548–51

APRIL 25, 1951, REPORT ON UNITED STATES CASUALTIES

SUMMARY NO. 35

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, April 20, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	61, 744	51, 487	655	9, 071	53
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10, 567	8, 775	103	1, 522	167
3. Killed in action, total	9, 380	7, 861	81	1, 279	159
4. Wounded in action, total	41, 428	33, 365	500	7, 530	33
a. Died of wounds	1, 087	826	10	243	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	40, 341	32, 539	490	7, 287	25
5. Missing in action, total	10, 936	[1] 10, 261	74	262	339
a. Died	100	88	12	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 159	1, 126	2	0	31
c. Current captured	113	110	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9, 564	[1] 8, 937	60	262	305

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Apr. 20, 1951. They do not reflect all casulaties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 573–51

May 2, 1951, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 36

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin cumulated for the period through midnight Friday, April 27, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	62,799	52,305	668	9,278	548
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10,813	8,993	106	1,544	170
3. Killed in action, total	9,603	8,057	84	1,300	162
4. Wounded in action, total	42,246	33,992	507	7,714	33
a. Died of wounds	1,110	848	10	244	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	41,136	33,144	497	7,470	25
5. Missing in action, total	10,950	[1] 10,256	77	264	353
a. Died	100	88	12	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1,166	1,133	2	0	31
c. Current captured	113	110	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9,571	[1] 8,925	63	264	319

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, April 27, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense, Office of Public Information

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Immediate release

No. 612–51

May 9, 1951, Report on United States Casualties

SUMMARY NO. 37

The Department of Defense today announced the following report of battle casualties in the Korean area, based on notifications to next of kin accumulated for the period through midnight Friday, May 4, 1951:

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casulaties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	64,055	53,115	682	9,695	563
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	11,001	9,119	106	1,605	171
3. Killed in action, total	9,765	8,158	84	1,360	163
4. Wounded in action, total	43,350	34,731	521	8,065	33
a. Died of wounds	1,135	872	10	245	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	42,215	33,859	511	7,820	25
5. Missing in action, total	10,940	10,226	77	270	367
a. Died	101	89	12	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1,163	[1] 1,130	2	0	31
c. Current captured	114	111	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9,562	[1] 8,896	63	270	333

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, May 4, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Report of battle casualties (based on notifications to next of kin cumulated through midnight Friday, May 11, 1951)

	Total, Department of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	65, 523	54, 416	691	9, 831	585
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	11, 112	9, 215	108	1, 617	172
3. Killed in action, total	9, 848	8, 231	86	1, 367	164
4. Wounded in action, total	44, 669	35, 917	527	8, 192	33
a. Died of wounds	1, 163	895	10	250	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	43, 506	35, 022	517	7, 942	25
5. Missing in action, total	11, 006	10, 268	78	272	388
a. Died	101	89	12	0	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 169	1, 135	2	0	32
c. Current captured	115	112	0	0	3
d. Current missing	9, 621	8, 932	64	272	353

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, May 11, 1951. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Sept. 1, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Sept. 1	Through Aug. 25	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	8, 957	6, 886	2, 071
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	682	503	179
3. Killed in action, total	599	443	156
4. Wounded in action, total	5, 366	3, 889	1, 477
a. Died of wounds	83	60	23
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	5, 283	3, 829	1, 454
5. Missing in action, total	2, 992	2, 554	438
a. Died	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	94	70	24
c. Current captured	50	48	2
d. Current missing	2, 848	2, 436	412

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Sept. 8, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Sept. 8	Through Sept. 1	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	11, 022	8, 957	2, 065
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	1, 168	682	486
3. Killed in action, total	1, 044	599	455
4. Wounded in action, total	6, 673	5, 366	1, 307
a. Died of wounds	124	83	41
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc)	6, 549	5, 283	1, 266
5. Missing in action, total	3, 305	2, 992	313
a. Died	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	121	94	27
c. Current captured	51	50	1
d. Current missing	3, 133	2, 848	285

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Sept. 15, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin cumulated through midnight Friday)

	Total, Department of Defense through Sept. 15	Through Sept. 8	Increase during week
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	13, 911	11, 022	2, 889
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	1, 858	1, 168	690
3. Killed in action, total	1, 684	1, 044	640
4. Wounded in action, total	8, 709	6, 673	2, 036
a. Died of wounds	174	124	50
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	8, 535	6, 549	1, 986
. Missing in action, total	3, 518	3, 305	213
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	148	121	27
c. Captured or interned	50	51	[1] 1
d. Current missing	3, 320	3, 133	187

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[1] Army figure was revised to exclude 1 case erroneously carried in the Sept. 8 report.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through midnight Friday, Sept. 15, 1950. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Sept. 22, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Sept. 22	Through Sept. 15	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	17, 220	13, 911	3, 309
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and5a)	2, 441	1, 858	583
3. Killed in action, total	2, 211	1, 684	527
4. Wounded in action, total	11, 050	8, 709	2, 341
a. Died of wounds	230	174	56
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	10, 820	8, 535	2, 285
5. Missing in action, total	3, 959	3, 518	441
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	167	148	19
c. Captured or interned	50	50	0
d. Current missing	3, 742	3, 320	422

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Sept. 29, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Sept. 29	Through Sept. 22	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	20, 756	17, 220	3, 536
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	2, 954	2, 441	513
3. Killed in action, total	2, 660	2, 211	449
4. Wounded in action, total	13, 953	11, 050	2, 903
a. Died of wounds	294	230	64
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc)	13, 659	10, 820	2, 839
5. Missing in action, total	4, 143	3, 959	184
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	193	167	26
c. Captured or interned	73	50	23
d. Current missing	3, 877	3, 742	135

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Oct. 6, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Oct. 6	Through Sept. 29	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	24,163	20,756	3,407
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	3,614	2,954	660
3. Killed in action, total	3,242	2,660	582
4. Wounded in action, total	16,661	13,953	2,708
a. Died of wounds	372	294	78
b. Other (current wounded returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	16,289	13,659	2,630
Missing in action, total	4,260	4,143	117
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	311	193	118
c. Captured or interned	107	73	34
d. Current missing	3,842	3,877	−35

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Oct. 13, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Oct. 13	Through Oct. 6	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	26,083	24,163	1,920
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,036	3,614	422
3. Killed in action, total	3,618	3,242	376
4. Wounded in action, total	18,129	16,661	1,468
a. Died of wounds	418	372	46
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	17,711	16,289	1,422
5. Missing in action, total	4,336	4,260	76
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0
b. Returned to military control	366	311	55
c. Captured or interned	107	107	0
d. Current missing	3,863	3,842	21

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Oct. 20, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Oct. 20	Through Oct. 13	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	26, 701	26, 083	618
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, 5a, and 5b)	4, 125	4, 036	89
3. Killed in action, total	3, 682	3, 618	64
4. Wounded in action, total	18, 682	18, 129	553
a. Died of wounds	442	418	24
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	18, 240	17, 711	529
5. Missing in action, total	4, 337	4, 336	1
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0
b. Captured, subsequently died	1	0	1
c. Returned to military control	403	366	37
d. Current captured	107	107	0
e. Current missing	[1] 3, 826	3, 863	−37

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[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported Army figures.

Note.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Oct. 27, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Oct. 27	Through Oct. 20	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	27, 610	26, 701	909
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, 5a, and 5b)	4, 403	4, 125	278
3. Killed in action, total	3, 934	3, 682	252
4. Wounded in action, total	19, 346	18, 682	664
a. Died of wounds	467	442	25
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	18, 879	18, 240	639
5. Missing in action, total	4, 330	4, 337	[1] 7
a. Presumed or declared dead	0	0	0
b. Captured, subsequently died	2	1	1
c. Returned to military control	450	403	47
d. Current captured	107	107	0
e. Current missing	3, 771	3, 826	[1] 55

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[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported Army and Marine Corps figures.

Note.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Nov. 3, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Nov. 3	Through Oct. 27	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	28,235	27,610	625
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,655	4,403	252
3. Killed in action, total	4,159	3,934	225
4. Wounded in action, total	19,793	19,346	447
a. Died of wounds	492	467	25
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	19,301	18,879	422
5. Missing in action, total	4,283	4,330	[1] −47
a. Died	4	2	2
b. Returned to military control	500	450	50
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	3,672	3,771	[1] −99

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported Army and Marine Corps figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Nov. 10, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Nov. 10	Through Nov. 3	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	28,881	28,235	646
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,798	4,655	143
3. Killed in action, total	4,283	4,159	124
4. Wounded in action, total	20,251	19,793	458
a. Died of wounds	511	492	19
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	19,740	19,301	439
5. Missing in action, total	4,347	4,283	64
a. Died	4	4	0
b. Returned to military control	517	500	17
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	3,719	3,672	47

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Nov. 17, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Nov. 17	Through Nov. 10	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	29,996	28,881	1,115
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	4,993	4,798	195
3. Killed in action, total	4,461	4,283	178
4. Wounded in action, total	21,096	20,251	845
a. Died of wounds	528	511	17
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc)	20,568	19,740	828
5. Missing in action, total	4,439	4,347	92
a. Died	4	4	0
b. Returned to military control	528	517	11
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	3,800	3,719	81

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Nov. 24, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Nov. 24	Through Nov. 17	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	31,028	29,996	1,032
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	5,307	4,993	314
3. Killed in action, total	4,755	4,461	294
4. Wounded in action, total	21,662	21,096	566
a. Died of wounds	548	528	20
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	21,114	20,568	546
5. Missing in action, total	4,611	4,439	172
a. Died	4	4	0
b. Returned to military control	546	528	18
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	3,954	3,800	154

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Dec. 1, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Dec. 1	Through Nov. 24	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	32, 442	31, 028	1, 414
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	5, 616	5, 307	309
3. Killed in action, total	5, 038	4, 755	283
4. Wounded in action, total	22, 337	21, 662	675
a. Died of wounds	573	548	25
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	21, 764	21, 114	650
5. Missing in action, total	5, 067	4, 611	456
a. Died	5	4	1
b. Returned to military control	621	546	75
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	4, 334	3, 954	380

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Dec. 8, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Dec. 8	Through Dec. 1	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	33, 878	32, 442	1, 436
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	5, 870	5, 616	254
3. Killed in action, total	5, 258	5, 038	220
4. Wounded in action, total	23, 477	22, 337	1, 140
a. Died of wounds	607	573	34
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	22, 870	21, 764	1, 106
5. Missing in action, total	5, 143	5, 067	76
a. Died	5	5	0
b. Returned to military control	630	621	9
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	4, 401	4, 334	67

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Dec. 15, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Dec. 15	Through Dec. 8	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	36,421	33,878	2,543
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	6,180	5,870	310
3. Killed in action, total	5,518	5,258	260
4. Wounded in action, total	25,587	23,477	2,110
a. Died of wounds	657	607	50
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	24,930	22,870	2,060
5. Missing in action, total	5,316	5,143	173
a. Died	5	5	0
b. Returned to military control	658	630	28
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	4,546	4,401	145

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Dec. 22, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Through Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Dec. 22	Through Dec. 15	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	38,325	36,421	1,904
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	6,432	6,180	252
3. Killed in action, total	5,742	5,518	224
4. Wounded in action, total	27,012	25,587	1,425
a. Died of wounds	684	657	27
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	26,328	24,930	1,398
5. Missing in action, total	5,571	5,316	255
a. Died	6	5	1
b. Returned to military control	705	658	47
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	4,753	4,546	207

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Dec. 29, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Dec. 29	Through Dec. 22	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	40,176	38,325	1,851
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	6,761	6,432	329
3. Killed in action, total	6,031	5,742	289
4. Wounded in action, total	27,997	27,012	985
a. Died of wounds	716	684	32
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	27,281	26,328	953
5. Missing in action, total	6,148	5,571	577
a. Died	14	6	8
b. Returned to military control	720	705	15
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	5,307	4,753	554

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Jan. 5, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Jan. 5, 1951	Through Dec. 29, 1950	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	42,713	40,176	2,537
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7,023	6,761	262
3. Killed in action, total	6,247	6,031	216
4. Wounded in action, total	29,306	27,997	1,309
a. Died of wounds	759	716	43
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	28,547	27,281	1,266
5. Missing in action, total	7,160	6,148	1,012
a. Died	17	14	3
b. Returned to military control	744	720	24
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	6,292	5,307	985

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Jan. 12, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Jan. 12	Through Jan. 5	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	45, 137	42, 713	2, 424
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7, 303	7, 023	280
3. Killed in action, total	6, 509	6, 247	262
4. Wounded in action, total	29, 951	29, 306	645
a. Died of wounds	772	759	13
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	29, 179	28, 547	632
5. Missing in action, total	8, 677	7, 160	1, 517
a. Died	22	17	5
b. Returned to military control	822	744	78
c. Current captured	108	107	1
d. Current missing	7, 725	6, 292	1, 433

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Jan. 19, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Jan. 19	Through Jan. 12	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	46, 201	45, 137	1, 064
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7, 499	7, 303	196
3. Killed in action, total	6, 693	6, 509	184
4. Wounded in action, total	30, 251	29, 951	300
a. Died of wounds	780	772	8
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	29, 471	29, 179	292
5. Missing in action, total	9, 257	8, 677	580
a. Died	26	22	4
b. Returned to military control	844	822	22
c. Current captured	107	108	−1
d. Current missing	8, 280	7, 725	555

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Jan. 26, 1950 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Jan. 26	Through Jan. 19	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	46,814	46,201	613
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7,739	7,499	240
3. Killed in action, total	6,897	6,693	204
4. Wounded in action, total	30,615	30,251	364
a. Died of wounds	796	780	16
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	29,819	29,471	348
5. Missing in action, total	9,302	9,257	45
a. Died	46	26	20
b. Returned to military control	873	844	29
c. Current captured	107	107	0
d. Current missing	8,276	8,280	−4

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Feb. 2, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Feb. 2	Through Jan 26	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	47,388	46,814	574
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	7,905	7,739	166
3. Killed in action, total	7,014	6,897	117
4. Wounded in action, total	30,941	30,615	326
a. Died of wounds	811	796	15
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	30,130	29,819	311
5. Missing in action, total	9,433	9,302	131
a. Died	80	46	34
b. Returned to military control	902	873	29
c. Current captured	109	107	2
d. Current missing	8,342	8,276	66

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Feb. 9, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Feb. 9	Through Feb. 2	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	48,035	47,388	647
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8,154	7,905	249
3. Killed in action, total	7,245	7,014	231
4. Wounded in action, total	31,395	30,941	454
a. Died of wounds	826	811	15
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	30,569	30,130	439
5. Missing in action, total	[1] 9,395	9,433	[1] 38
a. Died	83	80	3
b. Returned to military control	912	902	10
c. Current captured	111	109	2
d. Current missing	[1] 8,289	8,342	[1] 53

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Feb. 16, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Feb. 16	Through Feb. 9	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	49,132	48,035	1,097
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8,346	8,154	192
3. Killed in action, total	7,408	7,245	163
4. Wounded in action—total	32,230	31,395	835
a. Died of wounds	853	826	27
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	31,377	30,569	808
5. Missing in action, total	9,494	9,395	99
a. Died	85	83	2
b. Returned to military control	955	912	43
c. Current captured	110	111	—1
d. Current missing	8,344	8,289	55

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Feb. 23, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Feb. 23	Through Feb. 16	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	50, 675	49, 132	1, 543
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8, 612	8, 346	266
3. Killed in action, total	7, 639	7, 408	231
4. Wounded in action, total	33, 401	32, 230	1, 171
a. Died of wounds	888	853	35
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	32, 513	31, 377	1, 136
5. Missing in action total	9, 635	9, 494	141
a. Died	85	85	0
b. Returned to military control	969	955	14
c. Current captured	110	110	0
d. Current missing	8, 471	8, 344	127

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Mar. 2 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Mar. 2	Through Feb. 23	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	52, 448	50, 675	1, 773
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	8, 853	8, 612	241
3. Killed in action, total	7, 857	7, 639	218
4. Wounded in action, total	34, 692	33, 401	1, 291
a. Died of wounds	911	888	23
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States etc.)	33, 781	32, 513	1, 268
5. Missing in action, total	9, 899	9, 635	264
a. Died	85	85	0
b. Returned to military control	980	969	11
c. Current captured	110	110	0
d. Current missing	8, 724	8, 471	253

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Mar. 9, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Mar. 9	Through Mar. 2	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	54, 649	52, 448	2, 201
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	9, 123	8, 853	270
3. Killed in action, total	8, 801	7, 857	244
4. Wounded in action, total	36, 108	34, 692	1, 416
a. Died of wounds	937	911	26
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	35, 171	33, 781	1, 390
5. Missing in action, total	10, 440	9, 899	541
a. Died	85	85	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 011	980	31
c. Current captured	110	110	0
d. Current missing	9, 234	8, 724	510

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Department of Defense

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Mar. 16, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through March 16	Through Mar. 9	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	55, 814	54, 649	1, 165
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	9, 379	9, 123	256
3. Killed in action, total	8, 335	8, 101	234
4. Wounded in action, total	36, 893	36, 108	785
a. Died of wounds	959	937	22
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	35, 934	35, 171	763
5. Missing in action, total	10, 586	10, 440	146
a. Died	85	85	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 027	1, 011	16
c. Current captured	110	110	0
d. Current missing	9, 364	9, 234	130

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Mar. 23, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Mar. 23	Through Mar. 16	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	57, 120	55, 814	1, 306
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	9, 602	9, 379	223
3. Killed in action, total	8, 511	8, 335	176
4. Wounded in action, total	37, 918	36, 893	1, 025
a. Died of wounds	1, 004	959	45
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	36, 914	35, 934	980
5. Missing in action, total	10, 691	10, 586	105
a. Died	87	85	2
b. Returned to military control	1, 063	1, 027	36
c. Current captured	111	110	1
d. Current missing	9, 430	9, 364	66

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Mar. 30, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Mar. 30	Through Mar. 23	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	58, 550	57, 120	1, 430
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	9, 865	9, 602	263
3. Killed in action, total	8, 753	8, 511	242
4. Wounded in action, total	39, 023	37, 918	1, 105
a. Died of wounds	1, 025	1, 004	21
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	37, 998	36, 914	1, 084
5. Missing in action, total	10, 774	10, 691	83
a. Died	87	87	0
b. Returned to military control	1, 094	1, 063	31
c. Current captured	112	111	1
d. Current missing	9, 481	9, 430	51

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Apr. 6, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Apr. 6	Through Mar. 30	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	59, 396	58, 550	846
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10, 080	9, 865	215
3. Killed in action, total	8, 941	8, 753	188
4. Wounded in action, total	39, 590	39, 023	567
a. Died of wounds	1, 040	1, 025	15
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	38, 550	37, 998	552
5. Missing in action, total	10, 865	10, 774	91
a. Died	99	87	12
b. Returned to military control	1, 109	1, 094	15
c. Current captured	113	112	1
d. Current missing	9, 544	9, 481	63

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Apr. 13, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Apr. 13	Through Apr. 6	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	60, 775	59, 396	1, 379
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10, 363	10, 080	283
3. Killed in action, total	9, 195	8, 941	254
4. Wounded in action, total	40, 681	39, 590	1, 091
a. Died of wounds	1, 068	1, 040	28
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	39, 613	38, 550	1, 063
5. Missing in action, total	10, 899	10, 865	34
a. Died	100	99	1
b. Returned to military control	1, 141	1, 109	32
c. Current captured	113	113	0
d. Current missing	9, 545	9, 544	1

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Apr. 20, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Apr. 20	Through Apr. 13	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	61,744	60,775	969
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10,567	10,363	204
3. Killed in action, total	9,380	9,195	185
4. Wounded in action, total	41,428	40,681	747
a. Died of wounds	1,087	1,068	19
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	40,341	39,613	728
5. Missing in action, total	10,936	10,899	37
a. Died	100	100	0
b. Returned to military control	1,159	1,141	18
c. Current captured	113	113	0
d. Current missing	9,564	9,545	19

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending Apr. 27, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through Apr. 27	Through Apr. 20	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	62,799	61,744	1,055
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	10,813	10,567	246
3. Killed in action, total	9,603	9,380	223
4. Wounded in action, total	42,246	41,428	818
a. Died of wounds	1,110	1,087	23
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	41,136	40,341	795
5. Missing in action, total	10,950	10,936	14
a. Died	100	100	0
b. Returned to military control	1,166	1,159	7
c. Current captured	113	113	0
d. Current missing	9,571	9,564	7

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending May 4, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through May 4	Through Apr. 27	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	64,055	62,799	1,256
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	11,001	10,813	188
3. Killed in action, total	9,765	9,603	162
4. Wounded in action, total	43,350	42,246	1,104
a. Died of wounds	1,135	1,110	25
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	42,215	41,136	1,079
5. Missing in action, total	[1] 10,940	10,950	−10
a. Died	101	100	1
b. Returned to military control	[1] 1,163	1,166	−3
c. Current captured	114	113	1
d. Current missing	[1] 9,562	9,571	−9

[1] Reflects revisions of previously reported figures.

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Increase in battle casualties for week ending May 11, 1951 (based on notifications to next of kin)

	Total, Department of Defense		Increase during week
	Through May 11	Through May 4	
1. Total casualties (sum of items 3, 4, and 5)	65,523	64,055	1,468
2. Total deaths (sum of items 3, 4a, and 5a)	11,112	11,001	111
3. Killed in action, total	9,848	9,765	83
4. Wounded in action, total	44,669	43,350	1,319
a. Died of wounds	1,163	1,135	28
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to the United States, etc.)	43,506	42,215	1,291
5. Missing in action, total	11,006	10,940	66
a. Died	101	101	0
b. Returned to military control	1,169	1,163	6
c. Current captured	115	114	1
d. Current missing	9,621	9,562	59

NOTE.—These figures represent cumulative casualties for which notification to next of kin was effected through the dates indicated above. They do not reflect all casualties which have occurred up to that time, because of the time lapse required to receive notifications of individual casualties from the Far East and to verify and process these notifications in the headquarters of each service. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

RELATIVE PERCENTAGE LOSSES OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE IN WORLD WAR II AND IN KOREA

The battle casualties of the first six American divisions engaged in Europe averaged 3 percent a week of strength June 6, 1944, through May 11, 1945. In Korea, Army battle casualties have averaged nine-tenths of 1 percent a week since June 25. For the first 4 months of this year (1951), these Army Korean casualties have averaged five-tenths of 1 percent.

It will be seen from this that in the fighting in Europe against Hitler's forces the weekly losses of our troops were at a rate approximately three times as great as those experienced by our troops in Korea since June 25 and approximately six times as great as losses experienced in the last 4 months.

Ratio of United States Casualties to Total Communist Casualties in Korea

The ratio of United States casualties to total Communist casualties in Korea is about 1 to 12. Many of the Communist losses have been inflicted by our allies, including ROK troops, and, therefore cannot be entirely credited to American forces. If ROK and other United Nations losses are included, the ratio is only 1 to 3.

Ratio of Allied Casualties to German Casualties in Western Europe

The ratio of Allied and German casualties in Western Europe was about 1 to 5, according to estimates of enemy losses in General Marshall's biennial report. Figures of German casualties compiled from German documents for the period from June 1, 1944, to February 1, 1945, provide a ratio of only 1 to 1.2, but it should be remembered that these are incomplete. It is impossible to separate German casualties inflicted by United States troops from those attributable to our allies.

Appendix EE

Letter From Felix E. Larkin to Chairman Russell

Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington 25, D. C., May 22, 1951.

Hon. Richard B. Russell,
Chairman, Committe on Armed Services, United States Senate.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed herewith is the distribution list of the copies of the Wake Island notes, requested by Senator Knowland.

Sncerely yours,

Felix E. Larkin,
General Counsel.

Miscellaneous Distribution Sheet

From: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Paper:______________________
Dated 18 October 1950. Env. No.________________
Subject: Substance of statements made at Wake Island conference on October 15, 1950, compiled from notes kept by the conferees from Washington.
To: Distribution Officer, Message Center.

Consignee	Number of copies	Copy Nos.
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Col. A. L. Hamblen, special assistant for occupied areas, Department of the Army	5	27–31
Dr. Philip Jessup, Department of State	10	32–41
Admiral A. C. Davis, Director, Joint Staff	5	42–46
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APPENDIX FF

LETTER FROM STYLES BRIDGES TO CHAIRMAN RUSSELL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
May 2, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: I have been requested to submit the enclosed resolution of the Senate of the Illinois General Assembly for the record in the hearings about to begin under your chairmanship of the joint sessions of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.

If this procedure is agreeable to you, I would appreciate it if you would request that this resoultion be included in the record of the meetings.

Sincerely yours,

STYLES BRIDGES.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SIXTY-SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 49

Offered by Senators Baker, Bidwill, Broyles, Butler, Carpentier, Cash, Collins, Crisenberry, Downing, Drach, Hart, Johnson, Knox, Lantz, Larson, Laughlin, Little, Lyons, McBroom, Miller, Mueller, O'Neill, Paddock, Peters, Saltiel, Smith, Thompson, Trager, Van Hooser, Walsh, and Wayland

Whereas early this morning President Truman announced the discharge of Gen. Douglas MacArthur from all of his military commands; and

Whereas General MacArthur has long been a symbol of the determination of the free peoples of the world to resist totalitarian aggression and has been looked to with hope by the freedom-loving peoples of the world; and

Whereas the shocking action of the President leaves our fighting men stranded in Korea without benefit of the leadership of General MacArthur, and further leaves the people of our Nation in a greater state of confusion and with further lack of knowledge as to true conditions: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the Sixty-seventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois, That we express our unqualified confidence in General MacArthur and vigorously condemn the irresponsible and capricious action of the President in summarily discharging him from his command and that we further condemn such action without an opportunity to General MacArthur and others of his command to inform the people of our Nation of the true condition of affairs in Korea and the Far East; and be it further

Resolved, That we further criticize and condemn the policies of the present administration of the United States for withholding information, if any exists, to justify this action.

Adopted by the Senate, April 11, 1951.

Authentication.

——— ———,
President pro tempore of the Senate.

——— ———,
Secretary of the Senate.

APPENDIX GG

LETTER FROM SIDNEY ABERMAN TO CHAIRMAN RUSSELL

WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE,
New York 7, N. Y., May 2, 1951.

Senator RICHARD RUSSELL,
Chairman, Hearings on Far East Policy,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: The opening of congressional hearings on Far East policy prompts us to suggest that mediation such as has been suggested by Prime Minister Nehru of India is the only constructive solution to the problems which led to and arose from the Korean War.

Honesty demands humble recognition of the fact that no single nation can come into court with clean hands and demand that its program be accepted.

If General MacArthur were still in command, with his advocacy of bombing China and of having Chiang Kai-shek's troops invade the mainland, mediation would of course be out of the question. His removal offers an ideal opportunity for the United States to take the initiative in bringing about peace.

In the current MacArthur-Truman controversy, many Americans—possibly a majority—back the President on the grounds that they want our country to remain under civilian control—that they do not want to see the military take over. We agree with this viewpoint, but we believe President Truman should have gone further.

We believe that General MacArthur's dismissal would be an appropriate occasion to renounce war as a method of solving the Korean crisis and to suggest that the United Nations offer the North Koreans a concrete mediation proposal. We feel confident that the UN would respond favorably. It is still not too late. The present hearings, of which you are chairman, could result in such a recommendation.

We should like to request that this letter be made part of the record of the hearings.

Sincerely,

SIDNEY ABERMAN, *Secretary.*

APPENDIX HH

LETTER FROM VICE ADM. OSCAR C. BADGER, USN, COMMANDER, EASTERN SEA FRONTIER, TO CHAIRMAN RUSSELL, SUPPLEMENTING TESTIMONY WITH REFERENCE TO BOMBING OF BASES IN MANCHURIA AND THE BLOCKADE BY UNITED NATIONS, RATHER THAN THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES

COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER,
90 CHURCH STREET,
New York, June 27, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Joint Meeting, Senate Armed Services Committee
and Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D .C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: As a result of my testimony before the joint Senate committees, I have received an appreciable number of individual comments and have read a wide variety of press interpretations of some of my statements. Looking back, I realize that my desire for brevity and the categorical nature of a few of my answers did not give full opportunity for a definitive analysis of the reasoning behind them.

The two subjects which I feel my testimony did not thoroughly explore were the bombing of bases in Manchuria and the blockade by United Nations rather than the United States Naval forces. The reasons behind my statements on these two subjects were then and are now as follows:

BOMBING OF BASES IN MANCHURIA

It is my opinion that we should maintain a full readiness to bomb these bases in case of need, but I do not think that such bombing should be undertaken at the present time because I think that the beneficial effect would not be altogether one-sided. Long and careful consideration has led me to this opinion.

I do not believe the war in Korea is a popular war in China nor do I think that the Communist government is by any means a popular government. I think that there is still a possibility of Chinese uprising against Chinese Communist leaders, particularly in the provinces of South China and south of the Yangtze River. In other words, I think that we will have a "divided" China which is an asset on our side which should be exploited by all possible means and certainly not destroyed by any mistake on our part.

In my recommendations to the various agencies in Washington during the past two years and as contained in my lecture of March 14, to the National War College which is a part of your record, I stressed the importance of exploiting the anti-Communist feeling in China. Because we could not maintain direct control, I recommended as a course of action the development of suitable economic, humanitarian, and agricultural programs in the other nations of Southeast Asia, including Formosa. I emphasized that these programs should be administered through such efficient planning and technical agencies as to insure their highest effectiveness with the greatest economy. I believe that these measures will not only build up a strong and favorable political barrier to the spread of Communism in these areas, but that their benefits will drift over into the helpless and dissatisfied population of China and thereby enhance the possibility of their revolution against Communist control.

I have suggested and recommended other actions toward exploiting Chinese internal resistance to the Communists.

Certain characteristics of the Chinese should be recognized in all of these considerations. Foremost among these characteristics is the definite consciousness of the Chinese people regarding their own territorial sovereignty. This has been the principal cause of the strong "anti-foreign" feeling which lies only skin deep in every Chinese. It has also been the cause of many of the wars of the Chinese people and some of their internal disturbances among forces of various provinces.

During my recent experiences in China, I recognized the ease with which the Communists could exploit in their favor any carelessness on our part or disregard of these inherent Chinese characteristics. For instance, I found that low-flying planes over Communist held territory were being exploited successfully as imperialist invasion of Chinese territorial rights. Furthermore, they were being exploited successfully in the population of Shantung which at that time was not less than 95 percent anti-Communist. By the dropping of several thousand reassuring pamphlets and by requiring our planes to fly at altitudes of not less than 5,000 feet over this territory, we overcame the Communist advantages which our previous attitude had made possible.

Another important example of failure to recognize the strength of this characteristic occurred in 1936 when the Chinese people were heavily engaged in one of their most extensive civil wars (the Sun Yat-sen Revolution). Because of the extensiveness of this revolution and the definite division of the Chinese, the Japanese considered them to be woefully weak and felt that their invasion of China could be undertaken under circumstances that would insure its success. History showed that almost immediately after the landing of the Japanese in Shanghai that the Chinese forgot their own internal differences, and worked together as best they could in a truly unified effort against the invader. Inefficient as military effort might have been, their determination was such as to bring about utter failure by the Japanese.

I do not believe that the bombing of purely military targets is feasible. The bases in China, such as those as I have seen, are seldom situated in detached areas. They usually constitute a few structures surrounded by areas of dense population, even to the extent of a large number of habitations interspersed between official buildings. The bombing of such supply centers would certainly involve thousands of the Chinese civilian population. An exception to this general rule is in the air bases where such gasoline storage, hangars, etc., that I have seen are generally well separated from the populated areas.

I personally believe that any unnecessary bombing which would involve Chinese areas of population would provide a very strong and effective tool in the hands of the Communists to popularize the war against the so-called imperialists and tend to unify the Chinese people. I think that this would tend to destroy the possibility of a Chinese anti-Communist revolution. I do not think it advisable to subject ourselves to this unfavorable opportunity except under the most urgent need for desperate action to achieve success in Korea. Therefore, I believe that we should be ready to take such desperate action but that such action should be undertaken only as a last resort when other means to interrupt Chinese lines of supply in Korea have failed to weaken effectively Chinese military strength in that area.

My advice, therefore, with regard to the bombardment of Chinese bases which would involve Chinese centers of population would be to avoid such action as long as possible, not in the spirit of appeasement of the Communists, but in the spirit of pursuit of the offensive in support of our objectives throughout the Far East. The unification of the Chinese people which could well be caused by such action on our part would, in my opinion, provide insurmountable obstacles to our efforts against communism throughout the Far East.

BLOCKADE BY U. N. FORCES VS. BLOCKADE SOLELY BY U. S. FORCES

In my testimony I favored the establishment of some form of blockade of the Chinese coast for the obvious advantages to be achieved. I do not feel that conditions local to China have anything to do with this question.

However, since I expressed my views without giving any particular reason to the Investigating Committee, I will state here that I do not believe that a unilateral blockade conducted by any nation is feasible under existing circumstances. I merely call attention to the many complications in attempting to carry out the spirit of the U. N. and to maintain coordination of Allied powers if we were unilaterally to direct our ships to exercise the privilege of visit and search of the vessels of other friendly nations without the full agreement and acquiescence of such nations. I do not feel that the U. S. would acquiesce under any circumstances to such action by any other power, friendly or otherwise, and I cannot conceive of any other voluntary action in the other direction. We ourselves have declared war because of just such action by other nations. Therefore, I feel that any blockade undertaken must be a U. N. effort to make it practicable, effective, and free of international disputes and serious consequences.

The foregoing is submitted with the request that it be included in the record as a part of my testimony in order that my views on these two vital subjects may be fully set forth and fully available to all members of the Committee. I have no objection to the contents of the foregoing being made available to the press.

Sincerely yours,

OSCAR C. BADGER,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.

APPENDIX II

JAPANESE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS FROM AND TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND HONG KONG, JANUARY 1950 TO FEBRUARY 1951

(Requested May 14, 1951, by Senator Sparkman by letter)

TABLE 1.—*Japanese imports from Communist China, January 1950 to February 1951*

[In thousands of United States dollars, c. i. f]

Commodity	January to June 1950	July to September 1950	October December 1950	Total 1950	January 1951	February 1951 [1]
Soybeans	7,867	4,718	925	13,510	0	570
Rice (polished)	(2)	1,790	647	2,437	42	207
Peanuts	2,204	1,155	0	3,359	27	793
Heavy coking coal	1,308	2,667	1,944	5,919	213	22
Bituminous coal					0	0
Crude salt	43	163	475	681	0	0
Iron ore	1,927	420	365	2,712	78	115
Ramie	1,579	917	758	3,254	85	51
Cotton twine and thread	(2)	(2)	(2)	673	0	0
Bristles	123	138	212	473	154	112
Cashmere goat wool	(2)	117	112	229	0	9
Other fibers and textiles	(2)	17	511	528	16	0
Oil seeds	462	390	330	1,182	77	198
Oil cake	633	0	168	801	0	0
Hides and skins	184	437	653	1,274	82	293
Bone dust	312	0	0	312	0	0
Tung oil	510	156	248	914	0	0
Others	673	546	738	1,284	250	451
Total	17,825	13,631	8,086	39,542	1,024	2,821

[1] Preliminary.
[2] Not separated (negligible).

NOTE.—These figures are subject to revision, but any revision necessary will have a negligible effect.
Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

TABLE 2.—*Japanese exports to Communist China, January 1950–February 1951*

[In thousands of United States dollars]

Commodity	January to June 1950	July to September 1950	October to December 1950	Total 1950	January 1951	February 1951 [1]
Ganvanized steel sheets	2,997	3,746	909	4,210	0	0
Other steel plates and sheets (uncoated)				3,679	0	0
Steel bars, shapes, laggings, and wires			2,295	3,897	0	0
Steel pipes and tubes				1,790	0	0
Other iron and steel mill products			4,527	696	0	0
Other metals and metal products			285	487	0	0
Electrical machinery and communications equipment	547	838	962	1,408	0	0
Transportation and equipment				167	76	[2] 483
Other machinery and parts				772	2	[3] 18
Chemicals and products	(4)	224	374	598	0	0
Cotton fabrics	(4)	(4)	160	160	179	111
Rayon filament	(4)	(4)	402	402	65	155
Rubber products	(4)	(4)	245	245	0	10
Gunny bags	(4)	238	0	238	0	0
Others	379	292	222	893	49	33
Total	3,923	5,338	10,381	19,642	371	810

[1] Preliminary.
[2] Bicycles and tricycles.
[3] Sewing machines.
[4] Not separated (negligible).

NOTE.—These figures are subject to revision, but any revision necessary will have a negligible effect.

Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

TABLE 3.—*Japanese imports from Hong Kong, January 1950 to February 1951*

[In thousands of United States dollars, c. i. f.]

Commodity	January to June 1950	July to September 1950	October December 1950	Total 1950	January 1951	February 1951 [1]
Wool fabric	(2)	(2)	135	135	0	0
Silk cocoon (waste)	(2)	(2)	29	29	0	1
Used gunny bags	(2)	(2)	14	14	0	0
Ramie fiber	12	0	0	12	0	30
Iron ore	0	89	34	123	88	0
Scrap iron and steel for smelting	(2)	(2)	46	46	17	9
Hides and skins	17	0	48	65	8	7
Bristles	13	0	10	23	0	0
Peanuts	0	0	0	0	39	89
Green beans	0	0	0	0	73	42
Others	23	32	55	110	28	46
Total	65	121	371	557	253	224

[1] Preliminary.
[2] Not separated; small quantities shipped in period January–September 1950 are included under October–December 1950.

NOTE.—These figures are subject to revision, but any revision necessary will have a negligible effect.

Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

TABLE 4.—*Japanese exports to Hong Kong, January 1950–February 1951*

[In thousands of United States dollars, f. o. b.]

Commodity	January to June 1950	July to September 1950	October to December 1950	Total 1950	January 1951	February 1951 [1]
Rayon fabric	1,454	3,888	6,729	12,071	2,931	1,452
Cotton fabric	1,912	1,717	3,090	6,719	2,296	774
Other textiles	1,161	899	2,367	4,427	621	343
Fish and shellfish	742	1,150	2,287	4,179	1,326	314
Fruits and vegetables	863	648	627	2,138	194	50
Condiments and spices	461	484	592	1,537	169	73
Cement	857	322	719	1,898	117	179
Clay products and pottery	291	155	184	630	117	85
Iron and steel mill products	202	807	3,752	4,761	56	267
Iron and steel manufactures	747	442	173	540	48	30
Brass and bronze products			23	437	29	19
Other metals and metal products			244	652	142	27
Textile machinery	705	519	783	1,533	348	129
Other machinery			328	802	112	228
Wood and paper products	(2)	(2)	(2)	2,300	685	483
Chemical fertilizers	(2)	(2)	(2)	1,311	0	0
Pigments, paints, and varnishes	(2)	(2)	(2)	961	143	61
Other chemicals	(2)	(2)	(2)	1,631	130	55
Stationery supplies	(2)	(2)	(2)	1,080	201	(2)
Others	1,561	2,221	7,221	3,720	644	356
Total	10,956	13,252	29,119	53,327	10,309	4,925

[1] Preliminary.
[2] Not separated.

NOTE.—These figures are subject to revision, but any revision necessary will have a negligible effect.
Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

JAPAN, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND HONG KONG IMPORT-EXPORT TRADE, MARCH 1951

(Requested May 14, 1951, by Senator Sparkman by letter)

TABLE 1.—*Japanese imports from Communist China,*[1] *Mar. 1–31, 1951*

[In United States dollars]

Commodity	March 1951	Commodity	March 1951
Food and beverage	$2,966,383	Animal and vegetable products	$1,024,183
Soybeans	493,485	Oilseeds	692,468
Peanuts	1,725,990	Hides and skins	275,812
Cinnamon and cassia	20,492	Others	55,903
Rice	534,987		
Sugar	173,164	Oils, fats and waxes: Vegetable oils	212,686
Others	18,265	Chemicals	278,495
Fibers and textiles	561,598	Natural lacquer	245,251
		Crude drugs	26,555
Bristle	54,370	Others	6,689
Ramie	234,495		
Waste and old fibers	150,201		
Others	122,532	Nonmetallic minerals: Crystalline graphite	9,998
		Metals and metal products	116,201
Wood and paper	63,864		
		Iron ores	57,799
Matrush	58,820	Scrap iron and steel for smelting	58.402
Straw plaits	3,915		
Rattan	1,129	Total	5,233,408

[1] Imports from Communist China to Japan involved no payment in United States dollars. Japanese goods only have been exported in settlement, with principal payment cleared as transactions through the Japan-Hong Kong open account.

Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

TABLE 2.—*Japanese exports to Communist China*

Commodity	March 1951	Commodity	March 1951
Food and beverages: Dried, salted, and smoked trepangs	$14,646	Animal and vegetable products: Tires and tubes (bicycles and tricycles)	$3,320
Fibers and textiles	284,124	Machinery	896,523
Cotton fabrics	270,341	Bicycles, tricycles and parts	712,090
Silk fabrics	13,783	Sewing machines and parts	184,433
Wood and wood products	5,120	Miscellaneous products: Vulcanized fiber bars and sheets	4,814
Japanese paper	492		
Pasteboard and cardboard	1,054	Total	1,208,547
Stencils for duplicating machine	3,574		

Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

TABLE 3.—*Japanese imports from Hong Kong*[1]

Commodity	March 1951	Commodity	March 1951
Food and beverages	$175,176	Chemicals	$3,022
Peanuts	131,538	Musk	3,010
Soybeans	40,000	Vanillin, coumarin, and heliotropin	12
Others	3,638	Nonmetallic minerals	0
Fibers and textiles	17,229	Metals and metal products	41,018
Waste cotton	14,500	Iron and steel-mill products	27,458
Rags	2,703	Lead scrap for smelting	13,250
Artificial fiber fabric	26	Nickel alloy ingots	310
Wood and paper	3,660	Machinery	0
Straw plaits	2,160	Miscellaneous products	166
Matrush	1,500	Books and periodicals	111
Animal and vegetable products	40,910	Celluloid manufactures	26
Hides and skins	21,419	Scientific and professional instruments	29
Crude rubber	16,111	Total	282,447
Hide flashings	3,380		
Oils, fats and waxes: Beeswax	1,266		

[1] The origin of goods imported into Japan from Hong Kong is unknown.

Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

TABLE 4.—*Japanese exports to Hong Kong*[1]

Commodity	March 1951
Food and beverages	$257,851
Fruit and vegetables	35,609
Fish and shellfish	106,647
Ajinomoto	115,504
Malt beverages	91
Fibers and textiles	1,850,789
Cotton fabric	736,701
Rayon fabric	901,423
Rayon handkerchiefs	40,237
Waterproof cloth	40,528
Other textiles	131,900
Wood and paper	304,879
Paper (printing and writing)	148,774
Pasteboard and cardboard	53,172
Others	102,933
Animal and vegetable products	4,213
Chemicals	172,713
Pigments, paints, and varnishes	45,570
Industrial inorganic chemicals	92,849
Other	34,294
Nonmetallic minerals	$271,496
Portland cement	219,441
Other	52,055
Metals and metal products	626,691
Steel bars and wire	195,150
Other iron and steel products	253,085
Brass and bronze products	67,420
Other metals and metal products	111,036
Machinery	162,443
Textile machinery	93,139
Bicycles, tricycles, and parts	37,760
Other	31,544
Miscellaneous products	185,654
Scientific and professional instruments	15,405
Smoking accessories	57,169
Cellophane sheets	31,525
Shell buttons	17,497
Others	64,058
Total	3,836,729

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[1] Export licenses from Japan to Hong Kong were validated when accompanied by essential supplies certification issued by the Hong Kong government, which certified end use of the goods in Hong Kong and guaranteed that they were not for reexport.

Source: Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP.

APPENDIX JJ

AIRCRAFT IN PHILIPPINES DECEMBER 7, 1941

(Requested by Senator Fulbright of General Vandenberg on May 29, 1951; see p. 1459 of printed hearings)

"Senator FULBRIGHT. General, do you know how many planes we had in the Philippines on December the 7th, 1941?"

(Delete) "General VANDENBERG. No, sir, I do not. I will try and find that figure for you."

(Insert) "General VANDENBERG. Volume I of The Army Air Forces in World War II states:

"'For defense of the Philippines the Far East Air Force had in commission thirty-three B–17's, of which sixteen were at Del Monte and the rest at Clark Field, and approximately ninety pursuit aircraft. The 3d Pursuit Squadron at Iba and the 17th at Nichols each had eighteen P–40E's; the 20th at Clark was equipped with the same number of P–40B's. The 21st and 34th Squadrons, respectively based on the Nichols and Del Carmen fields, had arrived in the Philippines only in late November and did not receive their planes until 7 December, when the former was assigned approximately eighteen hastily assembled P–40E's and the latter took up its duties with P–35's, each of which had an average flying time close to 500 hours. Also available were a miscellaneous assortment of noncombat aircraft and twelve P–26's flown from Batangas by pilots of the Philippine Air Forces.'"

"Senator FULBRIGHT. Was an investigation ever made by the air forces with regard to the situation and the loss of our planes on December 7, 1951?"

(Delete) "General VANDENBERG. I am not familiar with it. When that investigation was made, if it was made, I was not in Washington. I will endeavor to find that out and supply it."

(Insert) "General VANDENBERG. The Air Force has never made a formal investigation of this situatiion. To the best of my knowledge, the preparation and publication of The Army Air Forces in World War II in 1948 represents the only complete compilation of facts pertinent to this matter."

(Delete) "Senator FULBRIGHT. You can find that out and supply it for us?"

(Delete) "General VANDENBERG. I will endeavor to, Sir."

"Senator FULBRIGHT. * * * Number one, how many planes did we have and how many were (p. 3857) lost on December 7th in the Japanese raid. How many were on the ground and lost on the ground, and how many in the air? You had some bombers. You had a fair air force, didn't you, some bombers and fighters and so on?"

(Insert) "General VANDENBERG. Volume I of The Army Air Forces in World War II states:

" 'In less than one day of hostilities the strength of the Far East Air Force had been reduced by half. Of its thirty-five B–17's, not more than seventeen remained in commission. About fifty-five of the original P–40's had been lost either in combat or on the ground. Of the P–35's, no more than fifteen were operational, and perhaps twenty-five to thirty miscellaneous aircraft—B–10's, B–18's, and observation planes—also had been destroyed. Casualties were comparably heavy. At Clark Field alone, 55 officers and men had been killed and more than 100 wounded, to which numbers were added approximately 25 killed and 50 wounded at other points.' "

(Delete) "General VANDENBERG. There was a very small force in the Philippine Islands of the air force."

(Delete) "Senator FULBRIGHT. Would that be very difficult for you to secure for the Committee?"

(Delete) "General VANDENBERG. Senator, I can't answer that. I can assure you that if we have it and it can be made available, I will certainly dig it out."

"Senator FULBRIGHT. I wonder if you would have your staff also ascertain exactly at what time on December the 7th the Japanese struck Clark Field in the Philippines."

(Insert) "General VANDENBERG. According to The Army Air Forces in World War II the attack on Clark Field began approximately between 12:20 and 12:35 p. m., Philippine time, December 8, 1941. I believe this would be approximately 10:30 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, December 7, 1941."

(Delete) "General VANDENBERG. We will endeavor to do that, Sir."

"Senator FULBRIGHT. It was alleged that he (General Brereton) had urged dispersal of planes and that there had been some controversy over that. If you can ascertain that it would help."

(Insert) "General VANDENBERG. On this point I should like to read into the record the following information which is set forth in Volume I of The Army Air Forces in World War II which states:

" 'The Far East Air Force had begun to take precautionary measures early in November. General Brereton ordered all post, group, and squadron commanders to be prepared for any emergency. Each headquarters was to operate a message center continuously and was to designate an "alert officer" in addition to the officer of the day. Base commanders were ordered to keep sufficient personnel available to perform guard duties and any other tasks required in an emergency. Special instructions to tactical units emphasized the need for operational readiness: not only were aircraft to be dispersed so as to minimize the effects of an aerial attack, but crews for all aircraft in commission were to be placed on "two-hour readiness" call day and night. The 19th Bombardment Group was ordered to have one squadron prepared at all times for reconnaissance and bombing missions, while the 24th Pursuit Group was to keep a three-plane flight from each squadron on the alert from daybreak until dark. These orders were in effect by 10 November.

" 'In view of the relatively weak air defenses, the importance of dispersal areas for heavy bombers became paramount. Yet the number of fields suitable for the purpose was far below the number needed. An airfield construction program, which included the extension and improvement of existing fields as well as the preparation of new ones, had been adjusted to the expanding requirements of the air force, but it progressed much too slowly to meet with the satisfaction of air commanders. Only Clark Field, with two large hangars, a limited dispersal area, blast pens, and barracks, could be considered reasonably complete; and its vulnerability was a major cause of concern to General Brereton and his staff. In mid-November attempts were made by air force officials to acquire construction equipment for building dispersal pens at Clark, but the efforts came to naught.

" 'Of chief significance in the development of a building program was the decision to establish a heavy bomber base on Mindanao, southernmost of the large islands in the Philippines. This decision was in accordance with recommendations made by General Brereton's staff during his absence in mid-November on a trip to Australia. Objections were raised because the war plan for the Philippines did not provide ground forces for defense of Mindanao, but the natural advantages of a soil that lent itself to rapid development of all-weather strips provided an argument which prevailed over the preference of general headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure location. Accordingly, authority was granted to establish a temporary base at Del Monte, where one runway suitable for heavy bombers had existed for some months, pending a "definite location of the Bomber Command" in the Visayan islands. In another hurried decision the 5th Air Base Group, which had arrived in Luzon on 20 November, was selected to develop the new base under the direction of Maj. Ray T. Elsmore. Within one week, boats were procured, equipment and suppiles were loaded, and the 500-mile voyage from Manila was completed by the air base group. Native labor and local commercial companies assisted in rushing completion of minimum facilities, but no more than the bare minimum had been provided when the first B-17's moved down from Clark on 5 December. Only one radio capable of communication between Mindanao and Luzon had been set up, and maintenance facilities were practically nonexistent.

" 'The incompleteness of these preparations at Del Monte governed the decision on movement of the heavy bombers from Clark Field. On 4 December, General Brereton directed that immediate steps be taken to move two squadrons with their sixteen B-17's, plus a limited number of B-18's for use as air transport, to Del Monte under a plan to have the bombers stage through Clark Field for operations in the event of hostilities. Though he shared the common concern over the vulnerability of the bombers at Clark Field, this initial movement was limited to two squadrons because of the anticipated early arrival of the 7th Bombardment Group (H) and a plan to base that entire group on Del Monte.

" 'In response to a question on this point by the AAF Historical office, General Brereton indicated that the initiative for the transfer came from his own staff and stated that "approval for the movement of the 16 Flying Fortresses to Del Monte was obtained from General Sutherland only with the understanding that they would be returned to airfields to be constructed on Cebu and Luzon as soon as the necessary operating facilities could be prepared'."

(Delete) "General VANDENBERG. Correct."

APPENDIX KK

REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING ESTIMATES OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE REGARDING THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF AIR GROUPS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THIS COUNTRY

(Requested by Senator Johnson on p. 1398, Vol. II, on May 28, 1951)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Washington, June 13, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM H. DARDEN,
Chief Clerk, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. DARDEN: The General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, referred to this Department your letter of June 6 concerning data requested by members of the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations to be submitted as part of the record of testimony by various witnesses who have appeared at the current joint hearings of the committees.

Your list of data to be submitted included the following two items as having been requested of General Vandenberg:

(1) "The estimate of every Chief of Staff since World War II—both of the Army and the Air Force—of the minimum number of Air Groups or the minimum amount of air power they believed to be necessary to protect this country in peacetime—requested by Senator Johnson at page 3684.

(2) "General Vandenberg's estimate as to whether he believes the Air Force, Budget Bureau, Executive Department, and the Congress are proceeding as fast as we could to increase our Air Force in the light of world conditions—requested by Senator Johnson at page 3684."

With regard to item (2), it is our opinion, after a careful review of the record of testimony, that General Vandenberg answered this request of Senator Johnson in part on page 3687 of the record and further at various points on pages 3799-3803.

It is also our opinion that General Vandenberg answered item (1) at various points on pages 3687-3688 of the record with regard to his own views as Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. Since, however, Senator Johnson requested to be furnished the recommendations made by every Chief of Staff since World War II, including the Army and Air Force, as to the minimum amount of air power which they regarded as necessary in peacetime, there is enclosed (Tab A) a quotation on this point made by General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff of the Army and by General Spaatz as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

We would appreciate your inserting these quotations into the record as a part of General Vandenberg's testimony.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT E. L. EATON,
Brigadier General, USAF,
Director of Legislation and Liaison.

(Enclosure.)

"General VANDENBERG. I should like at this point to refer to Senator Johnson's request that I put into the record the recommendations made by every Chief of Staff since World War II, including the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, as to the minimum number of air groups or the minimum amount of air power that those men felt would be necessary to protect this country in peacetime.

"On June 27, 1946, at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on S. 2343, a bill to provide for the appointment of additional commissioned officers in the Regular Army, and for other purposes, General Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff, stated: 'I have gone over the troop dispositions that we must maintain at present, and the dispositions that I think we should keep permanently, and until there is a definite trend showing a growing confidence in the United Nations, I believe that the 70 group program is about as low as we can go. This 70 air-group program requires 400,000 officers and men.'

"On April 26, 1948, in hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1948 Supplemental Appropriations bill for the national defense General Spaatz, then Air Force Chief of Staff, stated: 'In my opinion, the 70-group program on which I have testified before the Finletter committee, congressional committee, and before the House Armed Forces Committee, which includes the $822,000,000. is the minimum force for the security of the United States at this time.'"

APPENDIX LL (*see also* Appendix VV)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 2, 1951.

HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: In response to your letter of July 19, I am enclosing a memorandum providing the information item by item as listed on your enclosure of material requested of Secretary Acheson or the Department of State during the hearings and not previously provided.

Sincerely yours,

ADRIAN S. FISHER,
The Legal Adviser.

(Enclosure)

CUMULATIVE LIST OF INFORMATION REQUESTED ON THE RECORDS AND NOT PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED

TO BE FURNISHED BY STATE DEPARTMENT

1. The names of the policy makers in the Department of State who visited MacArthur prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea—requested by Senator Smith at page 700, part 1.

This information has been made available to the Joint Committee and appears in the record of June 19 on page 2807, part 4.

REQUESTED OF SECRETARY ACHESON

1. Four letters between the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee and the Department of State relating to the international rubber situation be declassified—requested by Senator Johnson and by letter dated May 16. page 1868, part 3.

The four letters requested were delivered directly to Senator Johnson's office, with a covering letter, on June 6, 1951.

2. Whether technicalities of export permits prevented the shipment of supplies to the Chinese Nationalists after the lifting of the arms embargo in May 1947—requested by Senator Hickenlooper at page 1886, part 3.

The information has been made available and appears in the record of June 19 on page 2809, part 4.

3. Whether, immediately after VE-day, a consignment of 20,000 German rifles, which had been shipped from a German port for China, was stopped en route by an order signed by Lauchlin Currie on White House stationery—requested by Senator Brewster at page 1953, part 3.

The information has been made available and appears in the record of June 19 on page 2810, part 4.

4. Whether, on March 20, 1947, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Acheson stated that the Chinese government is not approaching collapse; it is not threatened by defeat by Communists; and the war with the Communists is going on much as it had for the past 20 years—requested by Senator Brewster at page 1955, part 3.

The information has been made available and appears in the record of June 19 on page 2810, part 4.

5. Whether Dr. Stuart, the United States ambassador to the Chinese Nationalists, on July 1, 1947, stated that the Nationalist troops in rural areas have insufficient small arms and ammunition to arm all combatant troops in the field—requested by Senator Brewster at page 1955, part 3.

The information has been made available and appears in the record of June 19 on page 2811, part 4.

6. The number of rifles, machine guns, artillery pieces, fighting plans and other military equipment furnished the Chinese Nationalists by the United States after December 7, 1941—requested by Senator Russell at page 1960, part 3.

The information has been made available and appears in the record of June 19 on page 2813, part 4.

7. The name of the American consul and the names of the persons who sent a telegram received March 16, 1949, and read into the record at pages 1971–1973—requested by Senator Russell at page 1979, part 3.

This same question was raised again on June 8 by Senator Bridges on page 2154. Secretary Acheson replied in detail (pp. 2154–2155) on which it was considered unwise to provide the names. The Chairman indicated his concurrence at the end of the discussion. (See pp. 2154–77, pt. 3.)

8. The relationship between Owen Lattimore and the State Department—requested by Senator Wiley at pages 1982–1982, part 3.

Mr. Lattimore is not an employee of the Department of State and is not and never has been a top adviser to the Department. A memorandum setting forth the full facts is attached herewith.

9. The full text of the letter of May 5, 1951, written by General Li Tsung-jen—requested by Senator Kefauver at page 2043, part 3.

The letter in question was made available to the committee with the approval of the President as a classified document under cover of a letter dated July 10 from Felix Larkin, General Counsel, Department of Defense, transmitting the Department of State reply dated July 3.

10. The full text of General Barr's report—requested by Senator Kefauver at page 2045–2046, part 3.

Since this report was made by General Barr to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State is unable to make it available.

11. The full text of the report of General Hurley, part of which appears at page 86 of the White Paper and read into the record at page 1873, part 3—requested by Senator Kefauver at page 2046, part 3.

This request is under study because crytographic security is involved. A further reply will be made as quickly as possible.

12. The communications from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense relating to the responses received by the State Department on the subject of "hot pursuit" from other countries who have forces fighting in Korea—requested by Senator Cain at page 2078, part 3.

Senator Cain repeated his request at page 2131, part 3, of the record of June 7. Secretary Acheson read the requested documents into the record on page 2148, part 3, and they were deleted by the censor from the public record. However, they are available to the joint committee in its secret record of the hearings.

13. Whether or not any of the 12 documents which General Hurley referred to in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 1949 were omitted from the White Paper. If so, why?—requested by Senator Bridges at page 2161, part 3.

The Department of State has no record of just what 12 documents General Hurley referred to in the above described testimony. All documents and reports which rightly belonged in a necessarily selective and representative compilation of important documents on American relations with China for the period 1944–1945 were included in whole or in part in the White Paper. Reports which were either lacking in general interest or were representative of facts or points already adequately brought out by the material included, of course, were omitted.

14. Which Mexican officials, a couple of years ago, advised the State Department that Mexico did not want a loan for the purpose of development of her oil resources—requested by Senator Morse at page 2171, part 3.

This information was provided directly to Senator Morse in a letter, dated June 11, 1951, from the Secretary of State.

15. Whether General Barr, over the protests of Chiang, gave priority of equipment to two Nationalist generals located in North China which generals shortly thereafter went over to the Communists—requested by Senator Hickenlooper at pages 2198–2199, part 3.

This statement is not true. Admiral Badger, in his testimony on June 19, appearing on pages 2745–2748, part 4, of the record, testified in detail on this priority recommendation which he had urged for military assistance to North China. General Barr testified in detail on this subject also. This testimony appears in the record of June 21, on pages 2963–2965, part 4; pages 2986–2987, part 4; pages 2990–2991, part 4; pages 2994–2996, part 4; and pages 3005–3006, part 4.

Memorandum

Mr. Lattimore is not an employee of the State Department and is not and never has been a top adviser to the Department. The facts in this regard are a matter of public record and are set out below:

Pauley mission, 1945

On October 15, 1945, Mr. Owen Lattimore was appointed as an economic adviser to the United States Reparations Mission to Japan. He served with the Mission until February 12, 1946. While on this assignment he was paid out of the Department's International Conferences funds.

"Meet the Public," 1946

Mr. Lattimore was one of 28 persons to lecture on a program known as "Meet the Public," which was given at the Department's Foreign Service Institute. He gave one lecture on June 5, 1946. This program was initiated by the Department's Office of Public Affairs and was designed to bring before departmental personnel the viewpoints of various persons who were working on, or interested in, foreign affairs. In this capacity, Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no remuneration. The following were the speakers on this program:

Senator J. William Fulbright
Mr. Ernest K. Lindley, Chief of the Washington Bureau of Newsweek
Mr. Charles Bolte, Chairman of the American Veterans' Committee
Congressman Jerry Voorhis
Professor Owen Lattimore, Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Professor Frederick L. Schuman, Williams College
Mr. Herbert Elliston, Editor of the Washington Post
Mr. Eugene Meyer, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Dr. Jacob Viner, Professor of Economics, Princeton University
Dr. Harold Lasswell, Professor of Law, Yale University
Mr. Wallace Deuel, Editor of the Chicago News
Senator Wayne Morse

Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, Vice Chairman of Americans United for World Government, Inc.
Mr. James M. Landis, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board
Senator Warren Austin
Dr. Arthur Compton, Chancellor of Washington University, St. Louis
Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean, Editor and Research Director of the Foreign Policy Association
Mr. Kermit Eby, Director of Education and Research, Congress of Industrial Organizations
Mr. Hamilton Owens, Editor of the Baltimore Sun (and Sun papers)
Professor Frank Tannenbaum, Columbia University
Mr. Gardner Murphy, American Psychological Association
Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, Vice President of Georgetown University and Regent of the School of Foreign Service
Mr. David Lawrence, Editor of the U. S. News and of the World Report
Mr. Robert Watt, International Representative of the American Federation of Labor
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
Dr. Dexter Perkins, Professor of Latin American Affairs, University of Rochester
Congressman Mike Mansfield
Dr. James P. Baxter, President of Williams College

Memorandum and Round Table, 1949

On October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, Mr. Lattimore, following preliminary correspondence with the Department of State, was one of a group of 25 private individuals participating in a round-table discussion arranged by the Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views on United States foreign policy toward China. As a member of this group, Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no compensation but was reimbursed for expenses. This round-table discussion followed a solicitation of written views on the same topic from a larger group in response to which the written views of thirty-one private individuals were received and analyzed. Some of the members, including Mr. Lattimore, were in both groups. Both the written views received and the transcript of the round-table discussion were made available as some of the background material for consideration by Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case, and Ambassador Jessup, who had been requested by the Secretary to review United States policy toward the Far East. The thirty-one who expressed views initially in writing were:

Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution
Professor Hugh Borton, Columbia University
Former President Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University
Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington
Former Ambassador William Bullitt
Former Under Secretary Castle
Former Consul John A. Embry
Professor Rupert Emerson, Harvard University
Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City
Professor John K. Fairbank, Harvard University
Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City
Professor Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University
Former Under Secretary Grew
Colonel Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA, China
Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck
Roger Lapham, former Administrator, ECA, China
Professor Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University
Professor Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University
Oliver C. Lockhart, Export-Import Bank of Washington
Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations
Professor Wallace Moore, Occidental College, Los Angeles
Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University
C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration
Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Virginia
Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York City
Mr. James Rowe, Washington
Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adloff), New York City
Professor Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky
Professor Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University

Professor Mary Wright, Stanford University
Admiral Yarnell

The twenty-five who attended the round-table discussions were:

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, Department of Political Science. Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, New York
John K. Fairbank, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, New York, New York
Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, New York, New York
Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Language, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign Power Company
John D. Rockefeller III, President, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, New York
William R. Herod, President, International General Electric Company, New York, New York
Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Masaschusetts
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, Washington
Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland
Ernest B. McNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank, Portland, Oregon
George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs, Council of Northern California, San Francisco, California
Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington
Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, New York

The following were invited to the Round-Table October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, but did *not* attend:

W. Langbourne Bond, Pan American Airways, Washington, D. C.
Monroe E. Deutsch, Provost, University of California
Anne O'Hare McCormick, New York Times
Moris T. Moore, Chairman of The Board of Time, Inc.
Michael Ross, Director, Department of International Affairs, CIO
J. E. Wallace Sterling, President, Stanford University

LETTERS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE REPLYING TO LETTERS OF SENATOR TYDINGS

APRIL 17, 1950.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: It has been stated by Senator McCarthy during the course of the hearings now being held by the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under S. Res. 231, that Mr. Owen Lattimore is "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy."

It it important for our committee to determine the truth of this contenion for whatever bearing it may have on other evidence adduced in the Lattimore matter. For that reason, I would appreciate it greatly if you would inform me at your earliest possible convenience of the extent to which, in your opinion, Dr. Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy," or the extent that Dr. Lattimore influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period in which you were Secretary of State.

I am addressing a similar letter to Secretary Acheson, Mr. Hull, and Mr. Byrnes.

Thanking you for your kindness in giving the committee this information, I am

Very respectfully,

MILLARD E. TYDINGS.

APRIL 22, 1950.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have received your letter of April 17 in which you refer to a recent statement, in connection with the hearings of the subcommittee on Foreign Relations under Senate Res. 231, that "Owen Lattimore is the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy." Your letter then asks the extent to which, in my opinion, "Lattimore was the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" during the period in which I served as Secretary of State.

The statement referred to above is completely without basis in fact.

So far as I and my associates can recall I never even met Mr. Lattimore.

I take the liberty of commenting on the harmful effect on our foreign relations of such statements, charges, or insinuations broadcast with so little regard for the truth. They undoubtedly confuse our friends abroad, undermine and weaken our position before the world, and actually lend assistance to the powers that would destroy us.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL.

APRIL 24, 1950.

DEAR MILLARD: I have your letter of the 17th asking the extent to which, in my opinion, Mr. Owen Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" or the extent he influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period I was Secretary of State.

I do not know Mr. Lattimore. If he ever wrote me about the Far Eastern policy the letter was not called to my attention. If, while I was Secretary of State, he discussed our Far Eastern policy with any officials of the department concerned with that policy, in their discussions with me, they did not quote him.

Early in December 1945, General George C. Marshall went to China and thereafter his reports to the President and me influenced our policies in China and the Far East. I do not think General Marshall was influenced by Mr. Lattimore.

To my former colleagues, I take the liberty of adding that, regardless of the merits of complaints as to what has heretofore occurred, the President and the Secretary of State have given proof of their desire to restore the bipartisan policy in our foreign affairs, and I earnestly hope the members of the Senate will cooperate in that effort.

While I was Secretary of State I found I could talk to Senator Vandenberg with the same freedom with which I talked to Senator Connally and to my assistants, and I profited by his advice. I am sure that in his absence other Republican Senators will cooperate just as did Senator Vandenberg. It is extremely important at this time, in view of the tenseness of the situation in world affairs, that we do not give to either our friends or enemies abroad the false impression of a serious division among us in our policies as to the Soviet Government. Seldom in history have our people been so united on any issue.

I hope that, regardless of our differences on domestic issues, our political leaders can present a united front in our foreign relations.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES.

APRIL 20, 1950.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have your letter of April 17 in which you inquire concerning the extent to which, in my opinion, Dr. Owen Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" or the extent he influenced our Far Eastern policy while I was Secretary of State.

In my opinion, he was in no sense the "principal architect" of our Far Eastern policy during the period I served as Secretary of State. Although his position in academic circles as a student of and writer on some aspects of Chinese life and history was, of course, known to us, I am not aware that during this period he had any appreciable influence on our Far Eastern policy. I do not remember having consulted with him on that subject or on any subject at any time.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL.

APRIL 27, 1950.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: In a letter dated April 17, 1950, you asked that I inform you of the extent to which, in my opinion, Mr. Owen Lattimore was the "principal architect' of our Far Eastern policy," or the extent to which he influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period in which I have been Secretary of State. On April 17, Mr. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, wrote you in full detail concerning Mr. Lattimore's connections with this department in the past. The Far Eastern policy of this Government, like all other foreign policy, is the responsibility of the Secretary of State and has been made by me in my administration subject, of course, to the direction of the President.

I welcome this opportunity to state personally and categorically that during the period in which I have been Secretary, Mr. Lattimore, so far as I am concerned or am aware, has had no influence in the determination of our Far Eastern policy. There is clearly no basis in fact for describing Mr. Lattimore as the "principal architect" of our Far Eastern policy. I might add that, so far as I am aware, I have never met Mr. Lattimore.

The Far Eastern policy of the United States has at all times been determined after careful study by the responsible officers of the department and an objective evaluation by me of all of the facts available to this Government. The Department of State has explored all avenues to arrive at the relevant facts. The measure of the participation of Mr. Lattimore, so far as this department and I are concerned, is fully and fairly indicated in the letter of April 17 from Mr. Peurifoy.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

APPENDIX MM

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
JULY 2, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR DICK: After talking with some of my colleagues I am enclosing to you herewith three documents to be considered for insertion in the record of the hearings of the two committees on the MacArthur dismissal.

The first (*a*) is a letter from me to the Secretary of State dated November 4, 1949; the second (*b*) is a letter from me to the Secretary of State dated December 27, 1949, and following up the first letter; and the third (*c*) is the report of my visit to the Far East in September 1949, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. This reports the Far Eastern problems facing the United States.

While this report of mine (*c*) is somewhat lengthy for insertion in the record, I feel on rereading it that it so fully covers the Far Eastern situation as I saw it two years ago, that it may be relevant to our present discussions. I will be glad to be advised by you whether you see any objection to having it published with the rest of the record.

I enclose, also, for your consideration for publication in the record of the hearings a statement, dated May 18, 1951, by the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor entitled "For a Bi-partisan Policy in the Far East." This statement I have designated (*d*). This summary of practical measures to be adopted in connection with our present foreign policy in the Far East strikes me as so sound that I believe it would be helpful in the compilation of the hearings.

Always cordially yours,

H. ALEXANDER SMITH.

[Enclosure (*a*)]

Hon. DEAN ACHESON, NOVEMBER 4, 1949.
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR DEAN: I had hoped to see you before this to have a chance to talk to you personally about my experience in the Far East. I see by the papers this morning that you may be called suddenly to Paris for a conference with the British and French on policies generally, and therefore the chances of my seeing you before you return do not appear to be too bright. I realize the pressure you are under and want to send you my very best wishes as you undertake these important deliberations.

There are just two matters I wanted particularly to emphasize in my talk with you and I can state them in this letter, with the hope that I can elaborate my reasons at a later date:

1. I am strongly of the conviction that under no conditions should we recognize the Chinese-Communist government at this time, and furthermore I hope it will be possible for you with your eloquence and diplomacy to persuade the British not to do so. Whether or not it ultimately has to be done remains to be seen, but I think it would be tragically fatal at the moment. From my talks with the British authorities in Hong Kong, I was convinced that they were thinking exclusively in terms of (a) defense of Hong Kong, or at any cost retaining it in British possession, and (b) the pressure of their commercial interests in Shanghai and Hong Kong to recognize the Commies, so that traditional British trade can go on as before.

I was also impressed, however, with the argument from the British that they felt whatever stand was taken should be taken with the United States and not apart from the United States. I feel, therefore, that our strong stand against recognition would have a weighty effect upon the British position. In any event, however, I urge that we do not make the mistake, as I see it, of recognizing the Chinese Communist government at this time. Many things can happen in the next few months.

2. The second important conviction that came to me from my trip was that under no conditions should we let Formosa fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists or under the domination of Russia. This, of course, presents a very difficult question, and it is problematical whether the Nationalist Government could defend Formosa without further aid from us. From the standpoint of our own national security, however, I was convinced from my visit on the ground and getting the feel of our strategical island bases that the occupation of Formosa by hostile forces would definitely threaten our security. I did not arrive at this conclusion from any strategical knowledge of my own, which I make no claim to, but from the insistence of our military and naval forces wherever I went that this was a very dangerous issue and that we could not afford to pass it up.

Without raising the question of whether or not we should back up the Nationalist forces in their defense, the feeling seems to be among many of our people in Japan and in other places that in light of the fact that the peace treaty has not as yet been signed with Japan, Formosa today is technically part of Japan, even though because of the Cairo agreement we permitted the Nationalists to take it over. If we can still take the position that technically it is part of Japan, and that as we are occupying Japan we have a responsibility for all Japanese possessions, we could, I believe, perfectly consistently take it over by our occupancy, with notice to the UN that it might be made a trusteeship area. This should be done in collaboration with the Nationalist Government that is there and with the Taiwan people themselves, who I believe would be anxious to have us take such a step. If this were done, the Chinese Communists would be faced with the responsibility of attacking the United States if they attacked Formosa under these conditions.

I am sending you his line at this time because of your contemplated trip to Europe, and as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, who feels he has a personal responsibility to express to our representative his convictions on these important points. I am working now on a more complete report to my committee, based on my observations, and to you as Secretary of State.

With kindest personal regards and assurances to you of my eagerness to work these problems out on a completely cooperative basis, having in mind the legislative as well as the executive responsibilities of all of ous, I remain,

Always cordially yours,

H. ALEXANDER SMITH,
United States Senator.

(Enclosure (*b*))

DECEMBER 27, 1949.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Following up my previous suggestion to you and the recommendation made in my report to the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, I desire to submit some further suggestions with regard to the Formosan situation.

In light of the fact that the United Nations by resolution in which the United States joined, referred the matter of the Nationalist complaint against Russia to the Little Assembly, I assume that recognition of the Chinese Communist Government by the United States will be postponed for the present.

Since the Nationalist Government is now headquartered on the island of Formosa, we have a situation that demands the immediate attention not only of the United States but also of the United Nations.

The following factors seem to me necessary for consideration in this matter:

A. Understanding was given to the Nationalist Government of China at the Cairo Conference that Formosa would be returned to China in the eventual settlement of the peace with Japan;

B. The Chinese Communists have conquered practically the entire Chinese mainland and can be expected to demand that Formosa be turned over to them, with threat of military aggression if the demand is not complied with;

C. From a strategic standpoint Formosa must not be allowed to fall into hands that are hostile to the United States, since such an occupation would seriously threaten our island defense line running from Japan south through the Okinawa group and through the Philippines;

D. Since the Japanese peace treaty has not as yet been signed, Formosa is still legally a part of Japan where the United States, representing the conquerors of Japan are now in occupation.

With these factors in mind I respectfully suggest the following procedure:

I. The United States should immediately engage in informal conversations with Mr. K. C. Wu, the new Governor of Formosa, with the purpose of arranging for the occupation of the island by the United States. Since the United States, representing the conquerors of Japan, is now in occupation of Japan the logic of the situation would seem to suggest that the United States should also be in friendly and peaceful occupation of Formosa until such time as the ultimate sovereignty of the island is determined. Inasmuch as the Chinese Nationalist Government was our ally in the last war and is still recognized as the legitimate government of China, we might consider a joint occupation pending the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty.

II. The United States should explore with the Nationalist Government the possibility during the occupation of either (a) the suspension of aggressive hostilities against the Communists, including the blockade, or (b) carrying on such activity from some base other than Formosa, such as Hainan. The success of any further aggressive action on the part of the Nationalist Government appears extremely doubtful and the Nationalist Government might welcome the opportunity for the temporary cessation of hostilities during the period of this occupation. The Nationalist Government would be supported by the United States if necessary against aggression by any outside force, but it should preferably not be used during the period of occupation as a base for aggressive operations against the Communists on the mainland.

III. The period of occupation of Formosa by the United States alone or jointly with the Nationalist Government should envisage the establishment of a form of democratic government participated in by the Formosan people themselves, and the building up of a democratic and socially just economy. From my conversations with Mr. Wu when I was in Formosa last October, I am convinced that he is one of those Chinese Nationalist leaders who has been advocating a reform and rehabilitation program for the Chinese people and who feels that on the island of Formosa such a program could be put into effect with the cooperation of the Formosan people themselves. Such a development would contemplate the ultimate economic self-sufficiency of the island. Our own ECA funds have already been used in initiating such a development, and I note in the papers that our ECA officials on Formosa after consultation with Mr. Wu, are recommending the use of additional ECA funds on the island.

Such a development in Formosa might well become a pattern of reform and reconstruction for the provinces on the Chinese mainland, if and when that territory is eventually liberated.

IV. A full report of this action, if taken, should be made to the United Nations, stating that our purpose is to maintain the peace until the ultimate sovereignty of the island can be determined.

The course suggested seems to me to be the sound approach to this difficult problem, having in mind the best interests of the existing Government of Formosa, the Formosan people themselves, and the strategical importance of the island as far as the interests of the United States are concerned.

Always cordially yours,

H. ALEXANDER SMITH.

(Enclosure (*c*))

FAR EASTERN PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES

(Report of visit to the Far East September and October 1949, by H. Alexander Smith, member, Committee on Foreign Relations of United States Senate)

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
November 29, 1949.

To the Chairman and Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate:

I am submitting herewith for the consideration of the Foreign Relations Committee and others interested a report of the trip to the Far East which I took with the consent of the Senate, leaving Washington on September 13 last. In this report I have endeavored to indicate the scope of the trip, to present certain over-all observations, and finally to make certain recommendations with regard to our far eastern foreign policy.

I am fully aware of the danger of individuals or groups visiting areas of the world for a short period of time and then claiming to have all the answers. I hope I have avoided this danger.

I do feel, however, as I stated to the committee before I left, that it is vitally important for the members of appropriate committees of the Congress to visit in person the areas in the world where these critical situations have developed. Only by a personal visit can we get the "feel" of a situation and have that independence of judgment which we should have in dealing with the recommendations of policy that come from the Executive.

I sincerely hope that the members of the committee will have the time and opportunity to consider this report.

Always cordially yours,

H. ALEXANDER SMITH.

PART I. REASONS FOR AND SCOPE OF THE TRIP

As I stated on the floor of the Senate in asking consent to take this trip, I felt that the situation in the Far East was so critical that some members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees should go there as promptly as possible in order to obtain first-hand information which might be of value in dealing with issues of future policy determination.

I am one of those who, since before the close of World War II, has supported our bipartisan foreign policy and has voted for every measure reported to the Senate aimed to bring about the collaboration of the nations of the world to insure the peace. I was an ardent supporter of the United Nations Charter, and have been deeply concerned over its temporary set-back because of the misuse of the veto by Communist-dominated Russia. From the first announcement of the so-called Marshall plan I supported that policy, which was aimed to accomplish the economic recovery and rehabilitation of Europe. During the first years of its operation it has been most effective in halting the creeping paralysis of communism.

For the same reason that I supported the Marshall plan, I have supported the North Atlantic Pact and military implementation of that pact to the end that in the Atlantic area at least we can say, "So far and no farther." We have said clearly to the world that an attack on one of the Atlantic Pact nations would be considered as an attack on all. And we have served notice that the United States will be a participant if there is any breach of the peace in the North Atlantic area. I believe that what we have accomplished this year in setting up the North Atlantic Pact will be another important milestone on the road to world peace.

But at the very moment last summer when this was being accomplished I, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, felt completely frustrated because it seemed to me that while we were barring our front door (the Atlantic area), the back door (by which I mean the door to the Far East) was being left unlocked. The iron curtain is quietly being lowered over Asia.

It has been a great suprise to me that, while the administration and the Department of State took our Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees completely into their confidence and collaborated with us in developing both the Marshall plan a year ago and the North Atlantic Pact this year, we have never been consulted about policy in the Far East. In spite of the great concern of many of us over the future of that area we have been practically told there is nothing to do and that we must wait and let nature take its course—or to use another expression, "let the dust settle." The splendid bipartisan approach which characterized the Marshall plan, the Truman doctrines for Greece and Turkey, and the North Atlantic Pact negotiations, has been completely lacking insofar as the Far East is concerned, and those of us who have felt alarmed over this unfortunate situation have been given the feeling that we were unwelcome meddlers in matters of policy that has already been settled. This was why I felt that somone from our committee should go and try to get the facts first hand.

In order to be certain that my trip would not be an embarrassment to anyone on the ground, I wrote to General MacArthur in Tokyo and asked for his judgment on the matter. He not only invited me to come but expressed the hope that every member of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees could come and see first-hand what the responsibilities of the United States are in this critical area. Upon my arrival he thanked me personally for coming. He and others with whom I talked pointed out that while we in the United States naturally are more concerned with Europe because our ancestry is practically entirely European, we seem to be neglecting an area of the world that may well be the decisive factor as to whether there will be a world war III.

Our trip was a rapid one. Mrs. Smith accompanied me and through the courtesy of the Department of Defense our travel and hotel accommodations were splendidly taken care of. Everywhere we went I can testify to the fact that in the Far East at least there is a definite and splendid unification of the armed services, and the men in the field who are responsible for the security of the United States cannot be commended too highly for the effective and inspirational discharge of their duties. From the time that we landed in Tokyo we were enabled to cover an enormous amount of territory because of the full cooperation of General MacArthur and his associates in the military, naval, and air forces.

We visited Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Korea, Formosa, and on our flight home, the island of Guam, the Trusteed Islands in the Pacific, and the Hawaiian Islands. During this trip we interviewed many people including, of course, the United States high command—military, naval, and air, our State Department officials—ambassadors, consuls and their staffs, native Japanese, Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, and inhabitants of the various islands. We also had the privilege of interviewing many Americans and British who for years have been living in these areas.

PART II. COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC AREAS

While it is the purpose of this report to comment particularly on the situation in China, I desire to sum up briefly my observations on other specific areas.

A. Japan

Of all the areas we visited Japan stands out as a beacon of light and hope in an otherwise alarming picture. No one could be in Japan for even a short period without realizing that an entirely new chapter in the history of the world is being written.

The cold war with Russia has been described as a war of ideologies—the battle for men's minds. That is definitely true as I will comment later in this report. While we in America have been theorizing about it, Russia has won the cold war in China and in other areas up to date. But in Japan General MacArthur and his splendid group of associates are carrying on this war for men's minds and are demonstrating practically what the western Christian tradition is. General MacArthur is not only commander in chief of our military forces in the island areas but is also supreme commander of the allied powers (SCAP). For the first time in history the victor in a great, devastating war has raised the vanquished to their feet and has not only taught them how to recover and take care of themselves, but has contributed to the cost of their recovery. It is too early, of course, to draw any final, definite conclusions, but I would like to emphasize now that this ideological war is being constructively carried on in Japan. A new Japan may well arise to be the spearhead of a revitalized western Christian tradition in the Far East. We have a long way to go before this can be accomplished, and we, of course, face in Japan, as in other parts of the world, the subversive influences of communism, but Japan under MacArthur is moving ahead and in the right direction.

Another aspect of the Japanese situation impressed us. From our interviews with local Japanese, as well as our own Americans who have been in Japan for some years, we were left with a feeling that an opportunity may be presented to the religious and educational workers who have heretofore been interested in Japan to make a real contribution now. It seems to be admitted that, generally speaking, Buddhism is not increasing, and Shintoism, which involves the worn-out idea of emperor worship is being discarded. This situation leaves a vacuum for those who have what might be called spiritual yearnings, and this vacuum could well now be filled by aggressive, practical, and inspiring Christianity. This would unquestionably be the best bulwark against the further spread of communism. And it is interesting to note in this connection that an aggressive and positive leadership in this matter is being taken by Japanese women. Women in Japan are free for the first time in Japanese history, and their new freedom is releasing the hidden resources of feminine idealism and fundamental spiritual aspirations.

B. Our strategic line of defense—Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines

We had the privilege of traveling by air as the guest of Admiral Turner Joy of our Pacific Fleet from Japan to Okinawa in the Ryukyu group of islands, and to the Philippines. In making this trip and studying our maps we became aware of the critical importance of the line of islands running north and south and making a bastion of defense in the western Pacific to defend the Pacific islands for which we are responsible and our own American mainland. Certainly I would urge that the members of our Armed Services Committee of both House and Senate should visit this area, confer with our Army and Navy leaders and study the relationship of the western Pacific defense to the Formosan problem, which I will discuss later.

C. The Philippines

As we passed through the Philippines on our way to the China area we were conscious of the "growing pains of a new republic." I wish we could have had more time there because here as well as elsewhere the serious threat of communism is present. We were in the Philippines while the election campaign was getting under way, which involved the reelection of President Quirino. I am happy to note in the recent press that President Quirino was reelected by a substantial majority.

President Quirino was strongly pro-American and a supporter of the independent governmental structure which we in America had helped to create, while one of his opponents particularly was violently anti-American and as a matter of fact had been a Japanses quisling in the late war. The result of the election seems to indicate that the Filipino people as a whole desire to be a part of what we call the western tradition, and for the present at least have their faces set against the Communist menace. But it is clear that their economic situation is serious and will be a problem for us for some years ahead.

D. Korea

After our trip to Okinawa, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, we returned to Tokyo where we made our second journey by air through the courtesy of General MacArthur to Korea, Formosa, Guam, and then home. We went to Korea on General MacArthur's special advice in order to see the young, struggling, new republic on the ground.

As a matter of the so-called ECA watch-dog committee, I felt a special responsibility to visit Korea, inasmuch as our Foreign Relations Committee had authorized an ECA appropriation of $150,000,030 for the rehabilitation of Korea's industries. Before I left Tokyo I had conferred with representatives of our Government who had been in Korea and who gave me a very favorable description of what had happened during this last year. These reports were reassuring because on the transport from Seattle to Japan I had been led to believe by those who were familiar with the situation that it might not be possible to save Korea from the Communist wave. The question that was presented, of course, was whether the United States would be justified in investing an additional $150,000,000 in South Korea rehabilitation if there was imminent danger of South Korea being taken over by North Korea, which is under direct Russian control.

In Korea we were welcomed by our Ambassador, Mr. John J. Muccio and Dr. A. C. Bunce, who is in charge of our ECA operations. In conversation with these representatives and their staffs, and additional conferences which we had with President Syngman Rhee, I came to the conclusin that a further ECA investment in Korea is a justifiable calculated risk. During the Japanese control many important industries were started which give promise, if they can be continued, of making Korea an important industrial area. Unfortunately, while the Japanese were in control, Japanese industrial experts held all the higher jobs, so it is necessary for Koreans who are now taking over to have special training to qualify them for executive leadership. This means that the United States has had to furnish technical experts to train the natives to run these plants. A year or so ago this situation looked difficult, and coupled with the threat that Northern Korea, dominated by Russia, might take over the entire peninsula, we took a risk in giving Korea our initial ECA aid. Developments during this past year, however, have justified our confidence. As is well known, the new Korean Republic has been recognized by the United Nations and, therefore, in a sense is under United Nations care as well as United States. The Koreans have developed a well-trained army of their own of some 100,000 men, which army it is believed is thoroughly capable of taking care of Southern Korea in any possible conflict with the north.

I was advised that the Northern Koreans had endeavored to enlist the aid of the Chinese Communists in order to take over and conquer the Southern Koreans, but the Chinese Communists turned them down on the ground that they had too many responsibilities in other parts of China. I was also advised that the Northern Koreans tried to get the Russians to intervene directly in taking over Southern Korea but the Russian reply was that they did not wish to initiate world war III by creating an incident in a minor area like Korea. Whether or not this is true, the fact remains that all those I talked with in Korea, which included our people and natives, felt that there was no immediate danger of the absorption of Southern Korea by the North. After all that we have done for the Southern Koreans and our public statements to the effect that we are endeavoring to support the urge for nationalism and freedom of these areas in the Far East, we would be definitely letting down all of the far-eastern peoples if we did not carry through on this Korean project.

I was most favorably impressed by Dr. Bunche and his advisers who are carrying on the ECA operations and I feel that we should give them a vote of confidence by an early appropriation for this further Korean development. While I did not have time to go into all the details of the proposed $150,000,000 authorization, I feel that a substantial sum should be authorized and appropriated so that there will be no stoppage of the pipe line which is taking supplies and materials to the Koreans at the present time.

E. Guam and the Pacific trusteed islands

On our way home by air we stopped at Guam, which is today an American possession, and also in the Pacific trusteed islands, which the United States holds as trustee under action by the United Nations. In Guam we were entertained by Governor and Mrs. Skinner and our military and naval people there, and in our short stay were presented with the problem facing the people of Guam; namely, some sort of organic act to give them status as a Territory of the United States. It is contemplated that the Guamanian Parliament will send representatives to Washington early in 1950 to discuss with us their present status and the kind of legislation they would like to see adopted in order to give them the new status they aspire to.

The Pacific trusteed islands, of course, are a study in themselves, but I took occasion when I was in Guam and Honolulu to discuss the responsibilities we have assumed in this trusteeship. I am happy to note that a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs is visiting the islands this fall and doubtless will come back wth specific recommendations. We can get some idea of the size of the problem when we realize that the area covered by this group of islands is about the same as the entire United States. These islands are of great importance to us strategically and for our air service to the Pacific, and certainly they cannot again be permitted to fall into hostile hands.

F. Hawaii

On our way home we stopped in Hawaii where we had the privilege of conferring with Admiral Ginrich, Chief of Staff for Admiral Radford (who was in the United States at the time, and Admiral Fiske, who has the immediate responsibility for the trusteed islands. Again we were given the opportunity to see all that there was to see in the limited time at our disposal, and to get the reflections of opinion from these experienced and able representatives of the United States.

PART III. THE PROBLEM OF CHINA

As I stated in an earlier part of this report our main objective in taking this difficult trip was to get the feel of the Chinese situation. We were handicapped in this because of the difficulty and practical impossibility of getting inside China. Again General MacArthur came to our rescue by making it possible for us to go to Hong Kong and later to Formosa, where we had the opportunity of studying some of the problems that exist there. Everywhere we went in the Far East, China is a primary subject of discussion. People with whom we talked are divided into two main classes: first, those who follow the general line of United States policy and look upon the Nationalist cause as completely washed up; second, those who are sharply critical of the United States policy, who feel that we are largely to blame for the let-down of morale of the Nationalists and who feel that there is still salvage in the existing situation, desperate though it is. We are compelled to face the fact that the situation is desperate and without seeking to lay the blame as to where the fault lies at the moment, our immediate objective is to find a formula for the future.

In Hong Kong in addition to conferring with members of our American consulate we had the privilege of talking with the British authorities. It is interesting to note that the attitude of the British has been and probably will continue to be fundamentally different in its approach to the problem than ours. The British have a commercial stake in the Far East that we have never had and in their present precarious financial condition they have every incentive to preserve that stake and save what they can. I fear that this commercial pressure on them will prevent their taking the long range view and may lead them to immediate policies of appeasement and conciliation, which may well be a threat to the entire future of the Far East. Hong Kong is a British colony and the British intend to defend it at all costs. They have increased their military forces, their air forces and their navy, and probably from a purely military standpoint they would out-match the Chinese Communists. The great danger of their position, however, is that Hong Kong is an island with an inadequate food and water supply, and with an over population at the time because of the influx of refugees from other parts of China. As food and water would have to be brought in from the outside and as the Chinese population itself might be led by subversive influences to revolt, it is readily conceivable that Hong Kong might fall just as it did in World War II, and as Singapore did in that war.

This suggests that the British would be prepared to recognize the Chinese Communist Government in exchange for a hands-off policy in Hong Kong, and in exchange for trade relationships which are being pressed on the British by their business interests in Singapore, Hong Kong, and other Chinese cities. It is my judgment that the British are desirous of taking the step of recognition in order to calm down the difficulties of the moment, but they would hesitate to do so unless we join them in this move. As I will point out later in the recommendations of my report, I am strongly opposed to recognition of the Chinese Communist Government because I feel that the movement was inspired in Moscow, the present Chinese leaders were trained in Moscow, they are now being directed by Moscow, and they are being supplied by Moscow. We should no more recognize the Chinese Communist Government than we should recognize Russia itself if she was the foreign invader of China and had conquered China.

It was our privilege to talk with American-trained Chinese who have the vision of the Western Christian tradition and who, I believe, would sincerely make any personal sacrifices to save China from the dangers that now threaten it. We had the privilege of conferring at some length with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who in spite of all the mistakes that he has admittedly made in dealing with this situation, is nevertheless, in my judgment, one of the most important figures that World War II produced, and who still has much to contribute to the salvation of his country. In our conference with him we purposely avoided discussion of any further military assistance. We made it as clear as we could that we were not thinking in military terms so that there could be no possible implication that further military aid would be forthcoming. What we did stress was that the Nationalist Government had not offered the Chinese people any program of reform and rehabilitation which competed adequately with the Communist promises. We pointed out that even on the island of Formosa, which had formerly been Japanese territory, the Nationalists, when they took over, could have made the island an ideal Chinese province with all the reforms that the Chinese people were yearning for. Unfortunately the island has had two Nationalist governors, both of whom had the purely militaristic point of view, and who treated the Formosan people, not as liberated Chinese, but as a conquered population. It is to be hoped that the new governor, by whom we were entertained and who impressed us very favorably, may show a complete about-face in this tragically erroneous policy.

A difficulty with the Nationalists today is that there are two groups competing for control. One is a military group, thinking only in military terms, and the other is a civilian group which is laying more emphasis on agrarian and other reforms. The United States has been handicapped in its effort up to some months ago to give military aid because the aid that we turned over to the Nationalist Government apparently quickly found itself in Communist hands. The mistake that we made in this respect was in not having an American controlled set-up which could insure that the aid reached its ultimate intended destination. There has, unfortunately, been serious mismanagement and inefficiency by the Nationalists, and these are the dangers which have determined our policy to furnish no further military aid under present conditions.

The facts of the Chinese situation can be fairly simply stated. The morale and leadership and the strength of the Nationalist Government, which was the foundation of Chiang Kai-shek's brilliant leadership in the war against Japan, has collapsed because of military mistakes and internal jealousies. It has also collapsed because of the thread of misunderstanding and ineptness on our part which runs through the whole post VJ-day story. My own judgment is that we did not thoroughly understand the Chinese psychology and we seemed to come to the conclusion that the only alternative to further military aid was complete abandonment or at least temporary inaction, which to them was the same as abandonment, and contributed to the break-down of whatever morale was left.

From our personal contacts I am prepared to deny the unfortunate propaganda that all Chinese in the Nationalist ranks are corrupt. Many of the finest Chinese that we met still stand by the Nationalist cause. They were not able to prevail probably because democratic processes have not yet been set up in China. The Nationalist Government has remained too military. We were advised that many honest men did all they could to induce the "Gimo" (Chiang) to bring in essential reforms. But the Gimo's experience has unfortunately been with the sword and he finds difficulty in really taking the "reform" approach seriously. The weakness of the Nationalists has not primarily been corruption, as so often and, I believe erroneously charged, but a leadership that has not really understood Western democracy.

And that is why I want to stress that in my judgment, we have overlooked a far more important factor in this situation than mere military aid. That factor is what might be called the psychological or ideological factor which could have meant support and backing for those high-minded Chinese whom we well knew and who were seeking reform and who should never have been given the discouragement that came from the feeling that their old traditional friend, the United States, had abandoned them in their time of greatest crisis.

PART IV. OVER-ALL OBSERVATIONS

The situation in the Far East is admittedly very complicated with currents and cross-currents making it difficult for any complete diagnosis. On such a short trip as we took I would hesitate to try and draw any final conclusions, and I agree with those who have stated that our attitude must remain flexible because of the constant day-to-day changes in the picture. With this emphasis on flexibility I would like to make the following general observations:

1. Nationalism and freedom

It is immediately obvious to anyone visiting the Far East that there is a widespread yearning among all peoples in this area to express their own nationalism and to be free from external controls. There is definitely a revolt against imperialism in any form and the traditional colonialism. This leads to a propaganda of hatred toward foreigners which, of course, the Chinese Communists have capitalized on. The Russians, being familiar with the Far-Eastern psychology and the traditional opposition to foreign invaders in the China area, have been smart enough not to open themselves to that attack. Consequently, as they have also done in the satellite countries of Europe, they have made their penetration by training nationals to carry the torch for them. Whatever policy we adopt in the future must recognize this normal and commendable urge for self-expression.

2. Economic reform and rehabilitation

In addition to this yearning for nationalism and freedom there appears to be an urge for economic reform and rehabilitation. The threat of famine and hunger is always before these masses in the Far East. Here, again, the Chinese Communists have sensed the need and furthermore their promises of agrarian and other reforms have had great weight in weaning the people away from the Nationalist government, which failed to offer any reforms when it had the opportunity.

3. Need of American "Far East-mindedness"

In talking with representatives of the United States it seemed apparent to me that those who are on the firing line in that area feel that the people back home whom they represent are more concerned with the problems of Europe and the Near East than with the far-eastern problems. This is understandable and explained by the fact that practically all of us in the United States come from European ancestry and, therefore, we naturally think in terms of the type of problems that Europe presents. Europe is so much nearer to us in our thinking that the threats coming from Europe are more realistic than the far-distant Asia. In spite of this fact, however, it is clear that in Asia we have an area comprising an enormous part of the entire world's surface, with a population of upward of a billion people, and that while we are preoccupied with Europe the real threat of world war III may be approaching us from the Asiatic side.

4. A divided authority

I discovered in the areas visited a feeling that our United States representatives were handicapped in their handling of Far East problems because we are dealing with them in compartments rather than as a whole. There is a divided command. General MacArthur has general supervision of Japan and the islands lying south of Japan and running through the Philippines. This is today our Pacific line of defense in the Far East. In addition he is doing an outstanding job in Japan in the difficult role of conqueror occupying the land of the conquered. But he is in the embarrassing position of having nothing whatever to do with the mainland of Asia, which is under the jurisdiction of our naval forces. Our military and naval commanders with whom I talked seemed to be agreed that there should be a unification of authority in the entire area, and also that an over-all ideological as well as purely military approach to the problems was necessary if we were to meet the challenge that communism is making to millions of these people. The policy of "let the dust settle" completely ignores this other and more important approach.

I was left with the definite impression that in the Far East there is no one finger on the pulse of all the problems in which all of these countries are so intimately related. Certainly from the military and general strategical point of view this is a critical weakness.

5. The military future

While the final chapter has not yet been written so far as the military operations in China are concerned, it seems clear that at the present moment the military phase of the so-called Chinese Civil War is critical. The Chinese Nationalist government, which had received our support and on which we pinned our hopes, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whom we believed would be the bright shining star in the far-eastern firmament, have both shown serious weaknesses so far as military operations are concerned. Whether what is left of the China mainland can be held by the Nationalists, or whether Formosa can be defended are questions not yet answered.

These are problems that should be given immediate attention by whatever agency is set up by us to determine the most effective use to be made of the $75,000,000 flexible fund. This was the special fund appropriated by the Congress to be used by the President to stop the spread of communism in China and the Far East.

6. The morale factor

In talking with people whose views represent both sides of the Chiang Kai-shek controversy I came to the conclusion that there was a tendency to think that the only alternative to further military aid to the Nationalist government was the abandonment of China entirely. In talking with prominent Chinese leaders, whom I found had ideals for China other than mere military victory for the Nationalist government, I sensed a feeling of despair because of their abandonment by the United States at this crisis in their history. Since the days of the Boxer indemnity scholarships, the open door, and our strong stands for China's territorial integrity, advanced Chinese thinkers have looked to the United States for leadership in the areas of education and in spiritual advancement. These thinkers emphasized the point that as serious as the loss of our military support was, there was even more serious loss to the Chinese people of those morale-building factors which Americans and American-trained Chinese had heretofore contributed. It would seem as though in our dealings during the last few years with the Chinese we underestimated the importance of this distinction between morale-building factors and mere military might. Consequently our most recent contributions of military supplies, and especially the last $125,000,000 under the ECA bill of last year, were of no value whatever since prior to the turning over of those supplies the morale of the people had collapsed.

7. "Salvage" in the situation

Because of this morale factor, which it is very hard to define and lay our hands on in a practical way, I feel that there is a "latent salvage" right now in the situation which we cannot afford to neglect. There are Chinese leaders with whom I talked in Hong Kong, in Tokyo and in Formosa who are figuratively speaking, holding out their hands to us with a plea to continue to believe in their basic objectives and to continue to help them maintain their courage against these tremendous odds of military defeat. These are the real standard bearers against the creeping paralysis of Russian-inspired Chinese communism. These individuals might well be described as oases in the vast desert of China, and I have no doubt that through the entire area there are those who would rally to a courageous ideological approach aimed at Chinese rehabilitation.

PART V. SPECIFIC IMMEDIATE RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of these general observations what recommendations can be made for positive, constructive action at this time?

In considering this question I want to emphasize again that I have no final and conclusive answers and, therefore, what I am suggesting is simply an approach to the whole problem and an honest recognition of its difficulty and immensity.

What I am pleading for is an attitude of mind by us which will give hope and courage to those who are still willing to remain faithful to what they believe in. In this spirit I make the following specific recommendations:

1. A united far-eastern command

Our over-all command in the development of our policy in the Far East should be unified in one control such as General MacArthur has so ably demonstrated in Japan, which will recognize not only the strategic military problems of the area from the standpoint of the security of the United States, but also and especially will appreciate the fact that we are engaged in an ideological war—a war to capture the minds of men.

2. The $75,000,000 flexible fund

In order to make the most effective use of the $75,000,000 flexible fund, there should immediately be appointed a committee or agency, familiar with the situation from experience on the ground. This agency would advise the President as to the practicability of military projects which might be developed to carry out the fund's objectives.

Specially, I suggest that such a committee be made up of such outstanding men as General MacArthur, Admiral Badger, General Wedemeyer, Admiral Berkey, General Chennault, and Ambassador Leighton Stewart.

Such a committee would certainly have the united approval of the American people.

3. No recognition of Chinese Communist Government

Inasmuch as the practically unanimous opinion of all those with whom I talked was that the present Communist movement was originally initiated in Moscow, its leaders were trained in Moscow, and it is now being directed from Moscow, I am opposed to any recognition of the Chinese Communist Government by the United States. The Chinese Communist advance is definitely an alien invasion, and is undermining the aspirations for nationalism and freedom which all of these far eastern countries are struggling to attain.

4. Program of reform and rehabilitation—No military aid

While I would recommend that we continue our present recognition of the Nationalist Government as long as it survives, I would leave the question of further military aid to the discretion of the President, acting with advice of the agency to be set up under recommendation 2 above. As a policy we should emphasize primarily the importance of the development of an ideological program of reform and rehabilitation, which should be practically applied immediately in the areas still occupied by the Nationalists.

What I mean by this is that there should be developed such a reform program in the non-Communist western provinces, in the area of Chungking (until and unless Chungking falls), on the island of Hainan, and particularly on the island of Formosa. On the island of Formosa there is an outstanding opportunity to develop for the Formosa people themselves a program which would mean the assurance of their freedom and the rehabilitation of their industries, and especially their agriculture. I believe that this possibility should be explored immediately with the Nationalist Government now in control of Formosa and with the Taiwan people themselves, who are opposed both to the Chinese Communists and also to the Nationalists. I believe that the Taiwan people would cooperate with the Nationalist Government in setting up through our ECA operations a type of recovery which might be an example to other provinces in China now in desperate need. Furthermore, Formosa is ideally located for the development of our Voice of America program which, however, I would not call the "Voice of America," but rather the "Voice of the New China."

5. Formosa must not fall into hostile hands

I recognize that because of the unsettled conditions on the island of Formosa today, the previous proposal might be difficult of accomplishment. But whether or not that proposal could be accomplished, it is my urgent recommendation that under no circumstances must we let the island of Formosa fall into hands hostile to the United States. This is not only because Formosa might be the last bastion opposing the Communist wave in China, but also because Formosa, if in hostile hands, would threaten the island bases in the eastern Pacific from Japan to the north and down through Okinawa and the Philippines in the south.

At the present moment Formosa has an uncertain legal status. It was a part of Japan prior to World War II. It is occupied today by the Chinese Nationalist forces because it was agreed at Cairo that it would be returned to China at the conclusion of the Japanese war. Technically, however, until the peace with Japan is ratified the area is still a part of Japanese territory and could be included in our Japanese military occupation. I recommend that this situation be carefully explored with the further recommendation that any possible steps taken should be reported at once to the United Nations with an expression of determination on our part to keep the island out of the war area and to assist in its economic development. We might explore the possibility of a United Nations trusteeship pending such time as the ultimate sovereignty of the island could be determined.

6. Admit and correct mistakes

I recommend the following moves to correct what appear to be mistakes of policy:

(a) Discontinue making Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders "political lepers." With all their alleged mistakes they merit our interest and help. They can help build the New China.

(b) Discontinue our present policy of watchful waiting and become positive in our support of anti-Communist resistance in the Far East.

(c) Do not permit short range financial pressures to outweigh long range ideological objectives.

7. *Over-all advisory group*

I recommend that in order that we may keep our hands on the day-to-day changes in the far-eastern situation, that we continue the advisory committee appointed by the Secretary of State: Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup; Raymond B. Fosdick, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation; and Everett Case, president of Colgate University; and that we support this advisory committee by the appointment of a subcommittee of the Congress chosen on a bipartisan basis from the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the corresponding committees in the House.

Should such a group of continuing advisers be appointed, I would recommend that the whole group or at least a subcommittee thereof proceed immediately to the Far East to observe conditions on the ground and to make specific recommendations for positive action.

8. *Areas other than China*

The foregoing recommendations are directed primarily to the difficult Chinese problem, but I would not limit our investigation and consideration to that single area. We have the problem of Korea to which I referred earlier in this report and which I had the privilege of visiting, and I feel that we are justified in carrying out an ECA rehablitation program in light of the splendid progress the Koreans have made during the past year.

In addition to Korea, however, and the other areas which I have discussed earlier in this report, we must give consideration to the area bordering on China on the southwest, particularly Burma, Thailand (Siam), and French Indochina.

When Congress authorized the flexible $75,000,000 fund for military aid to be used in the area of China where the Communist advance might be threatening, it was definitely realized that there might be trouble in these spots and that prompt military aid might be justified. During my trip I was advised that there are at the present time real disturbances in Burma and French Indochina, but I was also advised that Thailand (Siam) is in the best shape politically and is strongly anti-Communist. All these areas need our immediate careful study and probable aid. The advisory agency provided for in recommendation 2 should make a study of these areas at once.

CONCLUSION

The time for effective action is now. America united on a far-eastern policy can and must definitely halt this creeping paralysis of communism, which today threatens every freedom that our forefathers fought, bled, and died for on this continent. A firm stand now is a way by which we can avert the horrors of a third world war.

Throughout our entire trip whether we were in Japan, in the Philippines, in Korea, or in parts of China, we could seem to sense the deep yearning of people for a new leadership which would mean freedom from superimposed controls and an end of war and fighting. This is an obviously difficult ideal to be attained, and it can only be attained if the powerful, peace-loving nations of the world courageously stand together against aggression and the rule of might. This may call for an early reconsideration of the United Nations Charter and a new approach to international cooperation to establish the rule of law and the protection of the weak against the aggression of the strong.

As we traveled and talked to people with different viewpoints we felt that this yearning for nationalism and freedom was bringing people closer together in an understanding in the truest sense of the brotherhood of man. People were meant by the great design to be free and to live together. It was never meant that any people on the globe should be subjected to the domination and control of any other people. The yearnings in the Far East and in other parts of the world for freedom is an expression of the recognition of these eternal truths.

The sympathy of the United States for these yearnings and the determination of our people to aid in this eternal quest for freedom must continue to be the foundation of our foreign policy.

November 29, 1949.

(Enclosure (*d*))

FOR A BIPARTISAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

(Statement by the executive council of the American Federation of Labor, Chicago, May 18, 1951)

Our country has been in the midst of an historic debate over its foreign policy. That our nation can engage in such a debate during a bitter and costly war (Korea) is a great tribute to the vitality of American democracy. This debate has already brought much clarification. It has enlarged the area of agreement, particularly, in regard to our course in Asia over which the sharpest disputes had arisen. We are confident that, in the final settlement of the issues, the democratic ideals, humanitarian interests, and world responsibilities of the American people will rise above party and personality. In the present critical hour, this is the first prerequisite for the adoption of a sound and just bipartisan foreign policy, especially in the Far East.

A way must be found to attain this bipartisanship and thus to insure the continuation of the century-old friendship between the American and Chinese people. In this spirit, we propose that such a bipartisan foreign policy should include the following evaluation and practical measures:

1. The war in Korea is a war planned, plotted, and prepared by the imperialist ruling class of Russia as an organic part of its drive to conquer all Asia and, thereby hasten Soviet domination of the entire world. At this stage of military operations, the North Korean puppets and the Chinese Communists hordes are serving as the catspaws and cannon fodder for imperialist Russia. As the leading power in the camp of international democracy, America has assumed the heaviest burdens and responsibilities in this bitter conflict. But we must redouble our efforts to secure greater contributions and more active participation in this military struggle by other members of the United Nations.

2. In line with the UN General Assembly decision branding the Peiping regime as an aggressor not only against the Republic of Korea but also against the United Nations as a whole our country should set the peace in rallying the other free peoples in applying not only an arms embargo but also rigid economic sanctions against Communist China so as to reduce its military potential and thereby hasten the end of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

3. In view of the global nature of the crisis precipitated by Russian aggression and the urgent need for strengthening the political, economic, and military forces of the free nations in Europe, Asia and elsewhere, the present objective of the UN in the Korean conflict would be to halt and defeat this Soviet aggression, to restore the territorial integrity and protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea as founded and recognized by the UN, and to aid its people in achieving reconstruction and security against any future aggression.

4. In view of the offer made by the Chinese National Government to provide 30,000 troops for the UN forces in Korea, the recently appointed US Military Mission to retrain the Nationalist forces on Formosa should give priority to retraining and reequipping these troops with the object of making them available to the Supreme Commander of the UN as military requirements necessitate.

5. Our country should continue to give military aid to the Chinese National Government based on Formosa with a view of preventing its seizure by the Communists. The US should also continue to give economic aid to Formosa—either as a continuation of the present ECA or as a part of the Point Four Program. The stabilization of the economy of Formosa, the development of its economic resources, the raising of its living standards, and the active advancement of democratic reforms on this island should be systematically furthered in order that it may serve as an inspiring contrast to mainland China groaning under the iron heel of Communist terror and Russian exploitation.

6. Under no circumstances or pretext whatsoever should our government in any way recognize or approve the admission of Communist China into the UN. Furthermore, our government should do all in its power to have other governments desist from recognizing it or seeking its admission into the UN.

7. The US should not commit itself to a war on the continent of Asia. We stress this though we heartily sympathize with the aspirations of the National Government to speed the liberation of the Chinese mainland from the traitorous and terrorist Communist dictatorship and its masters in Moscow. In this connection, our Government should, in cooperation with the National Government of China, make a careful survey of the possibilities of guerilla warfare

on the mainland with a view of giving forces resisting Communist tyranny and Russian domination appropriate and practical aid.

8. The peace and security of the world demand a free and democratic and independent China. Our government should vigorously reaffirm its policy of unstinting support for restoring to the Chinese people their full national independence and territorial integrity.

It was in this spirit that Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay offered the historic policy of the Open Door to prevent the threatening partition of China at the close of the 19th Century. In a similar spirit, Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing turned down Japan's Twenty-One Demands made in China during World War I. In the same spirit, Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull made strenuous and successful efforts to have China accepted as a member of the Big Five in the UN. Today, more than ever before it is imperative for our country to insure the continuity of its traditional policy of friendship for the Chinese people through the attainment of a genuinely bipartisan foreign policy in the Far East.

Appendix NN

Statement of W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, Regarding Our Wartime Rlations With the Soviet Union, Particularly as They Concern the Agreements Reached at Yalta

To the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate:

I am submitting this statement for use in connection with the hearings on the Far Eastern situation. My objective is to clarify the confusion that has arisen regarding the understandings reached at Yalta by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with Premier Stalin.

Much has been said and written about Yalta and its effect on the postwar course of events. Some people have shown a lack of understanding of our objectives in the conduct of the war and our efforts during the war to lay a foundation for a peaceful postwar world. Others appear to have profited from hindsight. Still others—for reasons best known to themselves—have distorted and perverted the facts to a point where their statements have little or no basis in reality. As a result, a myth has grown up that what President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill did at Yalta has led to our postwar difficulties with the Soviet Union. This myth is without foundation in fact.

The discussions at Yalta and the understandings reached there were an integral part of our negotiations with the Soviet Union throughout the war to bring the desperate struggle to a victorious and early conclusion and to find a way in which the United States, Great Britain, and the U. S. S. R. could live together in peace. The postwar problems have resulted not from the understandings reached at Yalta but from the fact that Stalin failed to carry out those understandings and from aggressive actions by the Kremlin.

In this statement I have attempted to set forth the manner in which President Roosevelt sought to achieve his objectives. In doing so I have drawn heavily on my personal experiences. After being involved in our rearmament program beginning June 1940, I was sent by President Roosevelt to London in March of 1941 as his special representative for assistance to Great Britain. From October 1943 until January 1946, I was Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Prior to this appointment President Roosevelt had sent me on several special missions. The first was in September of 1941, when I went to Moscow with Lord Beaverbrook as Chairman of the President's Special Mission to the Soviet Union. In August 1942, I represented President Roosevelt at the first meeting of Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin in Moscow. I was with Secretary of State Hull at the Moscow Conference in October 1943. I attended all but one of the conferences between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and all of the conferences between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—Teheran in November 1943, Yalta in February 1945, and Potsdam in July 1945. I also attended the meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. I was in San Francisco for a few weeks during the United Nations Conference in April and May 1945. Throughout the war I had innumerable personal talks with Churchill and many discussions with Stalin.

The primary objective of the American and British governments in our relations with the Soviet Union during the war was to keep the Soviet Army as an effective fighting force against Hitler. We sought to do this through the shipment of essential supplies and through the coordination of our military strategy. Supplies began to flow shortly after the discussions Lord Beaverbrook and I had with Stalin in Moscow in September 1941. The principal strategic talks took place when Churchill visited Moscow in August 1942 and at Teheran in November 1943. At this latter conference, Stalin was informed of our plans to land in France, and he undertook to attack shortly after we got ashore in order to prevent the Germans from diverting divisions from the eastern front to the west.

There are those who now contend that we should not have supported the Soviet armies. They contend that we should have let Germany and the Soviet Union kill each other off. These people forget the real danger was that Hitler would knock Russia out of the war. The Germans were only a few miles from Moscow when I was there in October 1941. That year the winter saved the city. I was in Moscow again in August 1942 when the Russians were again facing disaster. The supplies from the British and ourselves may have been decisive in helping the Russians to hold Leningrad, to prevent the encirclement of Moscow, and to stop the onslaught on Stalingrad and the oil fields of the Caucasus. With the increased flow of our supplies, by the spring of 1944 the Russians had been able to throw the Germans back on all fronts.

These people forget that on June 6, 1944, when the Allies landed on the Normandy beaches, there were about 60 German divisions in France and the Low Countries, whereas there were 199 German divisions and 50 satellite divisions engaged on the eastern front. In accordance with Stalin's agreement at Teheran, the Russian armies launched a major offensive on June 22 and tied down and broke through this formidable Nazi force.

If we had failed to come to the support of the Soviet Union, the Germans would have rendered the Russian armies ineffective and would have been able to throw their full power against an allied invasion of the continent. In this case it is doubtful whether such an invasion could have been attempted, and no one can now tell how long the war with Hitler might have lasted.

These tremendous and courageous operations by the Soviet Army and the fact that Stalin had honored such a vital military commitment influenced the attitude of British and American representatives in subsequent negotiations with the Soviet Union—and built up favorable opinion for the Soviet Union among the people of the United States and the other Western Allies.

In addition to maintaining the Soviet Union as an effective fighting ally against Hitler, it was our objective to encourage the Soviet Union to join in the war against Japan at the earliest possible date. Because of their ambitions in the East, there was never any doubt in my mind that the Soviets would attack the Japanese in Manchuria in their own due time. The question was whether they could come in early enough to be of any help to us and to save American lives. I raised the subject with Stalin as early as August 1942. He told me then that it was his intention to come into the Pacific war when he was in a position to do so. Stalin was gravely concerned by the possibility of a premature attack by the Japanese. He had weakened his Siberian forces for the defense of Stalingrad. Furthermore, the Japanese Navy alone could have cut off the vital line of our supplies coming through Vladivostok.

The question of Soviet participation in the Pacific war was discussed in some detail at Teheran. Roosevelt proposed to Stalin the basing of American heavy bombers in the Maritime Provinces north of Vladivostok. This was deemed a necessary requirment by our Air Force in order to cover the Japanese Islands. In addition, Roosevelt suggested the possible use of Soviet ports for our naval forces and requested the immediate exchange of military intelligence concerning Japan. Stalin agreed that those matters should be studied. Shortly thereafter we established exchange of combat intelligence. The other matters continued to be the subject of discussion on my part with Stalin in Moscow during the ensuing year.

Concurrently with our negotiations for the conduct of the war, President Roosevelt sought to come to an understanding regarding postwar problems with the Soviet Union. It was clear that unless these problems were settled we would have difficulties once the war was ended. President Roosevelt attempted to use our relationship as allies to develop a basis on which world peace could be maintained, and to settle in advance differences which we were likely to have over the treatment of territories occupied by the Red Army.

In August 1941, before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt and Churchill had met at sea and proclaimed the Atlantic Charter, a statement of the fundamental principles to which nations must adhere if they are to live together in peace and freedom. In January 1942, at our request, the Soviet Union subscribed to the Atlantic

Charter in the Declaration by United Nations. In October 1943. a further step was taken in the Moscow Declaration, which laid the foundation for the United Nations. This declaration was signed by Molotov, Eden and Hull, and the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow. It was only after Hull's vigorous insistance that Molotov agreed to the inclusion of the signature of the Chinese. This was in line with Roosevelt's consistent attempts to strengthen the position of the Chinese National Government and to obtain the support of that Government by the Soviet Union.

At Teheran, in addition to the military matters, President Roosevelt attempted to develop further a basis for reaching political understandings with the Soviet Union. Plans for the organization of the United Nations were discussed, and also such matters as the postwar treatment of Germany, the future of Poland, and the independence of Iran. Further negotiations about these matters took place in Miscow on frequent occasions during the ensuing year and, with respect to the United Nations organization, at Dumbarton Oaks.

Russian objectives in the Far East were also explored at Teheran particularly with reference to the need of the Soviet Union for the use of warm water ports. I understand that Roosevelt had talked about this latter point with Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference, and that Chiang had indicated his agreement with the idea that the Port of Dairen should be internationalized.

In my talks with Roosevelt in 1943 and 1944, he told me of his concern over the historic conflicts between the Soviet Union and China, and the need for finding a basis for the settlement of the underlying causes of these difficulties.

On Roosevelt's instructions, I discussed with Stalin on a number of occasions throughout 1944 Soviet participation in the war against Japan, the concerting of our military actions in the Pacific, including operations by American bombers from the Maritime Provinces, and the basis of an understanding between the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government. In one of these talks, which took place in June, Stalin minimized the Chinese Communists, and stated that Chiang was the only man who could hold China together and that he should be supported.

Molotov reiterated this position when Mr. Donald M. Nelson and Major General Patrick J. Hurley stopped at Moscow in August en route to Chungking.[1]

Although Stalin had on several occasions mentioned Soviet political objectives in the East, it was not until December 1944 that he outlined these objectives to me in detail. He said that Russia's position in the East should be generally reestablished as it existed before the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. The lower half of Sakhalin should be returned to the Russians, as well as the Kurile Islands, in order to protect Soviet outlets to the Pacific. The Russians wished again to lease the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and to obtain a lease on those railroads in Manchuria built by the Russians under contract with the Chinese, specifically, the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was the direct line from the Trans-Siberian Railroad through to Vladivostok, and the South Manchurian Railroad making a connection to Dairen. He stated that the Soviet Union would not interefere with the sovereignty of China over Manchuria. In addition Stalin asked for the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. I pointed out to Stalin that the talks at Teheran had envisaged internationalization of the Port of Dairen, rather than a lease. Stalin replied that this could be discussed. I immediately reported Stalin's proposals to President Roosevelt, and they became the basis of the discussions at Yalta.

It was against this background, which I have briefly sketched, that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met with Stalin at Yalta in early February 1945. The question of Roosevelt's physical condition at the time of Yalta has been the subject of considerable discussion. Unquestionably, he was not in good health and the long conferences tired him. Nevertheless, for many months he had given much thought to the matters to be discussed and, in consultation with many officials of the Government, he had blocked out definite objectives which he had clearly in mind. He came to Yalta determined to do his utmost to achieve these objectives and he carried on the negotiations to this end with his usual skill and perception.

The discussions at Yalta covered a wide range of topics, including final plans for the defeat of Hitler, the occupation and control of Germany, reparations, the United Nations Conference to meet at San Francisco on April 25th, the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to the liberated peoples of

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[1] See U. S. Relations With China, p. 71–72.

Europe, and the establishment of a free, independent, and democratic Poland through the holding of free and unfettered elections. By the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Roosevelt and Churchill obtained the pledge of Stalin for joint action to secure the fundamental freedoms for the people in territories overrun by the Red Army.

The text of the Declaration is as follows:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor Nations.

"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (*a*) to establish conditions of internal peace; (*b*) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (*c*) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (*d*) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

"The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

"When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving Nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

"In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

It was agreed that there should be continued collaboration between the three Governments through periodic meetings of the Foreign Secretaries, and the concluding paragraphs of the Yalta communique, quoted below, expressed the determination of the three Governments to have "unity for peace as for war":

"Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

"Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving Nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, 'afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.'

"Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace."

Had Stalin honored these commitments taken at Yalta, Eastern Europe would be free today and the United Nations would be a truly effective organization for world security.

The last understanding to be reached was that relating to the Far East. The crucial issue was not whether the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War, but whether it would do so in time to be of help in the carrying out of the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The great danger existed that the Soviet Union would stand by until we had brought Japan to her knees at great cost in American lives, and then the Red Army could march into Manchuria and large areas of Northern China. It would then have been a simple matter for the Soviets to give expression to "popular demand" by establishing People's Republics of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. President Roosevelt sought to reduce the general assurances which Stalin had previously given to specific undertakings for the early entry of Russia in the Pacific War, to limit Soviet expansion in the East and to gain Soviet support for the Nationalist Government of China.

It should be recalled that it was only on the second day of the Yalta Conference that General MacArthur entered Manila. The bloody battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa still lay ahead. It was not until more than five months later that the first and only experimental explosion of the atomic bomb was successfully concluded at Alamogordo. The military authorities estimated that it would take 18 months after the surrender of Germany to defeat Japan, and that Soviet participation would greatly reduce the heavy American casualties which could otherwise be expected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning an invasion of the Japanese home islands, and were anxious for the early entry of Russia in the war to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and in order that our bombers could operate from bases in Eastern Siberia.

These plans were outlined in two memoranda which were before the President at Yalta.

In a memorandum for the President, dated 23 January 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided by the following basic principles in working toward U. S. S. R. entry into the war against Japan:

"Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations. The United States will provide maximum support possible without interfering with our main effort against Japan.

"The objective of Russia's military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with United States air forces based in eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic between Japan and the mainland of Asia."

In a memorandum dated 22 January 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

"1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows:

"To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by—

"(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

"(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

"2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a basis for planning the war against Japan:

"The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific—

"(*a*) Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

"(*b*) An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

"(*c*) The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.

"3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders:

Objectives	*Target date*
Continuation of operations in the Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro, Leyte)	————
Iwo Jima	19 February 1945
Okinawa and extension therefrom in the Ryukyus	1 April-August 1945

"4. Until a firm date can be established when redeployment from Europe can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in the Chusan–Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu–Honshu in the winter of 1945–1946.

"5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the entry of Russia into the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination so far has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for that purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 is remote due to lack of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined.

"6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation of the European war requires postponement of the invasion of Japan until well into 1946."

These military considerations had been the subject of careful study by Roosevelt for a long time and they were uppermost in his mind at Yalta. President Roosevelt personally carried on with Stalin the negotiations leading up to the understanding on the Far East. I was present at the meetings when these matters were discussed and, under President Roosevelt's direction, I took up certain details with Stalin and with Molotov. Neither Secretary of State Stettinius nor any of his advisers, except for Charles E. Bohlem who acted as the President's interpreter, had anything to do with these negotiations. Any suggestion to the contrary is utterly without foundation in fact.

The first conversations took place on February 8th, at which Stalin brought up with Roosevelt the proposals which he had presented to me the previous December in Moscow. Stalin contended that these proposals should be accepted. Roosevelt said that he believed there would be no difficulty in regard to the Kurile Islands and the return to Russia of the southern half of Sakhalin. He said that, although he could not speak for Chiang Kai-shek, he believed that Dairen might be made a free port under an international commission, and that the Manchurian railroads might be operated jointly. The President and Stalin also discussed internal conditions in China. Stalin reiterated his recognition of the need for a united China under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.

Stalin suggested that the proposals be put in writing and be agreed to before the conference ended.

Two days later, on February 10, Molotov took up with me the details of the understanding to be reached. I reemphasized President Roosevelt's views that the ports should be free ports and not leased to the Soviet Union, that the Manchurian railroads should not be leased but jointly operated, and that in any event the understanding should specify that the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek was required.

I reported this conversation to Roosevelt, and he instructed me to explain his views again to Molotov, which I did.

Later on in the same day, February 10, Roosevelt and Stalin met again. Stalin agreed to the modification as proposed by Roosevelt, except that he maintained that a lease on Port Arthur would be required, as it was to be used for a naval base. Stalin accepted the requirement for Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence and said that he wanted his concurrence also to the status quo in Outer Mongolia. President Roosevelt and Stalin concluded that the matter should be discussed with Chiang when Stalin was prepared to have this done, having in mind the need for secrecy and lack of security in Chungking.

On the following day, the text was shown to Churchill, and after his agreement, it was signed on that day, February 11, 1945, by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. The full text is as follows:

"The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

"1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

"2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

"(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union, "(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored,

"(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.

"3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

"It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

"The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

"For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke."

Stalin also agreed to joint planning for military operations in the Pacific and to the use by the United States Army Air Force of bases in the Maritime Provinces at Komsomolsk and Nikolaevsk.

President Roosevelt felt that he had achieved his principal objectives. He had obtained the agreement of the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan within three months after the defeat of Germany. This was the period required to move Soviet troops from the European front to Siberia. It was considered to be in good time, and conformed to the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which involved the redeployment of our forces from Europe to the Pacific. Roosevelt had also obtained Stalin's pledge of support for Chiang Kai-shek and recognition of the sovereignty of the Chinese National Government over Manchuria.

In recent years several objections have been leveled at the terms of the Yalta understanding on the Far East and the circumstances under which it was concluded.

It has been asserted that the understanding was a mistake because, as it turned out, Russian participation had no influence on the defeat of Japan. To President Roosevelt at Yalta, the lives of American fighting men were at stake. He had been advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the defeat of Japan would take many months after VE-day and that if the Soviet Union came in soon enough countless American lives would be saved. Furthermore, up to that time, Stalin had carried out vital military undertakings. Roosevelt, therefore, considered that a definite commitment from Stalin was of supreme importance and would be of great value.

Another criticism is that Chiang Kai-shek was not consulted before the understanding was signed and that the understanding was kept secret. The question of consulting Chiang was a difficult one. Secrecy was a military necessity. Experience had shown that whatever was known in Chungking got to the Japanese. Stalin was unwilling to risk Japanese knowledge of his plans until he had been able to strengthen his forces in Siberia. At Roosevelt's insistence, however, the understanding specified that Chiang's concurrence was required where China's direct interests were affected and that Chiang should be notified at the appropriate time.

I am sure that Roosevelt would have much preferred to have consulted Chiang in advance, if he had thought it was feasible for him to do so. On the other hand, he had had certain general talks with Chiang on some of the points involved, and knew of Chiang's desire to come to a permanent understanding with the Soviet Union. For these reasons, and also because of the strong support that he had given Chiang in the past, Roosevelt felt that he could work things out with Chiang when the time came.

Because of the prior conversation with Stalin, Roosevelt was convinced that the requirement for Chiang's concurrence qualified the provision that the claims of the Soviet Union "shall be unquestionably fulfilled," and that Stalin so understood. Events proved that Roosevelt was correct. The Yalta understanding provided a framework for negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government in the summer of 1945, looking toward a settlement of the long standing difficulties between the two countries. These negotiations which I will discuss in greater detail later in this statement, were voluntarily negotiated between the two governments and culminated in the Sino-Soviet agreements of August 1945. In these agreements, although the Soviet Union obtained certain privileges in the railroads and the ports, it fully recognized the sovereignty of the National Government over both China and Manchuria and agreed to support that government and no other. When the Sino-Soviet agreements were made public in August they were welcomed both in China and in the United States. These agreements dispose of the claim that the concessions made at Yalta regarding Manchuria undermined Chiang Kai-shek and ultimately caused him to lose control of the mainland of China. The loss of control over the mainland by the National Government was due not to the Yalta understanding but to the fact that the Soviet Union broke the Sino-Soviet agreements and to the factors which have been discussed in detail before these Committees.

Subsequent to the Yalta Conference certain events took place during the late winter and spring of 1945.

At the end of February, Ambasador Hurley, who was then United States Ambassador to China, returned to Washington for consultation. He has testified that he saw President Roosevelt on two occasions in March and that Roosevelt instructed him to go to London and attempt to ameliorate the Yalta understanding (Printed Record, Part 4, p. 2885). It does not appear that Ambassador Hurley correctly recalls the facts.

I am convinced that President Roosevelt's concern after Yalta was to see to it that friendly relations were developed between the Soviet Union and the National Government of China.

Ambassador Hurley came through Moscow on his way to Chungking in April. He stayed with me during his visit. At no time did he indicate to me that President Roosevelt was disturbed about the understanding reached at Yalta or that he desired that this understanding be ameliorated. On the contrary, the purpose of Ambassador Hurley's visit to Moscow, as he stated it to me and to Stalin, was to find out from Stalin when Chiang could be told about the Yalta understanding and to help further cement the relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government.

This is revealed by the report which Ambassador Hurley sent to the Secretary of State on the meeting which he and I had with Stalin and Molotov on the night of April 15. The full paraphrased text of this report, dated April 17, is as follows:

"Conference concluded by me and Harriman on April fifteenth with Molotov and Stalin. My analysis of former statement by Molotov on attitude of Soviet toward National Government of China and Chinese Armed Communist Party given to Stalin and Molotov. My analysis was briefly as follows: 'Molotov said at the former conference that the Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at all. Their objective is to obtain what they look upon as necessary and just reformations in China. The Soviet Union is not supporting the Chinese Communist Party. The Soviet Union does not desire internal dissension or civil war in China. The Government of the Soviet Union wants closer and more harmonious relations in China. The Soviet Union is intensely interested in what is happening in Sinkiang and other places and will insist that the Chinese Government prevent discriminations against Soviet Nationals.' Molotov agreed to this analysis. I then outlined for Stalin and Molotov existing relations between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party. I stated with frankness that I had been instrumental in instituting conferences and negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government. I then presented in brief form an outline of the negotiations, of the progress which had been made and of the present status. I informed Stalin that both the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party claimed to follow the principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment of a government of the people, by the people and for the people in China. I continued that the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party are both strongly anti-Japanese and that the purpose of both is to drive the Japanese from China. Beyond question there are issues between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government, but both are pursuing the same principal objective, namely, the defeat of Japan and the creating of a free, democratic and united government in China. Because of past conflicts there are many differences on details existing between the two parties. I made clear American insistence that China supply its own leadership, arrive at its own decisions, and be responsible for its own policies. With this in mind, the United States had endorsed China's aspirations to establish a free, united government and supported all efforts for the unification of the armed forces of China. I informed him that President Roosevelt had authorized me to discuss this subject with Prime Minister Churchill and that the complete concurrence of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden had been obtained in the policy of endorsement of Chinese aspirations to establish for herself a united, free, and democratic government and for the unification of all armed forces in China in order to bring about the defeat of Japan. To promote the foregoing program it had been decided to support the National Government of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin stated frankly that the Soviet Government would support the policy. He added that he would be glad to cooperate with the United States and Britain in achieving unification of the military forces in China. He spoke favorably of Chiang Kai-shek and said that while there had been corruption among certain officials of the National Government of China, he knew that Chiang Kai-shek was 'selfless', 'a patriot' and that the Soviet in times past had befriended him. I then related to Stalin and Molotov the request made by the Chinese Communists for representation at the San Francisco Conference. I told them that before leaving China I had advised the Chinese Communists that the conference at San Francisco was to be a conference of governments and not of political parties and that I had advised the Communists to request representation at San Francisco through the National Government of the Republic of China. I told him that this decision had been upheld by President Roosevelt and that the President had advised Chiang Kai-shek of the advisability of the National Government's permitting the Chinese Communist Party to be represented on the Chinese National Government's delegation to the conference at San Francisco. I told the Marshal that it was a very hopeful sign when Chiang Kai-shek offered a place on the delegation to San Francisco to a Chinese Communist and that the appointment had been accepted. I told Stalin that I thought it was very hopeful that a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party would be a delegate of the Chinese National Government at San Francisco. Stalin agreed that this development was very significant and he approved. I told him that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had indicated their approval of the policy outlined. The Marshal was pleased and expressed his concurrence and said in view of the over-all situation, he wished us to know that we would have his complete support in immediate action for the unification of the armed forces of China with full recognition of the National Government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. In short, Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to America's policy in China as outlined to him during the conversation.

"Also instructed by Roosevelt to discuss another subject with Stalin. Asked by Stalin if I was acquainted with subject. I stated yes. Stalin then inquired if I had advised Chiang Kai-shek. I said no. Stalin then said that he and Roosevelt had agreed that when it was time for discussions with Chiang I was to institute such discussions. There followed a full talk on this subject as to which Harriman, who is now on his way to Washington, can give you the details. Harriman's general helpfulness and cooperation in the meeting with Molotov and Stalin and in all other matters were of great value."

With regard to the last paragraph of the telegram, Stalin said he preferred to delay discussion of the Yalta understanding with Chiang for about two months longer and Hurley agreed.

I returned to the United States to report to President Truman immediately after the conversation with Stalin and before Ambassador Hurley's report was prepared and dispatched. On April 19, I discussed Ambassador Hurley's report with Mr. E. F. Stanton of the Far Eastern Affairs Division of the Department of State. Mr. Stanton's memorandum of that conversation is summarized as follows on pages 97–98 of the volume United States Relations With China:

"Mr. Harriman felt that General Hurley's report, while factually accurate, gave a 'too optimistic impression of Marshal Stalin's reactions.' Mr. Harriman was certain that Marshal Stalin would not cooperate indefinitely with Chiang Kai-shek and that if and when Russia entered the conflict in the Far East he would make full use of and would support the Chinese Communists even to the extent of setting up a puppet government in Manchuria and possibly in North China if Kuomintang-Communist differences had not been resolved by that time. He indicated that he had impressed on General Hurley the fact that statements made by Stalin endorsing our efforts in China did not necessarily mean that the Russians would not pursue whatever course of action seemed to them best to serve their interests. Mr. Harriman feared that Ambassador Hurley might give Chiang Kai-shek an 'over-optimistic account of his conversations with Stalin' and he thought it might be advisable to suggest to General Hurley that he should be careful 'not to arouse unfounded expectations'."

As a result of this conversation, the Secretary of State on April 23 instructed Ambassador Hurley in Chungking not to present his talk with Stalin in too optimistic a light to Chiang Kai-shek.

In a cable to President Truman from Chungking on May 10, 1945, Ambassador Hurley outlined in some detail his conception of the mission which he had been given by President Roosevelt in March. There is nothing in this cable which indicates that Roosevelt had instructed Ambassador Hurley to attempt to ameliorate the Yalta understanding. The paraphrased text of the cable is as follows:

"Knowing the great strain under which you must be working I have hesitated to burden you with problems by which we are confronted here. In my last conference with President Roosevelt he entrusted me with two specific missions in addition to my duties as Ambassador to China. The first mission was to bring Churchill and Stalin to an agreement on the policy that the United States has been pursuing in China. Namely (1) to take all necessary action to bring about unification under the National Government of all anti-Japanese armed forces in China. (2) To endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people for the establishment of a free united Democratic Chinese Government. (3) To continue to insist that China furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions and be responsible for her own policies and thus work out her own destiny in her own way. As you have no doubt been advised by the Secretary of State I obtained concurrence of Churchill and Stalin on the plan outlined. The British claim that the policy to which they now agree has always been British policy. This statement is incorrect. Roosevelt knew it was incorrect and that is why he sent me to London. We have conclusive evidence on this point which it now seems unnecessary to resubmit since agreement has been reached. The policy of all the Southeast Asia Imperialists Governments was to keep China divided against herself. This policy would seem to have been altered now that the British and the Soviet have agreed to the Roosevelt policy in China.

"The second mission entrusted to me by President Roosevelt in my last conference with him pertains to a decision affecting China reached at the Yalta Conference. Before my last visit to Washington and before I had been informed by the President of the Yalta decision pertaining to China including particularly the all-important prelude, the Generalissimo had discussed with me China's position on the same problems decided upon at Yalta and had given me his attitude relating to them. He gave me, at that time, an aide memoire summarizing his position on some of the problems. Of course, the subject discussed in the prelude to the Yalta decision was not known to him and so far as I am concerned the matter has not yet been presented to him. Since my return we have continued to discuss the problems that would be involved in promoting future friendship and peace with Russia, without referring to the Yalta decision as such. All of the problems decided, except No. 1 in the prelude, have been raised by the Generalissimo and discussed fully with me. I am convinced that he will agree to every one of the requirements but will take exceptions to the use of two words "preeminent" and "lease." These two words have bad connotations in Chinese. They have been involved in the controversies over extraterritoriality. These two words seem to impinge on the principles of the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of China. Both Roosevelt and Stalin advised me that it was agreed between them that I would not open the subject of the Yalta decision with Chiang Kai-shek until the signal was given me by Stalin. Stalin said he would give me carte blanche and let me use my own judgment as to when and how to present the subject. However, both Harriman and I were of the opinion that it would be best to delay the presentation because of the possibility of leakage which in turn might bring undesirable results. I explained this to Stalin and it was finally decided that I am not to present the subject to Chiang Kai-shek until we have advised Stalin that, in our opinion, the time is opportune and until we have received the signal from him. I want to emphasize to you that prior to my recent visit to Washington I had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek all phases of the Chinese-Russian problem before we knew what was contained in the Yalta agreement, and since coming back to Chungking we have again thoroughly covered the same subjects without alluding to the primary subject. We are therefore in a position to proceed with dispatch on the Yalta Agreement when we are authorized to submit particulars thereof to the Generalissimo. My purpose in wiring you this report is to give you the foregoing brief and somewhat cryptic outline of the situation and at the same time advise you that the Generalissimo has received telegrams from the Chinese Ambassador at Washington summarizing all of the items decided at

Yalta except the primary one. The Chinese Ambassador's recitations of the various items are not all correct although he states that he got the various points in conversation with President Roosevelt. The Chinese Ambassador has indicated that the United States will join as a third party in the agreement between Russia and China on the various instrumentalities described. No such participation is indicated in the Yalta decision. In addition to this the Chinese government yesterday received a cable from a Chinese Representative in Switzerland which reports movements of troops that we know are taking place and which indicate Russia's intent. The Chinese government also has other information of movements and plans from which they have concluded that the object referred to in the prelude of the Yalta decision is definitely expected to happen. From the reports the Chinese are now receiving and with what they already know it is reasonable to expect them to reach approximately correct conclusions on this subject. It is of utmost importance that the Generalissimo as head of a state vitally concerned should be informed officially and in an appropriate straightforward manner becoming the character of the United States when the time is propitious. This information could and probably would have been given to him some time ago were it not for the lack of security associated with China. It now appears desirable that you discuss this situation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State to determine when you should direct me to ask Stalin for his approval of the time when I am to officially inform Chiang Kai-shek. Telling Chiang Kai-shek and asking him to clamp down secrecy which no doubt he would do to the best of his ability would I believe keep the secret from the enemy longer than it will be kept by letting the Chinese continue to conjecture publicly on the facts that come to their knowledge from other sources. The American Theater Commander is familiar with the contents of this message."

With regard to Ambassador Hurley's comments on the words "preeminent" and "lease" in the Yalta understanding, I can personally state that neither Roosevelt nor Stalin intended that the phrase "preeminent interests" should go beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports to and imports from the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt had told me at Yalta that this was his interpretation and, when I took this position with Stalin in August 1945, he agreed. As to the lease on Port Arthur, Roosevelt looked upon this as an arrangement similar to privileges which the United States had negotiated with other countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations.

The problem of China and the Soviet intentions in the Far East was also discussed during Mr. Hopkins' special mission to Moscow in May 1945. During a conversation which he and I had with Stalin on May 28 I brought the matter up and Stalin reaffirmed his support of a unified and stable China which would control all of Manchuria. Stalin reiterated that the Soviet Union had no territorial claims against China and stated that he would support the open-door policy. He said he would also welcome representatives of Chiang to be with his troops when they entered Manchuria in order to facilitate the establshment there of administration by the Chinese National Government.

Soviet participation in the war against Japan was again discussed at the Potsdam Conference which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945. It will be recalled that although the first and only atomic bomb experimental explosion had been successfully concluded on July 16, the bomb had not yet been used against Japan. During the conference, Stalin informed President Truman of peace feelers which he had received from the Japanese Government. These were of such a character as to be unacceptable.

At Potsdam, more than five months after Yalta, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still planning an invasion of the Japanese home islands and still considered Soviet participation in the Pacific war essential. On July 24, 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported to the President and the Prime Minister that their overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific was as follows:

"In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required."

The Combined Chiefs of Staff also stated:

"The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations."

They went on to say that our policy should be to:

"Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith."

On the basis of this over-all plan, extensive discussions were carried on with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff for the attack on Manchuria by the Soviet forces about two months prior to landings by U. S. forces on the Japanese home islands.

In the meantime the Chinese Government had been informed of the Yalta understanding. In Washington on June 9, President Truman had discussed with T. V. Soong, Premier of the Chinese National Government, the provisions of the understanding, including the promise of Stalin to conclude a treaty of friendship with the National Government of China. On June 14, President Truman saw Soong again and told him of the renewed assurances Stalin had given Hopkins and myself in Moscow to support the National Government of China under Chiang. Soong expressed his gratification. On June 15 Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang of the Yalta understanding and also communicated to him Stalin's renewal of his assurances regarding China's sovereignty in Manchuria and his support of a unified and stable China and of the open-door policy.

By this time it had been agreed that negotiations would start promptly in Moscow between China and the Soviet Union regarding the matters dealt with in the Yalta understanding. T. V. Soong arrived in Moscow at the end of June 1945. Negotiations were conducted between Stalin and Molotov, on the one hand, and Soong, on the other. They were interrupted by the Potsdam Conference, but were resumed early in August, at which time Soong was joined by Wang Shi-chieh, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese National Government.

Stalin, at the outset, made demands that went substantially beyond the Yalta understanding. While Soong was not prepared to accede to all of these demands, he made it clear to me that his Government was anxious to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union, and to this end he was prepared to make concessions which we considered went beyond the Yalta understanding.

At no time did Soong give me any indication that he felt the Yalta understanding was a handicap in his negotiations. I repeatedly urged him not to give in to Stalin's demands. At the same time, during this period, I had several talks with Stalin and Molotov in which I insisted that the Soviet position was not justified. This action I took on instructions from Washington. Also, on instructions, I informed Soong that the United States would consider that any concessions which went beyond our interpretation of the Yalta understanding, would be made because Soong believed they would be of value in obtaining Soviet support in other directions. Soong told me that he thoroughly understood and accepted the correctness of this position. The fact is that, in spite of the position I took, Soong gave in on several points in order to achieve his objectives.

Events moved swiftly during the early days of August. On August 6, the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima and on August 9 another on Nagasaki. On August 8, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. On August 10, Japan sued for peace through the Swiss Government and on August 14 an armistice was arranged. On that day a series of agreements between the Soviet Union and China, including a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, were concluded. They were ratified by the Chinese Government on August 24, 1945, and were made public at that time. The texts of these agreements are set forth on pages 585–596 of the volume entitled "United States Relations with China" and are summarized as follows on page 117:

"The Treaty pledged mutual respect for their respective sovereignties and mutual noninterference in their respective internal affairs. In the exchange of notes the Soviet Union promised to give moral support and military aid entirely to the 'National Government as the central government of China' and recognized Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria; and China agreed to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if a plebiscite after the defeat of Japan confirmed that that was the desire of the Outer Mongolian people. The agreement on Dairen committed China to declare Dairen a free port 'open to the commerce and shipping of all nations' and provided for Chinese administration of the port; but it exceeded Yalta by granting the Soviet Union a lease of half of the port facilities, free of charge. This agreement has not been put into effect, since Nationalist military and civil officials have been prevented from functioning in the Kwantung Peninsula area because of the attitude of the Russians and the Chinese Communists. The agreement on Port Arthur provided for the joint use of the area as a naval base by the two Powers and extended the boundary of that area farther than the United States expected, though not to the pre-1904 boundary which the U.S.S.R. would have preferred. The railway agreement provided for joint ownership and operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways. The Treaty and the agreements regarding Dairen, Port Arthur, and the railroads were to run for thirty years."

Of prime importance is Article V of the Treaty of Friendship which reads as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of noninterference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party."

Supplementing this provision an exchange of notes between Molotov and Wang specified:

"In accordance with the spirit of the afore-mentioned Treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U. S. S. R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be *entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China.*" [Italics supplied.]

Soong told me in Moscow he was gratified at the results obtained and expressed his gratitude for the active support the United States had given him in his negotiations. Ambassador Hurley informed the Secretary of State on August 16 from Chungking that Chiang Kai-shek was "generally satisfied with the treaty." Ambassador Hurley went on to state that at his suggestion, Chiang had invited Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist party to a conference in Chungking. His cable concluded by stating that "Chiang Kai-shek will now have an opportunity to show realistic and generous leadership." On September 6, Ambassador Hurley cabled the Department of State that: "The publication of these documents has demonstrated conclusively that the Soviet Government supports the National Government of China and also that the two governments are in agreement regarding Manchuria."

The Sino-Soviet agreements were welcomed by the American press. As a sample I quote below portions of an editorial which appeared in Life magazine on September 10, 1945:

"Twelve days after Japan gave up, there was announced in Moscow and Chungking an agreement which was as great a victory for common sense as the defeat of Japan was for armed might. The Soong-Stalin treaties contain less ammunition for pessimists than any diplomatic event of the last 20 years. The signature of two men have done as much to assure peace as all our Flying Fortresses.

* * * * * * *

"Two strong and subtle men, both revolutionaries since youth, sat down in Moscow and discovered that each needed and wanted a long peace to complete his particular revolution. So they negotiated out every major issue between Russia and China.

* * * * * * *

"In Chungking, Mao and Chiang are now laying the basis for that (China's) future. It is extremely bright.

"Certainly Americans have cause to call it bright. For the present prospects of China are a vindication of American policy in Asia for almost 50 years.

* * * * * * *

"Peace, lively but genuine peace, is therefore the outlook."

Nothing that was done at Yalta contributed to the loss of control over China by Chiang Kai-shek. The Yalta understanding was implemented by the Sino-Soviet agreements, which had they been carried out by Stalin, might have saved the Chinese National Government. The inability of the Chinese National Government to maintain control over China was due to the fact that the Sino-Soviet agreements were not honored by Stalin, and to other factors which have been dealt with before these Committees in great detail.

I do not believe that it would serve a useful purpose for me to discuss the subsequent course of events in China, as they have been testified to at length in these hearings by others who had direct contact with these matters.

In conclusion, I want to reemphasize the objectives that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill sought to achieve in their relations with the Soviet Union during the war.

Their primary objective was to maintain Russia as an effective fighting ally. This problem in itself gave grave concern, not only as to the military capabilities of the Soviet forces, but also as to whether the Kremlin would make separate arrangements with Hitler and leave the Western Allies stranded. The building of mutual confidence in the conduct of the war was not an easy task. But the fact remains that Russia has an effective fighting ally, and carried out vital military undertakings against Hitler.

In addition, Roosevelt and Churchill sought to lay a foundation during the war for cooperation to maintain world peace by all nations, including the Soviet Union, and to find solutions to specific problems which would result from the war, particularly with regard to the treatment of those countries which would be occupied by the Red Army. No one was under any illusions about the difficulties that we would encounter. Nevertheless, step by step, Soviet leaders subscribed to principles which culminated in the formation of the United Nations. They entered into agreements designed to dispose of many specific problems. The carrying out of these commitments would have gone a long way toward achieving Roosevelt's objective of a peaceful world. The post-war difficulties stem from the fact that Stalin did not carry out his commitments and from the fact that the Soviet Union has failed to live up to the Charter of the United Nations.

Some people claim that we "sold out" to the Soviet Union at Yalta. If this were true, it is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union has gone to such lengths to violate the Yalta understandings. The fact is that these violations have been the basis of our protests against Soviet actions since the end of the war. There would have been a sell-out if Roosevelt and Churchill had failed to bend every effort to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union and had permitted the Red Army to occupy vast areas, without attempting to protect the interests of people in those areas.

Only by keeping our military forces in being after Germany and Japan surrendered could we have attempted to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw from the territory which it controlled and to live up to its commitments. The people of the United States and the war-weary people of Europe were in no mood to support such an undertaking. This country certainly erred in its rapid demobilization in 1945, but this is an error for which the entire American people must share the responsibility. I cannot believe that anyone seriously thinks that the move to bring the boys home could have been stopped. I still recall my grave concern when I was in Moscow at the cold reception the Congress gave to President Truman's recommendation for universal military training in the fall of 1945.

The most difficult question to answer is why Stalin took so many commitments which he subsequently failed to honor. There can be no clear answer to this question. I believe that the Kremlin had two approaches to their postwar policies, and in my many talks with Stalin I felt that he himself was of two minds. One approach emphasized reconstruction and development of Russia, and the other external expansion.

On the one hand, they were discussing possible understandings with us which would lead to peaceful relations and result in increased trade and loans from the west for the reconstruction of the terrible devastation left in the wage of the war. If they had carried out this program, they would have had to softpedal for the time at least the Communist designs for world domination—much along the lines of the policies they had pursued between the two wars.

On the other hand, we had constant difficulties with them throughout the war and they treated us with great suspicion. Moreover, there were indications that they would take advantage of the Red Army occupation of neighboring countries to maintain control, and they were supporting Communist Parties in other countries to be in a position to seize control in the postwar turmoil.

The Kremlin chose the second course. It is my belief that Stalin was influenced by the hostile attitude of the peoples of Eastern Europe toward the Red Army. and that he recognized that governments established by free elections would not be "friendly" to the Soviet Union. In addition, I believe he became increasingly aware of the great opportunities for Soviet expansion in the postwar economic chaos. After our rapid demobilization, I do not think that he conceived that the United States would take the firm stand against Soviet aggression that we have taken the past five years.

The one great thing accomplished by our constant efforts during and since the war to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union is that we have firmly established our moral position before the world. Had these efforts not been made, many people of the free world would still be wondering whether we and not the Kremlin were to blame for the tensions that have developed. The fact that the Soviet Union did not live up to its undertakings made clear the duplicity and the aggressive designs of the Kremlin. This fact has provided the rallying point for the free world in their collective effort to build their defenses and to unite against aggression.

(Signed) W. A. HARRIMAN.
W. A. Harriman.

Subscribed and sworn to this 13th day of July 1951.

PERCY E. NELSON,
Notary Public.

APPENDIX OO

WASHINGTON 5, D. C., *June 20, 1951.*

Hon. RICHARD RUSSELL,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: Supplementing the testimony which I was accorded the courtesy of giving before the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 3, 1949, I am sending you this letter, for any assistance that it may be to your present Joint Committee inquiry, a statement of my on-the-spot views and comments on the proposals which have been put forward for bringing to a conclusion the war in Korea.

I have been following the testimony in this inquiry as carefully as I can at this distance. The attached statement was largely prepared a month ago, but I believe that the views expressed are still pertinent today.

Needless to say, I shall be glad to assist your committee in any way that I can.

Yours very truly,

C. L. CHENNAULT,
Major General (Retired) United States Army.

This letter was signed and sent for General Chennault, who is presently in Formosa, at his request and direction.

FERN HILL, *Secretary.*

STATEMENT OF C. L. CHENNAULT, MAJOR GENERAL (RETIRED) UNITED STATES ARMY

It is not the intention of the writer to enter into the controversy over the removal of General MacArthur, but rather to discuss the military aspects of the situation in Korea and China, particularly with regard to implementing General MacArthur's recommendations for winning the war in Korea. Those recommendations may be summed up under four headings, or points:

1. Blockade the coast of China to prevent the importation of strategic or war materials into Red China from coastal ports.
2. Deliver air attacks upon Red lines of transportation serving the forces in Korea and upon Red centers of industry and transportation in Manchuria and North China.
3. Supply and support the Nationalist Chinese and other anti-Communist elements in active military and guerrilla resistance to the Red Government.
4. Provide a slight increase in the numbers of the allied forces fighting in Korea.

1. NAVAL BLOCKADE OF THE CHINA COAST

A study of the map of China reveals that the country has thousands of miles of coast line stretching from Antung, Manchuria, to the Indo-China border just east of Mon Cay. The principal Chinese mainland ports are Antung, Port Arthur, Yingkow, Hulutae, Chinwangtao, Ta-ku (Tientsin), Chefoo, Tsingtao, Haichow, Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Canton, and Kwangchowan. Foreign-held ports serving China are Dairen (Russian), Hong Kong (British), and Macao (Portuguese).

All of the ports in the north from Antung around the shores of the Yellow Sea to Chefoo can be blockaded by a naval patrol operating between Inchon and the eastern tip of Shantung peninsula, a distance of about 200 miles. Certainly, this patrol would present no difficult problem to our navy, but it would be necessary to make periodic inshore sweeps with light vessels in order to destroy junk and sampan traffic between the Chinese ports. It would also be necessary to allow Russian flag vessels access to Dairen.

Tsingtao, Shanghai, and ports to the south could be blockaded by small patrols or station ships guarding the entrances to the harbors. The Chinese Navy, with a little help, could blockade all of the Chekiang and Fukien ports as far south as Swatow, Kwangtung.

The British-held port of Hong Kong presents a very difficult problem. The Hong Kong and Kowloon port facilities serve the people of the island colony and of the New Territories, with a combined population of more than two million. Considerable light industry has been developed in the Colony since the end of the war with Japan and especially since the Communist conquest of Kwangtung in October 1949. A British-owned railway runs from the harbor side in Kowloon to the border of Red China at Shumchun. Under recent arrangement, through freight cars move from Kowloon to Canton and thence north to either Hankow or Shanghai. Chinese export goods flow down to Hong Kong in solid carload lots to pay for imports.

The Kowlon-Canton railway, although an important carrier, actually moves less than one-fourth of the total tonnage of goods from Hong Kong to China. During the month of March, well after the imposition of the U. S. embargo on strategic materials for Red China, the railroad moved about 35,000 tons as compared to over 100,000 tons acknowledged to have ben transported by commercial steamships plus a large but unknown tonnage carried by smuggling vessels to points all along the coast. Still another considerable but unknown volume of goods is transshipped at Hong Kong into coastal vessels which ply regularly to Macao, Kwangchowan, Canton, Swatow, and other Red ports. Transshipments from one vessel to another for delivery to the Reds at Macao or other ports is not included in the statement of goods shipped from Hong Kong to Red China.

Actually, two or three British steamship lines operate regularly scheduled sailings for both passengers and cargo to such ports as Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, Changhai, Tsingtao, and Tientsin. In addition to this regular service, British and Red Chinese shipping firms in Hong Kong operate numerous coastal vessels under charter. These vessels fly a motley assortment of flags such as Greek, Panamanian, and Portuguese, but they are usually officered by British citizens and have Chinese crews. These vessels are frankly called "blockade runners" in the Hong Kong press and their job is to carry any cargo loaded aboard them, strategic or other, to the Reds.

The term "strategic goods" is purely an academic expression to anyone who has even a slight knowledge of Red China's political and economic organization. Private trading and private ownership of goods has been abolished by the Red Government. Both exports and imports are rigidly controlled by the government. Chinese trading firms manned by trusted Communist officials have been set up in Hong Kong and Macao to buy and sell under orders of the government. It can be safely stated that *all imports* are for the direct or indirect use of the Reds' military forces, and therefore, strategic in character. The Russians are simply unable to supply all the requirements of China's vast military machine over the long trans-Siberian railway and China must endeavor to obtain deficit items through her seaports. For this reason, an effective blockade would have a direct and almost instant effect upon the military forces. Economic sanctions which permit the import of any class of goods into regimented China will not have the desired effect upon the military machine.

Macao offers another difficult problem to any plan to blockade Red China. It is a small Portuguese colony with a highway and numerous inland waterways extending back into the interior. On the seaward side, it is almost surrounded by islands garrisoned by Red troops. It depends upon China and other sources for its food and upon trade with China for its very existence. The colonial government has, of necessity, been extremely friendly and cooperative toward the Red Chinese government. The Reds can take Macao any time they choose. Still, it is a wide-open port for the importation of all kinds of goods into China and the Reds will *not* take it so long as it continues to provide them a free market for trading in gold, arms, ammunition and scores of other commodities so necessary to their militant program.

If a blockade of the Red China coast is to be effective it must also plug the big leaks through Hong Kong and Macao. I am sure this can be done, while at the same time making adequate provision for the civil populations of the two colonies. Nevertheless, to do so will call for a substantial sacrifice by the British and the Portuguese. It will eliminate their present lush profits on the Red China traffic. Considering what is at stake, however, who will say that it is unreasonable to require this sacrifice.

A tight blockade of Red China's coast is feasible and would certainly result in lowering her war potential. It would increase the burden of Russia's supply line to China, possibly to the point where China's minimum requirements could no longer be delivered. There is no reason to believe that it would lead to immediate war with Russia.

2. AIR ATTACKS ON THE "PRIVILEGED SANCTUARY"

According to his opponents, General MacArthur's recommendation that air attacks be made upon the "Privileged Sanctuary" of the Reds in Manchuria is likely to provoke Russian retaliation with thousands of airplanes and hundreds of submarines. Again, the opposition makes positive, dogmatic statements without furnishing evidence or proof of any substance. Let us examine the situation and then seek such evidence as may be available to determine the effects of air attack.

Reference to a sketch map of Korea and Northeast China reveals that there are three transport centers or bottlenecks through which the major portion of all personnel and supply must pass in order to reach the Communists on the central and western Korean fronts. These focal points are Mukden, Changchun and Kirin. It is true that two railroads wind down from Harbin to the eastern Korean front but this supply route can be covered by naval fire after it passes across the border into Korea.

Mukden is by far the most important objective for air attacks in Manchuria. It is a city of more than a million people and has such important industries as steel mills, sawmills, cement plants, cotton and wool mills and one of the largest manufacturing arsenals in Asia. It is also the market for all the food produced in the rich agricultural region of south-central Manchuria. All of the railroads and highways from China proper, as well as several from North Manchuria and Siberia, converge at Mukden. The principal rail and highway supply lines for all the Red troops in Western Korea run southeast from Mukden to Antung and other border points. Nearly all of the replacement troops and new units for the Chinese armies in Korea pass through Mukden. The main line railroad from Mukden to Tientsin and Peiping transports nearly everything, troops, food and equipment, from China proper to Manchuria. The railroad and the parallel highway run along the flat coastal plain with little cover from air attack and in many places both are in easy range of medium-caliber navy guns firing from the sea. Mukden has four old airfields which have been greatly improved since the Reds took over. It also has extensive railroad yards, car and locomotive production plants and car and locomotive repair shops. The terrain around Mukden is such that shuttling personnel and supplies around Mukden would be slow and difficult if the transport facilities in the city and the approaches to the city are neutralized. Combined with air attacks upon Mukden and its vicinity, additional attacks upon the main line railway and highway between Mukden and Tientsin would slow down the movement of personnel and equipment to such a degree that vast communist forces could hardly be maintained even in Manchuria, far short of Korea.

While Changchun and Kirin are not so important as Mukden, attacks upon their transport facilities, airfields, and industrial plants would further weaken the Red position in Korea. None of these points is closer than two hundred miles to the border of Siberia so there is little chance for an accidental bombing of Russian territory by a "lost" airplane.

The most significant factor in the Red logistical system is the length of time required for a build-up in Korea even with all railways and highways protected from air attack. After the first massive Chinese offensive more than two months elapsed before the second and less massive offensive was launched. It has now been more than a month since the second assault was stopped and pushed back. The third effort is, at this writing, surely but slowly building up behind the inviolable wall of "Sanctuary." This would indicate that the destruction or slowing down of even a small percentage of the Red supplies and personnel might make it possible for the Chinese to maintain an army of sufficient size to hold territory in Korea, much less any army capable of taking the offensive. The question seems to be "How long will we maintain the 'Privileged Sanctuary' while the Reds build up and launch successive offensives to kill our boys in Korea?" If there is any real evidence that Russia will go to war with the rest of the world the moment we drop bombs in Manchuria, the maintenance of "Privileged Sanctuary" may be justified for the time being. However, such evidence should not be kept a secret from the American people since, if it exists, it is certainly no secret to Russian and Chinese Red bosses.

3. USE OF NATIONALIST CHINESE FORCES

Of all his proposals, General MacArthur's recommendation that we support the Nationalist Chinese in their war of resistance against the Reds may promise the most effective results.

Of all our allies, only the British and Indians of the major powers still talk hopefully of establishing friendly relations and resuming trade with Red China. The British hope appears to be diminishing after eighteen months of studied insult by Red government officials. Though they continue to maintain a Ministry in Peiping and a few consulates in other cities, they have recently announced the closing of six consular offices in the interior, "Because there was no business." Repeated statements by Mao Tse-tung and other Red officials that Red China would only look to Russia for friendship plus the bitter nation-wide antiforeign, and particularly, anti-American campaign, has apparently convinced the most naive American non-Communist officials, politicians and businessmen that Red China does not intend to be our friend either in "our time" or any conceivable time in the future. Little, if anything, is heard now from the proponents of a coalition government in China or from the warm admirers of the "Chinese Communist agrarian reformers." It has become increasingly clear that our life and death struggle with Communism must be fought against Communism in China as well as against Communism in Russia and Communism in the United States.

If we acknowledge the necessity for fighting Communism in China, we should carefully weigh all of our resources for waging a successful campaign—political and economic as well as military. Our campaign must be aggressive because the defensive attitude cannot win in China or anywhere else. Formosa is the only area in the Far East from which a successful economic, political and military effort against Communism in China can be launched.

With no intention of engaging in the controversy regarding the merits of the Chinese Nationalist soldier, I will point out that General Stilwell rated his Chinese Nationalist soldiers very highly. The Russian-trained Chinese Communist soldiers in Korea—blood brothers of the Nationalists on Formosa—have given our troops some extremely bad times, despite their complete lack of air and naval support and inferior artillery support. It is utter nonsense to say that the Nationalist soldiers will not fight if given training, equipment and supervision such as Stilwell gave his men.

In addition to six hundred thousand trained soldiers, sailors and airmen, most of them veterans, a force larger than the combined non-Communist military forces in Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Hong Kong, Formosa also offers the following resources in the battle against Communism:

Economic

1. A stable, democratic form of government.
2. A contented, hard-working people who now have a much higher standard of living than any other people at least from Alaska to Turkey.
3. A self-sufficient economy whose exports exceed its imports, less ECA aid.
4. A very high literacy level. Public schools from kindergarten through high school are available to all children on the island.

Political

1. A liberal Federal and Provincial government which could be extended to the mainland without major modification.
2. A numerous cadre of foreign-educated students who have found refuge from Communism on the island.
3. A leader in President Chiang who commands the loyalty of more Chinese than any other three living non-Communist Chinese leaders combined.
4. A government whose political principles are directed toward democracy as we know it rather than toward regimentation under the spurious Communist democracy.

Military

1. Veteran army, navy and air force organizations numbering more than six hundred thousand officers and men. These organizations could be expanded after landing on the mainland as rapidly as equipment could be made available.

2. A numerous guerrilla cadre on the mainland. Most estimates place the strength of mainland armed guerrillas at one to one and one-half million. There is little doubt but that two or three times these numbers would join any movement which offered a chance for success in ending the Red reign of terror.

3. A network of over thirty airfields, many of them suitable for modern airplanes.

4. Three good harbors with accommodations and facilities for all types of vessels required in this area.

5. The geographical location of Formosa is such that it can be used as a base for striking at the soft underbelly of China, the long coastline stretching from Shanghai on the north to Canton on the south. Most of the area along this coast is mountainous and communication to the interior is extremely poor. The Reds would find it extremely difficult if not impossible to supply their troops in this area if subject to sustained attacks.

Of course, any agreement to support the Nationalists in a counteroffensive against Communism must emphasize the fact that we will provide equipment, technical training and supervision and a limited air and naval force to assist in the defense of Formosa and in making landings on the mainland but *not one soldier* for fighting on the mainland. I feel confident that the Nationalists would accept this provision, and I also feel confident that they are strong enough to make a success of their invasion. I am not altogether alone in this feeling of confidence, for the Red Chinese government has provided evidence that they concur in my views. For several months the Red government has been dismantling industrial plants in south and central China and moving them to the north and northwest. Government records and other valuable documents have also been moved out. It is common talk among all classes of Chinese that the Reds expect to lose south and Central China—perhaps as far north as Peiping—but hope to hold Manchuria and the northwest—Kansu, Ningsia, Chinghai, Sinkiang, Suiyuan and Chahar provinces.

As a matter of fact, Mao Tse-tung and his Red associates are more afraid of Chiang Kai-shek than they are of the combined forces of the United Nations. They know that the United Nations forces could not and would not invade China, but Chiang Kais-shek, the only available focus of the growing anti-Communist sentiment among the Chinese people, can invade China and lead his people in the overthrow of the Red Government and the elimination of the hated Russian "Advisers." They have reason to fear Chiang because he drove them from post to pillar throughout China's vast domain for more than twenty years. This is the real explanation of why the conquest of Formosa is so important to the Chinese Reds. By taking Formosa they eliminate Chiang as a focus of counter-revolution.

The support of the Nationalists, as I have described it in preceding paragraphs, is the only logical, feasible way to counterattack Communism on the mainland of China. It would not involve the United States in a war in China because we would not land a single American soldier on the continent. It is almost identical with the Russian plan for supporting the Reds in their conquest of China and their attempt to overrun Korea. It could hardly incite Russia to immediate, all-out war because Chinese *only* would invade China, and Russia has repeatedly refrained from employing Russian troops in satellite areas.

In fact, this plan offers the only hope of destroying the Red government in China and establishing a united democratic government friendly to the United States and other non-Communist members of the United Nations. It wouldn't cost much, only a fraction of the cost of maintaining our forces in the Korea war, and it has the promise of attaining results of immeasurable value.

4. INCREASE IN UN FORCES IN KOREA

MacArthur's fourth recommendation to increase slightly the fighting forces in Korea is certainly within the capability of the United Nations. There should be sufficient troops in Korea to withstand repeated assaults by any conceivable Red concentration and to permit rotation of battle-weary personnel. Although the General does not mention the number or percentage of increase required, his use of the word "slightly" indicates that a 20-percent, or less, increase might be adequate. Such an increase should not weaken the defenses of Western Europe too much.

Although many dogmatic statements without supporting evidence of any kind have been made with regard to the Korean situation and Russian intentions, vis-à-vis, both Korea and Western Europe, there has been a curious failure to examine and analyze such evidence as to Russian intentions as is furnished by experience. Despite the great flexibility of Communist strategy which often reverses its course overnight, the Russian tactics and procedures follow rigid patterns—as is indeed necessary in any regimented state. Let us examine the record of the past 6 years to determine whether it reveals any evidence that might be of value in determining Russia's intentions and probable course of action today.

Russia has positively refused to fight on two great fronts. Despite Japan's known weakness early in 1945, and despite the fact that Russia had strong military forces in Siberia—as she has now—Stalin refused to enter the war against Japan until after the surrender of Germany. As a matter of fact, he specified that he would not enter the Japanese war until 90 days after the surrender of Germany. Now, Stalin desired to participate in the Japanese defeat more than he wanted anything else at that time. Long before the surrender of Germany he knew that Japan was weakening fast, for the Japanese had requested the Russians to sound out the Allies with regard to a negotiated peace. There was some danger that Japan might surrender before the 90-day period of grace expired. Nevertheless, he held firmly to his course in order to make sure that Germany was completely defeated and that Russian forces occupied selected strategic areas in Germany on the Western front before turning his attention to Japan on the Eastern front. Stalin is as aware of the value of Western Europe to his dream of world conquest as we are, and it is inconceivable that he will deliberately jump into a war in Korea, and possibly Japan, and thereby be forced into fighting on two great fronts. The available evidence on this point indicates that Stalin will not permit Russsia to be drawn into a war in the Far East.

It is extremely doubtful that Russia can fight a war of major proportions in the extreme Far East. Although she has been endeavoring to industrialize central and eastern Siberia to the point where it could support a major war from its own resources, there are many indications that she has not yet attained her objective. An army of one or two million men plus a large air force, plus a considerable force of submarines and other supporting forces would still have to draw an enormous tonnage of supplies and replacement personnel from the Ural region and from Russia proper.

Russia has undoubtedly collected a tremendous stockpile of military supplies in eastern Siberia, but there are always certain classes of supplies and certain critical items which must be brought up regularly from the zone of the interior. We could certainly prohibit her operation of a supply line by sea, and it is doubtful whether the two Siberian railroads could move the tonnages required by her Far Eastern forces in a sustained campaign, particularly if the railroads roads are slowed up by air attack, The evidence on this point is not very pertinent since Russia's last sustained war in the Far East was with Japan in 1904–1905. At that time the second trans-Siberian railroad was not built but Russia was deefated quickly—partly because of a lack of supplies and partly because of other reasons. If those who fear a Russian attack on Korea and Japan have any evidence supporting the theory that Russia is capable of waging a major war in those areas, it should be presented to the public.

An attack upon Korea and Japan would be no picnic excursion for the Russians. She certainly would not precipitate a world war by attacking United Nations forces in Korea unless she was prepared to follow through by undertaking the conquest of Japan. Granted that the Russian armies could drive our forces out of Korea, it can be assumed that a considerable number would be evacuated to Japan, despite Russian air and submarine attack. We already have two divisions in Japan and we should be able to defend our airfields and essential naval facilities there and on Okinawa. Russia does not have enough shipping in the Far East to undertake a massive landing on the main Japanese islands and a landing in great force would be necessary to insure success. In addition to the United Nations forces in Japan, any attempt at armed invasion by Russians would be met by the Japanese "police" army and by as many veterans of the last war as could be armed. There must be more than two million trained veterans still fit for military duty who could and would fight in defense of the homeland. Of course, small Russian units could cross the narrow straits from southern Sakhalin to Hokkaido, but Sakhalin has very poor transport communications and could hardly serve as a supply base for a sustained campaign.

All the available evidence indicates that Russia would not precipitate a world war with the relatively insignificant objective of driving us out of Korea and that she would have little hope of success at an attempt to overrun Japan with the means she has available or can make available within a reasonable time.

As a matter of fact, available evidence reveals that Stalin is opposed to open warfare as a mean for spreading Communism. He has indicated on numerous occasions that he prefers infiltration and overthrow from within. Stalin is opposed to war because he has learned from experience that it is destructive and that the outcome of war is not always certain. He was forced into World War II by Hitler's treacherous attack, and he kept out of the war with Japan until he was certain that Japan could not win. He refused to use Russian soldiers in Greece though there is no doubt that he wanted a Communist satellite on the Mediterranean Sea. All of the evidence indicates that Stalin will refrain from open war unless Russian territory is invaded or until the time arrives when he is convinced that his retention of power depends upon war.

Then what are his intentions with regard to the conflict between the United Nations and the combined Chinese-Korean Communist forces? Why are there repeated reports of an increase in Russian troops, airplanes and submarines in eastern Siberia? It is these reports that have frightened us into maintaining the present limitations upon our military action against the Chinese Communists and which caused the summary removal of General MacArthur. It is curious that such precise reports of Russian troop movements and dispositions "leak out" from Siberia but the vast build up of Chinese troops and supplies on the Korean border last October was concealed from the American Army in Korea, from Tokyo and from Washington. Can it be possible that the Siberian intelligence leaks are intentional? Has Washington suddenly opened a pipeline under the Siberian iron curtain or is it only a blow hole which spouts nothing but that which the Russians pump into it?

Of course, there have been other and more illogical arguments for maintaining the "Privileged Sanctuary" in Manchuria and for continuing trade with Communist China. A strong allied faction argues that bombing Mukden and other targets in Manchuria would alienate the friendship of the Chinese people, and make them really angry with us, in fact. Another strong group, principally British trade tycoons, argue that a blockade of the China coast is impracticable and that economic sanctions deprive us of valuable contacts with the Communists. History produces plenty of evidence that the British, Americans and other naval powers have always resorted to blockade in order to weaken the enemy's war potential in the past. A blockade of China might not stop all smuggling, but it would certainly halt the movement of hundreds of thousands of tons of rubber, petroleum products, steel, chemicals, medicines, motor vehicles, dyes, fabrics and other indispensable war materials which are now flowing into China's emaciated military stockpiles.

As for alienating the people by bombing Manchurian targets, the argument is silly for it overlooks the obvious fact that the Chinese people have nothing to say about the war in Korea. It is the hierarchy of Red Chinese leaders who are responsible for that war and all evidence indicates that they have already alienated themselves from our group of friends. They have repeatedly proclaimed that Russia is their only friend, that they look only to "Father Stalin" for guidance and assistance and that they will fight to the death against the "imperialist" forces in Korea. In my considered opinion, the people would be happy to see bombing attacks upon the airfields, railways, arsensals and other war objectives and would stand on the streets and wave at our airplanes during the attack—just as they did during our attacks upon targets in Japanese-occupied areas during the last war. Available evidence derived from numerous reports from the interior of China, indicates that the Red Chinese leaders are none too secure in their seats of power. Despite the mass campaign of assassinations and terror which they launched in February, there are still hundreds of thousands of guerrillas actively operating in all of the provinces and the masses of the people are becoming more and more dissatisfied with the benefits of the Peoples' Democracy with its Russian background. It is more than likely that any action which would prevent Chinese Communist armies from continuing their aggression in Korea would result in the elimination of the current Chinese leaders and possibly in the overthrow of the Red government. The Red leaders have pledged themselves to the liberation of Korea and failure to attain their objective will weaken their positions enormously.

With all of this evidence before us, I think we can determine, with a fair degree of accuracy, the intentions of Stalin with regard to the Russian program in the Far East, barring, of course, some totally unexpected incident which might occur to upset his calculated course.

First, Stalin has no intention of engaging in a major war in the Far East because of anything that may happen to the Chinese Communists. When Stalin decides that war is necessary to defend Russia or to maintain his power, he will launch his Red hordes against the most valuable objective, western Europe.

Second, Stalin is opposed to fighting on two great fronts. He had hoped that Red China could drive the United Nations forces out of Korea and then continue Communist conquest in Asia. He is still backing them with supplies, technical supervision, tanks and airplanes but not with Russian ground troops.

Third, Stalin is satisfied to have the war in Korea continue indefinitely as a bloody see-saw between Chinese and United Nations forces. It is a distinct drain upon our resources and it costs the Chinese little but manpower, of which they have an inexhaustible reserve. Any hope that the Chinese will become discouraged and ask for peace because of manpower losses is simply wishful thinking. Neither the Chinese nor Stalin place any value whatever on human life, and human suffering.

Fourth, Stalin also needs time before a world war begins. He has troubles of his own both at home and in many satellites. Our leaders who justify a stalemate in Korea in order to gain time, are playing Stalin's game. He still believes that the democracies will so weaken their economies by inflation, unemployment and unbalanced budgets that Communism will gain its objectives without a great world war.

Fifth, Stalin would not be embarrassed if we used all available means, including all four of General MacArthur's recommendations, to end the Chinese aggression in Korea, provided there is no violation of Russian territory or invasion of Chinese territory by foreign troops. Our success in Korea would be a slight set-back in the plan of Communist conquest, but Stalin would quickly evaluate the new factors and adjust his stategy accordingly.

The question for us to decide is not whether President Truman was justified in removing General MacArthur, or whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the President or with MacArthur, but whether we want to continue sacrificing Allied soldiers and war materials in Korea until Stalin calls off the Chinese. The means and the power to force a successful decision are available to us. Will we use them or will we continue to play Stalin's game? I say the decision should be to use whatever means and methods are necessary to end the war in Korea quickly, thereby saving the lives of thousands of our boys and the further impoverishment of a country and a people who are already in desperate circumstances. The Korean people—men, women, and little children—are the real sufferers from the stalemate war. Furthermore, of course, the ending of the conflict in Korea would enable us to direct our undivided attention and effort toward any other danger area that may be created by Stalin. If this decision is made, all parties and all factions should unite to give it one hundred percent support.

Appendix PP

82d Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

COMPILATION OF CERTAIN PUBLISHED INFORMATION

ON

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1951

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FOREWORD

United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D. C., April 30, 1951.

Contained herein are certain published materials which have been assembled and compiled by the staff of the Armed Services Committee, with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, for the use of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations in connection with their inquiry into the military situation in the Far East.

Attention is invited to House Report No. 2495, Eighty-first Congress, second session, entitled "Background Information on Korea," prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, pursuant to House Resolution 206, and to "United States Policy in the Korean Crisis," Publication 3922, Far Eastern Series 34, Department of State, for information relative to the situation in Korea to the dates of their publication in July 1950. This compilation does not duplicate the material contained in those publications, but supplements them by presenting (1) the text of communications providing the basis for the present inquiry, (2) a chronology of significant events pertinent to such inquiry prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, and (3) the text of certain statements and communications pertaining to the subject of this inquiry.

This compilation represents an initial effort to assemble reference materials which may be of assistance to the committees in the conduct of their study. Undoubtedly it is incomplete in many respects, but no source material (other than that contained in the publications referred to above) available to the staff at the date of printing has been omitted. Fragmentary material, and items for which a complete and authentic text was not available at the time of this printing, have been excluded. In the preparation of this compilation the staff has not undertaken to supply any analysis or evaluation of the materials contained herein.

Richard B. Russell, *Chairman.*

COMPILATION OF CERTAIN PUBLISHED INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

I. COMMUNICATIONS INITIATING INQUIRY

A. Message from committee chairman to General MacArthur, April 13, 1951

April 13, 1951.

Hon. George C. Marshall,
Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: The Senate Armed Services Committee has decided by unanimous vote to conduct a full inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignment in that area.

The committee requests that you appear at the first hearing, which will be held on Wednesday, April 18, 1951, at 10:30 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building. This will be an executive session of the committtee.

The committee would also like to hear the views of General MacArthur at the earliest practicable date following your appearance. The general's first appearance before the committee will also be in executive session. Later sessions will be in accordance with the desires of General MacArthur and the committee.

In view of the foregoing I request that you convey the following message to General MacArthur by the most expeditious means of communication available:

> "The Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously requests that you appear before it to give your views on the military situation in the Far East and the circumstances leading up to your relief from your several commands in that area. The committee plans to hear the Secretary of Defense on Wednesday, April 18, and will schedule a subsequent meeting with you to be held at your convenience. This initial meeting will be in executive session. Additionally, the Armed Services Committee has under consideration extending to all Members of the Senate and House of Representatives an invitation to an open meeting with you to hear such views as you may care to express. Please inform me as promptly as possible when you will be available to advise with the committee and whether you are agreeable to appearing at a meeting to which all Members of the Congress will have been invited. Personal regards. Signed Richard B. Russell, United States Senator, Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services."

I should appreciate it very much if you would inform us as to the time when General MacArthur receives the above message and if you would transmit the reply to me upon receipt.

With assurances of esteem, I am

Sincerely yours,

[s] RICHARD B. RUSSELL, *Chairman.*

B. Reply thereto by General MacArthur

"Reur DEF 88528 April 14, please give Senator Russell my personal regards and inform him that I am advised resolutions are pending in Congress inviting me to address a joint session as was done in the cases of Generals Eisenhower and Clay and others when they first came from abroad and that until action has been taken on such resolutions I would deem it inappropriate to make any other plans. If such resolutions are approved, I would regard it a great honor and distinction to address the Congress in general terms."

C. Message from committee chairman to General MacArthur, April 14, 1951

APRIL 14, 1951.

Hon. GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to thank you for transmitting my previous message to General MacArthur and for sending me the General's reply.

I request that you convey the following message to General MacArthur by the most expeditious means of communication available:

> "Re your message: Insofar as I am advised, all members of the Senate Armed Services Committee are supporting the resolution for you to address joint meeting of Congress. Suggestion in my wire that committee was considering inviting all Members of the Congress to an open meeting to hear you was made before it became clear that a concurrent resolution might be adopted. Indications are this resolution will be approved on Tuesday the 17th. My first message referred more especially to your appearance before the committee in executive session to discuss with us the matters referred to in that message. We, of course, realize that any invitation extended to you by concurrent congressional resolution will take precedence over committee hearings and understand why you might prefer that your address to the Congress should be in general terms. However, the members of the Armed Service Committee, having definite responsibilities in the field of national defense, wish to discuss with you in executive session matters which might affect security if made public. Please inform me as promptly as possible what dates subsequent to April 18 will be convenient for you to meet with the committee. Regards. Signed Richard B. Russell, United States Senator, Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services."

I should appreciate it very much if you would inform us as to the time when General MacArthur receives the above message and if you would transmit the reply to me upon receipt.

With assurances of esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

[s] Richard B. Russell, *Chairman.*

D. Reply thereto by General MacArthur

"Reference your 88565. Please convey to Senator Russell my regards and state that I will be available to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee at any time after I have addressed the Congress in accordance with the concurrent resolution to that effect."

E. Telegram from committee chairman to General MacArthur, April 17, 1951

Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
St. Francis Hotel, San Francisco, Calif.:

Appreciate your acceptance of our invitation to appear before Senate Armed Services Committee subsequent to your address to Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also desires to hear your testimony and in order to avoid duplication and to conserve your time and efforts, arrangements have been made for a joint meeting of these committees to hear you. Your schedule for the remainder of this week appears to be quite strenuous and I assume you would prefer to be heard next week. I hope you can appear early in the week of April 23. I shall look forward to seeing you while you are in Washington, and if it is more convenient you can advise me as to an acceptable date while you are here.

Personal regards,

Richard B. Russell,
United States Senator,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.

F. Unanimous consent agreement of the Senate, April 25, 1951

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 25, 1951, p. 4434]

JOINT MEETING OF ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AND COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS TO HEAR GENERAL MACARTHUR

Mr. Russell. Mr. President, Gen. Douglas MacArthur has accepted the invitation of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to appear before that committee on Thursday, May 3. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has requested that it be permitted to meet with us in a joint meeting. I ask unanimous consent that that may be done, for the purpose of that meeting as well as subsequent hearings on the subject.

The Vice President. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Wherry. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. Russell. I yield.

Mr. Wherry. Is it contemplated that the two committees will sit jointly in continuous meetings?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; both for the purpose of hearing General MacArthur, and for the purpose of subsequent hearings to be held on the same subject.

II. CHRONOLOGY OF SOME SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

[Compiled by John L. Houk and Ellen Clodfelter, Foreign Affairs Section, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, April 16, 1951]

1945

September 9: United States troops accept the surrender of Japanese forces south of the 38° parallel and United States Military Government in Korea is established.

1947

May 17: South Korean Interim Government is established by Ordinance No. 141 of the United States Army Military Government in Korea:

November 14: The UN General Assembly passes a resolution stating that the Korean people themselves should create a provisional government through free and secret election of representatives and that subsequently foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea. UN Temporary Commission on Korea is created to observe the election and to consult with the elected representatives and the government.

1948

June 25: The UN Temporary Commission on Korea adopts a resolution stating that the election held in the southern zone on May 10 was a "valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea."

August 15: The Government of the Republic of Korea with Syngman Rhee as its President, is inaugurated and Army Military Government in Korea is terminated.

September 9: The Supreme People's Council in North Korea formally declares the establishment of a "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" claiming jurisdiction over the entire country.

October 12: The U. S. S. R. extends diplomatic recognition to the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea." During the following six weeks the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe also recognize the "government" in North Korea.

1949

April 8: Russian veto blocks Korean Republic's admission to UN.

July 1: United States Army discloses that the withdrawal of American occupation forces is completed. Only a small contingent of some 500 officers and men for training Korean forces is left.

1950

June 19: Dulles assures Korea of continued United States support and predicts Communists will lose grip on North Korea eventually.

1950

June 25: Between 4 and 5 o'clock in the morning (Korean time) North Korean Communist forces attack South Korea defense positions south of the 38th parallel.

At 5:45 p. m. the Security Council adopts a resolution (9–0, Yugoslavia abstaining, U. S. S. R. absent) calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. All members are requested to "render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean forces.

June 27: At 12 noon President Truman reveals that, pursuant to the Security Council's call upon UN members to render every assistance to the execution of the June 25 resolution, he has ordered United States air and sea units "to give the Korean Government troops cover and support," and has asked Moscow to act to terminate the fighting in Korea.

At 10:45 p. m. the Security Council adopts a resolution sponsored by the United States requesting "that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

June 29: In reply to United States note of June 27 asking that the U. S. S. R. "use its influence with the North Korean authorities toward immediate withdrawal of their invading forces," the U. S. S. R. replies that "the events which are going on in Korea were provoked by the attack of troops of the South Korean authorities," and that the Soviet Government "holds now also to the principle of the inadmissibility of the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea."

U. S. S. R. declares that the Security Council resolution on Korea is illegal.

President Truman holds that the United States is "not at war."

June 30: President Truman states he has authorized General MacArthur to use certain supporting ground units and the Air Force to conduct missions on specific targets in northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. "Within hours" a battalion of United States infantry is ashore in Korea.

July 2: In answer to the Chinese Nationalist's offer of June 29 and 30 to furnish troops, United States replies that in view of Chinese Communists' threat to attack Formosa, a conference should be held with General MacArthur before troops are dispatched from the island.

July 7: The Security Council adopts by 7 votes (India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia abstaining) a resolution to channel men, ships, planes, and supplies from contributing UN members directly to a unified command under the United States which would have discretion as to using the United Nations flag.

In a note to the United States, the U. S. S. R. states that it will hold the United States responsible for "all damage to interest of the Soviet Union" caused in carrying out the blockade.

July 8: President Truman names MacArthur as the UN Commander and orders him to use the UN flag concurrently with those of the participating nations.

1950

July 13: Nehru sends personal notes to the United States and U. S. S. R. asking aid in localizing and terminating the Korean fighting by "breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council * * *."

August 2: Statement issued by Gen. Chiang Kai-shek states that he and General MacArthur have reached agreement on the defense of Formosa, based on Chinese-United States military cooperation.

October 7: UN General Assembly adopts resolution, 47–5, recommending that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."

October 9: General MacArthur addresses to "the Premier, Government of North Korea" a demand for the surrender of the forces under his command in whatever part of Korea they are situated.

October 15: A conference is held on Wake Island between President Truman and General MacArthur. President Truman issues a statement stating that a "very complete unanimity of view" had prevailed in the discussions covering Korea, Japan, and United States policy to promote peace in the Pacific.

November 16: President Truman states that "we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China * * * we will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East."

November 24: UN forces open general "end the war" offensive in northwestern Korea under the personal direction of General MacArthur.

November 28: General MacArthur announces that the United Nations forces in Korea "face an entirely new war" as over 200,000 Red China troops intervene in Korea.

Wu Hsiu-chwan, chief of Communist China's delegation to the Security Council, makes first speech at Lake Success, accusing the United States of "criminal armed aggression" against China and announcing that the Chinese Reds will not talk to the Council about the presence of Chinese troops in North Korea.

November 30: President Truman declares "the forces of the United Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea." In answer to reporter's questions, he states that the United States would take whatever steps were necessary to meet the military situation in Korea, and that consideration is being given to the use of the atomic bomb if necessary to assure victory, but he did not want to see it used.

December 1: General MacArthur states that orders forbidding him to strike across the Korean border at Chinese Communists were putting the UN forces under "an enormous handicap, without precedent in military history."

As of this date the following members of the UN have troops in or en route to Korea: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States.

December 22: Communist China's Premier and Foreign Minister Chou-en-lai rejects the proposal of the UN Cease-Fire Committee, stating the Committee is unlawful because Communist China had not participated in creating it. He demands the withdrawal

1950

of all foreign troops from Korea, the withdrawal of the United States from Formosa, and the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

1951

January 23: United States Senate unanimously adopts a resolution calling on the United Nations "to immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea."

February 1: The United States resolution introduced January 20, as amended, which would declare the Chinese Communist government to be engaged in aggression and establish a Good Offices Commission, is adopted 44–7 with 9 abstentions. The amendment, submitted by Lebanon, had the effect of withholding any recommendations for sanctions if the proposed good offices committee reported satisfactory progress.

March 7: United Nations forces recapture Seoul.

General MacArthur reports that the battle lines would remain in a "theoretical military stalemate" as long as there was a "continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counteroffensive action" and no major additions to the organization strength.

March 24: General MacArthur asserts he is ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander of the Chinese and North Korean forces to end the war and "find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed." He added that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its effort to contain the war in Korea would "doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse."

The State Department subsequently issues a statement that "the political issues, which General MacArthur has stated are beyond his responsibility as a field commander, are being dealt with in the United Nations and by intergovernmental consultations."

March 29: Chinese Communist radio rejects MacArthur's offer of a truce in Korea and urges the Red troops to renew their efforts. The offer is termed a "bluff" and an "insult to the Chinese people."

April 5: Representative Martin makes public a letter written March 20 by General MacArthur in which the general endorses Martin's demand for the use of Chinese Nationalist forces to open a second front against the Communists in Asia.

April 11: President Truman relieves General MacArthur of all command in the Far East. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway is appointed to succeed MacArthur.

III. BEGINNING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOREA

A. Statement by United States representative to the United Nations, June 25, 1950

At 4 o'clock in the morning Sunday, June 25, Korean time, armed forces from North Korea commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea. This assault was launched by ground forces along the thirty-eighth parallel, in the Ongjin, Kaesong, and Chunshon sectors, and by amphibious landings on the east coast in the vicinity of Jangmung. In addition, North Korean aircraft have attacked and strafed the Kimpo airport in the outskirts of the capital city of Seoul.

Under the circumstances I have described, this wholly illegal and unprovoked attack by the North Korean forces, in the view of my Government, constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.

This is clearly a threat to international peace and security. As such, it is of grave concern to my Government. It is a threat which must inevitably be of grave concern to the governments of all peace- and freedom-loving nations.

A full-scale attack is now going forward in Korea. It is an invasion upon a state which the United Nations itself, by action of its General Assembly, has brought into being. It is armed aggression against a government elected under United Nations supervision.

Such an attack strikes at the fundamental purposes of the United Nations Charter. Such an attack openly defies the interest and authority of the United Nations. Such an attack, therefore, concerns the vital interest which all the members of the United Nations have in the organization.

The history of the Korean problem in the United Nations is well known to you. At this critical hour I will not review it in detail. But let me recall only a few milestones in the development of the Korean situation.

A Joint Commission of the United States and the Soviet Union for 2 years sought unsuccessfully to agree on ways and means of bringing to Korea the independence which she assumed would automatically come when Japan was defeated. This 2-year deadlock prevented 38,000,000 people in Korea from getting the independence which it was agreed was their right.

My Government, thereupon, sought to hold a four-power conference at which China and the United Kingdom would join the United States and the Soviet Union to seek agreement on the independence of Korea. The Soviet Union rejected that proposal.

The United States then asked the General Assembly to consider the problem. The Soviet Union opposed that suggestion. The General Assembly by resolution of November 14, 1947, created the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. By that resolution the General Assembly recommended the holding of elections not later than the 31st of March 1948, to choose representatives with whom the commission might consult regarding the prompt attainment of freedom and independence of the Korean people. These elected representatives would constitute a National Assembly and establish a National Government of Korea.

The General Assembly further recommended that upon the establishment of a National Government, that Government should in consultation with the Commission constitute its own national security forces, and to dissolve all military or semimilitary formations not included therein. The General Assembly recommended that the National Government should take over the functions of government from the military command and from the civilian authorities of North and South Korea, and arrange with the occupying powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of the armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within 90 days.

Elections were held in South Korea and the Commission did observe them. A Government in South Korea was set up as a result of the elections observed by the Commission. The Commission was unable to enter North Korea because of the attitude of the Soviet Union.

The Temporary Commission in its report to the third session of the General Assembly stated that not all the objectives set forth for it had been fully accomplished and that, in particular, unification of Korea had not yet been achieved.

Notwithstanding the frustrations and difficulties which the Temporary Commission had experienced in Korea, the General Assembly at its third session continued the Commission's existence and requested it to go on with its efforts to bring North and South Korea together.

One aspect of the resolution adopted by the third session of the General Assembly should, I feel, be particularly emphasized. The General Assembly declared that a lawful government had been established in Korea as a result of the elections observed by the Commission and declared further that this was the only lawful government in Korea. This is a most significant fact.

The General Assembly declared further that the Government of Korea was based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the United Nations Commission.

In the light of this declaration, my Government on January 1, 1949, extended recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea, and more than 30 states have since that time also accorded recognition to that Government.

The United Nations Commission worked toward the United Nations objective of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea, the removal of the barriers between the regions of the North and South, and the unification of that country under a representative government freely determined by its people.

In 1949, as in 1948, the Commission's efforts to obtain access to North Korea which included both direct intercourse with the northern authorities and endeavors to negotiate through the Government of the U. S. S. R. were fruitless. The Commission was unable to make progress either toward the unification of Korea or toward the reduction of barriers between the Republic of Korea and the northern authorities. The Commission reported to the General Assembly that the border of the thirty-eighth parallel was becoming a sea of increasingly frequent exchanges of fire and armed raids, and that this constituted a serious barrier to friendly intercourse among the people of Korea.

The Commission observed the withdrawal of United States forces, which was completed on June 19, 1949. Although it signified its readiness to verify the pact of the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from North Korea, the Commission received no response to its message to the U. S. S. R. and therefore could take no action.

At the fourth session, the General Assembly again directed the Commission to seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social, and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea. The General Assembly also authorized the Commission on October 21, 1949, in its discretion, to appoint observers and utilize the services and good offices of persons whether or not representatives of the Commission. The United Nations Commission in Korea is presently in Seoul and we have now received its latest report.

Mr. President, I have tabled a draft resolution which notes the Security Council's grave concern at the invasion of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of North Korea. This draft resolution calls upon the authorities in the North to cease hostilities and to withdraw armed forces to the border along the thirty-eighth parallel.

The draft resolution requests that the United Nations Commission on Korea observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel and keep the Security Council informed on the implementation and execution of the resolution. The draft resolution also calls upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the carrying out of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

B. The first United Nations Security Council resolution, June 25, 1950

Resolution concerning the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, adopted at the four hundred and seventy-third meeting of the Security Council on June 25, 1950:

> *The Security Council,*
>
> *Recalling* the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea";
>
> *Mindful* of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;
>
> *Noting* with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,
>
> *Determines* that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,
>
> I. *Calls for* the immediate cessation of hostilities; and
>
> *Calls upon* the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;
>
> II. *Requests* the United Nations Commission on Korea
>
> (a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
>
> (b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and

(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

III. *Calls upon* all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

(*Voting for the resolution:* China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, United Kingdom, United States. *Abstention:* Yugoslavia. *Absent:* Soviet Union, the Soviet Delegate having boycotted meeting of the Council since Jan. 10, 1950.)

C. Statement by the President of the United States, June 27, 1950

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the thirty-eighth parallel This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the associated states in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

D. Statement by United States representative to the United Nations, June 27, 1950

The United Nations finds itself confronted today with the gravest crisis in its existence.

Forty-eight hours ago the Security Council, in an emergency session, determined that the armed invasion of the Republic of Korea by armed forces from northern Korea constituted a breach of the peace. Accordingly, the Security Council called for a cessation of hostilities forthwith and the withdrawal by the northern Korean authorities of their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel. The Security Council also requested the United Nations Commission on Korea to observe the withdrawal and to report. Finally, the Security Council called upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of the resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

The decision of the Security Council has been broadcast to the Korean authorities and is known to them. We now have before us the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea which confirms our worst fears. It is clear that the authorities in North Korea have completely disregarded and flouted the decision of the Security Council. The armed invasion of the Republic of Korea continues. The North Korean authorities have even called upon the established Government of the Republic to surrender.

It is hard to imagine a more glaring example of disregard for the United Nations and for all the principles which it represents.

The most important provisions of the Charter are those outlawing aggressive war. It is precisely these provisions which the North Korea authorities have violated.

It is the plain duty of the Security Council to invoke stringent sanctions to restore international peace.

The Republic of Korea has appealed to the United Nations for protection. I am happy and proud to report that the United States is prepared as a loyal member of the United Nations to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea.

I have tabled a resolution which I ask the Council to consider favorably as the next step to restore world peace.

That resolution is as follows:

"*The Security Council*,

> "*Having determined* that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
>
> "*Having called* for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and
>
> "*Having called* upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and
>
> "*Having noted* from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

"*Having noted* the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security.

"*Recommends* that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

This is the logical consequence of the resolution concerning the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea adopted at the four hundred and seventy-third meeting of the Security Council on June 25, 1950, and the subsequent events recited in the preamble of this resolution. That resolution of June 25 called upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution, and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities. This new resolution is the logical next step. Its significance is affected by the violation of the former resolution, the continuation of aggression, and the urgent military measures required.

I wish now to read the statement which the President of the United States made today on this critical situation.

(See C above.)

The keynote of the resolution and my statement and the significant characteristic of the action taken by the President is support of the United Nations purposes and principles—in a word "peace."

E. The second United Nations Security Council resolution, June 27, 1950

Resolution concerning the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, adopted at the four hundred and seventy-fourth meeting of the Security Council, on June 27, 1950:

> *The Security Council,*
>
> *Having determined* that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace.
>
> *Having called for* an immediate cessation of hostilities, and
>
> *Having called upon* the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and
>
> *Having noted* from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and
>
> *Having noted* the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,
>
> *Recommends* that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

(*Voting for the resolution:* United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Norway, Ecuador, and Cuba. *Voting against:* Yugoslavia. *Absention:* Egypt, India (2 days later India accepted the resolution). *Absent:* Soviet Union.)

F. Statement by the President of the United States, June 30, 1950, on further military action in Korea

At a meeting with congressional leaders at the White House this morning, the President, together with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed with them the latest developments of the situation in Korea.

The congressional leaders were given a full review of the intensified military activities.

In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.

General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.

G. The Third United Nations Security Council resolution, July 7, 1950

The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, having recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

(1) *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

(2) *Notes* that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

(3) *Recommends* that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

(4) *Requests* the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

(5) *Authorizes* the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

(6) *Requests* the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the unified command.

(*Voting for the resolution:* United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Cuba, Ecuador, and Norway. *Abstention:* Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. *Absent:* Soviet Union.)

H. Statement by the President of the United States, July 8, 1950

The Security Council of the United Nations in its resolution of July 7, 1950, has recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the Security Council resolutions of

June 25 and 27, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

The Security Council resolution also requests that the United States designate the commander of such forces, and authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

I am responding to the recommendation of the Security Council and have designated Gen. Douglas MacArthur as the commanding general of the military forces which the members of the United Nations place under the unified command of the United States pursuant to the United Nations' assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the unprovoked armed attack against it.

I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

I. Memorandum of July 3, 1950, prepared by the Department of State on the authority of the President to repel the attack in Korea

This memorandum is directed to the authority of the President to order the Armed Forces of the United States to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea.

As explained by Secretary Acheson to the press on June 28, as soon as word of the attack on Korea was received in Washington, it was the view of the President and of all of his advisers that the first responsibility of the Government of the United States was to report the attack to the United Nations.

Accordingly, in the middle of the night of Saturday, June 24, 1950, Ambassador Gross, the United Nations Deputy Representative at the Security Council of the United Nations, notified Mr. Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations, that armed forces from North Korea had commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea.

A meeting of the Security Council was immediately called on Sunday, June 25, at the request of the United States. The Council at that meeting adopted a resolution, presented by the United States, calling on the North Korean authorities to cease hostilities and to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel (which separates North Korea and the Republic of Korea). The resolution also requested the United Nations Commission on Korea to observe such withdrawal and to keep the Security Council informed on the execution of the resolution. Finally it called on all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of the resolution and to refrain from assisting the North Korean authorities.

A report from the United Nations Commission for Korea received on June 26 indicated that the Security Council resolution had been completely disregarded by North Korea and that the armed invasion of the Republic of Korea was continuing.

The President, accordingly on June 27, 1950, made an announcement pointing out that communism had defied the orders of the Security Council issued to preserve international peace and security and stating that he had therefore ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. Since the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would directly threaten the security of the Pacific area and United States forces there, he also ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. Further, he directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened, that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated as well as military assistance to the French forces and those of the associated states in Indochina, and that a military mission be dispatched to provide close-working relations with the forces in Indochina. The President stated that he knew that all members of the United Nations would consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the United Nations Charter, and he instructed Ambassador Austin, the United States Representative to the Security Council, to report the steps he had taken to the Council.

This Ambassador Austin did on the afternoon of June 27, saying that he was happy and proud to report that the United States was prepared as a loyal member of the United Nations to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea. He presented to the Council a draft resolution which inter alia noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security and recommended that United Nations members furnish such assistance to the Republic as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security. The resolution was forthwith adopted by the Security Council at the same meeting on June 27.

Secretary Acheson at his news conference on June 28 emphasized that the actions of the United States had been taken in support of the United Nations. "After June 25," he said "all action in Korea has been under the aegis of the United Nations."

The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control over the use thereof. He also has authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. Since the beginning of United States history, he has upon numerous occasions utilized these powers in sending armed forces abroad. The preservation of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace is a cardinal interest of the United States. Both traditional international law and article 39 of the United Nations Charter and the resolution pursuant thereto authorize the United States to repel the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.

The President's control over the Armed Forces of the United States is based on article II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that he "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."

In *United States* v. *Sweeny*, the Supreme Court said that the object of this provision was "evidently to vest in the President the supreme command over all the military forces—such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war" (157 U. S. (1895) 281, 284).

That the President's power to send the Armed Forces outside the country is not dependent on congressional authority has been repeatedly emphasized by numerous writers.

For example, ex-President William Howard Taft wrote:

"The President is made Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy by the Constitution evidently for the purpose of enabling him to defend the country against invasion, to suppress insurrection, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use of the Army for any of these purposes, the action would be void. * * * Again, in the carrying on of war as Commander in Chief, it is he who is to determine the movements of the Army and of the Navy. Congress could not take away from him that discretion and place it beyond his control in any of his subordinates, nor could they themselves, as the people of Athens attempted to, carry on campaigns by votes in the market place" (Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 1916, pp. 128–129).

Professor Willoughby writes:

"As to his constitutional power to send United States forces outside the country in time of peace when this is deemed by him necessary or expedient as a means of preserving or advancing the foreign interests or relations of the United States, there would seem to be equally little doubt, although it has been contended by some that the exercise of this discretion can be limited by congressional statute. That Congress has this right to limit or to forbid the sending of United States forces outside of the country in time of peace has been asserted by so eminent an authority as ex-Secretary Root. It would seem to the author, however, that the President, under his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and his general control of the foreign relations of the United States, has this discretionary right constitutionally vested in him, and, therefore, not subject to congressional control. Especially, since the argument of the court in *Myers* v. *United States* with reference to the general character of the executive power vested in the President, and, apparently, the authority impliedly vested in him by reason of his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it is reasonable to predict that, should the question be presented to it, the Supreme Court will so hold. Of course, if this sending is in pursuance of express provisions of a treaty, or for the execution of treaty provisions, the sending could not reasonably be subject to constitutional objection" (the Constitutional Law of the United States, 1929, vol. III, p. 1567).

In an address delivered before the American Bar Association in 1917 on the War Powers Under the Constitution, Mr. Hughes stated that "There is no limitation upon the authority of Congress to create an army and it is for the President as Commander in Chief to direct the campaign of that Army wherever he may think they should be carried on." He referred to a statement by Chief Justice Taney in *Fleming* v. *Page* (9 How. 615) in which the Chief Justice said that as Commander in Chief the President "is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command" (S. Doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7).

At the time the approval of the Treaty of Versailles was under consideration in the Senate, there was under discussion a reservation to article 10, presented by Senator Lodge, to the effect that "Congress * * * under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the

United States." Senator Walsh, of Montana, stated in debate on November 10, 1919, that the statement was a recital of "What is asserted to be a principle of constitutional law." He said that if—

"* * * any declaration of that character should ever be made by the Senate of the United States, it would be singularly unfortunate. It is not true. It is not sound. It is fraught with the most momentous consequences, and may involve disasters the extent of which it is hardly possible to conceive.

"The whole course of our history has been a refutation of such a declaration, namely, that the President of the United States, the Chief Executive of the United States, the Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States, has no power to employ the land or naval forces without any express authorization upon the part of Congress. Since the beginning of our Government, our Navy has been sent over the seven seas and to every port in the world. Was there ever any congressional act authorizing the President to do anything of that kind?"

He stated that our Navy travels the sea "in order to safeguard and protect the rights of American citizens in foreign lands. Who can doubt that the President has no authority thus to utilize the naval and land forces of the United States?"

Mr. Borah stated:

"I agree fully with the legal or constitutional proposition which the Senator states, and I hope this [reservation] will be stricken out. It is an act of supererogation to put it in. It does not amount to anything. It is a recital which is not true. It cannot change the Constitution, and it ought not to be there. * * * It would simply be vain and futile and, if I may say so, with due respect to those who drew it, the doing of an inconsequential thing" (58 Congressional Record, pt. 8, p. 8195, Nov. 10, 1919, 66th Cong., 1st sess.).

Not only is the President Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, but he is also charged with the duty of conducting the foreign relations of the United States and in this field he "alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation" (*United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, *et al.*, (299 U. S. (1936) 304, 319)).

Obviously there are situations in which the powers of the President, as Commander in Chief and his power to conduct the foreign relations of this country complement each other.

The basic interest of the United States is international peace and security. The United States has throughout its history, upon orders of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and without congressional authorization, acted to prevent violent and unlawful acts in other States from depriving the United States and its nationals of the benefits of such peace and security. It has taken such action both unilaterally and in concert with others. A tabulation of 85 instances of the use of American Armed Forces without a declaration of war was incorporated in the Congressional Record for July 10, 1941. See also the appendix to the pamphlet by James Grafton Rogers entitled "World Policing and the Constitution" published in 1945 by the World Peace Foundation.

It is important to analyze the purposes for which the President as Commander in Chief has authorized the dispatch of American troops abroad. In many instances, of course, the Armed Forces have been used to protect specific American lives and property. In other cases, however, United States forces have been used in the broad interests of American foreign policy, and their use could be characterized as participation in international policy action.

The traditional power of the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States without consulting the Congress was referred to in debates in the Senate in 1945. Senator Connally remarked:

"The historical instances in which the President has directed armed forces to go to other countries have not been confined to domestic or internal instances at all." Senator Millikin pointed out that "in many cases the President has sent troops into a foreign country to protect our foreign policy * * * notably in Central and South America." "That was done," he continued, "in order to keep foreign countries out of there—was not aimed at protecting any particular American citizen. It was aimed at protecting our foreign policy." To his remark that he presumed that by the Charter of the United Nations we had laid down a foreign policy which we could protect, Senator Connally replied that that was "absolutely correct." He added:

"I was trying to indicate that fact by reading the list of instances of intervention on our part in order to keep another government out of territory in this hemisphere. That was a question of carrying out our international policy, and not a question involving the protection of some American citizen or American property at this moment." (Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, pt. 8, November 26, 1945, p. 10967.)

During the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900–1901 the President sent about 5,000 troops to join with British, Russian, German, French, and Japanese troops to relieve the siege of the foreign quarters in Peking and reestablish the treaty status. This was done without express congressional authority. In defining United States policy at the time Secretary of State Hay said:

"* * * The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and, fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (V Moore's Digest of International Law, p. 482. See also Taft, op. cit. pp. 114–115; Rogers, op. cit. pp. 58–62.)

After the opening up of Japan to foreigners in the 1850's through the conclusion of commercial treaties between Japan and certain western powers, antiforeign disturbances occurred. In 1863 the American Legation was burned following previous attacks on the British Legation. The commander of the U. S. S. *Wyoming* was instructed to use all necessary force for the safety of the legation or of Americans residing in Japan. Secretary of State Seward said that the prime objects of the United States were: "First, to deserve and win the confidence of the Japanese Government and people, if possible, with a view to the common interest of all the treaty powers; secondly, to sustain and cooperate with the legations of these powers, in good faith, so as to render their efforts to the same end effective." (V Moore's Digest of International Law, pp. 747–748.)

In 1864 the Mikado, not recognizing the treaties with the western powers, closed the straits of Shimonoseki. At the request of the Tycoon's Government (opposed to the Mikado) American, British, French, and Netherlands forces in a joint operation opened the straits by force. The object of the western powers was the enforcement of treaty rights, with the approval of the government that granted them. (V Moore's Digest, p. 750; S. Ex. Doc. 58, 41 Cong. 2d sess.)

Again in 1868 a detachment of Japanese troops assaulted foreign residents in the streets of Hiogo. One of the crew of the *Oneida* was seriously wounded. The safety of the foreign population being threatened, naval forces of the treaty powers made a joint landing and adopted measures to protect the foreign settlement. (Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1868, p. XI.)

Former Assistant Secretary of State James Grafton Rogers has characterized these uses of force as "international police action," saying: "They amounted to executive use of the Armed Forces to establish our own and the world's scheme of international order. Two American Presidents used men, ships and guns on a large and expensive scale." (World Policing and the Constitution, published by the World Peace Foundation, 1945, pp. 66, 67.)

In 1888 and 1889 civil war took place in Samoa, where the United States, Great Britain, and Germany had certain respective treaty rights for the maintenance of naval depots. German forces were landed, and the German Government invited the United States to join in an effort to restore calm and quiet in the islands in the interest of all the treaty powers. The commander of the United States naval forces in the Pacific was instructed by the Secretary of the Navy that the United States was willing to cooperate in restoring order "on the basis of the full preservation of American treaty rights and Samoan authority, as recognized and agreed to by Germany, Great Britain, and the United States." He was to extend full protection and defense to American citizens and property, to protest the displacement of the native government by Germany as violating the positive agreement and understanding between the treaty powers, but to inform the British and German Governments of his readiness to cooperate in causing all treaty rights to be respected and in restoring peace and order on the basis of the recognition of the Samoan right to independence. (I Moore's Digest of International Law, pp. 545–546.)

On July 7, 1941, the President sent to the Congress a message announcing that as Commander in Chief he had ordered the Navy to take all necessary steps to insure the safety of communications between Iceland and the United States as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts and that American troops had been sent to Iceland in defense of that country. The United States, he said, could not permit "the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere." For the same reason, he said, substantial forces of the United States had been sent to the bases acquired from Great Britain in Trinidad and British Guiana in the south to forestall any pincers movement undertaken by Germany against the Western Hemisphere (Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 87, pt. 6, July 7, 1941, p. 5868).

Thus, even before the ratification of the United Nations Charter, the President had used the Armed Forces of the United States without consulting the Congress for the purpose of protecting the foreign policy of the United States. The ratification of the United Nations Charter was, of course, a landmark in the development of American foreign policy. As noted above, Senator Connally and Senator Millikin agreed that the President was entitled to use armed forces in protection of the foreign policy represented by the Charter. This view was also expressed in the Senate debates in connection with the ratification of the Charter. For example, Senator Wiley made the following pertinent statement:

"It is my understanding, according to the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, that the terms 'agreement or agreements' as used in article 43 are synonymous with the word 'treaty.' On the other hand, I recognize that Congress might well interpret them as agreements brought about by the action of the Executive and ratified by a joint resolution of both Houses. These agreements would provide for a police force and the specific responsibility of each nation. But outside of these agreements, there is the power in our Executive to preserve the peace, to see that the 'supreme laws' are faithfully executed. When we become a party to this charter, and define our responsibilities by the agreement or agreements, there can be no question of the power of the Executive to carry out our commitments in relation to international policing. His constitutional power, however, is in no manner impaired" (Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, July 27, 1945, pp. 8127–8128).

An even fuller exposition of the point was made by Senator Austin, who stated:

"Mr. President, I am one of those lawyers in the United States who believe that the general powers of the President—not merely the war powers of the President but the general authority of the President—are commensurate with the obligation which is imposed upon him as President, that he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That means that he shall take all the care that is required to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

"Of course, there are other specific references in the Constitution which show that he has authority to employ armed forces when necessary to carry out specific things named in the Constitution; but the great over-all and general authority arises from his obligation that he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That has been true throughout our history, and the Chief Executive has taken care, and has sent the armed forces of the United States, without any act of Congress preceding their sending, on a great many occasions. I have three different compilations of those occasions. One of them runs as high as 150 times; another of them 72 times, and so forth. It makes a difference whether we consider the maneuvers which were merely shows of force as combined in the exercise of this authority—as I do—or whether we limit the count to those cases in which the armed forces have actually entered upon the territory of a peaceful neighbor. But there is no doubt in my mind of his obligation and authority to employ all the force that is necessary to enforce the laws.

"It may be asked, How does a threat to international security and peace violate the laws of the United States? Perhaps, Mr. President, it would not have violated the laws of the United States previous to the obligations set forth in this treaty. Perhaps we have never before recognized as being true the fundamental doctrine with which I opened my remarks. But we are doing so now. We recognize that a breach of the peace anywhere on earth which threatens the security and peace of the world is an attack upon us; and after this treaty is accepted by 29 nations, that will be the express law of the world. It will be the law of nations, because, according to its express terms, it will bind those who are nonmembers, as well as members, and it will be the law of the United States, because we shall have adopted it in a treaty. Indeed, it will be above the ordinary statutes of the United States, because it will be on a par with the Constitution, which provides that treaties made pursuant thereto shall be the supreme law of the land.

"So I have no doubt of the authority of the President in the past, and his authority in the future, to enforce peace. I am bound to say that I feel that the President is the officer under our Constitution in whom there is exclusively vested the responsibility for maintenance of peace." (Congressional Record 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, July 26, 1945, pp. 8064–8065.)

Action contrary to the Charter of the United Nations is action against the interests of the United States. Preservation of peace under the Charter is a cornerstone of American foreign policy. President Truman said in his inaugural address in 1949:

"In the coming years, our program for peace and freedom will emphasize four major courses of action.

"First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness."

In the Korean situation, the resolution of the Security Council of June 25 determined, under article 39 of the Charter, that the action of the North Koreans constituted a breach of the peace and called upon "the authorities in North Korea (*a*) to cease hostilities forthwith; and (*b*) to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel." It also called upon "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." This is an application of the principles set forth in article 2, paragraph 5, of the Charter, which states: "All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action which it takes in accordance with the present Charter * * *." The Security Council resolution of June 27, passed after the North Korean authorities has disregarded the June 25 resolution, recommended "that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." This recommendation was also made under the authority of article 39 of the Charter.

The President's action seeks to accomplish the objectives of both resolutions.

The continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities would have meant that the United Nations would have ceased to exist as a serious instrumentality for the maintenance of international peace. The continued existence of the United Nations as an effective international organization is a paramount United States interest. The defiance of the United Nations is in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations to bring about a settlement of the problem. It is a threat to international peace and security, a threat to the peace and security of the United States and to the security of United States forces in the Pacific.

These interests of the United States are interests which the President as Commander in Chief can protect by the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States without a declaration of war. It was they which the President's order of June 27 did protect. This order was within his authority as Commander in Chief.

J. General MacArthur's estimate of the military situation, July 19, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950]

With the deployment in Korea of major elements of the Eighth Army now accomplished, the first phase of the campaign has ended and with it the chance for victory by the North Korean forces. The enemy's plan and great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han Line the way seemed entirely open and victory was within his grasp.

The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal American elements as they arrived by every available means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete coordination by air and naval elements, forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics, which so slowed his advance and blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build a secure base.

I do not believe that history records a comparable operation which excelled the speed and precision with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate commitment to major operations. It merits highest commendation for the commanders, staffs and units concerned and attests to their superior training and high state of readiness to meet any eventuality. This finds added emphasis in the fact that the Far East Command, until the President's great pronouncement to support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no slightest responsibility for the defense of the Free Republic of Korea. With the President's decision it assumed a completely new and added mission.

It is, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving continuous local struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our final stabilization line will unquestionably be rectified and tactical improvement will involve planned withdrawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not be without choice. Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored.

K. General Order No. 1, General Headquarters, United Nations Command, Tokyo, July 25, 1950

[From United Nations release, July 25, 1950]

1. In response to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of July 7, 1950, the President of the United States has designated the undersigned Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces assisting the Republic of Korea. Pursuant thereto, there is established this date the United Nations Command, with General Headquarters in Tokyo, Japan.
2. The undersigned assumes command.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
General of the Army, United States Army,
Commander-in-Chief.

IV. AID TENDERED BY CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT AND VISIT OF GENERAL MacARTHUR TO FORMOSA

A. Aide-mémoire from Chinese Nationalist Government to the United States, June 29, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950]

The Chinese Government will make available for use in South Korea to repel the armed attack of North Korea one army of seasoned troops of approximately 33,000 men suitable for operations in plains or hilly terrain.

These troops carry the best equipment at China's disposal.

For the transportation of these troops the Chinese Government will provide 20 air transports of the type of C–46 and, if necessary, can give a reasonable amount of air cover. If the troops are to be transported by sea, the Chinese Government can provide a moderate amount of naval escort.

These troops can be ready for embarkation in five days.

B. Response of the United States thereto

[From Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950]

In response to the request contained in the Chinese Embassy's Aide-Mémoire of June 29, 1950, the appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States have given consideration to the expression of willingness on the part of the Government of the Republic of China to furnish ground forces for service in Korea in support of the United Nations.

The Secretary of State desires to inform His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of China of the deep appreciation of the United States Government for this prompt and substantial demonstration of support for the United Nations on the part of the Government of the Republic of China. In light, however, of the threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces from the mainland, a threat repeated in the last day or so by spokesmen for the Chinese Communist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the Government of the United States of America that it would be desirable for representatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters to hold discussions with the Chinese military authorities on Taiwan concerning the plans for the defense of the island against invasion prior to any final decision on the wisdom of reducing the defense forces on Taiwan by transfer of troops to Korea. It is understood that General MacArthur's Headquarters will be in communication with the appropriate Chinese military authorities on Taiwan with a view to the dispatch from Tokyo of representatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters for this purpose.

C. Statement of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek relative to visit of General MacArthur to Formosa, August 2, 1950

[From New York Times, August 2, 1950]

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and top-ranking officers under his command paid a visit to us at a most difficult time in our struggle against communism. This was indeed encouraging both to the Chinese people and the armed forces.

An agreement was reached between General MacArthur and myself on all the problems discussed in the series of conferences held in the past two days. The foundation for a point defense of Formosa and for Sino-American military cooperation has thus been laid. It is our conviction that our struggle against Communist aggression will certainly result in final victory.

Our people and armed forces have a great admiration for General MacArthur for his determined leadership in the common fight against totalitarianism in Asia and for his deep understanding of the menace of communism. Now that we can again work closely together with our old comrade in arms, General MacArthur, I am sure not only will our determination in the struggle for this common cause be strengthened but the peoples of all Asia will be aroused to fight Communist aggression and they will be convinced that democracy and freedom will ultimately triumph.

V. REPORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, UNITED NATIONS, ON THE COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOREA

A. First Report, July 25, 1950

At 0400 Korean time on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army launched a completely unprovoked invasion of South Korea. North Korean infantry crossed the 38th parallel, led by Soviet-made tanks in an estimated number of 100. The main attack was down the Pochon-Uijongbu-Seoul corridor. Simultaneously, attacks were launched in the Ongjin Peninsula to the West, against Chunchon in the eastern mountains, and down the east coast road. The North Korean Air Force covered the amphibious landings, and attacked Kimpo Airfield, near Seoul. The size of the attack, the fact that it covered the principal areas along the 38th parallel, and the amount and character of material involved, and the use of amphibious landings, indicated clearly that the invasion had been carefully planned for long in advance.

The character and disposition of the Republic of Korea Army indicated that it did not expect this sudden attack. This fact is supported by a report of an observation team of the United Nations Commission on Korea, made along the 38th parallel and dated 24 June 1950. This report stated that its team of observers "had, in the course of a two-week inspection been left with the impression that the Republican Army was organized entirely for defense and (was) in no condition to carry out a large-scale attack against the forces in the North. The observers found that the Republic of Korea forces were disposed in depth all along the 38th parallel with no concentration of troops at any point, that a large number of Republic of Korea troops were actively engaged in rounding up guerrillas and were, in any case, entirely lacking in the armor, heavy artillery, and air support necessary to carry off an invasion of North Korea." These facts controverted completely the North Korea broadcast from Pyongyang, late in the morning of 25 June, that the Republic of Korea had initiated an attack across the border and that the North Korean Forces had been ordered to repel the attack.

The North Korean invaders were reported to have committed initially 6 divisions of Infantry, 3 Border Constabulary Brigades, supported by approximately 100 Soviet-made T34 and T70 tanks and ample heavy artillery. Their Air Force held complete control of the air, and was at the time estimated to be composed of 100–150 Soviet-made combat planes. The total strength of the North Korean forces was placed at between 90,000 and 100,000, organized in approximately 7 divisions and 5 brigades, well trained and equipped chiefly with excellent Soviet material.

Opposed to this mobile army, Republic of Korea troops were initially deployed along the 38th parallel with elements of 4 divisions, with the remainder in the interior, without tanks or heavy artillery and with only 16 trainers as an air force; an organization assigned primarily for preserving internal security.

With such a discrepancy in character and armament between North and South Korea, the actual date of the assault is immaterial; the potential for it was present for months.

In the light of the above facts, it is apparent that the attack upon South Korea was a carefully-planned, full-scale invasion in force.

From the attack to the fall of Seoul on 28 June, North Korean forces struck southward across the 38th parallel on 25 June, in four major drives:

A. To the west, a Border Constabulary Brigade attacked in the Ongjin Peninsula against approximately one Republic of Korea regiment and was reported on 26 June in control of the area. However, a considerable number of Republic of Korea men escaped by sea.

B. One North Korean division, plus 42–50 tanks captured Kaesong on the afternoon of 25 June, and later pushed south through Hunsan toward Seoul. Another North Korean force of from 8,000–10,000 men, plus more than 50 tanks, drove down the Pochon-Uijongbu Corridor toward Seoul.

C. A division of North Korean troops, supported by heavy artillery and tanks, struck south toward Chunchon.

D. Along the east coast, a Border Constabulary Brigade reinforced to approximately 10,000, attacked Kangnung and carried out two amphibious landings further south.

The North Korean attack was initially opposed by five Republic of Korea divisions located in or north of Seoul. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, and other light infantry weapons. Taken completely by surprise, and facing greatly superior equipment, they fought desperately, but were forced to withdraw gradually. Another Republic of Korea division, hastily brought up from the south, was badly mauled in the fighting of 26 June. An official report on 30 June indicated that the Republic of Korea forces had suffered a high percentage of casualties and had lost much equipment in the hurried withdrawal.

On 28 June, aircraft of the United States Air Force, operating pursuant to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations began air operations against the North Korean invaders in support of Republic of Korea forces and later struck at military targets north of the 38th parallel with a view to disrupting the lines of communications and supply of the invading forces.

The badly decimated Republic of Korea forces reformed south of the Nan River, and with U. S. A. F. assistance, sought to delay the North Korean advance. By sheer weight of numbers and material they were forced back step by step until, on 2 July (Korean time) the town of Suwon, 20 miles south of Seoul, was reported in North Korean hands.

Establishment of Unified Command

Meanwhile, in pursuance of United Nations recommendations, United States ground forces were committed to the area for stabilization of the front. On 5 July, a very small United States force made contact with the invaders, south of Suwon. On 7 July, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the Unified Command was established and General Douglas MacArthur was designated by the President of the United States as the Commanding General of the forces of the members of the United Nations.

The first United States troops were small in number and were committed as a holding force only. They were followed by additional supporting forces as rapidly as could be transported to the battle line. Facing odds at times as high as 20 to one, "Our Army troops, ably supported by tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force and Navy and our Australian friends, flying under most adverse conditions of weather . . . distinguished themselves in the most difficult of military operations—a delaying action".

Under the protection of this delaying action unified command forces have steadily been strengthened. Under the combined impact of ground, air and naval forces, the progress of the invasion has been slowed, while the enemy has suffered severe losses on sea and land which are curtailing his supply and transportation capabilities.

At the outset of the North Korean invasion, naval forces available to oppose the aggression consisted of a small Republic of Korea Coast Guard. United States and other forces proceeded to the operational areas and by virtue of overwhelming superiority established a patrol of both coasts of Korea. These forces took the necessary action to prevent movement by sea of forces and supplies for use in operations against the Republic of Korea, including ingress and egress to and from Korean ports of merchant vessels furnishing or likely to furnish assistance to the North Korea authorities. United Nations Naval Forces covered some of the initial necessary evacuations, rendered logistic support, and by operating against North Korean waterborne forces denied the Communist invaders the logistic support of its forces by sea.

Naval units proceeded to accomplish the waterlift of troops and supplies to Korea, patrol by naval aircraft of water and coastal areas, escort duties and coastal patrol functions. Harassing fire from naval units on both coasts shelled targets susceptible to naval gunfire, breached roads, and generally interfered with enemy communications. Naval units have attacked North Korean water traffic where found, and have already destroyed approximately one-third of the vessels originally available to North Korean naval forces.

A new phase of naval operations commenced on 3 July with the first aircraft carrier air strike. They struck on the west coast of North Korea. Subsequent carrier strikes on the east coast of Korea have been made by the British and United States units. The first amphibious landing by United Nations Forces was accomplished on the east coast of Korea on 18 July 1950.

The present naval situation finds both coasts of Korea covered by naval forces of the Unified Command. Harassing fire and fire support missions are being carried out by these forces. Patrols and reconnaissances are being conducted by naval patrol planes over coastal and water areas. Logistic support of men, equipment, and supplies by transport continues with escort.

Immediate Action of U.N. Members

It has been inspiring to witness the rapidity with which various Member States have contributed to the naval forces assisting in the restoration of peace in Korea. The United Kingdom, Australia, New

Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands have dispatched vessels to support the United Nations' effort to cut off supplies for the invading hordes from north of the 38th parallel. In carrying out this work, shore bombardments have been conducted where and as necessary to interdict the supply of Communist troops which have moved into that portion of Korea governed by the Republic of Korea under the aegis of the United Nations. Valuable service has also been rendered by a British naval unit in the rescue from the water of airmen who had been compelled to abandon their airplane. The Coast Guard of the Republic of Korea has been rendering invaluable service in providing for the security of the shorelines. Naval air provided by the United Kingdom has contributed in a major way in the support of landing operations at P'ohang-dong.

Upon the request by the Security Council of the United Nations for assistance to defend the Republic of Korea against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in the area immediately available were those United States and British Commonwealth occupation forces under the command of General MacArthur in the occupation of the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were sufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan.

Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council resolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards for peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suitable for combat in Korea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment and supplies, from their various occupation occupation stations in Japan, by combinations of motor, rail, water and air transportation, to Korea. Even so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately available to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to Korea from the United States—a distance of one-third of the way around the globe. Future assistance for the defense of the Republic of Korea, both men and materials, must be transported over corresponding distances from the Member nations of the United Nations rendering such assistance. The well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the size of their force, their logistical support and their ability to continue to press the attack, account for the degree of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the Republic of Korea have been forced to submit to the time and place selected by the aggressor, and now must depend upon assistance from nations peacefully disposed and lying not merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away.

Extensive Resources of Aggressors

From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers of enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the North Korean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess of their internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the aggressor, combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot be overcome until the United Nations forces achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and manpower. The task is not a small one when viewed in comparison with the potential resources of the aggressor force. Until forces of the Unified Command are increased further in strength, the rapidity with which success will be achieved cannot be predicted. However, with the combined efforts of the United Nations, the full effect of the contribution from each member nation will be felt in the ultimate defeat of the aggressors from north of the 38 degree parallel.

Commanding General's Prediction of Victory

In conclusion, it is believed appropriate to quote the Unified Commander's latest estimate of the Korean operations.

"With the development in Korea of major elements of the Eighth Army now accomplished the first phase of the campaign has ended and with it the chance for victory by the North Korean Forces. The enemy's plan and great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han Line the way seemed entirely open and victory was within his grasp. The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal American elements as they arrived by every available means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete coordination by air and naval elements, forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics which so slowed his advance and blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build a secure base.

"I do not repeat *not* believe that history records a comparable operation which excelled the speed and precision with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate commitment to major operations. It merits highest commendation for the commanders, staffs and units concerned and attests to their superior training and high state of readiness to meet any eventuality. This finds added emphasis in the fact that the Far East Command, until the President's great pronouncement to support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no repeat *no* slightest responsibility for the defense of the Free Republic of Korea. With the President's decision it assumed a completely new and added mission.

"It is, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving continuous local struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our final stabilization line will unquestionably be rectified and tactical improvement will involve planned withdrawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not repeat *not* be without choice. Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored. MacArthur."

Appendix

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, July 7, 1950

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;
2. *Notes* that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;
3. *Recommends* that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;
4. *Requests* the United States to designate the commander of such forces;
5. *Authorizes* the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;
6. *Requests* the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

B. Second Report, August 16, 1950

I herewith submit a report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 20 to 31 July, inclusive. Details of these operations are in press communiqués numbers 98 to 126, inclusive, and Korean press releases numbers 127 to 177, inclusive. A general description of the operations for the period is as follows:

By 20 July main enemy columns, each of approximately division strength, reinforced by tanks, were contacted and identified at the following points: 4th North Korean Division, northwest of Taejon; 2nd North Korean Division, southeast of Chongju; 15th North Korean Division, 15 miles southeast of Chongju; 5th North Korean Division, north of Yongju; and there were unidentified elements north of Yongdok. The enemy 1st, 3rd and 6th Divisions, also identified by this date, were either in reserve, regrouping or en route to other battle areas. The battle-front was not a continuous line, but rather, it consisted of a series of columns of battalion and regimental size probing main roads and mountain trails in an effort to penetrate United Nations positions. The greatest concentration was massed for the drive toward Taejon, with decreasing strength toward the east. The enemy forces on the East Coast were separated from those to the West by rugged mountains. However, in the mountainous area, from Youngyang south to Yongchon, there were an estimated 1,500 guerrillas. The guerrillas, often intermingled with refugees, became one of the major security problems of the campaign.

In the Taejon sector the enemy employed two and possibly three divisions with tank support. The delaying force in this area was the United States 24th Division and elements of the United States 25th Division. This delaying force executed a planned withdrawal to Yongdong on 21 July. The position at Yongdong was held for four days, showing an increased United Nations strength. Nevertheless, the enemy was able to muster such superior forces that he penetrated our flanks and forced the withdrawal of the delaying force to Hwanggan on 26 July, and to Kumchon on 30 July. Meanwhile, the 6th North Korean Division, which had garrisoned Seoul, was reported on 23 July to have moved south in the direction of Chonju. With the 6th Division echeloned to the rear, the 4th North Korean Division initiated a major strategic envelopment to the south against weak militarized police forces of the Republic of Korea. Driving virtually unopposed toward the western and south ports the enemy seized Mokpo, Kwangju, Amwon [Namwon], and Chinan on 24 July.

The enveloping force then shifted direction of movement to the east toward the vital ports of Masan and Pusan. Yosu and Hadong were taken on 27 July, and, by 28 July, enemy forces reached eastward to Kochang, and, to the north, extended the line to Muju. This major envelopment was possible to an enemy who employed at least nine divisions against a United Nations ensemble of only three United States divisions and four of the Republic of Korea divisions, all understrength.

East of Taejon, in the sector opposing the forces of the Republic of Korea, enemy progress was less rapid. The 15th North Korean Division, driving down the Chungju-Hamchang axis, was reinforced on 28 July by the 1st North Korean Division. These enemy forces continued making local advances until they reached the outskirts of Hamchang. East of the Hamchang area, enemy forces believed to be from the 5th North Korean Division finally occupied Yongju by 24 July and thereafter made no appreciable progress during this period. On the east coast, the action was initially fluid with alternating withdrawals and advances in the vicinity of Yongdok. By 26 July the 5th North Korean Division was positively identified in the east coast area, and by the 29th, Yongdok was in enemy hands. Infiltration and guerrilla operations in rear areas which initially constituted some annoyance were materially reduced by the close of the period.

On 31 July there were eleven enemy divisions identified on the line of contact, with the possibility of two or three additional formations. The enemy dispositions formed a discontinuous line from Chinju in the south, northward through Kochang, Hwanggan, and Hamchang, and eastward through Yongju to Yongdok with the greatest concentration of divisions in the central part of this line. However, the wide envelopment in the south and southwest continued as the enemy action of major significance. The general pattern of enemy strategy, predicated on superiority of forces and armament, is a double envelopment, in the north via Hamchang, in the southwest via Kochang-Chinju, while maintaining pressure in the center to prevent displacement of United Nations Forces.

As yet no army forces of Member nations other than the United States have arrived in Korea. The Republic of Korea forces have been reorganized into two corps and have been resupplied with United States equipment. They have progressed admirably. In addition, the Republic of Korea forces have demonstrated by limited attacks and determined defensive operations that they are doing and will continue to do their utmost in defense of their country. Their withdrawals have been more to preserve continuity of the battle front than because of enemy pressure. United States and Republic of Korea army forces with their increased artillery and larger caliber rockets have proven that they can meet and destroy the North Korean tanks.

Member Nations Contribute Forces

Naval forces were considerably augmented during this period by the addition of several United States and British units and a few units from other nations. Eight nations are now represented by naval forces and assistance: Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To date the bulk of shipping necessary to the conduct of the Korea war has been provided by the United States. Naval forces have maintained a continuous and effective patrol of North Korean ports and coastlines. Carrier air strikes of increasing frequency have ranged from strategic targets in the north to battlefield targets in close support of the ground movement. A patrol on both coasts, directed primarily toward interception of enemy shipping to the south, has effectively stopped all coastal water movement of enemy troops and supplies. Shore bombardments as requested by infantry units on the east coast have proved to be very effective in destroying military targets, harassing the enemy at night, and disrupting coastal land communications. When returning to our bases for logistic support, patrol ships have performed additional tasks of convoying and escorting shipping to and from Pusan. Naval units have participated in the evacuation of the sick and wounded from Korea to locations of security and better care in Japan. The accomplishment of these continuing tasks has, to date, resulted in relatively minor interference or resistance by the enemy in the form of aerial strafing or bombardment by shore-based artillery. There has been no naval interference by the enemy.

United States light bombers and United States, Australian and Republic of Korea fighters continually attacked targets in close support of ground troops, including attacks on tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and bridges. United States medium bombers attacked and destroyed the Chosen explosives manufacturing plant at Konan. Several marshalling yards were disrupted and many railroad and highway bridges were cut, thereby reducing and delaying the flow of supplies to North Korean forces. Due to the heavy air attacks on rail and highway traffic during daylight, the North Korean forces resorted to moving practically all traffic at night. This was countered by increased night attacks on concentrations of traffic. A considerable number of United States fighter aircraft were brought to Japan by the United States Navy carrier *Boxer* to augment the fighters previously available. Canadian troop carrier aircraft joined the United States Military Air Transport Service operations in carrying men, supplies and materials to the Far East. Although a few enemy sorties were flown, enemy air activity during the period was negligible.

Communist Propaganda Challenged

The false and inflammatory communist propaganda, which has been so largely responsible for the continuing disunity among Koreans, has become an increasing menace because of the disruption of normal press and radio facilities in the Republic of Korea. To combat this propaganda, United Nations Command Headquarters' leaflets and radio broadcasts are utilizing that most powerful of weapons, the truth. Two and one-half hours of broadcasts are beamed to Korea daily and over 25,000,000 leaflets have been dropped by aircraft. In addition to the latest factual news reports, citizens and soldiers of North Korea, and of the Republic of Korea, are being informed of the steps taken by the United Nations to restore peace. The leaflets and broadcasts are designed to reveal to North Koreans the duplicity of their leaders and to bring encouragement to the people of the Republic of Korea.

United Nations Forces Cooperate

In summary, the operations of the United Nations forces for the period were:

A. Army: Army operations were basically planned withdrawals and delaying actions to gain time. The build up of forces has continued at an accelerated rate. The reorganization of Republic of Korea forces and their resupply with United States equipment has enabled them to make limited attacks and a determined defense. Infiltration and guerrilla operations in rear areas have been materially reduced.

B. Navy: Naval forces have been augmented by additional United States and British units, and French, Netherlands, Canadian and New Zealand combat ships have been added to the United Nations Command. To date the bulk of transport shipping has been provided by the United States. A continuous and effective naval patrol of North Korean ports and coastlines has been maintained. Carrier air strikes of increasing frequency have ranged from strategic targets in the north to battlefield targets in close support of the ground movement. Shore bombardments on the east coast have proved to be very effective in destroying military targets, harassing the enemy at night, and disrupting coastal land communications.

C. Air: United States light and medium bombers and United States, Australian and Republic of Korea fighters have continually attacked targets in close support of ground troops. Numerous marshalling yards were disrupted and many railroad and highway bridges were cut. Canadian troop carrier aircraft are now assisting in air transport.

In conclusion:

The ground fighting continues to be of a most savage character. The tenacity and valor of our heavily outnumbered forces rivals the almost fanatical determination of the enemy. The whole operation has assumed the character of a major campaign in which all United Nations Command forces are conducting themselves admirably. I cannot speak too highly of the splendid cooperation and the perfect coordination not only within but between the defense contingents of the various nationalities that comprise the United Nations forces. It is a picture of complete unification, both professional and national.

The international character of the operations in Korea has received important emphasis since the preparation of the last report in the offers of combat forces made by a number of Members of the United Nations. But, it is my sincere hope that the Member nations of the United Nations will without delay build up the strength of our ground forces. To bring the conflict to a successful conclusion quickly, it is essential for the Member nations to act speedily. The material utility of each contribution is directly related to the rapidity with which it is dispatched. Urgent attention, therefore, should be given to the arrival of organizations now in being.

If agreeable, it is my intent to render reports as of the first and fifteenth of each month to the United Nations on the progress of the field operations.

C. Third Report, September 2, 1950

I herewith submit report number three of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 to 15 August, inclusive. Details of these operations are contained in Eighth Army Communiques numbered 13 to 40 inclusive and Korean releases numbered 178 to 253.

A general description of the operations for the period is as follows:

Enemy action during the period was characterized by a rapid follow-up of United Nations withdrawals and a tightening of the squeeze of the lodgement area in southeastern Korea. Two major penetrations of the United Nations position were effected and maintained during the period, and at the close of the period a third potential penetration loomed as the result of a progressive enemy concentration.

Along the south coast, enemy forces drove through Chinju on the 1st of August and contained a two-pronged attack in the direction of Masan, with two major units, the north Korean 4th and 6th Divisions. The deepest penetration in this sector was reached on the 6th of the month when north Korean forces were stopped eight miles west of Masan by a United Nations counter-offensive. Task Force Kean launched the first United Nations attack in this sector at 0630 on 7 August. This force consisted of the 25th U. S. Infantry Division, the 5th U. S. Regimental Combat Team, the 1st U. S. Provisional Marine Brigade, and a Republic of Korea force of battalion size. The purpose of this attack was to remove the southern threat to the Pusan base and secure suitable defense areas. The attack progressed smoothly and efficiently with minimum losses to United Nations forces. All units reached their objectives by 13 August after having advanced about twenty miles. This attack not only secured the southern approaches to the beachhead, but also showed that the north Korean forces will not hold under attack. The "withdrawal" of some of the north Korean 6th Division units became a full retreat. Much north Korean equipment was abandoned to United Nations forces during this operation.

To the north of this sector, in the early part of the period, the operations of United Nations forces followed the trend reported in my previous reports. Units were on extended fronts of fifteen-thirty miles per division with light liaison only possible between units. Penetration and infiltration could not be prevented and a strategic withdrawal became necessary. On the night of 2–3 August, the U. S.

1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions conducted an orderly planned withdrawal of about twenty miles to the Naktong River line. The enemy advanced east from Kochang to close on the Naktong River line by the 4th of August. Patrols of this force, identified as the 4th Division, probed up and down the river line under the cover of an artillery duel. On the 6th of the month, the enemy selected his crossing site at a bend in the river eight miles south of Pugong–n.

Crossings began on the night of the 6th, and by the 8th the enemy had pushed one regiment into the bridgehead in the face of repeated local counter-attacks. By the 14th of the month the enemy had pushed probably the bulk of his division into this bridgehead at great cost in casualties.

In the central part of the sector, generally astride the Kumchon-Taegu axis, the enemy drove hard against Kumchon from three directions on August 1st, and then promptly followed the planned United Nations withdrawals from the area. The enemy used his front-line pre-war divisions in this area, the veteran 2nd, 3rd and 1st Divisions. The significance of these dispositions is best portrayed in a comparison of frontages, the Republic of Korea 1st Division held a front of twelve miles while its neighbor to the south, the 1st Cavalry Division covering Taegu held a front of twenty-eight miles, in a disposition of regiments abreast along the river front. This discrepancy of numerical and tactical strength which was critical from the beginning of the campaign has improved slightly but never to a point of security for the United Nations forces. They are compelled to continue the fight at great odds.

By the 4th of the month the enemy closed on the Naktong River line opposite Waegwan and again, as in the south, began probing for a crossing site. Twenty miles southwest of Taegu a small enemy force filtered across the river and disappeared into the hills before it could be destroyed. Northwest of Taegu, at Waegwan, the enemy pushed two battalions across on the 8th of the month. The next day the 1st U. S. Cavalry Division and 1st Republic of Korea Division attacked and forced the enemy to evacuate the remnants of this force to the west bank of the river. When the enemy deployment terminated, an estimated five divisions were employed in this sector, and near the end of the period there were indications of a general concentration of forces across the river from Waegwan in preparation for heavy assault.

Against the northern part of the line the enemy drove down the Chungju-Taegu axis and the Yonju-Andong axis with a total of three divisions, the 13th, 15th and 8th Divisions. Under this attack and to preserve the continuity of the line with the withdrawal of U. S. forces described above, it was necessary to direct the I and II ROK Corps to withdraw to better defensive positions. The Republic of Korea Army withdrawal was conducted in an orderly fashion on the successive nights of 2–3 and 3–4 August. Hamchang and Andong were secured by the enemy on the 3rd, and the parallel drives continued against the stiffening resistance of the Republic of Korea forces in this sector. Three enemy regiments concentrated in an attack from Yonggi-dong on the 9th and drove as far as Kunwi, twenty-five miles north of Taegu, but were forced to withdraw in the face of United Nations counter-attacks on the 11th to a general line through Uisong.

Republic of Korea forces conducted their defense operations with determination and inflicted heavy losses on the attackers.

On the east coast the town of Yongdok changed hands twice during the period. On the 3rd of the month the enemy lost the town to attacking forces of the 3rd ROK Division, but by the 10th he had built up his forces in the area sufficiently to retake the town and drive a few thousand yards south. Inland from the Yongdok-Pohang-dong axis an enemy force of two regiments, later identified as elements of the 12th Division, filtered through the rugged mountain trails over a period of days. By the 9th this force reached the general vicinity of Kigye, ten miles west of Pohang-dong, and by the 12th of the month had entered Pohang-dong and had driven within mortar range of the United Nations airfield in that vicinity. By the 10th of August this threat was considered sufficiently serious to again readjust the Republic of Korea and some U. S. Army Forces. This readjustment resulted in another local withdrawal to the line: Kunwi, Kusan-dong, Changsadong.

At the end of the period the hard-pressed enemy 4th Division retained its bridgehead across the Naktong River west of Yongsan. On the east flank the enemy continued to draw off United Nations forces in the east by his deep penetration to Pohang-dong, and slowly concentrated his forces north west of Taegu poised for a final drive to Taegu and Pusan. Enemy committed forces now consist of twelve fully identified divisions with a possibility of two additional.

In the enemy rear areas a large troop concentration was reported near the northeastern border of Korea indicating possible recruitment of Koreans from southeastern Manchuria.

Augmentation of United Nations forces in Korea during this period included the 2nd U. S. Infantry Division and the 1st U. S. Provisional Marine Brigade from the U. S., the 5th U. S. Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii and an increase in U. S. combat and service support units. During the close of the period a material number of U. S. tank units were arriving and will soon be ready to enter combat. The Republic of Korea Army continued to improve its organization and combat effectiveness. Several new ROK Infantry Regiments that had been previously activated and undergoing training were ready and committed to combat during the period. The Republic of Korea Army is showing determination and gallantry in the defense of its country, and developing increased tactical skill and maneuverability. There are still no United Nations ground units assisting the Republic of Korea in Korea except U. S. Army and Marine units. These units continue their gallant and effective action although heavily outnumbered and reflect their excellent peacetime training.

The information I have received on the size and type of units offered by Member Nations shows a united and determined spirit in the nations of the United Nations to repel the invader of the Republic of Korea that is gratifying. I still feel it my duty to report to you that contributions must be forthcoming without delay if this threat to international security is to be resolved promptly.

Naval Activities Intensified

United Nations Naval Forces now comprising warships from eight nations are operating under the control of the United Nations Naval Commander, Vice Admiral C. T. Joy. The co-ordinated efficiency of this command is an exemplary operation in proving the ability of the

United Nations to quickly assemble their naval strength in distant areas and operate jointly with great effectiveness. Such a co-ordination of naval strength by so many nations in an area so far distant from home naval bases is unparalleled in history. Recent augmentations to this formidable force have included significant additions of United States aircraft carriers.

These naval forces have been continuously engaged in their tasks with ever increasing effectiveness. To meet the threat of increasing numbers of troops and supplies coming from the northernmost regions of Korea, naval aircraft have been employed in interdiction missions to disrupt rail and road facilities and road networks. Naval aircraft have also been employed with excellent results on north Korean strategic targets including barracks, oil installations, factories, warehouses, power stations, marshalling yards, and railroad stations, vehicle and supply concentrations. In close support of the Infantry, naval aircraft operating in almost continuous application, and guided by ground controllers, have found a great number of various military targets in the battle area. At sea, naval aircraft have ranged the coasts, striking military targets along the enemy lines of water communications.

Naval surface craft have continued the constant patrol and interdiction of enemy water, rail and highway movement along both coasts. On the east coast cruisers and destroyers have been bombarding as called for and in direct support of the Infantry, in addition to their patrol functions.

Naval escort of troop ships and shipping continues to guarantee arrival of additional men and supplies in the battle area, and safe evacuation and care of wounded.

United Nations Naval Forces were virtually unhampered by the enemy. On the 2nd of August a duel between an enemy shore battery and a destroyer cost the enemy his shore battery.

Problems of Identification Difficult

Since the enemy is apparently forcing civilian labor to his use, problems of identification have become difficult. At sea the enemy is using every available craft, but United Nations forces in close coordination with the South Korea Navy are making every effort toward proper identification in order to allow continuance of innocent fishing. On land, civilians are carrying supplies in push-carts and donkey carts which burn and explode when strafed. The enemy hides vast quantities of military equipment in civilian dwellings, resulting in the necessity to fire and destroy such dwellings when such information is firm. However, the problem of avoiding the killing of innocent civilians and damages to the civilian economy is continually present and given my personal attention. The United Nations forces are urgently endeavoring to restrict destruction to the established military forces of the invader.

Air Forces Whittle at Enemy Potential

United States Far East Air Force medium bombers struck heavy blows at north Korean industrial targets of military significance and at the north Korean transportation system. The Korean manufacturing complex, the largest in the Far East, and the oil refinery at Wonsan, have been extensively damaged by successive attacks. The marshalling yards in Pyongyang, Wonsan, and Seoul have been repeatedly attacked, as have yards of less consequence. A general transportation interdiction program continues with destruction of rail and highway bridges along principal lines of communication. The rail and port transportation center of Najin-dong was also bombed.

A heavy toll of north Korean troops and matériel strength is being taken by the Far East Air Force light bombers and fighters and by Royal Australian Air Force fighters in close ground support action. From three hundred to five hundred sorties are now flown daily by United Nations Air Forces committed to action in Korea.

The intensity of night intruder missions by fighters and light bombers has been stepped up with gratifying results.

Against United Nations air activity the enemy still refuses to send his diminishing air force aloft in strength greater than one or two planes at a time. The enemy lost a total of fourteen aircraft destroyed with additional numbers damaged, but managed to increase somewhat the volume and effectiveness of his anti-aircraft fire.

Prisoners of War Well Treated

During the period a total of four hundred sixty-four north Korean prisoners were taken by United Nations forces. This brings the total collected to date to seven hundred nineteen. I have extended the proclamation I issued as Commander-in-Chief of all United States Forces in the Far East with regard to treatment of prisoners so that it now applies to all forces of the United Nations Command. I have accepted Mr. Frederick Bieri, International Red Cross, as an accredited delegate to this command under Paragraph 3, Article 10, and Paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Geneva Convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war, 12th August 1949. Mr. Bieri has been provided logistic support in Korea and given full opportunity to carry out his mission. Mr. Bieri's reports show clearly that the orders for compliance with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention are being carried out. Mr. Bieri's reports prove to the world that the discipline and treatment of prisoners of war are excellent in the United Nations Command prisoner of war collecting points, enclosures, and camps. Capture cards are mailed to Geneva promptly. In addition, I have established a branch Prisoner of War Information Bureau in the Provost Marshal Section of the United Nations Command where all required data in regard to enemy prisoners of war is recorded and copies transmitted through Washington to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

Koreans Kept Informed

United Nations radio broadcasts and air-dropped leaflets are the only major channels of accurate information still open to the Korean people. An additional 2,230,00 leaflets and news sheets, making a grand total of 27,230,000 have been dropped by aircraft over north Korean and occupied territory, and regular broadcasts totalling two and one-half hours continue daily. The highest priority is being given to messages designed to save human life. Civilians are warned daily to move away from military targets that must be bombed. North Korean soldiers are being informed of the humane treatment guaranteed them as prisoners of war, and encouraged to lay down their arms and abandon the cause of aggression. Despite communist tactics of terror and intimidation to prevent reception of these leaflets and radio messages, there is increasing evidence of their effectiveness among those whom the Communists have so ruthlessly denied access to the truth.

Summary:

ARMY: United Nations Army Forces are still out-numbered and hence were required to conduct some strategic withdrawals. The United Nations base area has been correspondingly reduced. The fluid conditions of the ground combat have been considerably stabilized. The United Nations treatment of prisoners of war conforms with the Geneva Convention.

NAVY: United Nations Naval Forces continue their important missions with increased effectiveness. In both Naval and Air operations strict measures are enforced to insure no attacks against innocent civilians or needless destruction of the civilian economy of either Republic of Korea or north Korea.

AIR: United Nations air power is growing in strength and effectiveness particularly in the capabilities of the bombers. Co-ordination between ground and air units is improving the effectiveness of the Air Forces in close support of the ground units.

In Conclusion:

I am glad to report that during this period the cohesion displayed by the United Nations Forces of this Command has proven the validity of the United Nations concept for peace.

My gravest concern is for a prompt build-up of the now outnumbered ground forces of this command.

D. Fourth Report, September 17, 1950

I herewith submit report number four of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 16 to 31 August, inclusive. Eighth Army communiques (numbers 41 through 65) and Korean releases (numbers 254 through 352) provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Ground Operations

During this period, the North Korean forces, still operating with twelve divisions, concentrated on preparations for renewed offensive activity, despite heavy blows and serious local losses inflicted by United Nations Forces. The enemy gradually re-inforced units opposite the extreme flanks and center of the United Nations perimeter and through the application of gradually increasing pressure along the entire northern front, has achieved moderate local gains in the face of continuing United Nations resistance. Front lines for the entire period ran generally from Tongyong on the south coast northward to the confluence of the Nam and the Naktong Rivers, thence north along the Naktong River to a point several miles north of Waegwan, thence generally eastward through the Kunwi area to the Kigye area continuing to the east coast north of Pohang-dong.

In the east coast sector, the North Korean 12th Division was driven back by attacks of the First Republic of Korea Corps which regained Pohang and Kigye on 18 August. By 26 August, the enemy 5th Division entered into action and together with the 12th Division renewed the attack, retook Kigye, and pushed United Nations Forces back to a line two miles north of Pohang. However, Kigye changed hands and was again retaken by the Republic of Korea Army on 29 August, but was lost to the North Koreans on 30 August.

Concurrently, the principal enemy effort was directed against the Taegu salient during this period, and, by 28 August, had scored moderate gains along the northern part of the arc in the zone of action of the II Republic of Korea Corps. The enemy 1st and 13th Divisions forced the United Nations defenders back several thousand yards, taking Kumwha in their most extensive advance. In repeated local attacks, the enemy 8th Division took Uihung on 27 August. The 2nd and 3rd North Korean Divisions near Waegwan were increasingly active, though no major effort is in evidence as yet. The net enemy gains, however, represented only local effect of no decisive character. Enemy long-ranged artillery emplaced west of the Naktong River has shelled Taegu ineffectively on a number of occasions in nuisance firing.

Operations in this northern and eastern sector were primarily by Republic of Korea Army units, intermittently supported by United States units. The 6th, 8th, Capitol, 3rd and 1st Republic of Korea Divisions have been in battle continuously since the war began against an enemy with initial favorable odds in mass and armor. Though operating on extended frontages of sixteen to twenty miles these divisions have maintained their tactical unity and their current recovery and performance is most gratifying.

In a wide bend of the river south of Tuksong the enemy 10th Division has held a bridgehead in an inactive state since mid-August. This penetration, estimated at one to two enemy regiments was being effectively contained by United Nations Forces at the close of the period.

Farther south, near the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, attacks by the United States 24th Division and the Marines eliminated a major penetration of the Naktong defense line on 18 August. Here the enemy 4th Division was decisively defeated, lost its bridgehead and was thrown westward across the Naktong River, suffering very heavy losses in both personnel and equipment.

At the southern end of the front in the Chinju-Haman corridor, the North Korean 6th Division, having been severely mauled in early August, cautiously restored contact with United Nations Forces, beginning 16 August, along a north-south line about two miles west of Haman. By 19 August, this division, augmented by two regiments, probably of the 7th Division, initiated a series of sharp probing attacks which continued to engage the attention of United Nations defending forces, though they have netted the enemy small gains on the ground. One mountain, Sobuk-San, has changed hands several times. Meanwhile, the large volume of rear area troop and vehicular movements indicate that the enemy intends to maintain strong pressure on this front, which represents the greatest threat to the United Nations base at Pusan. Prisoners from the North Korean 6th Division report that two of the three organic regiments are composed of troops who previously served in the Chinese Communist Armies.

United Nations Forces were augmented by the arrival of British Army combat units in Korea.

Naval Operations

During the period of this report the United Nations Naval Forces have encountered only slight resistance by the enemy. Complete

United Nations control of the seas continues, with guaranteed safe arrival in Korea of additional troops and supplies, and safe removal by sea of the sick and wounded. Naval patrol forces have met little interference, and a close patrol of the Korean coast is being maintained.

Further augmentation of Naval Forces is continuing. New units arriving during the period of this report have been mostly from the United States Navy. The entire Naval organization is well integrated, functioning smoothly, and coordinated efficiently with United Nations Army and Air Force units.

The United Nations Naval Force, now fortified by many smaller elements which together constitute a well balanced Navy, has attained such a degree of efficiency that it is now capable of assuming any type of Naval mission in Korean waters.

Operational efficiency has reached very high standards. Naval Forces not only continue to perform all tasks assigned, but are steadily increasing the ranges of application.

Basic logistic problems have been solved.

Naval aircraft operating from ships and land bases are performing the battle tasks of reconnaissance, spotting for artillery and naval bombardment, strafing and dive bombing of both tactical and strategic targets. Shore bombardment of military targets, harassing fire, and destruction of coastal land communications is carried on continuously by surface craft. Limited amphibious landings and water lift of troops have been conducted. Raiders have been landed for special tasks. Islands in strategic locations have been seized. Carrier aircraft have simultaneously given direct support to ground elements while striking stragtegic targets in North Korea. United States Marines have participated with traditional valor and great effectiveness in important land operations in the southwestern sectors.

As long as the enemy compels innocent civilians to serve his purpose in front line areas, the problem of avoiding casualties to noncombatants is excedingly difficult. Our Naval bombardment forces, both surface and air, are exercising every precaution to avoid harming the civil population and are employing every possible means to identify and destroy military targets only.

Air Operations

Enemy air strength continued to diminish until near the end of the period when a few minor single plane raids were staged. However, twin-engined bombers have been sighted recently on enemy airfields in both North and South Korea, leading to the belief that his air force has been strengthened by aircraft from outside Korea which are prepared to stage forward at an opportune time.

The combined air forces of the United Nations daily are producing a superior effort in support of ground forces. From the early strikes on 29 June of the United States Far East Air Forces jet aircraft, in support of ground forces of the Republic of Korea, the complete integration of the air and ground efforts has been outstanding. The air units of Australia, of the Republic of Korea, of the United States Navy and Marines and of the British Navy have joined the United States Air Force in the effective tactical support of all ground forces. Answering the call of United States Army, Marine or Republic of Korea ground forces for air support may be aircraft from any of the United Nations Forces in the air over Korea.

Control parties located with front line troops and observers in aircraft continued, over the enemy's and our own front lines, to direct air strikes in a matter of minutes upon any targets that reveal themselves.

The enemy shuns exposure by day, concealing his supplies and reserves in homes, in schools, and other public buildings. He drives his tanks and trucks through walls of simple peasant shelters that he might avoid daylight detection.

Enemy movement and attack by night are being countered by ever expanding operations of night intruder aircraft. These planes, equipped with special devices, have successfully harassed him by night, causing considerable reduction to his operations.

The enemy massed across the Naktong River from Taegu on 16 August was subjected to the heaviest tactical assault yet mounted when medium bomber aircraft delivered over 850 tons of bombs on the aggressor forces. Fighter-bomber aircraft roving the salient following this strike found few targets remaining in the desolate area.

Evidence continues to be gathered showing the depletion of stocks of munitions and supplies in the combat zone.

The program of interdiction of the transportation system supporting North Korean forces has reduced extensively the enemy's resupply potential and has hampered his movement of reinforcements. Countless bridges has been destroyed, the utility of the enemy's marshalling yards has been drastically reduced, many of his railroad repair and maintenance facilities have been eliminated. The efficiency of the interdiction program is clearly indicated by the quantities of rolling stock immobile in yards and on sidings. The enemy employs every expedient to substitute for the destroyed bridges. His transportation is subjected to attrition by all feasible means.

Pin point destruction of industrial and other military objectives in North Korea continues. Evaluation of photographs of these objectives after attacks shows remarkable accuracy has been obtained in striking the selected targets which in every instance have been of military significance. Targets have been great chemical complexes, iron works, electric power plants, tank assembly plants, deep-water docks, and other similar installations which enhance North Korean war potential. All continue subject to attack until United Nations Forces attain their goals.

United Nations Air Forces have dealt severe blows to war industries and transportation in Pyongyang, in Hamhung and Hungnam, in Wonsan, Songjin, Chinnampo, Chongjin, and Rashin. The North Korean populace has been warned by radio and by leaflets to vacate their areas that contain military targets. They have been urged "to leave these cities and go to the country or to the mountains." They have been informed that "military installations will be destroyed by United Nations planes," but that, "the United Nations Air Forces will do everything possible to protect innocent civilians from the war forced on Korea by the Communists". United Nations aircraft have been ordered to confine operations to military targets.

The accusation that United Nations aircraft have attacked the civilian populace has no basis of factuality.

Foreign Support for North Korean Forces

Considering that the present aggression of the North Korean forces is largely Communist led, planned and inspired, it is appropriate to review existing evidence of material and technical assistance rendered to North Korea, specifically, evidence of munitions which the Soviet Union has provided and is now providing to the North Korean forces, as well as evidence of trained military personnel which the Chinese Communists forces have furnished.

The USSR-domination of the northern portion of Korea began when Soviet occupation authorities arbitrarily interpreted the 38th parallel as a permanent delineation between two military zones. Immediately following the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, in September 1945, the Soviets began to organize a North Korean military force under the guise of a national police force or constabulary. This force, now known as North Korean People's Army, has from its inception been trained, supervised and logistically supported by the Soviet Union.

The supply of munitions and equipment to North Korea prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet Occupation Forces in December 1948 is openly acknowledged by the Soviets. However, they claim that all matériel now being utilized by North Korean forces was provided prior to their withdrawal, and that there has been no resupply from Soviet sources since that time.

Despite this Soviet claim, however, since the outbreak of the war, a wide variety of definitely identified Soviet equipment captured from the North Koreans in battle bears the manufacturing date of 1949 or 1950. Obviously, dated matériel could not have been provided prior to December 1948, thereby further confirming the many reports received by this Headquarters of Soviet delivery of munitions to North Korean forces during 1949 and 1950. Physical proof of such deliveries now includes 10 specific items fully reported, including photographs, as well as the physical items, forwarded to appropriate United States Army services. Among forwarded definitely identified items were a 7.62mm PPSH–41 sub-machine gun; an aircraft radio receiver type RSI–61–1; 2 types of hand grenades; and ammunition of varying types and calibres. In addition to these items, some forty-one other pieces of equipment, including small arms, armored vehicles, artillery, and ammunition have been captured from the North Koreans, and are definitely established to be of Soviet manufacture.

It may be possible that North Korea is manufacturing some matériel, particularly small arms. However, her industry is not capable of providing heavy equipment such as armor, tanks and artillery.

To date, there has been no confirmation of direct or overt Chinese Communist participation in the Korean conflict; however, they have furnished substantial if not decisive military assistance to North Korea by releasing a vast pool of combat-seasoned troops of Korean ethnic origin, which provided the means for expansion of the North Korean army. This fact, originally established by miscellaneous information emanating from the Manchuria-Korea area during the past four years, is now fully confirmed by numerous prisoner-of-war interrogations since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. A substantial percentage of all prisoners-of-war so far interrogated have received training in Manchuria or have performed active service with the Chinese Communist Army; at least half of the personnel and particularly those officers and non-commissioned officers in the North Korean 5th, 13th, and 15th Divisions and the 766th Independent Unit have participated in training or combat action with the Chinese

Communist Army. The Chinese Communist Army returned many of these Korean troops to North Korea during the past year.

Approximately 140,000 Korean troops have participated in training and combat action with the Chinese Communist forces in one of three categories: (a) the Korean Volunteer Army, which was formed from Koreans in Communist-held China and Manchuria during 1945–46; (b) USSR-trained Koreans, who were transferred from North Korea and were integrated into the Korean Volunteer Army or Chinese Communist Army to gain combat experience; and (c) USSR-trained Koreans, who participated in training at Chiamussu, Manchuria, or attended the officer's candidate school at Lungchingtsun, Manchuria. During the early part of 1947, the Korean Volunteer Army was integrated into the Chinese Communist Army in Manchuria. A great number of these troops have subsequently fought with the Chinese Communist Army as far south as Luichou Peninsula in the Hainan Island operation. After the Communist conquest of Manchuria during the fall of 1948, Korean troops began filtering back into North Korea. An acceleration of this movement became apparent during the early part of 1950, and by the middle of February 1950, Korean troops of the Chinese Communist 4th Field Army had departed from South China for North Korea. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, a probable aggregate of 40,000 to 60,000 Koreans trained by the Chinese Communists had been released and integrated into the North Korean army to expand the initial divisions and constabulary brigades to a current battle order of thirteen to fifteen divisions, without mentioning corps troops, line of communication troops and service elements.

Atrocities

Treatment of United Nations prisoners taken by enemy forces has on occasion been characterized by extreme brutality. Positive evidence of murdering of prisoners with bound hands has led me to issue a warning to the Commander in Chief of the North Korean forces on this subject.

The first instance of this character was discovered 10 July 1950 when United Nations troops retook lost ground and discovered dead American soldiers with their hands tied behind their backs, obviously killed while captives, since all had been shot through the head. Official photographs of four of these murdered Americans constitute visual proof.

A second was the murder of thirty-six American prisoners on the afternoon of 17 August 1950. Forty-one American soldiers, serving the United Nations cause, had been captured by an overwhelming Communist force on the morning of 15 August. Immediately after their capture each prisoner was stripped of all means of identification and each man's hands tied behind his back with telephone wire or shoe laces taken from his boots. The men were held prisoners for thirty-six hours without food. At the end of this time, the group of Americans were told to stand up whereupon they were sprayed by fire from individual weapons of approximately fifteen to seventeen North Koreans. After the men had fallen to the ground, they were fired upon once again to insure that all were dead. After the North Korean soldiers had left the scene, five soldiers still alive were able to make their way back to American lines. All victims in this massacre were members of the 1st Cavalry Division, United States Army.

Prisoners of War

In sharp contrast to the foregoing, Mr. Frederick Bieri, International Red Cross representative accredited to the United Nations Forces in Korea, reports that according to Korean standards, Republic of Korea treatment of prisoners of war was "perfect" and that he had never previously known a case when prisoner of war guards from their own personal supply had presented cigarettes and fruits to prisoners.

Over 2,000 prisoners of war were taken by United Nations Forces during the period. This is many times the number that have been taken in previous periods. Enemy desertions, though limited in scale, are increasing, apparently as a direct result of United Nations guarantees of humane treatment. Curiosly enough, some officer defectees are highly Communist-trained, and have served in their units as political-cultural "morale" officers, suggesting that propaganda officers themselves are most susceptible to an effective presentation of accurate information.

Psychological Warfare Operations

Daily United Nations radio broadcasts and over 37,000,000 air-dropped leaflets are providing the last channels to the Korean people for dissemination of the truth. Communist falsification of military claims is being relentlessly exposed by United Nations newscasts and news sheets. Seven million leaflets guaranteeing humane treatment of prisoners of war have been dropped over enemy lines. North Korean soldiers, who have been repeatedly told by their masters that capture or surrender will place their lives in grave jeopardy, are becoming increasingly cognizant of the duplicity of their leaders. An official message from the United Nations Command, transmitted by leaflets in Korean and in English, has warned North Korean military officers in Pyongyang and in field division headquarters, that United Nations prisoners must be accorded the humane treatment guaranteed by the rules and precedents of war.

Conditions in Korea

There exists a very hight state of morale both among the civilian population in general and in the government offices of the Republic of Korea. Although the area under control of the United Nations Forces at the present time has a great number of refugees, these refugees are being assisted in every way possible to provide them shelter and other necessities of life.

A great amount of this assistance is coming from volunteer aid from such organizations as have been established since 25 June; for example: The Emergency Ceneral Committee of the Korean Red Cross organized by Dr. Helen Kim, an eminent educator in Korea. This organization comprises volunteer workers who assist in the relocation of refugees and distribution of food and certain relief supplies. In addition to providing relief and assistance to refugees, this body provides assistance to military casualties of the Republic of Korea Army by volunteer nursing aid, by procuring and rolling bandages and surgical dressings, and in some cases, assisting in the medical treatment of the casualties.

Another evidence of high morale is the formation of a Patriotic League to give all-out assistance to the United Nations effort in Korea. This is again an organization of volunteer workers who assist in volunteering needed labor, and procuring equipment or indigenous supplies for use by United Nations forces.

Government offices are operating on a twenty-four hour basis, even at Cabinet and Ministerial levels to cope with every situation at any time it may arise.

Other signs of high morale of the people of Korea are indicated by the numerous "welcome" signs in all of the various communities and the spontaneous contribution of refreshments to United Nations troops. In fact, in all walks of life and in all fields of endeavor there exists only the highest morale and the indomitable will to win.

Civilian Relief

In surveying the relief needs in Korea, it has been determined that the Republic of Korea was able during its withdrawal to salvage sufficient food supplies to provide subsistence for individuals in the area under control of United Nations Forces during the period of this report. However, it is estimated that these stocks will be inadequate to provide even a minimum subsistence after the middle of September. Arrangements therefore have been made as an emergency measure to supply the Republic of Korea with 15,000 metric tons of rice and 5,000 metric tons of barley in September, and 20,000 metric tons of rice and 10,000 metric tons of barley in the month of October.

The Republic of Korea has adequate raw cotton on hand and in shipment for operation of the cloth producing facilities in the area under protection of United Nations Forces until the end of December. The quantity of cloth produced during this period, however, would represent only a two months normal supply.

The Army Command in Korea has submitted an estimate of requirements for medical supplies and equipment, insecticides, chemicals for water purification, serums, vaccines and anti-toxins. To alleviate possible suffering resulting from procurement time lag, approximately twenty-five per cent of these requirements have been procured locally as an emergency measure. The remainder of the requirements has been forwarded through established channels to appropriate procurement coordinators.

At the present time, relief supplies are being delivered to Korea by military means and are being distributed in Korea by the Republic of Korea, Office of Supply. Through the Department of the Army, United Nations personnel of certain technical qualifications have been requested who will operate under military command to assist the Republic of Korea in distribution and efficient utilization of relief supplies, and provide adequate liaison and coordination between the Republic of Korea and United Nations military forces on relief matters.

Subsistence supplies are becoming a problem of immediate concern which will require the whole-hearted assistance of all members of the United Nations. With the advent of climatic change, assistance will be required in providing adequate clothing and blankets for the civilian population of Korea. Urgently needed medical supplies are a cause of grave concern and I trust will be given immediate attention. Estimated requirements of food, clothing and medical and relief supplies are being continuously computed and forwarded to the Joint Army, ECA, State Coordinating Committee for procurement in accordance with established procedure. There is little doubt that the

Members of the United Nations will contribute as generously to the relief of the destitute people of Korea as they have to the military effort.

In Conclusion

1. United Nations strength to accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea is growing slowly but steadily.
2. British Army units have arrived in Korea.
3. The United Nations air force and naval air attacks on purely military targets are bringing important results on the invader's ability and will to fight. The charges of indiscriminate bombing in Korea are groundless.
4. The United Nations fighting forces are conducting their operations with valor, efficiency, and a determination to win. The magnificent coordination of all services not only within forces of one nation but also between forces of different nations is a tribute to those forces and the nations they represent.
5. Positive proof has been obtained that during 1949 and 1950 the Soviets have supplied the North Korean forces with munitions and the Chinese Communists have supplied trained manpower.
6. The North Koreans have in some instances conducted savagely barbarous killings of captured Americans.
7. Both the Republic of Korea Government and people are valiantly and courageously supporting the cause to the extent of their capabilities.
8. Requirements for civilian relief assistance and supplies have so far been met by emergency measures but prompt action by Member nations is needed to provide food, warmth and medical supplies during the coming winter.
9. The forces to be provided by Member nations are urgently needed in Korea.

E. Fifth Report, October 5, 1950

I herewith submit report number five of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 to 14 September, inclusive. Eighth Army communiques numbers 66 through 89 and Korean releases numbers 353 through 437 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Ground Operations

On 1 September the North Korean high command, employing thirteen infantry divisions, two new tank regiments, and elements of a previously identified command division, launched their strongest offensive to date against the United Nations position in Korea. This comprehensive attack, which constituted one of the enemy's major efforts to date initially struck hard at the United Nations positions south of Tuksong and, within two days, had extended over the entire United Nations perimeter.

His initial effort, in the south, was unsuccessful. At the southern end of the front the enemy 6th and 7th Divisions had been driven back 3,000 yards to their original positions by 3 September, through determined counterattacks of the U. S. 25th Divisions supported by other United Nations forces. Thereafter, despite constant attacks, North Korean forces made no advances in this sector.

Farther north, in the Naktong River area between Hyonpung and the Nam River, the 10th, 2nd, 4th and 9th enemy Divisions plus armored elements began a general offensive eastward over the Naktong which scored initial advances of 6,000 to 8,000 yards against bitter resistance by the United Nations forces. By 5 September, however, the enemy had lost the initiative, and was forced to give ground under heavy United Nations forces' pressure. By the end of the period, the enemy retained only a two to three mile strip east of the Naktong River.

The enemy 3rd and 13th Divisions achieved gains of similar magnitude (6,000–8,000 yards) along the Taegu salient, from 4 to 11 September, in some of the heaviest fighting of the war. By that date, United Nations forces had absorbed the drive on Taegu, and began to register slow progress against strong enemy resistance. In the Sinnyong sector, the Republic of Korea 8th Division had gained about 3,000 yards by 4 September. During the series of heavy, but indecisive engagements which followed, United Nations forces blocked further enemy advances.

The British 27th Infantry Brigade joined the United Nations forces in the defense of the Naktong River line on 7 September. This unit has assumed its proportionate share of the United Nations operations in that sector and is engaged in defensive operations and systematic police action to eliminate small enemy parties in the rear areas.

In the Haeson-Angang sector near the eastern flank of the United Nations perimeter, the North Korean 15th and 12th Divisions posed a most serious threat temporarily. Initiating heavy attacks near Kigye on 3 September, enemy forces penetrated to within four miles of Kyongju by 5 September, though the threat to Kyongju was vitiated by United Nations counterattacks the next day. On 8 September, the enemy occupied the important town of Yongchon, but was driven out almost immediately by prompt aggressive action of Republic of Korea Army units. At his farthest advance the enemy had seized an area almost ten miles deep and fifteen miles wide in this sector, seriously threatening United Nations communications. However, beginning on 11 September, Republic of Korea and United States Army units conducted vigorous counterattacks and advanced up to six miles on the west flank of the pocket, relieved pressure on Yongchon and Kyongju, and threatened the North Korean forces in turn with encirclement.

On the east coast the North Korean 5th Divisions, after yielding some ground to United Nations attacks, resumed the offensive on 4 September. This offensive coordinated with the North Korean 12th and 15th Divisions' penetration on the west of Pohang-dong necessitated a withdrawal of the republic of Korea Army units holding Pohang-dong. Following their withdrawal these same Republic of Korean Army units counterattacked and established a firm line two miles south of Pohang-dong.

During the period, the most significant gains were made initially along the north and west flanks where enemy forces drove to within seven miles of Taegu, penetrated the lateral road net between Yongchon and Kyongju, and seized Pohang-dong. By 12 September, however, the momentum of the attacks was largely spent and the enemy was forced to fall back in the face of counterattacking United Nations forces. This abortive effort had cost the enemy an estimated 10,000 casualties without any significant losses to the United Nations forces either in territory or in combat effectiveness. At the end of the period, the United Nations perimeter ran northward from Yulchi on the south coast, to the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, thence north, parallel with, and two miles east of the Naktong River to Hyonpung, thence along the river for fifteen miles, thence, northeast through Sin-dong in a broad arc extending eastward below Haeson and Angang to the east coast at a point two miles south of Pohang-dong.

Naval Operations

United Nations naval forces during the period of this report continued to demonstrate their versatility of application by sustaining with undiminished intensity all operational tasks undertaken. During the enemy's major attack across the Naktong River, commencing early in the period, naval aircraft were almost entirely engaged in an all-out effort in close support of the ground troops for several days until the attack was effectively reduced. Thereafter, naval aircraft resumed their missions against North Korean targets in addition. A concentrated effort was made especially against transportation facilities, arsenals, military warehouses and supply dumps, and troop concentrations wherever located.

Naval surface forces continued coastal bombardment missions on an increasing scale until continuous day and night firing on the east coast military targets became habitual.

At sea along the Korean coast a very large number of enemy small craft have been destroyed, including small transports and freighters, trawlers, junks, and barges carrying North Korean military personnel and supplies. Difficulty of identification of water-borne craft engaged in military operations continues to be a problem. In some cases the enemy has forced native fishing operations to his use, and it is reported crews are shot if seen conversing with United Nations ships conducting investigations. Nevertheless, every effort is being made a confine destruction of small craft to those conducting military operations.

Enemy opposition to United Nations naval forces was insufficient to hamper United Nations naval operations.

Air Operations

Hostile aircraft have been observed on several occasions during the current period but have exerted no influence on the course of operations. It is a certainty that no difficulties will be experienced with the North Korean Air Force unless it procures planes from sources outside North Korea. Any future significant air action by North Korea will be a measure of the assistance given to her in open contravention of the actions and intent of the United Nations. Antiaircraft artillery fire is increasing somewhat both in volume and in accuracy.

A review of the accomplishments of the United Nations air effort from 25 June through 15 September reveals that, while sustaining losses of approximately 100 aircraft, over 28,000 combat missions have been flown. The greater part of these have been in direct support of United Nations ground forces. More than 10,000 non-combat missions have been flown in support of the United Nations effort. The bomb tonnage delivered to strategic and tactical military targets by the United States Far East Air Forces medium bombers exceeds 17,000 tons.

The previous report of the United Nations Command emphasized the pronouncement made to the civilian communities that military targets would be attacked by air and the warning to civilians to vacate the immediate zone of such targets. There has been and there remains the capability of the United Nations air forces to completely devastate the urban areas of North Korea, but with assiduous care destruction of the civilian population has been avoided and only targets of military significance have been attacked.

Among the targets are the following: Pyongyang arsenal, the largest in North Korea, producing over half the arms and ammunition (exclusive of that from outside sources) employed by the enemy, is about seventy per cent destroyed. The ports and naval bases of Chinnampo and Wonsan have received attacks in force. The largest integrated chemical combine in the Far East, contributing explosives, aluminum and magnesium has been reduced by eighty per cent. Specific targets in this combine have been the Hungnam nitrogen fertilizer plant, the Hungnam chemical plant and the Hungnam explosive plant. The oil refinery at Wonsan is about ninety-five per cent destroyed. Iron works at Chongjin and steel plants at Songjin and Kyomipo have been attacked with percentage destruction varying from thirty to ninety per cent.

Operations of the Chinnampo smelter, largest producer in North Korea of copper, lead, and zinc, have been sharply curtailed. In addition, at Chinnampo, an aluminum plant and one of the few North Korean magnesium producers has sustained fifty to eighty per cent destruction. Other similar targets have been and are being attacked.

Along the highway and railroad nets some 250 bridges have been rendered unusable by the dropping of at least one span of each. Important marshalling yards and railroad repair facilities in North Korea are from twenty-five to eighty per cent destroyed.

Total daily sorties have at one time during this period exceeded 700. The smooth coordination of the total United Nations air effort with the over-all ground effort continued exemplary.

Prisoners of War

Since my last report many additional North Korean prisoners were captured by United Nations forces. This brings the total number of prisoners in United Nations custody to over 4,000.

United Nations personnel in charge of prisoners of war camps continue to observe scrupulously all the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Prisoners of war are provided with the standard Republic of Korea Army ration and with a gratuitous tobacco issue. At each camp there is a permanently assigned staff of United States and Republic of Korea medical officers, nurses, and medical attendants. More serious cases are treated in hospitals on the same basis as wounded United Nations troops. The geographic coordinates of United Nations prisoner of war camps have been furnished to the United States Government for transmission to the International Committee of the Red Cross in accordance with Article 23, 1949, Geneva Convention.

Atrocities

It becomes necessary to report again continued inhumane acts on the part of North Koreans. These most recently reported atrocities follow the pattern of other North Korean killings. A strong enemy guerrilla force attacked and overpowered a group of seven Americans who were operating a signal relay station, tied their hands together and shot the United Nations soldiers in the back. All were left for dead. However, although seriously wounded, two of the victims survived.

As a continuation of the survey of relief needs in Korea mentioned in my previous report, an estimate of civilian aid requirements for Korea for fiscal year 1951 has been forwarded. This report was prepared by the Economic Cooperation Administration in conjunction with the Government of the Republic of Korea and representatives of the United Nations and other interested civilian agencies. These estimates contain sound, concise over-all civilian relief requirements for Korea based on the best information available at this time. Further surveys will continue to be made and necessary additional requirements will be forwarded to the Joint Army, Economic Cooperation Administration, State Department Coordinating Committee for procurement in accordance with established procedures.

Relief supplies continue to be delivered to Korea by military transportation for distribution through the Office of Supply of the Republic of Korea. As previously reported, arrangements were made as an emergency measure to supply the Republic of Korea with 15,000 metric tons of rice and 5,000 metric tons of barley in September and 20,000 metric tons of rice and 10,000 metric tons of barley in October. Based on subsequent surveys, the amounts of barley have been increased to 15,000 metric tons in September and 20,000 tons in October.

In accordance with my request, United Nations personnel have been recruited to assist the Government of the Republic of Korea in the distribution and efficient utilization of relief supplies and to provide adequate liaison and coordination between the Republic of Korea and the military forces in relief matters. To coordinate efficiently the problems of health and welfare in Korea, a Public Health and Welfare Section has been established as a Special Staff section of the United Nations Command. This section is presently staffed by available United States personnel who will be relieved progressively upon arrival of United Nations personnel recruited for these activities.

Psychological Warfare

United Nations radio broadcasts to the Korean people have been increased to a total of two and three quarters hours daily, consisting almost entirely of factual news reports with brief interpretative commentary. More than 48,000,000 leaflets have been dropped by aircraft or fired from artillery howitzers. 12,000,000 of these were directed at enemy front line troops, informing them of the United Nations Command guarantee of good treatment for prisoners of war, and providing them with safe conduct passes for use in surrendering. The mounting military strength of the United Nations forces has enhanced the credence which enemy soldiers place in these messages, and increasingly they are taking advantage of the safe conduct pass to lay down their arms voluntarily.

In Conclusion

1. United Nations forces in the Pusan-Taegu base area lost some ground including the Pohang-dong port. The fighting determination and combat efficiency of the United Nations forces in this area have steadily improved, but more forces are required.
2. There were further atrocities committed by North Koreans against United Nations captives.
3. The offers of personnel and supplies for civilian relief are appreciated. Future events may increase the requirements. Prevention of widespread suffering amongst Korea's war-torn population will be an important United Nations task.

F. Sixth report, October 21, 1950

I herewith submit report number six of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period of 15 to 30 September, inclusive. Eighth Army communiques numbers 90 through 117, X Corps communiques numbers 1 through 9, Korean releases numbers 438 through 509, and United Nations Command communiques numbers 6 through 10 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Introduction

Events of the past two weeks have been decisive. The strategic concepts designed to win the war are rapidly proving their soundness through aggressive application by our ground, sea and air forces.

The seizure of the heart of the enemy's distributing system in the Seoul area has completely dislocted his logistical supply to his forces in South Korea and has quickly resulted in their disintegration. Caught between our northern and our southern forces, both of which were completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy is thoroughly shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our combined combat activities.

The prompt junction of our two forces is dramatically symbolic of this collapse.

Continuing operations will take full advantage of our initiative and unified strength to provide for the complete destruction of the enemy and his early capitulation.

Ground Operations

The envelopment: At dawn 15 September, the United States X Corps made an amphibious assault on the Inchon area. The first phase in this wide envelopment was seizure of Wolmi-do, a small island which dominates Inchon harbor. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th United States Marine Division surprised the North Koreans with a perfectly co-ordinated attack that secured the island in two hours fighting.

The second phase of this operation involved the securing of the Inchon peninsula. The 1st United States Marine Division and four Republic of Korea Marine battalions accomplished this feat with lightning-like blows that kept the North Korean 18th Division and garrison units off-balance and unable to collect their forces for co-ordinated action. Kimpo airfield, the largest in Korea, was cleared on 17 September and opened for United Nations operations on 18 September. Elements of the 7th United States Division augmented by Republic of Korea Army forces were next brought into Inchon and rapidly took over the southern flank advancing speedily ten miles to the south and securing Suwon.

The liberation of Seoul and the denying to the North Koreans of road and rail lines in this communication hub comprised the third phase of this operation. On 19 September, the 1st United States Marine Division and two Republic of Korea Marine battalions crossed the Han River and started the attack on Seoul from the north. The remainder of the 1st United States Marine Division and the United States 7th Division enveloped Seoul from the south and west. The 17th Republic of Korea Regiment attacked through the center. By this time the North Korean forces had been able to bring in reinforcements from the 9th North Korean Division that was on the Eighth Army front and from scattered garrison and training units. The North Korean defense of Seoul was co-ordinated and fanatic, requiring the X Corps Commander to direct actual fighting with its hardships on civilian life and property. The liberation of the city was conducted in such a manner as to cause the least possible damage to civil installations. The third phase was completed on 28 September with only mop-up fighting continuing in the area. The President of Korea moved the Government of the Republic of Korea into Seoul on 29 September.

The obstacles to this wide envelopment were not only the enemy opposition, but also the natural obstacles of poor beaches fronted by miles of mud flats, a narrow channel, and an extraordinary tidal range of over twenty-nine feet. The success demonstrated a complete mastery of the technique of amphibious warfare, clockwork co-ordination and co-operation between the units and services participating. There was nothing noteworthy about the North Korean opposition, but there could have been. The potential was there. The North Koreans were proceeding with the construction of coastal fortifications, dug-in tanks and guns of all calibers, beach defenses and mining operations. Had this development been delayed for as much as a month, the enemy would have been ready and the assault, if possible, would have been more costly to United Nations assault forces.

The Main Attack

In co-ordination with the landing of X Corps at Inchon on 15 September, the Eighth Army launched its main attack on 16 September. After reports of the successful landings at Inchon, the forces of Korean, British, and United States Army troops attacked along their actual front against strong enemy resistance. Some of the most severe fighting of the entire war resulted. The North Korean forces had a tight ring around the United Nations forces in the Eighth Army area and were pressing their attacks. United Nations forces had inflicted severe punishment to the attacking enemy. This ring around the United Nations forces, though strong, was by this time lacking in depth. The first few days of the main attack were replete with attacks and counterattacks meeting head on.

By 18 September, the North Koreans began to give ground slowly around the entire Eighth Army front. By the 20th of September, the United Nations forces were punching holes in the North Korean ring. The port of Pohang-dong on the east coast was retaken by the 3rd Republic of Korea Division on the 20th of September.

The IX Corps in the south with the United States 2nd Infantry Division, United States 25th Division and attached Republic of Korea units got its attack rolling rapidly. In the Masan area, on the south coast, the enemy 6th and 7th Divisions had begun to yield ground by 19 September. Within four days our forces had driven westward almost to Chinju, and during the next week, enemy forces had been displaced almost to Hadong, a distance of thirty-five miles.

The I United States Corps to the north with the 1st United States Calvary Division, 24th United States Infantry Division, the 1st Republic of Korea Division and the 27th British Brigade crossed the Naktong River on the 19th, built up a firm bridgehead on the 20th, and then sprang from this bridgehead in a furious driving attack up the main Kumchon-Taejon axis pushing back the North Korean 1st, 3rd, 10th, and 13th Divisions about thirty-five miles west of their 15 September line.

On the northern and western fronts, the enemy 8th, 12th and 5th, 15th Divisions resisted fiercely until 22 September, when a series of precipitous withdrawals carried them more than seventy miles northward within six days.

The I and II Republic of Korea Corps on this front are responsible for this rapid progress. To keep the enemy continually on the move, these Republic of Korea units developed a leap-frog system with one regiment resting while one was driving. The enemy losses in personnel and equipment in this area were particularly heavy. At Uisong, over one hundred tons of rice and supplies and most of the equipment of a division were captured.

In large, the enemy has relinquished effective tactical control of nearly all Republic of Korea territory south of the 37th parallel, while United Nations forces now control a territory four times greater than at the commencement of the Inchon landings. In his general retreat, the enemy has suffered thousands of casualties and was forced to abandon large quantities of arms, ammunition, and equipment on all parts of the front. The loss of this material which includes field guns, tanks, trucks, and aircraft, will further reduce the North Korean fighting potential.

United Nations advanced positions on the north mark a general line from Nakp'ung on the east coast, westward through Panwanggok, and Chungju, and north through Ansong, to the east of Seoul, and west to Kump'o on the coast. On the southwest, United Nations advanced positions follow a line from the vicinity of Hadong northwest through Tamyang, Kumje, to Iri and north through Nonsan and Chochiwon to Paranjang, on the west coast.

The 12th Philippine Battalion Combat Team arrived on 24 September in the Eighth Army area and has joined the United Nations forces. This contribution consists of infantry, artillery, engineer, and supporting units. On 25 September, a Swedish evacuation hospital arrived in Korea and is now furnishing medical aid to United Nations forces. On 28 September, the 3rd Battalion Australian Regiment arrived in Korea and joined United Nations forces.

The Juncture

On the 26th of September, the 1st United States Cavalry Division in the Eighth Army main attack made a lightning thrust from the vicinity of Chonju and completed a juncture with the 7th United

States Infantry Division of the X Corps, in the vicinity of the Suwon airfield. This brilliant cavalry advance of approximately fifty-five miles closed the trap on the North Korean forces that were occupying the southwest corner of Korea.

While mopping up fighting is still in progress in this area, all effective escape routes are closed and the fate of the North Korean forces caught in the pocket is sealed.

Navy Operations

Despite the seasonal typhoon winds and swollen seas encountered during the period of this report, United Nations naval forces continued to apply their versatile land, sea, and air elements with increasing tempo. The most outstanding of their achievements against the enemy was the amphibious landing at Inchon, port of Seoul. The initial landings, made by United States Marines were supported directly by Naval and Marine aircraft in coordination with gunfire support from cruisers and destroyers, followed by bombarding rocket ships. The Marines aggressively seized their initial objectives and led the advance beyond Inchon. Succeeding troop units were immediately applied to the task of developing and expanding the poor unloading facilities of the port. Naval surface units remained on the scene of the landing to render gunfire support as needed and to give antiaircraft protection to the unloading and harbor activities. The United States battleship *Missouri* had just arrived in Korean waters in time for this operation after a spectacularly long trip, and instantly proved of enormous value with her great sixteen-inch guns. Noteworthy features of this amphibious operation were the Navy's clockwork coordination, strict adherence to schedule, and the overcoming of natural obstacles, especially in the extraordinary tidal conditions and limited maneuvering room for large vessels.

Also especially noteworthy of the varied naval operations and tasks is the "naval artillery" support given ground troops on the east coast. On repeated occasions, this heavy fire, directed from the air or by ground controllers, has taken such a toll of enemy troops and equipment as to inspire the hearty enthusiasm of our ground troops, and according to prisoner reports, substantially diminished the enemy's will to fight. The end of this reporting period finds these east coast bombarding elements engaged in such thorough interdiction fire as to allow the enemy to escape northward over coastal routes only with heavy casualties and without organization.

Naval air units in the Seoul area of operations, based both aboard ship and ashore, concentrated on close support of the ground advance and upon interdiction of enemy troops approaching Seoul from the north. Problems of identification remained difficult, since many North Korean troops disguise themselves with white clothes over their uniforms, taking advantage of our continued effort to protect the innocent refugees along the highways. Such troops while marching south toward Seoul, turned and walked north upon sighting United Nations aircraft.

A protected South Korean fishing sanctuary has been established; and additional sanctuaries will be provided wherever practicable, and where North Korean water movement can be identified and then absolutely prevented.

An effective patrol and close watch for shipping in and out of North Korean ports continues.

Of particular interest is the introduction of enemy sea mines into the areas of naval operations. Many free-drifting, apparently Soviet-made, mines have been sighted at sea; a large number of which have been exploded or sunk.

Air Operations

The greater part of the offensive power of all the United Nations air forces during this period has been devoted to attacks which are of immediate assistance to the rapidly advancing ground forces. Air assault at Inchon and on the battle front of the Eighth Army successfully softened up enemy resistance just prior to the launching of the amphibious and main attack. Advancing United Nations forces in all sectors were preceded by air attacks which materially reduced the enemy's defensive capabilities. Medium bomber aircraft for the second time joined the lighter aircraft in close support of ground forces when over forty B–29's struck enemy held areas in front of the Eighth Army in the vicinity of Waegwan.

The interdiction program inaugurated in the early stages of the Korean campaign to inhibit reinforcement and resupply of the North Korean Army was intensified. The disrupted communication system now serves to retard the withdrawal of the fleeing enemy and to prevent his removal of any heavy equipment. Attacks continue upon bridges and marshalling yards placed in partial operation by the North Koreans following their initial destruction. In order to effect the maximum delay to movements between bridges and marshalling yards, road and railroad beds have been bombed between the critical points. Abandoned vehicles and artillery attest to the inability of the enemy to move his equipment.

Several attacks have been made upon military barracks and training areas in North Korea. A few additional industrial targets of military significance in North Korea have been bombed and operations have been repeated against installations of this nature previously bombed when photographs have indicated the possibility of their renewed functioning on a reduced scale.

Airfields available to the North Koreans remain under constant surveillance and though improvements are continually being made to the fields, enemy air activity remains negligible. Two aircraft, one of which was destroyed, made an abortive attack over the invasion fleet off Inchon.

Airlift operations into Korea are providing ground forces with an increasing daily resupply of critical equipment and personnel and rapid evacuation of United Nations wounded personnel. One recent day's airlift totaled over 1,100 tons, including 2,000 passengers.

Total daily sorties of United Nations aircraft of all types now occasionally exceeds 1,000.

As in all air operations conducted under combat conditions, an ever-present danger of errors in navigation and target identification exists. The war in Korea is no exception. Recognizing from World War II experience that errors of this nature are a distinct possibility, CINCFE first directed his Air Commander on 30 June that all aircraft operating in North Korea would stay well clear of the frontiers of

Manchuria and the Soviet Union. This directive has since been reiterated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command in operations orders and in messages to subordinate commands. Similar directives to United Nations Air Commanders were issued on 3 July, 14 August and 2 September. He re-emphasized to his commanders the seriousness of violating the Manchurian border and again directed that the point be specifically and emphatically covered at all air crew briefings.

Prisoners of War

Subsequent to the X Corps landings at Inchon and the Eighth Army's vigorous offensive in the Pusan perimeter area large masses of North Korean Reds have surrendered; on one day the number exceeded 6,000. Since my last report more than 19,000 North Korean prisoners have been captured by United Nations forces. This brings the total number of prisoners of war to over 23,000.

A request by Mr. Frederick Bieri, the accredited delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, that he be permitted to purchase, on behalf of his organization, books, pamphlets and other reading material for the benefit of prisoners of war, has been granted. In accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention, the material provided is not censored by the United Nations Commander. Furthermore, Mr. Bieri has been informed that prisoners of war are permitted to received individual parcels or collective shipments containing foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies and articles of a religious, educational or recreational character which will enable them to pursue studies or cultural activities. The only limitations placed on such shipments are those deemed necessary by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Atrocities

Violations of the Laws of War continue to be reported by our forces in Korea. Two incidents recently reported are typical in this respect. The first incident concerns an unarmed American soldier who surrendered to the enemy on 14 September 1950. According to the story of an eyewitness to the event, this soldier was held with his arms extended by enemy troops and then shot in the face a number of times with an automatic weapon. In the Chinju area, troops of the 25th Division discovered on 26 September 1950 the bodies of twelve American prisoners of war who had their hands tied behind their backs and then were machine-gunned by North Koreans. Two other badly wounded American prisoners of war, being left for dead, survived this machine-gunning and are now in friendly hands. Both of these incidents are now being investigated by our field forces.

Civilian relief

With the rapid advance of United Nations forces, more and more emphasis has been focused on assisting the Republic of Korea in returning to normal government activities. The United Nations Command Public Health and Welfare Section has continued to assist in maintaining liaison with the Republic of Korea government agencies in planning for continued relief, health and welfare activities. Republic of Korea civil officials and police are following closely the advance of the United Nations forces to expedite the return to normal living conditions and re-establish governmental functions throughout the liberated areas. Movement of refugees to their homes in liberated areas has begun.

The Republic of Korea Government officials have organized government teams to include local and provincial civil administration, social welfare, public health, public utilities, police activities in major cities and areas liberated by United Nations forces including Seoul and Inchon.

Conservative estimates of refugees within the perimeter of the United Nations forces at the time the offensive began were approximately 306,000. Korean medical teams are stationed in all the major refugee camps or centered within clusters of smaller camps. Other isolated refugee camps are visited periodically by itinerant or temporary teams.

Medical supplies for care of refugees had been almost completely exhausted prior to the arrival of personnel from the Public Health and Welfare Section of the United Nations Command. Republic of Korea civil agencies with assistance from the Public Health and Welfare Section have inaugurated immunization and environmental sanitation programs. Medical supplies have been procured on an emergency basis and have been distributed to assist in the health and welfare of refugees of Korea.

By Cabinet order, the Central Relief Committee has been reconstituted as the Central Joint Committee for Relief consisting of the Ministers of Health, Social Affairs, Home Affairs, National Defense and Director of the Office of Supply sitting for the Republic of Korea, and health welfare and supply Officers of the Public Health and Welfare field organization in Korea. The functions of the Joint Committee are to establish requirement for direct relief supplies, allocate these supplies and formulate policy concerning distribution of these supplies.

Reports indicate stocks of medical supplies imported prior to the outbreak of hostilities and warehoused in the Seoul-Inchon area for the civilian population have been seized by the Communist military forces and utilized for their own purposes thereby creating additional supply problems in the Seoul-Inchon area.

Blankets and clothing remain critical relief items. Charcoal, lumber and building requirements for the Pusan-Taegu area can be evaluated shortly and will be called forward. Five Republic of Korea officials, including vice Ministers of Health and Social Affairs Ministries, have been dispatched 22 September 1950 to the Inchon-Seoul area to evaluate needs and report to the central government of Korea.

The self-reliance of the refugees and the spirit evidenced by them which indicates their ability to meet and overcome housing and other problems they find in the devastated areas are commendable. There is a strong desire among Koreans to measure up to the responsibilities insofar as their capabilities in manpower and other resources will permit.

Financial Agreement

An agreement was executed by the United States and the Republic of Korea on 28 July 1950 regarding expenditures in Korea by the forces under the United Nations Command. The text of the agreement is attached hereto as Appendix "A".

Psychological Warfare

Within a few hours after the United Nations landing at Inchon, radio broadcasts and leaflets were transmitting the news throughout Korea. The liberation of Seoul was reported with equal celerity. More than 74,000 leaflets have now been airdropped by United Nations forces. Soldiers and civilians of North Korea have received 5,000,000 leaflets showing the military significance of the fall of Seoul, and calling upon them to abandon futile resistance and prevent further bloodshed. Nearly 28,000,000 surrender leaflets have been dropped on enemy troops, calling upon them to surrender and guaranteeing them humane treatment. Eight and four-tenths per cent of the 1,013 prisoners interrogated stated that they were influenced by surrender leaflets to surrender. The percentage of the total number prisoners interrogated to date who were influenced by psychological warfare is over sixteen per cent; however forty-one per cent of the last 339 prisoners stated that they were so influenced.

In Conclusion

1. A successful frontal attack and envelopment has completely changed the tide of battle in South Korea. The backbone of the North Korean Army has been broken and their scattered forces are being liquidated or driven north with material losses in equipment and men captured.

2. The United Nations Command now comprises naval forces from eight nations; ground forces from five nations and air forces from two nations with advance elements of the third already arrived. This global support and willingness to fight for United Nations principles must be heartening to free men everywhere.

3. Reports continue on North Korean atrocities.

4. The offers of assistance by members of the United Nations in personnel and relief supplies have been noted with deep appreciation by myself and people of Korea. Continuing assistance by members of the United Nations during the coming winter months will immeasurably assist the Government of Korea in the prevention of widespread suffering of the war-victimized people of the Republic.

APPENDIX A

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA REGARDING EXPENDITURES BY FORCES UNDER COMMAND OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL ARMED FORCES OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Preamble

Object.

This Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Korea shall govern the relationships with respect to provision and use of currency and credits between the Government and people of the Republic of Korea and forces operating in Korea under the Unified Command of the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Member States of the United Nations designated by the United States pursuant to the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council of June 25, 1950, June 27, 1950 and July 7, 1950.

1. Local Currency Provided by the Republic of Korea.

The Government of the Republic of Korea shall provide the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as the Commanding General), with currency of the Republic of Korea and credits in such currency (hereinafter referred to as local curency and credits) in such amounts, of such types and at such times and places as he may request, for expenditures arising out of operations and activities in Korea and Korean territorial waters involving participation of forces under his Command.

2. Return of Local Currency and Cancellation of Credits.

The Commanding General may, at any time, return to the Government of the Republic of Korea all or any part of the local currency provided under paragraph 1 above, and request the cancellation of all or any part of any credits in such currency which may have been opened in his favor. Upon the termination of this Agreement, the Commanding General shall return to the Government of the Republic of Korea all local currency provided under paragraph 1 above remaining in his possession, and the unused portion of any credits which may have been opened in his favor shall be cancelled.

3. Use of Other Currencies.

If it should become desirable to use currency other than the local currency agreed to be provided under paragraph 1 above, the Commanding General may cause such currency to be used to the extent deemed appropriate.

4. Reports to the Republic of Korea.

If the Commanding General transfers local currency and credits to the Forces of other countries participating under his Command, the Government of the Republic of Korea shall be advised from time to time of such transfers.

5. Deferment of Settlement.

Settlement of any claims arising from the provision and use of currency and credits under the Agreement, including currency caused to be used under paragraph 3 above, shall take place directly between the Governments of the Forces concerned and the Government of the Republic of Korea. Such negotiations shall be deferred to a time or times mutually satisfactory to the respective Governments and the Government of the Republic of Korea. Where currency of the United States or of a third country has been transferred by the Commander-in-Chief to the Forces of third Governments, the right of the Government of the United States to make arrangements for reimbursement for such transfers directly with the recipient government shall not be prejudiced in any manner.

6. Maintenance of Records.

Records shall be maintained reflecting the amounts of currency and credits received and transferred under this Agreement, including the amounts of currency received and transferred under paragraph 3 above.

7. Effective date and termination.

This Agreement shall enter into operation and effect immediately upon the signature hereof and shall continue in effect until it is mutually agreed that the need therefor has ceased.

8. Registration with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in compliance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Superseding of Agreement of July 6, 1950.

This Agreement shall supersede the Agreement of July 6, 1950, between the United States Armed Forces in Korea and the Republic of Korea pursuant to which the Bank of Korea agreed to advance currency of the Republic of Korea to the Finance Officer, United States Forces in Korea, against reimbursement at the rate of exchange in effect on the date such currency is expended. Any currency advanced under the Agreement of July 6, 1950, shall be deemed to have been provided under this Agreement. The Agreement of July 6, 1950, is hereby abrogated.

Done in duplicate, in the English and Korean languages, at Taegu, Korea on this 28th day of July, 1950. The English and Korean texts shall have equal force, but in case of divergence, the English text shall prevail.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Representatives, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
By JOHN J. MUCCIO

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA:
By SOON JU CHEY

G. Seventh report, November 3, 1950

I herewith submit report number seven of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 to 15 October, inclusive. Eighth Army communiques numbers 118 through 120, X Corps communiques numbers 10 through 13, and Korean releases 510 through 558, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Introduction

The United Nations forces most challenging problem during this period was to maximize exploitation of strategic opportunities sequent to the spectacular collapse of the Communist invasion forces in south Korea. More than half of the enemy's combat forces were entrapped south of the 37th parallel, and are no longer available to him. Thousands more were lost in their desperate flight north to the 38th parallel. Since 1 October, in addition to thousands of prisoners, large stocks of enemy equipment have been captured. All territory formerly comprising the Republic of Korea except for the small Ongjin and Yonan peninsular areas, is now restored to that government.

Ground Operations

An outstanding achievement during the period was accomplished by the I Republic of Korea Corps with the 3rd and Capital Republic of Korea Divisions. From 30 September to 10 October this force spearheaded by the 3rd Republic of Korea Division moved up the east coast of Korea from below the 38th parallel to capture the north Korean port city of Wonsan. This movement was continually resisted by what the north Koreans could muster from elements of the north Korean 5th, 12th and 15th Divisions and from north Korean garrison units. The Republic of Korea forces advanced about fifteen miles a day. Their attacks were so rapid and relentless that the enemy was never able to organize co-ordinated resistance. The enemy was forced to commit units piecemeal. The Republic of Korea attack, superbly supported by Air Force and by the floating artillery of the United Nations Naval East Coast Patrol, rapidly overran everything placed in front of it.

The II Republic of Korea Corps with the 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions attacked north through the central part of Korea with equal drive and determination. Their advance was somewhat slower due to difficult terrain.

One more Republic of Korea division was activated during the period.

The Eighth Army with British, Australian, Philippine and United States units moved up the west coast and central sectors, relieved the X Corps of the Seoul-Inchon area on 7 October 1950 and continued its attack to the north. On the vital Seoul-Pyongyang axis, enemy resistance was stronger and better organized than elsewhere along the 38th parallel. Having cleared the Uijongbu area north of Seoul, the Eighth Army led by the 1st United States Cavalry Division drove across the 38th parallel in that sector on 9 October. By 12 October, our forces had penetrated more than fifteen miles into northern Korea toward the enemy capital of Pyongang, and had taken Paekch'on, five miles west of the Yesong River. Though the Communist defenses athwart the Seoul-Pyongyang axis retain a semblance of organization, United Nations forces continue to break through, and to bypass enemy units.

In the south, isolated remnants of six enemy divisions vainly sought to break out of the United Nations cordon. United Nations forces have progressively reduced these enemy bands, (presently totalling about 10,000 men) to more and more restricted areas, and are proceeding toward their ultimate elimination.

By the end of the period, the northern boundary of the occupied area of north Korea was generally indicated by a line running south and west from Wonsan to Hyon-ni thence to Ich'on, Pyongsan and Paekch'on.

Navy Operations

During the last two weeks, United Nations Naval Forces, comprising warships from eight nations, have continued to apply unremitting pressure on the enemy which has characterized their operations throughout the Korean campaign. Constant patrol operations by surface craft have prevented the enemy from moving desperately needed supplies by sea. On the other hand, an indispensable factor in the success of United Nations operations in Korea has been the uninterrupted flow of reinforcements and supplies from home bases to the troops in Korea. More than three hundred cargo and transport type vessels are now being employed in this service. Thanks to the presence of United Nations Naval escort vessels, the enemy has not been able to interfere, in the slightest degree, with the movement of this vast armada of shipping.

Carrier-based aircraft have continued to range over central and northern Korea, searching out and striking at worth while military targets wherever they can be found. As a result of these operations, heavy damage has been inflicted on enemy fortifications, military installations and land transport facilities. Carrier-based and land-based Marine aircraft have continued to provide close air support to United Nations ground forces.

United Nations Naval Forces have continued to provide naval gunfire support to ground troops in the Inchon area and at numerous points along the southern and east coasts of Korea. Generally, the fire of these heavy mobile guns has been directed from the air or by control personnel stationed on shore. Many enemy prisoners of war have volunteered the information that naval gunfire is especially hated and feared by the enemy ground troops.

Minor amphibious landings were carried out along the Korean coast notably at Mokpo, which was liberated by Republic of Korea Marines with the support of United Nations Naval units.

A series of well executed raiding operations against enemy communication lines along the east coast of north Korea were conducted by United Nations Naval Forces with excellent results.

During the period of this report, enemy mines have made their appearance in growing numbers in Korean coastal waters. There is strong evidence that the enemy has embarked on a program of indiscrimination mining without regard to international law or the safety of non-combatants at sea. It is a well-established principle of international law that live mines must be moored or otherwise fixed in place.

International law specifically forbids the use of unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after being laid. As a related matter, it required that moored mines shall be so constructed as to ensure that they will become harmless as soon as they have broken from their moorings. It must be of growing concern to law abiding peoples everywhere to know that to date over twenty-five freshly planted, contact mines have been found by United Nations forces drifting in the open sea off the coasts of Korea and that a large proportion of these have proven to be not harmless but live.

To date, United Nations forces have lost three small vessels, due to mines, and four additional vessels have been damaged. Although enemy mines constitute a threat to future operations, thanks to the persistent, daring and thorough work of the minesweeping flotillas, movement of shipping is proceeding on schedule.

Air Operations

The brunt of the air offensive now falls almost entirely upon Communist areas as United Nations ground forces continue their spirited drive north of the 38th parallel. Completing its 110th consecutive day of combat, the United States Far East Air Forces, in conjunction with aircraft of the United States Navy and Marines, the Royal Australian Air Force, the British Navy and the Republic of Korea, are ranging across all of north Korea, attacking every identifiable military target. Advance elements of a South African Air Force unit are engaged in the preparations preliminary to operations in response to the United Nations call for universal efforts to repel the aggressor.

Unceasing air attacks contributed to the lightning move of Republic of Korea forces on the east coast to Wonsan and to the elimination of enemy pockets of resistance remaining in south Korea. While close air support of ground forces is provided on the entire front, suitable targets in the immediate battle area are few. Hence, fighters, bombers, and night intruders have expanded their efforts against lines of communications, striking at any observed rolling stock and vehicles, and repeatedly attacking bridges, tunnels and marshalling yards. The enemy suffers serious losses of his remaining trucks, railroad cars, locomotives and tanks. His fuel, ammunition and other supply dumps are subjected to destruction as his capability for resupply diminishes.

The displacement north of United Nations air bases following the ground force advances has materially assisted in operations.

The interdiction of roads and railroads leading into the enemy's capital from the north and northwest have received special emphasis as a result of observed resupply efforts from that direction.

United Nations aircraft losses from hostile anti-aircraft fire, though not severe, have increased as the air operations increase over the more sensitive military installations in his homeland. Enemy air activity has been limited to but two abortive raids though airfield sweeps reveal new revetments and facilities appearing on his airfields in apparent anticipation of air operations.

A few minor attacks have been made during the period upon the remnants of certain military industrial targets. Of these, a raid on Kanni arsenal north of Pyongyang resulted in secondary explosions and fires indicating renewed efforts to utilize this facility.

Cargo and passenger airlift averaging well over eight hundred tons daily is providing critical supplies to all forces. Air evacuation of wounded personnel from the battlefield to general hospitals in Japan, and in certain cases to the United States, is vastly increasing the probability of recovery from severe wounds incurred in the fight for decency.

Prisoners of War

Prisoners of war captured by the United Nations forces now total more than 66,618. An average of approximately 3,000 north Koreans have been captured daily since my last report.

To ensure full coverage of all areas of Korea which are now in the hands of the United Nations forces, a second delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr. Jacques De Reynier, has been approved and is now in Korea. This delegate has been granted the same unrestricted privileges and opportunities to observe the prisoners of war at all stages, from capture to confinement in permanent camps, as has Mr. Frederic Bieri, the present delegate. In this connection Mr. Bieri has just returned from the prisoner of war transit enclosures at Seoul and Inchon and states that he found conditions there very satisfactory.

Atrocities

Violations of the Laws of War continue to be reported by United Nations forces in Korea. The following incidents typify the manner in which the armed forces of north Korea have violated accepted standards for humanitarian conduct of war. On or about 21 September, an American officer, who was a prisoner of a north Korean armed force unit, was tied to a tree, upon the approach of our troops, and deliberately shot four times. This officer was recovered by friendly troops, and although critically wounded, is expected to recover. Upon evacuating Taejon, on or about 27 September, the enemy deliberately executed forty American prisoners of war as well as approximately four hundred south Koreans. The bodies of the forty American prisoners of war have been recovered from the place of burial in a police station court-yard. One American prisoner of war, although badly wounded, survived this massacre and was recovered by United States forces. Official photographs of the bodies recovered, both American and south Korean, have been taken. The above incidents, as well as all other incidents reported, are being investigated by the field forces.

Civil Activities

The United Nations Command is continuing to work closely with the Republic of Korea officials. Continued surveillance to determine present and future civilian relief requirements is being co-ordinated through the Central Emergency Relief Committee composed of representatives of the Republic of Korea and Public Health and Welfare Section, General Headquarters, United Nations Command. This Committee, by co-ordinated planning, determines requirements for food, clothing, medical care and housing for direct emergency relief and sound administrative controls to effect proper and efficient distribution of relief supplies.

Pending receipt of contributions of the United Nations, supplies continue to be procured locally on an emergency basis. This action has been necessary to relieve the suffering, hardships and health problems brought about by the ruthless actions of the north Korean forces. In this regard, tentative arrangements have been made to obtain approximately 100,000 tons of food. In addition, medical supplies and equipment valued at $300,000 have been procured locally and supplied to the Republic of Korea to meet emergency needs. The United Nations forces are confronted daily with situations which require the use of available military supplies and facilities to alleviate undue hardship. The degree and extent of such aid is practically impossible to determine on a measurable basis.

A number of personnel recruited by the United Nations to render technical advice and assistance in the fields of public health and welfare have arrived and are materially assisting the authorities of the Republic of Korea at national, provincial and local levels in effectuating essential relief measures.

The main railroad line from the south bank of the Han river to Pusan was put back in operation on 7 October.

It is estimated for Korea south of the 38th parallel, 1,800,000 persons have suffered to some degree by the total or partial loss of their homes or personal property. Housing units destroyed are estimated at 150,000.

It is heartening to note the enthusiasm and efficiency of the civil officials of the Republic of Korea in the re-establishment of governmental functions in areas of the Republic of Korea recovered by United Nations forces. In Taejon, Seoul and many other areas, Korean officials were functioning within hours after liberation.

Official messages offering the north Korean forces an opportunity to bring to an end the hostilities were transmitted by radio and leaflets throughout Korea on 1 October and again on 9 October. (Copies of texts attached as Annex "A".) Both the complete text and a summary of the resolution on Korea adopted by the General Assembly on 8 October were disseminated in the same manner. Eighty-five million leaflets have been air-dropped over Korea by United Nations forces. One million five hundred thousand special leaflets were dropped with a large reproduction of the United Nations flag and a short statement of United Nations efforts toward establishment of a free, unified and democratic Korea. Radio Seoul has been restored to operation and is now being used for United Nations and Republic of Korea broadcasts.

In Conclusion

1. Operations are in progress to destroy all north Korean forces.
2. The north Korean Communist leaders have expressed determination to use all possible means to continue hostilities, even under futile circumstances.
3. An increase in atrocities committed by north Korean forces was evidenced during retrograde movements by those forces.
4. Contributions by member nations of relief and welfare supplies and personnel services have been of inestimable value in the liberation and rehabilitation of Korea. A continuation and increase of these contributions are essential to an orderly return of the Korean people to the democratic way of life.

ANNEX "A"

Text of General MacArthur's Message of 1 October 1950

To The Commander-in-Chief North Korean Forces: The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, call upon you and forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct—and I call upon you at once to liberate all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to such places as I indicate. North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care dictated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S MESSAGE OF 9 OCTOBER 1950

In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, for the last time call upon you and the forces under your command in whatever part of Korea situated, to lay down your arms and cease hostilities. And I call upon all north Koreans to cooperate fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea, assured that they will be treated justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and rehabilitate all parts of a unified Korea. Unless immediate response is made by you in the name of the north Korean government, I shall at once proceed to take such military actions as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

H. Eighth report, November 6, 1950

I herewith submit report number 8 of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 16–31 October inclusive. Korean releases (numbers 559 through 602) appended hereto provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Ground Operations

Enemy resistance to United Nations forces advances has been sporadic and weak during most of the period of this report, but had begun to stiffen towards the end of October. Despite the Communist defenders advantage of extremely rugged, mountainous terrain, their defensive efforts have failed to prevent continued U. N. advances, which have averaged more than 10 miles per day. Defending briefly at most points of contact generally with battalion size units the Communist North Korean forces have yielded 150 miles of territory over the whole front. The wholesale retreat before unrelenting U. N. pressure has been extremely expensive to the enemy both in men and in matériel. Enemy prisoners of war have reached an approximate figure of 135,000. Captured matériel was in proportion.

On 20 October the United States 187th Regimental Combat Team executed a parachute drop at Sukch'on and Sunch'on. The drop area was about 30 miles north of Pyongyang and was accomplished at the time United States, British and Republic of Korea Army units were attacking to secure Pyongyang. This efficiently executed airborne operation materially reduced the enemy resistance to the south and contributed to the rapid advance of the U. N. units on the west coast.

At no time since the September collapse of the North Korean line around Pusan has the enemy been able to organize a solid, coordinated front. However, with our approach to the Yalu River, the enemy has become somewhat more aggressive, and has resisted much more strongly along a line some 50 miles south of the border. In the west coast sector, elements of the NK 17th Armored, and 32d and 45th Infantry Divisions have built up the semblance of a front extending northeast about 50 miles from Chongju to Onjong, which has temporarily slowed our rate of advance. At Onjong, on the eastern leg of this sector, an estimated two regiments of the NK 45th Division vigorously counterattacked our advanced units, forcing one United Nations unit to make a slight withdrawal. United Nations forces also met increasing resistance in their advance on the east coast sector.

On 26 October, amphibious elements of the United Nations naval forces began an administrative landing of the 1st United States Marine Division and other units of the Corps over the beaches in the Wonsan area. These units had been moved by water from Inchon around the peninsula to Wonsan.

On 29 October the United States 7th Infantry Division with Republic of Korea Army units landed on the beaches at Iwon which is 178 road miles north of Wonsan.

The 7th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Republic of Korea Division advanced to the northern border of Korea on the Yalu River at one point near Ch'osan on 26 October.

For the first time in the Korean war, Chinese soldiers of the Chinese Communist forces were captured in combat in Korea. They wore North Korean uniforms, and may have been volunteers. There is no positive evidence that Chinese Communist units, as such, have entered Korea, although incomplete interrogation of these prisoners of war indicates that possibility.

Guerrilla operations conducted by enemy bands of from 50 to 2,000 have been relatively intensive south of the 39th [38th?] parallel. Such bands carry out frequent raids on defenseless towns and villages, and harass small military convoys and units. United Nations forces in affected areas destroy or disperse these bands when they show themselves but the process of eliminating this menace is necessarily a slow one, since the mountainous terrain and complex nets of hill trails facilitate their escape.

The First Turkish Armed Forces Command arrived in Korea on 17 October and has been attached to the Eighth Army. This force consists of infantry, artillery and supporting services normal to combat in the field. The Turkish force is a valuable and welcome addition to the United Nations columns.

Two more Republic of Korea infantry divisions were activated during the period.

Navy Operations

United Nations naval forces continued to effectively deny to the enemy the use of Korean coastal waters. Naval air support and naval gunfire activity were reduced during time of the period of this report, reflecting the decreased intensity of enemy resistance on the ground. Attacks of our carrier-based aircraft were concentrated mainly on moving transport and on roads and rail lines on the Korean east coast north of Wonsan and against the off lying islands near Wonsan harbor. Military targets in the vicinity of Songjin were bombarded by United Nations warships on 17 October.

The only serious problem confronting United Nations naval forces during this period was that of enemy mines. A number of Korean ports liberated by United Nations forces in recent weeks were mined by the enemy. In most cases, the numbers of mines involved are not large. However, the enemy laid a very massive minefield in the approaches to the harbor of Wonsan. To clear a channel through this minefield required the constant employment of a substantial number of United Nations minesweepers throughout a period of more than two weeks. A planned program for clearing principal North Korean ports of enemy laid mines has been instituted.

Evidence continues to accumulate that the design of the mines used by the enemy does not provide for their being rendered harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings, as is required by international law. To date, over 40 drifting mines have been found and destroyed by United Nations naval forces, of which a large proportion proved to be live.

Air Operations

United Nations combat aircraft retain the potential of mounting formidable offensive or defensive efforts but the paucity of North Korean targets has called for few daily sorties in comparison to the rate of air activity during previous periods. Fighters and light bombers are constantly available for close support as the United Nations ground forces drive the aggressor to his northern border but only limited numbers of tanks, vehicles and artillery provide targets as small enemy groups attempt to organize localized defenses and counterattacks or disengage and flee in disorder.

The accent has shifted from the combat aircraft to the cargo planes as air dropped equipment and supplies support the United Nations columns knifing deep into hostile territory beyond the capability of immediate normal resupply operations.

Aerial resupply to advanced bases has proved a major contribution to continued ground operations as surface supply routes have become extended. Airlift has provided the principal support for continued advances and will do so until additional seaports in North Korea are opened. Wonsan and Pyongyang are airlift terminals for the east and west sectors, respectively. One day's lift into Pyongyang for the 8th Army approximated 1,400 tons.

On 20 October, in a technically perfect performance, 110 Far East Air Forces cargo aircraft dropped over 2,800 paratroops of the United States 187th Airborne Regiment with over 300 tons of combat equipment well behind enemy lines at Sunch'on and Sukch'on. Succeeding drops brought the total of personnel dropped to about 4,000, the total equipment to over 600 tons.

Hostile air activity has consisted of a few nuisance raids by light aircraft at night. No damage has resulted.

Prisoners of War

The continuing disintegration of the North Korean Army as a fighting force is exemplified by the fact that approximately 135,000 prisoners of war are now in the hands of United Nations forces; of these about 60,000 are now located in five prisoner of war camps in the vicinity of Pusan, 33,000 are detained at a prisoner of war camp in Inchon, 11,000 at Pyongyang, and the remainder are detained in transit enclosures pending transfer to permanent camps.

Atrocities

United Nations field forces continue to report atrocities and other violations by the enemy of the laws and customs of war. Up to the present time, a total of 74 war crimes incidents, involving approximately 26,000 victims, have been noted in our files. Approximately

400 American military personnel appear to have been the victims of offences of various kinds, while the remaining victims have been South Korean nationals, civilians as well as military. Investigation of the incidents continues as the tactical situation permits.

It has become increasingly evident that in the interest of justice steps must be taken to try before appropriate tribunals of the United Nations Command those prisoners of war, and others who may be taken into custody and who, prior to capture or detention, have committed atrocities and other offences violative of the laws and customs of war. I have, therefore, caused to be prepared in this headquarters, and I have promulgated to the United Nations Command, a set of rules and regulations for the conduct of United Nations military commissions which will be convened, whenever needed, for the trials of such persons under the common law of war. Copies of these rules and regulations are being forwarded for your information. Jurisdiction is limited under the rules of conventional war crimes and the so-called international crimes of waging aggressive warfare and crimes against humanity, such as genocide, are not included.

Civilian Relief

Problems of relief and welfare in North Korea have been made more difficult and complex by the absence of local government officials, utilities, transportation, and relief and welfare agencies; however, supplies to prevent disease, starvation and unrest are being distributed as expeditiously as the military situation permits.

The situation in South Korea is becoming more stabilized with most of the refugees having been returned to their homes. Local governments have been reestablished in most areas. Economic conditions are improving and donations from member nations are beginning to arrive; however, critical needs exist for food, clothing, fuel and medical supplies.

Detailed surveys and estimates indicate that the Masan-Taegu perimeter sustained much heavier damages than originally estimated. The original estimate was that there were 30,000 homes destroyed whereas the actual destruction is nearer 120,000. Detailed surveys are now being conducted on a house-by-house, family-by-family basis.

Throughout the destroyed areas people are building temporary huts on former house sites. Progress on reconstruction has been good in the smaller towns and rural areas; however, rebuilding has been slower in the cities due to lack of raw materials.

In spite of the destroyed medical facilities and almost total lack of medical supplies, the general health of the people appears to be good. In some areas less than one-third of the local doctors can be found, either because they were war casualties or became refugees and have not returned to their former homes. Medical supplies for those who desire to resume practice are being provided from United Nations sources to assist in the relief, welfare, and prevention of disease throughout Korea. For example, the vaccination program is near completion in the city of Seoul with over 700,000 individuals immunized against cholera, typhoid and smallpox and over 300,000 immunized against typhus. Similar programs are now under way in Inchon and other large towns in the northern areas of Korea.

As indicative of the feeling of the populace in some areas north of the 38th parallel, there was a United Nations day celebration in the city of Wonsan attended by an estimated 12,000 persons with appropriate flags, banners and speeches.

This event was organized by the local populace without the guidance or influence of United Nations officials, or military forces.

Transportation in Korea

The transportation systems of Korea are in such a condition that extensive rehabilitation is required. The rail line from Pusan to Seoul was opened as a single track line on 21 October 1950 by means of a shoo-fly bridge across the Han River. This route has an average daily movement of 3,975 short tons and 688 passengers. Another single track line is in operation from Pusan to Tanyang and will be opened to Seoul after rehabilitation is completed on six major bridges and three tunnels. The single track line from Yosu to Kunsan to Taejon is in operation. The Seoul-Wonsan line is open to Tongduch'on-ni. The United Nations forces have rehabilitated and are operating 1,295 miles of railroad in Korea and have in operation 245 locomotives and 4,400 freight cars of all types. Extensive rehabilitation activities are in progress on the rail lines.

The highways from Pusan to Pyongyang are open. These roads are in poor condition and through highway movement is the exception rather than the rule. The main effort on highway rehabilitation has been directed toward restoring damaged bridges and minor repairs to the roads in heavy traffic areas.

As the major means of supplying both the military and civil requirements is by water, the ports of Korea have been rehabilitated materially. However, there still remains much construction to be done before they will be at their pre-war standards. The major ports of discharge are Pusan and Inchon. The discharge rate at Inchon has been raised from 1,000 short tons to 5,000 short tons daily during the period 19–31 October 1950. Many of the smaller ports are in operational condition and will be used for the relief programme in order to reduce the internal distribution problem. The ports of Wonsan and Chinnamp'o are in the process of being cleared of mines. During the period 15–31 October 1950, the ports in Korea discharged 366,507 measurement tons of military cargo, 45,000 metric tons of relief cargo, and outloaded 19,308 measurement tons of cargo.

With the liberation of large areas of Korea, increasing emphasis is being given by leaflet and by radio to inform the Korean people of the announced objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Special broadcasts and 3,120,000 leaflets were used throughout the nation on 24 October to commemorate United Nations Day. United Nations leaflets disseminated in Korea have passed the one hundred million mark. In areas of military operations, ground and airborne loudspeaker systems are being extensively used to inform many soldiers of the military situation and impress upon them the futility of resistance. Surrender leaflets and loudspeaker messages are having considerable effectiveness in inducing voluntary- surrenders. Radio Pyongyang has been restored to operation on a temporary basis, and is expected to resume scheduled broadcasts shortly.

Press Censorship

Despite heavy pressure to the contrary, no military censorship has been instituted by the United Nations Command throughout the Korean campaign. Reliance for security against the premature publication of information helpful to the enemy has instead rested upon voluntary censorship by editors and correspondents. This policy has resulted in the most complete and prompt public dissemination of information on the course of operations of any military campaign in history, without as far as is known a single security breach of a nature to assist the enemy. This may be said to the great and lasting credit of the press of the free world and its responsible publishers, editors, and correspondents. In evaluating the issue between compulsory and voluntary censorship, one must understand that the sole purpose of either is to safeguard against the premature publication of information on plans and operations which would assist the enemy to develop countermeasures. No form of censorship can prevent espionage, nor can it properly be employed to control undue emphasis given to the outcroppings of emotional strain which must, as in the present campaign, find its correction in the balance achieved through maturity gained with battle experience. Nor is it the proper instrument for the avoidance of factual error. Correspondents assigned to cover military operations are the selected representatives of responsible publishers and editors and their ability to assume the responsibility of self-censorship has been amply and conclusively demonstrated in the course of the Korean campaign. In the many military campaigns in which I have engaged, most of which were covered by a rigid form of news censorship, I have never seen the desired balance between public information and military security so well achieved and preserved as during the Korean campaign.

In Conclusion

1. Operations are continuing to destroy the remains of the North Korean forces.
2. Approximately 135,000 prisoners of war have been captured.
3. Complex airborne and amphibious operations were expertly executed by elements of the United Nations Army, Navy, and Air Force commands.
4. The attitude of the large majority of North Korean people toward the United Nations forces is that of friendly welcome for relief from oppression and conflict.
5. A Turkish Army force has arrived in Korea. Two more Republic of Korea infantry divisions were activated. Army combat forces now in the United Nations Command in Korea represent six different nations.
6. There is no military press censorship in the United Nations Command. Voluntary censorship of editors and correspondents is producing an excellent balance between public information and military security.
7. Repair of roads, rail lines and ports is progressing.
8. The continuation of the relief, welfare, and rehabilitation program in Korea is essential. To insure success of this program, it is imperative that member nations contributions of food, relief, and medical supplies be expedited for shipment to Korea.

I. Ninth report, December 27, 1950

I herewith submit report number 9 of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 1–15 November, inclusive. Korean releases (numbers 602 through 643) provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Introduction

Chinese Communist Forces in significant strength have moved across the Yalu River and attacked United Nations Forces. This constitutes an act of international lawlessness far exceeding that of mere brigandage. The course of operations of United Nations Forces in Korea has in consequence changed from that of pursuit of defeated and routed North Korean army remnants to that of a new campaign against a fresh enemy force.

Ground Operations

On 31 October, the dwindling North Korean Forces appeared to be making a last desperate stand in the Unsan area. Elsewhere, they were steadily giving ground to advance United Nations Forces. However, on 1 November, elements of the 124th Chinese Communist (CCF) Division were identified on the front near Kot'ori, a few miles south of Choshin Reservoir. Within ten days, through interrogation of prisoners from all Chinese units involved, elements of eleven more CCF divisions were identified in the forward areas. Of these, elements of nine had taken up positions between Pakch'on and Tokch'on in the western sector, and CCF strength in the Kot'ori area had expanded to identified elements of three divisions. At the same time, United Nations aerial reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in Manchuria, and into Korea.

To date, Chinese Communist intervention has increased effective enemy strength by an estimated three hundred percent. By this action, the enemy has made it necessary to integrate advanced United Nations elements into a continuous front on the western and central sectors, for coordinated large scale offensive action. During the period of the United Nations Forces redeployment the Communist Forces were moderately aggressive, and mounted numerous small scale attacks at various points in the western and central parts of the front. As United Nations Forces resumed the offensive, the enemy displayed flexibility, and resisted stubbornly at Pakch'on, Won'ni, and particularly at Tokch'on.

In the widely extended east coast sector, no definite front lines exist. Of the three main axes of advance, the Communists interposed a strong defending force only on the approaches to the Choshin and Fusen Reservoirs. On the P'ungsan-Kapsan axis, the North Korean Wonsan Brigade has retreated to Kapsan under steady United Nations pressure. The 507 North Korean Brigade, carrying out limited delaying actions, has been forced to displace 25 miles northward from Kilchu along the main east coast highway.

In reinforcement and resupply, the enemy is relatively safe from United Nations air interdiction, because he can move from the border to the front lines during the long winter hours of darkness.

Front lines at the end of the period ran generally from Pakch'on, near the west coast, eastward to Tokch'on, thence northeast to Kot'ori, and Kapsan, and thence eastward to Tajin on the east coast.

The 29th British Infantry Brigade Group arrived in Korea on 3 November and the 21st Thailand Infantry Regiment arrived on 7 November. United Nations Army combat forces in Korea now contain units from seven nations. The differences in language, equipment, supplies and methods of operations are being solved satisfactorily and the cooperation between forces of different nations is excellent.

One more Republic of Korea division was activated during the period.

Enemy guerrilla operations, primarily conducted by by-passed North Korean units, both in the immediate and deep rear areas, continue north of the 38th Parallel. Though by no means a serious factor these forces are a constant menace to United Nations supply lines, extremely prejudicial to civil control, and require disproportionate numbers of United Nations troops for internal policing action. Conditions south of the 38th Parallel have improved considerably and the counter-guerrilla operations in that area are now being accomplished entirely by Republic of Korea Forces.

Navy Operations

During the period covered by this report, units of the Thailand Navy joined the United Nations naval forces in Korean waters, which forces now are comprised of naval units of nine member nations.

United Nations naval forces of all types and categories, by their constant patrol activity, continued to maintain absolute control of the movement of all surface craft in Korean coastal waters.

Carrier-based naval aircraft carried out an interdiction program on lines of communication in northeastern Korea, attacking bridges, rail lines and enemy transports wherever found. During the latter days of the period, these aircraft shifted their attack to the international bridges over the Yalu, operating under strict orders not to violate Manchurian territory. Despite the handicaps of this restriction and of unhampered anti-aircraft fire from batteries on the Manchurian side of the river, the attacks of these aircraft have produced excellent results.

Marine fighter bomber aircraft, carrier-based as well as shore-based, furnished daily close air support to units of the X Corps in their operations in northeastern Korea.

Naval gunfire support and bombardment activity reached the lowest level of the Korean campaign, due to the growing lack of military targets within the radius of their guns.

Enemy mines continued to engage a large share of the attention of the United Nations naval forces. The small minesweeping flotilla, and associated units, devoted maximum effort to this tedious and dangerous task throughout the period and the results of this effort are plainly evident. Shipping was able to dock at berths at Wonsan Harbor on 5 November. Light draft vessels were able to enter Chinnamp'o Harbor on 10 November. Minesweeping continues off Chinnamp'o and Hungnam with the prospect that both these important ports will be completely free of mines in the near future.

To date over eighty drifting mines have been found and destroyed by United Nations naval forces. A large proportion of these drifting mines were live mines, in violation of international law which requires that mines shall be so constructed as to automatically become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.

Air Operations

The United Nations complete supremacy in the air has been challenged for the first time during the Korean operations by modern high performance type jet aircraft. Russian-produced MIG–15 have been engaged in combat over Korean territory since 1 November when United Nations planes were attacked in Sinuiju area. This period also has seen a marked increase in the employment of enemy conventional type aircraft against United Nations air and ground forces, though so far they have constituted in the main no more than a nuisance factor.

Comparative losses favor the United Nations forces despite operating factors favoring the enemy. The Communists are taking full advantage of the sanctuary afforded within the areas beyond the Manchurian border, respected by our forces. Aircraft have been observed taking off from Antung in Manchuria and proceeding to the attack south across the Yalu River. The interception of these planes between the border and the United Nations front lines is a difficult problem—so short a period of flight is involved.

Combat damaged Communist planes which would certainly have been destroyed, had our forces been operating without restriction, have found refuge in Chinese Communist territory. The superiority of United Nations pilots has been nullified upon occasion when hard pressed Communist fliers have utilized the border to break off combat and improve their tactical position by gaining altitude or by other maneuver, and then have returned to combat. Thus handicapped, United Nations aviators cannot anticipate the capability to deny the area to limited Communist aerial offensives.

Planes attacking military objectives south of the border have drawn antiaircraft artillery fire from guns on the Manchurian side. This hostile action has been conducted with impunity as a result of scrupulous efforts of United Nations forces to maintain inviolate the border. The Communists practice this conscienceless derision of justice and peace from their bases of aggression protected solely by a barrier imposed by the democracies' desire to prevent expansion of the arena of conflict.

Interdiction of enemy lines of communications is being vigorously pursued throughout the limited area remaining to the North Koreans. The southern ends of the bridges across the Yalu River are being attacked in an effort to retard the flow of Chinese Communist supplies and personnel, though the most important bases and reserves remain invulnerable within Manchuria. Command, communication and supply centers of North Korea will be obliterated in order to offset tactically the handicap we have imposed upon ourselves strategically by refraining from attack of Manchurian bases.

A South African Air Unit has joined other United Nations air forces in the Far East during the period.

Aerial supply continues to contribute materially to both ground and air combat operations.

Prisoners of War

Since my last report a new prisoner-of-war camp with two enclosures capable of accommodating 50,000 prisoners has been established in Pyongyang, Korea. Approximately 22,000 prisoners are now detained there. The three prisoner-of-war camps with eight enclosures now operating in Korea will provide facilities and accommodations for 200,000 prisoners.

All camps are being rapidly developed and improved. Projects now in progress include winterization of tents and other housing facilities, installation of elaborate water systems and construction of additional sanitary facilities and mess facilities. Large addtional quantities of warm winter clothing and bedding have been shipped to Korea for issue to prisoners of war.

Atrocities

In July the units of the United Nations Command were directed to investigate and report all war crimes atrocities uncovered by them. Subsequently, when it became evident that atrocities were being committed by the North Koreans on a large scale, it was deemed advisable to have in being an organization capable of continuing and completing investigations begun by tactical units which subsequently move forward. Therefore a war crimes division was established in the Headquarters of the Eighth United States Army, and to this division has been assigned operational responsibility for the investigation and apprehension of persons suspected and accused of having perpetrated conventional war crimes. Tactical units continue to investigate and report atrocities as heretofore.

It is now estimated that the number of victims of atrocities committed by the North Koreans totals 35,000 of whom the vast majority were non-combatants whose only crime was that they harbored, or were suspected of harboring, beliefs at variance with those of the individuals in power in North Korea. The receipt of new reports of almost unbelievable atrocities continues unabated. An incident only recently discovered, occurred on or about 27 September when approximately 50 civilian men and women were arrested by the North Korean authorities. Their hands and feet were tied; they were dropped down two wells, and large rocks were dropped on them. None survived this ordeal. Another incident, discovered on 2 November, occurred on or about 20 October, when more than 400 civilians, believed to have been political prisoners, were executed in the bomb shelter of a coal mine. Twenty persons are said to have survived this massacre. And, on 8 November, more than 700 bodies were found in another coal mine in the same vicinity.

Civil Activities

To assist in the problems of relief and the re-establishment of local and provincial governments in North Korea, civil assistance teams have been organized to provide the necessary guidance and assistance in the achievement of United Nations aims.

In cities north of the 38th parallel where tactical conditions permit, local civil governments have been reestablished by the appointment of appropriate individuals to key positions. These temporarily appointed officials provide necessary civil administration and function under the supervision and guidance of the civil assistance teams of the United Nations Command.

To further implement the civil assistance program in the field of public health and welfare, I have recently requested recruitment from United Nations members of technically qualified persons to permit formation of additional public health and welfare teams for use in the areas of North Korea.

The need for relief supplies and equipment in Korea continues to be critical. Economic conditions have improved with the receipt of more than 300,000 metric tons of relief supplies and equipment. However, additional contributions to prevent widespread suffering are becoming more necessary with the approach of the winter season.

The attitude of local inhabitants continues to indicate appreciation of the United Nations effort in Korea. Indicative of this was the recent spontaneous celebration by the citizens of Pusan on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the organization of the United Nations.

Psychological Warfare

The appearance of alien Communist soldiers in northern Korea has intensified the importance of leaflet operations and loudspeaker transmission to enemy forces. Twelve million leaflets were air dropped to enemy troops during the first half of November, including 7 million in Korean and 5 million in Chinese. The Chinese language leaflets reiterate the traditional friendship of the peoples of the United Nations for the Chinese people, and assure Chinese soldiers now in Korea the United Nations forces will respect the inviolability of Korea's international frontiers. All leaflets convey to enemy soldiers the United Nations guarantee of good treatment for prisoners of war, and urge them voluntarily to lay down their arms. More than 115 million United Nations leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea. Loudspeaker broadcasts, both from the air and on the ground, are proving effective in complementing the influence of leaflets in inducing surrender of enemy soldiers. United Nations broadcasts from Radio Seoul and Radio Pyongyang, as well as from United Nations Command Headquarters, continue to provide the civil population of Korea with authentic news reporting.

In Conclusion

1. Large scale Chinese Communist intervention has profoundly altered the concluding phase of the Korean War.

2. Advances continued in the eastern sector and forces were regrouped in the western sector to contend with the new enemy of the United Nations.

3. The United Nations Command now comprises army forces of seven nations, navy forces of nine nations, and air forces of four nations.

4. Enemy aircraft are attacking United Nations forces in Korea from basis in Manchuria.

5. Requirements continue for civilian relief supplies.

J. Tenth Report, December 27, 1950

I herewith submit report number ten of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 16 to 30 November, inclusive. Korean releases, numbers 644 through 689 and United Nations Command communiqués, numbers 12, 13 and 14, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Introduction

In order to more clearly present the situation facing the United Nations forces at this time, I present you a résumé of events that have transpired since September.

By the middle of October 1950, the United Nations forces had in prisoner-of-war enclosures over 130,000 north Korean military personnel and had killed or wounded over 200,000 more. Thus, the personnel of the north Korean forces were eliminated, their equipment was captured or destroyed, and all but the northern borders of Korea was held by United Nations forces. For all practical purposes, the conflict with the armed forces of the former north Korean regime had been terminated.

Beginning in October 1950, Chinese Communists started moving into Korea and attempted to cover their moves by statements that it was individual volunteer participation. It is perfectly clear that the Chinese started moving the mass of their forces to position for the invasion by the middle of September. The Chinese Communist forces are now invading Korea and attacking United Nations forces in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guiese of volunteerism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. These irrefutable facts prove that the Chinese Communist regime has directed an invasion of Korea and an assault against the United Nations forces.

During the first half of the period there were extensive operations by United Nations air forces of all types in sustained attacks on enemy lines of communications, supplies, and troop concentrations in conjunction with a regrouping and re-supply of United Nations Army forces. On 24 November a general attack was launched by all available United Nations forces. The attack progressed satisfactorily for two days, at which time strong attacks, principally by Chinese Communist forces, required readjustment of United Nations forces and resuming defensive operations. The United Nations offensive successfully developed and revealed the strength and intentions of the Chinese Communists.

Ground Operations

The enemy forces now opposing United Nations operations in Korea demonstrated considerable strategic and tactical skill during the period of this report. These forces, now predominantly Chinese Communist, surrendered very extensive areas in the east coastal sector in the zone of operations of the X United States Corps. United Nations forces were virtually unchallenged within the great quadrangle marked by Congjin, Hyesanjin, Choshin Reservoir, and Hungnam, except for strong pressure on United Nations units south and west of the Reservoir. The United States 7th Infantry Division met only moderate opposition in its rapid advance to the Manchurian border at Hyesanjin, and Republic of Korea forces had similar success advancing beyond Chongjin on the east coast. However, in the west sector Communist forces launched a strong offensive, producing a collision with the United Nations general offensive of 24 November.

In the west sector, on a line arching northward between Kasan and Tokch'on the enemy displayed little interest in combat from 16 to 25 November, inclusive. In many instances, United Nations units advanced several miles without contacting the enemy, and United Nations patrols ranging northward five to eight miles met only occasional resistance in the eastern part of the sector. On 26 and 27 November, the enemy, apparently reinforced by several fresh Chinese Communist armies (Corps) from Manchuria, attacked all along the line, devoting his major effort to the United Nations Eighth Army right flank in the Tokch'on area. These strong, sustained attacks, characterized by the usual Communist infiltration and flanking tactics, forced advanced United Nations units on the United Nations Eighth Army left flank and center to displace ten to twelve miles to a main line of resistance extending between Pakch'on and Won-Ni. Powerful Communist thrusts north of Tokch'on forced

United Nations units back about twenty-five miles to the vicinity of Taep'yong on the Taedong river. During the intense fighting in these actions, the enemy suffered heavy personnel losses as a result of maximum United Nations air, ground efforts. However, such losses are no longer of crucial military importance, in view of the enemy's tremendous capacity for troop reinforcement from secure bases in Manchuria.

The enemy opposition on the right flank of Eighth Army is now accepted as a major Chinese Communist force thrust which clashed with United Nations forces, and which involved elements of approximately eight Chinese Communist forces divisions, while holding operations on the remainder of the Eighth Army position involved approximately six additional Chinese Communist forces divisions. As part of this general Chinese Communist force offensive, savage attacks were directed against United Nations forces in the general vicinity of the Choshin Reservoir with a Chinese force estimated at six to eight divisions.

During the period 24 November to 1 December, the Chinese Communist forces are credited with having taken over direct responsibility for the entire front in North Korea, except for a short line of contact north of Chongjin on the east coast. The Chinese Communists reportedly have transferred most of the North Korean forces to Manchuria for restraining and re-equipping. At present, the only significant military power now confronting United Nations Forces in Korea is Communist China.

Identified and accepted Chinese Communist units are as follows:

- 38th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps)
  - 112th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 113th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 114th Chinese Communist Forces Division
- 39th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps)
  - 115th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 116th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 117th Chinese Communist Forces Division
- 40th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps)
  - 118th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 119th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 120th Chinese Communist Forces Division
- 42nd Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps)
  - 124th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 125th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 126th Chinese Communist Forces Division
- 50th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps)
  - 148th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 149th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 150th Chinese Communist Forces Division
- 66th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps)
  - 196th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 197th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 198th Chinese Communist Forces Division
- 20th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps)
  - 59th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 60th Chinese Communist Forces Division
  - 89th Chinese Communist Forces Division

This undoubtedly represents a total strength of about 200,000.

Units other than those listed above that have been identified, reported, and tentatively accepted are the 70th Chinese Communist Forces Division of the 24th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps) and the 79th and 80th Chinese Communist Forces Divisions of the 27th Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps). In addition is the doubtful and unaccepted presence of the 94th Chinese Communist Forces Division of the 32nd Chinese Communist Forces Army (Corps).

Judging from experience of the past, it is considered that there is a strong possibility that both the 24th and the 27th Chinese Communist Forces Armies (Corps) are in the area of operations, in which case approximately 55,000 to 60,000 additional Chinese Communist Forces troops would then be added making a total of at least 250,000.

In reviewing the build-up of Chinese Communist Forces in Manchuria and Korea it is necessary to go back to June and July of this year when the decision to move the Chinese Communist Forces 4th Field Army to Manchuria was apparently made and the actual redeployment of those forces implemented. In view of the situation in Korea at the time, the decision to deploy one field army to this critical area could conceivably be supported as tactically and strategically sound and in the best interests of the Chinese Communists from a purely defensive viewpoint. However, the subsequent movement and employment of elements of the 3rd Chinese Communist Forces Field Army and possibly portions of the 1st Chinese Communist Forces Field Army certainly cannot be so justified. The vast quantities of personnel and material now poised along the Yalu River and aggressively employed against United Nations Forces in Korea far exceed the most elaborate requirements for the establishment of a purely defensive structure along the Korean-Manchurian border. It is evident that the assembly of such an array of force could not have been effectively accomplished "over night." These factors, considered with other pertinent manifestations, certainly indicate that plans for the active and aggressive intervention in the Korean war were undoubtedly developed early in the summer.

Front lines at the close of the period in the Eighth Army sector ran generally northeast from the mouth of the Ch'ongch'on River to Pakch'on, east to Won-Ni, and thence southeast to Taep'yong-Ni. In the X United States Corps sector on the east coast, no definite front lines exist. Points of contact demarcate a general line north from Sach'ang to Hagaru and Yudam on the Choshin Reservoir, northeast to Samsu and thence northeast to Chongjin on the east coast.

A Netherlands Army battalion arrived on 22 November and a French Army battalion arrived on 29 November. These units have joined the United Nations Forces in Korea which raises to nine the number of nations contributing Army combat forces.

Communist guerrilla units varying from a few hundred to several thousand men are operating in isolated areas throughout the United Nations occupied portion of Korea. At present, nearly thirty per cent of the United Nations troops in Korea are employed against them in the essential task of protecting supply lines and the more vital urban centers. From 1 to 21 November, for example, there were nearly two hundred guerrilla raids and attacks, most of which required the immediate attention of United Nations anti-guerrilla forces. These units are primarily composed of former North Korean soldiers, and are led by professional leaders, many of whom have had extensive pre-war guerrilla experience. Guerrilla forces now total thirty thousand to thirty-five thousand in strength. There is growing evidence that guerrilla activities are being controlled and coordinated by the enemy high command and that this menace to United Nations operations will necessitate continued anti-guerrilla measures. Of these, the most successful to date has been the destruction of many major guerrilla supply caches.

Navy Operations

During the period of this report, United Nations naval forces of all types and categories despite extreme cold and considerable snow, continued to deny enemy surface units movement in any of the waters surrounding Korea. Carrier-based aircraft, also hampered by snow and adverse flying conditions, exerted maximum effort against military installations, troop concentrations, supply dumps, communications facilities, and especially the international bridges over the Yalu river over which the enemy is receiving most of his reinforcements and supplies. These carrier-based aircraft encountered intense and accurate aintiaircraft fire from batteries on the Manchurian side of the border when operating over Korean territory in the lower Yalu river valley. On one occasion, in the vicinity of Sinuiju, three carrier-based aircraft were seriously damaged by flak. In addition to antiaircraft fire, carrier-based units, as well as air force units, have been attacked by planes operating from the Manchurian side of the border. On 18 November, carrier-based aircraft of Task Force 77 were attacked by eight to ten jet planes of Russian MIG–15 type operating from bases in Manchuria. One of these planes was destroyed and several others damaged. They all quickly avoided combat and, except for the one that was destroyed, took refuge over the border in Manchuria. In addition to carrying out interdiction strikes, carrier-based planes, plus Marine shore based planes, furnished close air support to ground units in northeastern Korea.

Naval gunfire support and bombardment increased during this period and the United Nations naval units proved to be indispensable in aiding the advance of United Nations ground units north of Wonsan toward the northeastern border.

United Nations minesweeping units are continuing the task of sweeping mines from the harbors essential to our operations, a long and tedious process. While still a source of great danger to United Nations shipping, the menace of mines has been reduced considerably. Channels leading to the harbors of Haeju, Chinnamp'o, Wonsan, Hamhung, Sonjin, Iwon and Kojo have been swept by our minesweeping units and these ports are now open to our shipping. These are in addition to ports previously available to us. Thousands of tons of supplies are entering these ports daily for onward routing over short overland hauls to our United Nations units engaging the enemy to the north. Many drifting mines are still being sighted by our naval patrols both from the surface and the air. Many of these drifting mines are being destroyed and in most instances, as heretofore, prove to be still alive, even though they have no moorings. This is further evidence that the North Koreans have deliberately violated international law in planting mines that do not become harmless when they break loose from their moorings. This mine menace, both due to moored mines and drifting mines, will prove to be a source of great danger to the shipping of all nations even after the cessation of hostilities.

Air Operations

Air Forces of five nations, continuing the offensive launched by the United States Far East Air Force in June, struck repeatedly at Communist forces and installations in the narrow band of North Korea controlled by the aggressor. The major part of the air effort comprised sorties in direct and close support of ground forces. Other than during occasional periods of bad weather ground-unit commanders could anticipate early response to their calls for assistance by air.

The effectiveness of the United Nations are effort to prevent resupply and reinforcement of the enemies of the United Nations is seriously reduced by the restrictions to operations imposed by the border. Supply and concentration centers in the zone of action have been repeatedly attacked to the detriment of hostile capabilities, but the most suitable targets, many of them visible to our pilots flying south of tht Yalu river, are north of the border, and immune to our attacks. The effects of destruction of some of the international bridges is being nullified by the freezing of the river which permits crossing on the ice by heavy equipment at many points.

Hostile air activity, during the period 24 November–1 December, inclusive, was noted on twenty-three different occasions, with an overall total of at least forty-four enemy aircraft reported as being involved. It is not practical to estimate total aircraft committed by the enemy, as sightings on various days might include previously employed aircraft. Although fewer enemy jets were sighted and observations were less frequent than during the past three—four weeks, and, regardless of the fact that there were only three aerial engagements, utilization of enemy aircraft showed signs of becoming more effective. This was indicated by the 28 November and 1 December attacks on Pyongyang airfield during the early morning hours of darkness. The first of these attacks damaged six United Nations aircraft and killed one person, damage resulting from the second has not yet been reported. On 26 November, on the same general vicinity, enemy aircraft accomplished four propaganda leaflet drops. Two unidentified 4-engine aircraft were observed on 28 November and one unidentified twin-engine aircraft, and possibly another, were observed on 26 November. Probable reconnaissance of front line areas by enemy aircraft was indicated by the greater number of friendly ground unit observations.

The enemy aircraft could appear in much greater numbers and become increasingly aggressive. Should this occur, and in the strength believed available to the Chinese Communist air forces, it is believed that the enemy air force would be capable of:

(1) Diverting a considerable portion of the United Nations air effort from the direct support of ground action;

(2) Hindering the United Nations air lift in Korea;

(3) Striking United Nations vessels and installations in Korea; and

(4) Possible effective support of enemy ground action.

The readily accessible sanctuary in Manchuria has provided the enemy with an advantage that is almost impossible for our airmen to overcome despite our superiority in other respects.

A significant development in the United Nations air operations has been the increased number of attacks mounted at night against the enemy whose major movements are attempted under cover of darkness.

Air resupply continues its important contribution to our operations.

Prisoners of War

No large numbers of Communist prisoners were taken during the period of this report; the Eighth Army captured no north Korean prisoners on their front from 20 to 28 November. The total captured to date numbers in excess of 140,000, of which 275 are Chinese.

All enemy prisoners of war of Chinese nationality were being detained in separate compounds segregated from Korean prisoners of war, in accordance with the provisions of article 22 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of August 12, 1949.

During the last half of the period covered by this report about sixty United States prisoners of war, nearly all of whom were wounded, were returned to the United Nations control by the Chinese Communists. These recovered United States prisoners have all been evacuated through medical channels and are now being cared for in United States medical facilities located in Japan.

It is interesting to note that more than 6,000 north Korean prisoners of war are being given hospital facilities staffed and operated by United Nations personnel.

Atrocities

The investigation of reported war crimes continues on an increased scope as a result of improved conditions in those areas of Korea which have been liberated from Communist control. No reports of any atrocities have been received from the areas recently taken by United Nation troops. Reports from the very small number of wounded United Nations troops recently released by the Chinese Communists of humane treatment is in marked contrast with all other reports in this regard received since the beginning of hostilities. Too few have been released to draw any valid conclusions as to whether the actions taken and publicly announced by the United Nations Command to insure the punishment of war criminals have convinced the enemy of the necessity that all prisoners of war and non-combatants receive the humane treatment required under international law and demanded by modern civilization.

Civil Activities

Over-all contributions of civilian relief supplies from United Nations member nations now total approximately sixteen million dollars. These include food, clothing, medical and disease prevention supplies, fuel and miscellaneous items.

The advent of cold weather has made the clothing problem acute. Urgent need exists for additional quantities of blankets and clothing. Although medical and hospital supplies including sanitary materials are arriving in increased quantities a serious shortage of these items still exists due to the looting and destruction by the Communist forces in their withdrawal to the north.

Increasing quantities of rice, barley and flour received through United Nations sources have greatly improved the food situation in urban areas where the situation was acute. Conditions were particularly critical in the city of Seoul but regular free rations from November 3 to 15 caused the price of rice to fall from 8,000 won to 3,700 won per small mal (13.6 pounds). The rice price in June was 2,000 won per small mal. The government expects to collect 700,000 metric tons of rice from the current harvest. However, lack of transportation facilities from the rural to the urban areas may still present feeding problems in the larger cities. As rapidly as conditions permit rice-polishing mills are being put in operation with two such mills in the Hungnam-Hamhung area being placed in operation during this period.

Where possible, immunization programs have continued among the civilian population. The existing situation does not permit accurate disease reporting. However, there has been no indication of a serious outbreak of any communicable disease in either north or south Korea.

As rapidly as conditions permit local and provincial governments are being re-established throughout the areas in north Korea. Government officials are temporarily appointed and operate under the supervision of civil assistance officers of the United Nations Command.

Construction has been in the minimum due to scarcity of materials, transportation and equipment. Public buildings and hospitals are undergoing minor repair. Railroads and bridges have been reconstructed to the degree necessary for movement of military supplies and troops. An effort is being made to rehabilitize the fishing industry. Boats are being repaired and quantities of diesel fuel have been provided.

I would like to reiterate my previous statements that the contributions of member nations of the United Nations in personnel, supplies and matériel are contributing materially to the achievement of the United Nations objective in Korea and that continued assistance to the war torn country will do much to alleviate the suffering that exists.

Psychological Warfare

Intensive efforts are being made to inform soldiers, both Korean and Chinese Communists, of the truth about the Korean conflict and to persuade them to cease resistance. During the latter half of November, 20,000,000 leaflets and numerous loudspeaker broadcasts, both from the ground and from the air, were employed for this purpose, using messages in Korean and in Chinese. Messages reiterate the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, and the assurance that the United Nations forces will respect the Sino-Korean frontier. They inform the enemy soldier of the liberation of most of Korea, and point out to him that further resistance serves no effective purpose except to obstruct the efforts of the Korean People to achieve independence and unity. More than 136,000,000 leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea. Similar information is being communicated to the civil population by radio broadcasts from Seoul and Pyongyang, as well as from United Nations Command Headquarters.

In Conclusion

United Nations land and carrier-based aircraft have attacked unremittingly and successfully targets in the limited battle area, but the denial to United Nations air of access to the most suitable and important targets north of the privileged border has precluded success in isolation of the battlefield.

Complete organized Chinese Communist units totaling over five Chinese Communist Forces Armies with a strength of approximately 250,000 have already crossed into north Korea and attacked United Nations forces.

At the closing of the period United Nations ground units were on the defensive.

Hostile aircraft continue to attack United Nations forces from the sanctuary of bases in Manchuria.

United Nations naval minesweeping forces have opened the majority of the large ports in north Korea for United Nations shipping.

K. Eleventh report, January 31, 1951

I submit herewith report number eleven of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 1–15 December, inclusive. Korean releases 690 through 737 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Ground Operations

In the face of Chinese Communist participation detected early in November, it was imperative to discover the enemy's tactical and strategic intentions without delay. As a reaction to the United Nations Eighth Army advance of 24 November, the Chinese Communist Forces were forced prematurely to launch a large-scale offensive which was clear proof of their mounting tactical readiness and full decision for the North Korean offensive operations. No North Korean Forces were employed in the massive enemy attack; it was an exclusive Chinese Communist operation.

The Eighth Army right flank position held by the II ROK Corps was penetrated resulting in an untenable tactical disposition for other units of the Eighth Army. Withdrawal was forced upon the Eighth Army by the overwhelming superiority of enemy numbers moving in a position to strike it in the rear in the direction of Pyongyang. Eighth Army conducted deliberate planned withdrawals with unbroken cohesion, displaying skill by the field commanders and much gallantry by all forces concerned.

The X Corps was operating out of the east coast ports of Wonsan and Hamhung in an attack to the border. Its units were deployed on four lines of attack, the advance of the I ROK Corps along the northeastern coast which had passed Chongjin over 200 miles from the base and less than 60 miles from the border at its eastern extremity, the northern advance of the 7th Infantry Division which had reached the border at Hyesanjin, the northwesterly advance of the 1st Marine Division which had passed Yudam-ni on the western side of the Choshin Reservoir, and the westerly advance of the 3d Infantry Division out of Wonsan.

The massive extent of the Chinese Communist attack forced the withdrawal of the X Corps. From three of its four lines of advance this was effected without serious interference by the enemy. On the 4th, however, a major enemy drive impinged against the troops in the Choshin Reservoir area.

Whilst the 1st Marines with one battalion at Sindong-ni, one at Koto-ri and one with the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at Hagaru-ri at the south end of the Choshin Reservoir, kept the supply road and route of withdrawal open, the 5th and 7th Marines withdrew under heavy and continuous enemy pressure from their advanced position at Yudam-ni to the division base at Hagaru-ri, eleven miles to the south. Meanwhile, a task force consisting of two battalions of the 7th Infantry Division operating on the eastern side of the reservoir was attacked by an overwhelming number of Chinese Communist troops and withdrew across the frozen reservoir to join the Marines at Hagaru-ri.

All elements to the northward having closed at Hagaru-ri on 4 December, the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Infantry Division on the morning of 6 December resumed the attack to the southward. The enemy attempted to block the withdrawal route and brought pressure upon the column from the rear and both flanks. The column on 7 December reached the battalion holding the main supply route at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, a special task force from the 3d Infantry Division had moved north to Sudong-ni where it relieved the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which, in turn, attacked north to reopen the road to Koto-ri. On 9 December the head of the column effected a juncture with this battalion. The following day the leading elements of the column debouched from the mountains onto the coastal plain and entered the Corps defensive position. By nightfall 11 December, all elements had been withdrawn to that position and the concentration of the Corps was complete.

In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Infantry Division marched and fought over 60 miles in bitter cold along a narrow tortuous ice-covered road against opposition of from six to eight Chinese Communist force divisions which suffered staggering losses. Success was due in no small part to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support. The basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly courage displayed by the personnel of the ground units who maintained their integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior forces, consistently held their positions until their wounded had been evacuated and doggedly refused to abandon supplies and equipment to the enemy.

Under cover of the Chinese Communist force operations, North Korean units were known to be reorganizing and reequipping, in some instances within the sanctuary of Chinese territory, and are in a position to augment the total Chinese Communist forces. These reconstituted North Korean forces are formed into a number of corps, four of which have been identified and others are suspected. A Greek infantry battalion arrived on 9 December and has joined the United Nations Forces in Korea. The following ten nations are now represented by army combat forces in Korea: Australia, Greece, France, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

At the close of the period front lines in the Eighth Army sector ran generally from Tosong-ni near the west coast, north along the Yesong River to Kumchon, thence, northeast to Subyon-ni, southeast to Hongchon and Kapyong, northeast to Chichon-ni, and thence southeast to Naepyong-ni. Front lines in the X Corps sector followed an arc of fifteen miles radius centered on Hamhung.

Naval Operations

During the period of this report, United Nations Naval Forces continued to deny enemy surface units movement in any of the waters surrounding Korea. In the early part of this period naval air and surface units supported Republic of Korea troops in their withdrawal from the Chongjin area to the Songjin area.

Surface units provided fire support covering the withdrawal of United Nations Forces from the Wonsan area, a withdrawal which was accomplished with no loss of either personnel or equipment.

One naval amphibious group operated on the west coast and one group on the east coast of Korea. These groups were invaluable in conducting the relocation of units and their operations were conducted with outstanding efficiency in performing moves with no loss of men or equipment.

Naval and Marine air units, both carrier and shore-based, provided close air support for troops throughout the area of northeast Korea. The epic of the period was the close naval and marine air support furnished the 1st Marine Division and elements of the United States 7th Infantry Division in the Yudam-ni–Hagaru-ri–Koto-ri area. This support, which pinned down enemy forces and decimated those that exposed themselves, helped mightily in the successful withdrawal action.

On 5 December all United Nations personnel in the port of Chinnampo were withdrawn by sea. A total of 6,700 personnel were involved. Military facilities were destroyed by gunfire following this withdrawal. During this period drifting mines were frequently sighted and destroyed on the high seas. The hazard of these mines is particularly acute on the east coast. Minesweeping was continued in the Hungnam port area in order to improve the channel and make use of the port possible both day and night and in all types of weather.

Air Operations

United Nations Air Forces threw the bulk of their effort into close support of ground forces cutting their way through overwhelming number of Chinese Communists. The toll of the enemy taken by United Nations aircraft contributed in large measure to the successful move of our forces from the Choshin Reservoir to the Hamhung area despite the tremendous odds against them. Air support provided by United States Marine Air Force and Naval Aircraft in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground forces commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of tactical air operations in history.

One outstanding operation was the evacuation of wounded from the reservoir area prior to the successful withdrawal by the United States First Marine Division and elements of the 7th United States Division. The United States Far East Air Forces assisted by United States Marine and Royal Hellenic Air Force planes lifted the sick and wounded from a small improvised air strip at the southern tip of Choshin Reservoir. Icy runways, icing conditions in the air, and the mountains closely rimming the landing area as well as hostile action failed to prevent success of this operation.

The drive out of the mountains was further assisted by daily air drop of supplies of varying types from rations to bridge sections.

In Eighth Army area also tactical aircraft proved to be an effective weapon as enemy road blocks were eliminated and enemy concentrations of troops and supplies were repeatedly attacked, permitting ready disengagement and withdrawal of United Nations Forces.

Enemy air activity has increased but still remains indecisive. The Manchurian border continues to provide haven for hostile aircraft as well as for his largest concentrations of anti-aircraft artillery.

Night air operations to inhibit enemy movements are increasingly effective.

Prisoners of War

To date United Nations Forces have captured in excess of 145,000 Chinese and North Korean Communists. Since their capture these prisoners have been properly clothed, adequately fed, and given needed medical care.

Civil Activities

Since my last report military operations in Korea have made it necessary that certain revisions be made in the civil assistance program. Plans and requirements are continually being revised and made current in light of the changing conditions and factors involved.

Thousands of refugees from Communist oppression in North Korea have been streaming southward seeking the haven of United Nations protection, Emphasis at present is being placed on provisions of supplies for direct relief to alleviate suffering among these refugees made homeless as a result of the current military situation. It is estimated that upward of a million refugees will eventually require welfare assistance if they are to survive this winter.

The direct relief program faced by the United Nations Command at this time is a most difficult one. A great need exists for blankets, clothing, flannelette, food, medical supplies, etc. Member nations are urged to contribute relief supplies to alleviate the suffering and hardships of the war-ravaged peoples of Korea.

At the time of the destruction of the North Korean Peoples Army the civil assistance program was showing most tangible results; for example, local governments had been re-established in most of the provinces and countries under the control of the United Nations Forces; schools, churches and hospitals were in operation; surveys had been conducted and plans had been instituted to revitalize the economy in the areas under United Nations control.

Contributions of relief supplies by United Nations members between 25 June 1950 and 6 December 1950 have now reached an estimated dollar value of over $16 million. The largest item of 61,000 tons of rice with an estimated value of over $7 million was contributed by Thailand, Nationalist China and the Philippines.

It is heartening to note the loyalty, cooperation and willingness of the peoples in the areas under United Nations control. Such unsolicited attitude is indicative of popular desire to achieve the aims of the United Nations in the establishment of a united, free Korea. I feel that the civil assistance program has contributed materially by exemplifying, to the peoples of the world in general and the people of Korea in particular, the policies and aims of the United Nations.

Psychological Warfare

Millions of leaflets are being air-dropped regularly over Chinese troop concentrations in Korea to inform these forces of United Nations aims in Korea. Chinese-language leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts in the principal Chinese dialects are being used to reiterate United Nations friendship for the Chinese people. More than 150 million leaflets have been distributed in Korea. Simultaneously, United Nations radio broadcasts are informing the Korean people of the hostile acts by which alien Communist forces continue to frustrate their historic struggle for freedom and unity.

Conclusions

Objective appraisal of events bearing upon the United Nations military effort in Korea is essential if future plans and operations are to be in consonance with reality. The full import of the changed situation became evident during the period covered by this report, wherein interrogation of newly captured Chinese Communist prisoners of war has revealed both the extent of the participation of this new enemy and his basic intentions. There is thus left no doubt that it has long been the plan of the Chinese Communist authorities to commit so much of their war resources in manpower and matériel as necessary to insure destruction of the United Nations Command and prevent the United Nations from bringing order and unification to all of Korea. Our general attack of 24 November threw the surreptitious Chinese Communist buildup operations off balance and prematurely exposed the decision of the Chinese Communist authorities to intervene—a decision not openly announced nor previously brought to light through political intelligence.

The open intervention of Communist China and the employment of its vast war resources against the relatively small United Nations Command forced us to withdraw from our offensive operations designed to destroy remaining North Korean opposition to the objectives of the United Nations and to assume a posture of defense. This has been accomplished in complete order with all units intact and losses well within normal limits of combat experience.

Communist centers of the world have sought to propagandize the thought that our tactical operations initiated on 24 November resulted in the United Nations Command being completely shattered. They have sought to create the illusion of major tactical disaster—to point to the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean conflict as solely responsive to our own tactical decisions and movements. All of this is pure nonsense. The United Nations Command is in excellent shape with high morale, conspicuous self-confidence and marked battle efficiency. It is in no sense a defeated command. The entry of Communist China into the Korean conflict—a risk inherent in our Korean operations from their very inception—was responsive alone to decisions long determined upon and given effect by the destruction of the North Korean satellite forces. The principal factor underlying the existing situation—that the United Nations Command now is opposed by the combined war resources of Communist China—has become somewhat obscured by this rash of propaganda tending to cloud the real issue.

The United Nations Command due to intervening circumstances, quite beyond its power to control, was unable to complete the execution of its prescribed mission. It is within its present capabilities, however, to continue to inflict staggering losses upon this new enemy power and to cause an enormous and progressive attrition to the Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

L. Twelfth report, February 23, 1951

I herewith submit Report No. 12 of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for period 16 through 31 December inclusive. Korean releases Nos. 732 through 775 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Combined operations. Apart from the continuation of our Naval blockade and unremitting air interdiction of enemy troop and supply concentrations in North Korea, the period from 16 to 31 December was consumed by the United Nations Command with the readjustment of our ground positions along the Kaesong-Yongyong-Hwachon-Puypyongni defense line made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war and by the enemy in build-up operations preparatory to offensive action aimed at the conquest of all of Korea. These tactical readjustments have been conducted with great skill by local commanders and unparalleled coordination among the several areas. My communique No. 15 of 26 December publicly reporting on these operations is repeated here for the record of the United Nations Command:

"This amphibious movement of the 10 Corps from the Hungnam sector to a juncture with the 8th Army has been successfully completed with but light casualties and no matériel loss. This operation has been conducted with great skill and coordination by Army, Navy, and Air Commanders concerned and exemplary courage and marked efficiency have characterized the conduct of all personnel. It has completed the readjustment of our positions made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war. The real text [test] of the United Nations Command was when it was suddenly and without the customary notice of belligerency confronted by this new power in overwhelming force and yet survived without marked diminution of its strength and resources or loss of its fluidity of movement and maneuver. This it has done and has come through well.

"With the successful close of this phase of our operations, I believe it pertinent to review briefly the military events of the recent past. In the latter days of October our forces were advancing from the south and northeast in columns of pursuit to destroy the North Korea remnants and complete the prescribed mission of restoring order and unification to all of Korea. The end of the campaign was clearly in sight, when some of our units met with surprise assault by Chinese Communist elements of unknown organization and strength. In the face of this new force the Eighth Army was withdrawn to a closely integrated front, to there await the logistical build-up which would permit resumption of our advance in attack formation. Meanwhile, every effort was made to assess enemy strength and intentions in light of this new reinforcement repeatedly and publicly declared by Chinese Communist authorities to be only on an individual volunteer basis. Political intelligence failed to penetrate the iron curtain and provided no substantial information of intent. Field intelligence was handicapped by the severest limitations. Aerial reconnaissance beyond the border, which was the normal source of field intelligence, was forbidden. Avenues of advance from border sanctuary to battle area, only a night's march, provided maximum natural concealment. No intelligence service in the world could have surmounted such handicaps to determine to any substantial degree enemy strength, movements and intentions. This left ground reconnaissance in force as the proper, indeed the sole, expedient. Not until 24 November did our logistical position permit resumption of forward operations. We hoped that the Army would be opposed by no more than token Chinese force to support previous commitments but short of a full Chinese commitment to major operations.

"Political reassurances that the United Nations Command would not violate the international border were universally believed to have failed to convince the Chinese authorities. The free world wanted the integrity of our purpose fully understood and accordingly renewed assurances were publicly given by me as military commander upon the resumption of our advance that the Eighth Army would be returned to its home station in Japan just as soon as the Korean border area had been cleared of hostile elements. This but expressed our hopes—indeed the hopes of all men of good will—through reemphasis of our military objectives. Unfortunately in some quarters it has been otherwise interpreted and my intent misrepresented. Our advance was the final test of Chinese intentions. Events subsequently have had the slightest influence upon the momentous decision underlying Red China's commitment of her forces to war.

"The Eighth Army and affiliated United Nations units met powerful enemy resistance along the entire line—resistance which unmasked the fiction of 'volunteer' participation and disclosed the massive deployment of the Fourth Chinese Field Army, an important segment of the entire Chinese Communist military strength, in a formation of 9 corps abreast in columns of divisions to an aggregate of 27 divisions, with elements of the Third Field Army discovered in initial deployment immediately to the rear. Despite their initial valiant resistance, some of the ROK (Republic of Korea) forces were overwhelmed by this massive array. This exposed the Eighth Army's right flank and required its withdrawal. These withdrawal operations, made in accordance with plans previously prepared against any such eventuality, were skillfully conducted without loss of cohesion and with all units remaining intact. The gallant Second Infantry Division and the equally gallant Turkish Brigade being directly exposed by the gap torn through ROK forces took the heaviest attendant pressure, but the enemy, caught off balance in the midst of build-up operations, had not yet developed the strength to enable exploitation of the breakthrough which would have imperiled the Eighth Army. Fortunate presence of the 10 Corps on the enemy's flank forced him to divide his forces and thus further weaken his offensive capabilities achieved at that time of his build-up operations against the Eighth Army.

"In its broad implications I consider that these operations, initiated on 24 November and carried through to this redeployment, have served a very significant purpose—possibly in general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted during the course of the Korean campaign. The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command but without attaining a decision. Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or even to detect we did not achieve the United Nations objective. But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed before too late secret political and military decisions of enormous scope and threw off balance enemy military preparations aimed at surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces with one mighty extended blow.

"No command ever fought more gallantly or efficiently under unparalleled conditions of restraint and handicap, and no command could have acquitted itself to better advantage under prescribed missions and delimitations involving unprecedented risk and jeopardy."

Possibly of greatest political significance throughout these tactical displacement operations has been the avidity with which North Korean citizens have sought sanctuary behind the United Nations lines. There is little doubt but that given the opportunity practically the entire North Korean population would have migrated south in search of such sanctuary. Without the slightest hesitancy they have made clear their complete aversion to Communist rule and their fervent desire at whatever hazard for refuge within the protection of the United Nations. They welcomed our forces as liberators when we went in and sought to withdraw with us when we withdrew. Historically, this exemplifies the popular dread of Communist tyranny—the reason such rule may only survive in a totalitarian police state.

M. Thirteenth report, February 23, 1951

I herewith submit report number 13 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1–15 January, inclusive. Korean releases numbers 776 through 801 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Following a series of probing attacks against United Nations Forces deployed along the 38th parallel, the enemy, on 1 January, initiated a general offensive, directing his main effort due South toward Seoul and Kapyong in the West, and toward Yonju in the center. Employing his main force of 20 Chinese Communist infantry divisions, the enemy delivered heavy attacks against United Nations Forces to the North and Northeast of Seoul, and achieved deep penetrations of ten to twelve miles, which, in conjunction with similar successes by the enveloping force in the Chunchon area, forces a general United Nations withdrawal. By 4 January the enemy had occupied Seoul, and the United Nations Forces had displaced to a line South of the Han River. However, continued enemy success in the Wonju salient made this position untenable. On 7 January new United Nations defensive positions were established along a line extending from Pyongtaek Northeast to Wonju. Thereafter, the enemy maintained only light patrol contact, and began deploying his assault forces along a parallel line about ten miles to the North through Osan and Yoju.

An enemy force of eleven North Korean divisions and elements of an unidentified Chinese Communist corps undertook the main effort down the center of the peninsula, driving along and to the East of the Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon axis, which constitutes the principal North-South line of communications in this area. Taking advantage of superior numbers, strong guerrilla forces, and difficult terrain, the enemy has maintained a deep twenty to thirty mile penetration of the thinly held United Nations lines East of the Chunchon-Chechon axis. This penetration has enabled the enemy forces to drive repeatedly against the right flank of the main body of United Nations forces deployed to meet the large Communist Forces concentrated to the West, and to impede the withdrawal of United Nations units to Wonju by assuming blocking positions in their immediate rear. From 8 January the enemy has made strong efforts to drive United Nations Forces out of Wonju area, but has met stubborn resistance in the form of United Nations counterattacks and has suffered extremely high casualties.

The enemy has been relatively inactive in the East coastal sector, but Communist guerilla forces have been very active South of Yongwol, and particularly around Tanyang, a principal rail and road communications junction about twenty miles to the South. The 8,000-odd guerrilla troops in this general area are apparently working in close coordination with enemy troops on the front, and presently constitute the most formidable element of the enemy guerrilla forces, which now total not less than 25,000.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally from the West coast at Pyongtaek Northeast to Wonju, Southeast to Chechon, East to Yongwol, Northeast to Chongson, and thence to Samchock on the East coast.

United Nations Naval Forces, by means of constant patrol and daily aerial reconnaissance operations, continued to deny movement of enemy surface units or shipping in any of the waters surrounding Korea. Surface vessels executed gunfire missions in close support of troops and inshore bombardments. Ships operating in the Yalu Gulf area were hampered by thick, broken ice.

United Nations Ground Forces have been provided intensive and uninterrupted close air support. Completing 200 consecutive days of operations, and their 100,000 sorties, air units of the United States Far East Forces, in conjunction with Naval and United States Marine air elements, the Union of South Africa, Australia, Greece, and the Republic of Korea, mounted the heaviest attacks of the Korean conflict during this period. Troops, tanks, and artillery were the primary targets of aircraft on close support, armed reconnaissance, and North intruder missions. North of the battle area, communications targets and airfields continued under attack.

There has been a small increase in the number of ground attacks made by hostile planes, though air battle between the two forces are fewer than in other recent periods. Cargo aircraft continue their valuable support in resupply, evacuation, and in occasional small-scale air-drop operations.

Since the submission of my last report, the problem of handling refugees who have sought sanctuary within the area controlled by the United Nations Forces has increased daily. It is estimated that upward of a million refugees have migrated Southward seeking protection within the area now under the control of the United Nations Forces. These refugees fill the roads and impede and delay the movement of United Nations troops and supplies. Enemy agents are able to enter our lines disguised as refugees. In addition, enemy troops can approach our positions concealed in these masses of refugees, immune from air attack. Shelter, food and clothing continue to be the most critical supply items in alleviating the suffering of refugees in Korea. The limited shelter available is definitely inadequate to provide minimum housing requirements to the refugees within that area.

Every effort is being made by the United Nations Command, within the limits of the tactical situation, to alleviate suffering and prevent disease and unrest among refugees and the local population.

It is interesting to note that there has been no outbreak of communicable diseases of epidemic proportions in the areas under the control of the United Nations Forces. The contributions by member nations of food, medicine and clothing, et cetera, have been of immeasurable assistance in the control of disease and providing relief to the people of Korea.

Civilian relief requirements continue to change day by day and are being continuously reviewed and re-evaluated. This information is being forwarded through established channels in order that supplies required may be secured and given timely distribution in Korea to alleviate the suffering of the indigenous population of that war-ravaged country.

Daily air drops of United Nations leaflets are being made over enemy troop concentrations, both Chinese and North Korean. More than 184 million leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea. Loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets are being used to control the movement of civilian refugees fleeing from Communist terror. Radio broadcasts, both from United Nations Command Headquarters in Japan and Korea, are bringing the Korean people on both sides of the fighting lines an accurate daily report of events, with reassurance of continuing United Nations determination to work for the establishment of a free and united Korea.

In order to avoid the premature publication of any information which might be helpful to the enemy, censorship has been established in Korea.

As United Nations Forces withdraw, Communist forces extend their supply lines farther and farther to the South, thereby increasing the difficulties of supplying their forces as these lines are under repeated air attack.

The most significant event during the period was the enemy's carrying his attack below the 38th parallel.

N. Fourteenth report, February 23, 1951

I herewith submit report number 14 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16–31 January, inclusive.

Having been unable to continue his general offensive, the enemy during the period of this report has been, in the main, on the defensive. Aggressive United Nations reconnaissance in force on the western part of the front during the period 16–31 January met only light to moderate resistance as far north as Suwon and Kumyangjang, and indicated that the enemy has apparently abandoned Ichon. At the same time, air sightings and other reports indicated numerous small scale displacements on enemy forces northward in the area south of the Han River. The pattern of enemy resistance became slightly more uniform by 29 January as the United Nations offensive advanced to a general line three to five miles north of Suwon, Kumyangjang, and Ichon.

North Korean forces continued to defend stubbornly in the Wonju area until 24 January; however, United Nations patrols advanced ten miles northward into Hoengsong and, by 28 January, the enemy had withdrawn to positions about three miles north of that town. North Korean forces also offered only moderate resistance in the east coast sector, as United Nations forces advanced eight to ten miles in the Yongwol and Samchok area.

In the deep re-entrant on the Yongwol-Adong-Uisong axis, the north Korean troops withdrew from positions to which they had earlier infiltrated, leaving about one Division in the mountainous area east of Tanyang, and another astride the road between Andong and Yongju. These two divisions, materially augmented a force of about 5,000 guerrillas who were operating in the area east of Uisong. These two enemy regular units and the guerrilla forces were relatively active throughout the period, but broke contact and dispersed whenever they met superior United Nations forces. The guerrilla elements south and east of Uisong, on one occasion, extended their activities to the Yongdok area on the east coast, and some elements displaced southward into the Pohyan-San Mountain area, about 20 miles northwest to Pohang.

Front lines ran generally eastward from Suwon, near the west coast, to Yoju, thence northeast to Hoengsong, southeast to Yongwol, and northeast to Nakpong on the east coast.

Constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval forces continued to deny Korean waters to enemy warships and shipping. Surface units provided gunfire support to United Nations ground force units along the east coast of Korea and in the Inchon area. Check minesweeping operations were continued along the Korean east coast, particularly in those areas in which gunfire support ships operated. The sighting and destruction of drifting mines continued to be commonplace during this period. United Nations Naval forces continue to cover and protect the constant stream of shipping employed in moving personnel and material to United Nations forces in Korea.

United Nations aircraft continued highly effective operations against the ground elements of the Chinese Communist and north Korean forces. On days of favorable flying weather, a toll of thousands of casualties has been inflicted upon the enemy. The limited objective attacks and reconnaissances in strength of United Nations ground forces have served to flush into the open the concealed enemy, who has then been subjected to paralyzing attacks from the air. The smooth coordinations in these efforts between United Nations ground and air elements has been noteworthy.

Numerous aerial engagements have taken place in the air over north Korea just south of the Manchurian border. In one of these about sixty planes were involved. The superiority of United Nations planes, tactics, and pilots over those of the enemy has been repeatedly proven in these encounters and the number of hostile aircraft destroyed mounts slowly but steadily.

There are a few indications of enemy intentions to use airfields in Korea but the fields in Manchuria are their major bases. As many as eighty-five aircraft have been observed at one time on Antung Airfield just north of the Yalu River boundary.

The Communists have increased the number of single plane attacks on United Nations ground forces, but have inflicted only negligible damage.

Civilian relief and care of refugees continue to be a major task of the United Nations Command in Korea.

Although the mass migratory movement of refugees has subsided, the unparalleled problem of providing food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance to upwards of a million refugees remains most acute. United Nations Command Civil Assistance teams working closely with Republic of Korea officials have exerted every effort to relieve the suffering of the war ravaged peoples of Korea.

Housing and shelter for refugees within the area remain most critical. To date, the absorption of refugees has been accomplished by billeting with friends or relatives, in government prefabricated houses, and makeshift lodgings.

Commodity prices are steady throughout the area. This steadiness in prices reflects the progress of the Republic of Korea government food collection program which is increasing the flow of food supplies. The collection program is estimated to be fifty per cent complete as of the submission of this report.

May I assure you that the peoples of Korea are most appreciative of the contributions made by member nations and relief societies throughout the world. Such humane actions are truly representative of the democratic way of life. The refugees impose a terrific burden upon the economy of Korea and necessitate a continuous review and re-evalution of civil assistance requirements. I shall continue to forward these requirements through established channels in order that relief supplies may be secured and given timely distribution in Korea.

Over 205 million United Nations leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea, the great majority being directed at the Chinese and north Korea armed forces. Continuing daily air drops of leaflets are being made in an effort to show every enemy soldier in the line that there is an alternative to the heavily mounting loss of life. Thousands of Communist soldiers suffering from frostbite in the severe Korean winter are being urged to lay down their arms and obtain prompt and effective medical treatment from the United Nations forces. A network of seven Korean radio stations has been activated to originate and to relay broadcasts to the Korean people, whether presently under Communist subjugation or in free Korea. These broadcasts complement those originating in United Nations Command Headquarters, and materially increase the volume of factual news available to the Korean people to offset the torrent of false and inflammatory propaganda being directed toward them by Communist radio stations in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.

Reports have been received that typhus has hit at least part of the Chinese armies in Korea. The cold weather has added its toll of losses through frostbite, trench foot, and freezing. In addition to losses from weather and disease, the enemy has suffered extremely heavy casualties due to United Nations combat action. United Nations forces continue to retain their strength, firm resolve, and high morale.

O. Fifteenth report, March 26, 1951

I herewith submit report number 15 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1–15 February, inclusive.

General. During this period our strategic plans to cope with the new situation created by Communist China's entry into the war have continued to produce the desired results. By breaking contact with the enemy and rapidly withdrawing to the south when our advance of 24 November exposed the secret build up of Communist Chinese forces in the forward battle area south of the Yalu River, the enemy, following in pursuit, was forced to extend his lines of supply over 300 miles. Each mile of this forward extension rendered him increasingly vulnerable to air attack, expanded correspondingly our power by maneuver to overcome the handicap of numerically superior ground forces and terrain favorable to the enemy tactic of infiltration, and reduced proportionately our own logistical difficulties. Resulting from this more favorable balance, our air and ground forces have inflicted losses upon the enemy reaching major proportions, kept him off balance and denied him any extended enjoyment of the tactical initiative. Of possibly greater significance during this period has been the exploding of the myth, built by up enemy propaganda, of the invincibility of Communist military power and the clear demonstration that the allied soldier crusading for freedom is more than a match for the Communist soldier fighting to serve neither ideal nor spiritual purpose.

Our operations have been characterized by a most complete and effective co-ordination of the combined arms—land, sea and air—and an integration of the units of the several nationalities involved, spiritually and physically, with few parallels in military history. It is in every respect a unified command of high morale and marked battle efficiency, with every unit and individual invincibly bound together by a singleness of high purpose.

On 13 February after visiting the western sector of the Korean battle front, I issued the following public statement on the military situation: "What the future has in store in Korea continues to be largely dependent upon international considerations and decisions not yet known here. Meanwhile, the command is doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it. Our field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to weaken the enemy's supply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destructiveness of our air power, has worked well. In the development of this strategy the Eighth Army has achieved local tactical successes through maximum exploitation of the air's massive blows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies—but in the evaluation of these successes sight must not be lost of the enemy's remaining potential for reinforcement and resupply. We must not fall into the error of evaluating such tactical successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat just as many erred in assessing our strategic withdrawals in the face of Communist China's commitment to war as a decisive defeat inflicted upon us.

"We are still engaged in a war of maneuver with the object of inflicting as heavy a punishment upon the enemy as possible, striving constantly to keep him off balance to prevent his obtaining and holding the tactical initiative while at the same time avoiding the hazards inherent in his numerical superiority. The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved, and the relatively small force which could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such strategy would insure destruction of our forces piecemeal. Talk of crossing 38th Parallel at the present stage of the campaign except by scattered patrol action incidental to the tactical situation is purely academic. From a military standpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority of our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in undeclared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage of sanctuary protection upon Chinese soil for his military potential against our counter attack before we can seriously consider conducting major operations north of that geographic line.

"Meanwhile, however, the complete coordination of our land, sea and air forces and the consequent smooth synchronization of their combined operations, with each arm contributing its full part, continues to inflict terrific losses upon the enemy. General Ridgway is proving himself a brilliant and worthy successor to General Walker in command of the Eighth Army, and with Admiral Struble in command of the Fleet, and General Partridge in command of the Air comprise an ideal trio of field commanders."

Summary of Operations: Hard-driving United Nations forces scored advances of twelve to twenty-five miles along the entire front against stubbornly resisting enemy forces. Some of the most intensive fighting of the war took place in the Anyang and Yangpyong areas south and east of Seoul. Chinese Communist and north Korean forces, comprising the North Korean I Corps and the Chinese Communist 50th and 38th Armies, in an aggregate of eight divisions, fought tenaciously in the Anyang Kyongan, Yangpyong areas to protect the main route of approach to Seoul, but United Nations forces took Anyang on 7 February and advanced three miles north of the town on the following day. By 10 February the battered enemy in this area had been driven north across the Han River, and United Nations forces had taken possession of the Port of Inchon, Kimpo Airfield, and the south bank of the Han, to the south and west of Seoul. Enemy attempts to recross the river were repelled on 12 February.

Heavy fighting continued throughout the period in the area south of Yangpyong. The Chinese Communist forces of the 38th Army were forced back five to six miles on both sides of the Yoju-Yangpyong axis, and sustained heavy casualties. However, enemy resistance remains firm to the south and east of Yangpyong, and intensive action continues. Meanwhile, the enemy is maintaining his Han River bridgehead between Seoul and Yangpyong.

In the central portion of the front against light to moderate resistance United Nations forces took Hoengsong on 2 February and advanced nine miles to the north by 11 February. On the night of 11–12 February the enemy launched a heavy counter-offensive north of Hoengsong with two Chinese Communist armies on a ten mile front, the 40th and 66th Armies in conjunction with the north Korean V Corps in an aggregate of five to eight divisions. In this effort, the enemy penetrated our positions in several places, principally against the Republic of Korea 3d and 8th Divisions, achieved extensive infiltrations, and forced United Nations units to withdraw several thousand yards to a new defensive line south of the town. Our forces evacuated

Hoengsong on 13 February and withdrew to the vicinity of Wonju for further operations.

In eastern Korea, enemy resistance was spotty as United Nations forces advanced up to twenty-five miles. By 7 February Kangnung on the east coast was taken, and Chumunjin fell on the following day. By 10 February, United Nations forces had advanced several miles northward toward the 38th parallel.

In the Uihong area, almost 100 miles south of the main front, United Nations forces continued vigorous action to suppress relatively strong north Korean remnants and guerrilla forces. In repeated engagements of battalion and regimental size, the enemy forces invariably withdrew after a few hours of fighting. Guerrilla forces in this area are now almost constantly on the defensive and have lost the initiative.

Front lines at the end of the period ran generally from Inchon on the west coast to Seoul, southeast to Kwanju, east to the Han River below Yangpyong, east to Wonju or north thereof, northeast to Kanpyong, and thence to Chumunjin on the east coast.

United Nations Naval Forces conducted patrol and reconnaissance operations which continue to deny to the enemy the waters surrounding Korea. Air and gunfire support were furnished by naval units which maintained station in extremely severe winter weather conditions. Heavy naval gunfire support missions along both coasts blasted the enemy ahead of the United Nations ground forces as they advanced while United Nations Naval and Marine air units contributed to the close air support effort and to strike against the enemy in the rear areas. The bombardment of the Kangnung area on the east coast and of the Inchon area on the west coast were particularly effective.

Check minesweeping operations and destruction of mines were continued along the coasts of Korea to clear the waters used by gunfire support ships and transports. Drifting mines constitute a constant menace to shipping in Korean waters and in the Japan Sea. This mine menace was highlighted by the sinking of a sweeper engaged in check sweeping operations.

Air operations have followed the pattern of previous periods with the close integration of the air and ground efforts enjoying marked tactical success. Both on the main battle position and in United Nations rear areas where guerrilla activities have been a source of annoyance, the offensive ground action has served to increase the number of suitable air targets by forcing the enemy to concentrate and to reveal his location as he is driven from one area to another. Air drops of hundreds of tons of ammunition and other combat equipment, by removing the requirement for surface resupply, have granted to many army units a flexibility contributing materially to tactical successes.

Armed reconnaissance aircraft continue sweeping the North Korean roads and railroads of vehicles and rolling stock while destruction of bridges, marshalling yards and tunnels render the enemy resupply problem a gigantic one. Relatively heavy southbound traffic through Hamhung in the northeastern sector received the brunt of attacks during several days early in February and later the traffic in the western areas received the heavier effort.

Improved equipment and procedures have increased substantially the effectiveness of not only the night sweeps along lines of communications, but also the close support effort where the battle area can be brilliantly lighted by high candle power flares.

Air engagements have been few, the enemy refusing to operate except by sneak attack in areas other than those immediately adjacent to his Manchurian Sanctuary.

In addition to the prisoner of war enclosures in the vicinity of Pusan, an additional enclosure of Camp No. 1 has been opened on nearby Koje-Do Island at a site selected with due regard to the health and welfare of the prisoners. In accordance with Article 23 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, the coordinates of the new enclosure have been transmitted to the enemy through the international committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland.

During this period, the United Nations Command has made still further improvements at all enclosures of Camp No. 1 furnishing United States Army immersion type heaters for sterilizing mess gear, installing new oil-fed ranges and continuing the issuance of large additional quantities of warm clothing, bedding, and mess gear.

Since the submission of my last report the flow of refugees in the forward areas has been negligible. Controlled movement of refugees has been negligible. Controlled movement of refugees has been permitted but in general regulations issued by the United Nations Command have held the local population in their home communities. The redistribution of refugees away from Key Korean communication centers such as Pusan continues for humanitarian reasons and of military necessity. Every effort is being made by the United Nations Command to provide food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance for these unfortunate people.

Although some cases of sickness have been reported, it is noteworthy that there has been no general outbreak of disease of epidemic proportion in the areas under control of the United Nations forces. Active measures are being taken to prevent such an occurrence, including continuation of the DDT dusting program, expansion of the immunization program to include typhus, smallpox, and typhoid immunizations for the entire South Korean population, estimated at 20,000,000 persons, and improvement and reestablishment of medical facilities. For example, since my last report four hospitals have been placed in operation on Cheju-Do.

To date, I have knowledge of sixteen United Nations member nations whose generous contributions with those of United Nations organizations and voluntary relief agencies total over $14,500,000. Of this total, approximately $8,500,000 has been delivered in Korea. These contributions are of immeasurable assistance in alleviating the suffering of the war-ridden Korean civilian population and in the attainment of the United Nations objectives in Korea.

Through combined use of the media of radio broadcast, loudspeaker transmission and air dropped leaflets, United Nations forces are endeavoring to control the movement of civilian refugees in Korea in order to prevent needless loss of life. Broadcasts from airborne loudspeakers, accompanied by air drop of special leaflets, have been used to channel refugee groups along roads that will take them out of the immediate combat zone. Radio broadcasts have instructed civilians to stay out of the city of Seoul during the current operations in that area. Simultaneously, intensive dissemination of leaflets to enemy soldiers continues at a high level, with primary emphasis on instructions concerning methods of surrender, and on reassurance of their good treatment as prisoners of war in United Nations camps. More than 230 million United Nations leaflets have been disseminated. Daily United Nations radio broadcasts are now reaching a larger audience through the installation of mobile and stationary loudspeaker relay systems in several Korean cities.

P. Sixteenth report, March 26, 1951

I herewith submit Report No. 16 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16 to 28 February, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques, numbers 802 through 808, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Stubbornly resisting a vigorous United Nations offensive, enemy forces during this period were pushed northward seven to sixteen miles on a 90-mile front extending from Seoul to Chongson. The enemy employed large numbers of his tactical reserves, particularly in the Seoul-Hoengsong area. However, this move was not only unsuccessful but resulted in tremendous losses both in men and matériel. In this action the enemy's Han River bridgehead between Seoul and Yangpyong was eliminated, and he had been forced to relinquish his deep salient between Wonju and Chongson by 25 February. As a result, United Nations lines are now relatively straight and unbroken over the entire front.

United Nations forces had driven the enemy north of the Han River at Yangpyong by 19 February, but met heavy resistance immediately north of this town. Heavy fighting continued in the Chipyong area to the end of the period, as United Nations forces advanced about 10 miles and drove a shallow salient into enemy lines four to six miles north and northeast of Chipyong. Strong enemy forces were driven out of Hoengsong by 24 February, but continued stubborn resistance to the north and west of the town.

In the Pyongchang area, enemy forces held the initiative until 20 February, and forced United Nations units to make limited withdrawals from 16 to 19 February. During this period heavy fighting took place seven to ten miles north of Chechon, twelve miles east of Wonju, and in the area south of Chongson. Having overcome these strong local attacks, United Nations units began vigorous offensive action, and by February 24 the enemy had been forced to retreat ten to seventeen miles. Minor clashes took place in the Kangnung area, near the east coast.

Front lines at the end of the period ran northeast from Inchon to the Han River, along the Han to Yangpyong, east to Hoengsong and Chongson, and thence northeast to Kangnung.

Guerrilla forces in the Andong-Uihung area have been considerably less active during the period 16–28 February and have dispersed after short skirmishes with United Nations policing forces. It is estimated that United Nations action has now reduced the over-all strength of guerrilla forces in South Korea to about 30,000, representing a decline of about 15 per cent during the past two months.

Constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval Forces continued to deny to the enemy the use of Korean waters. Surface units provided effective gunfire support to United Nations ground units on both coasts of Korea, particularly in the Inchon-Seoul area. Other surface units carried out a devastating program of interdiction by naval gunfire of the east coast railroads and highways, concentrating the main efforts on bridges and tunnels near Wonsan, Tachon and Songjin. Republic of Korea Marines, supported by United Nations surface forces, occupied the islands of Ung-Do, Yo-Do and Sin-Do in the approaches to Wonsan to facilitate naval bombardment operations in the vicinity of that port. Amphibious elements of United Nations Naval Forces assisted in the reopening of the port of Inchon.

Drifting mines continued to menace shipping in Korean waters. Check minesweeping operations were continued along the east coast of Korea in waters used by the gunfire support ships.

Intermittently poor weather with low clouds, rain, sleet and snow hindered air operations, but good days saw the United Nations Air Forces mounting their greatest efforts of the Korean conflict. Generally rising temperatures and rain over South Korea have made the thawing ground a quagmire severely restricting normal resupply to front line units. Under this condition the capabilities of United Nations cargo aircraft on air landing and air-dropping supplies have been fully realized, contributing greatly to the success of current operations.

Enemy lines of supply were repeatedly attacked between the Manchurian border and the front lines. The numerical advantage of the enemy has been considerably offset by the constant choking of his lengthy supply channels. Bridges and marshalling yards continue to be the focal points of the strangulation attacks though dumps, tunnels, warehouses, and barracks are attacked whenever a degree of importance to the enemy is indicated. An increased number of vehicles and trains have provided remunerative targets.

Several multi-plane attacks by MIG–15s upon small formation of bombers and upon single planes have resulted in negligible damage.

The close support rendered to ground forces by all elements of United Nations tactic aircraft continues to be a decisive factor in each day's operations.

Since the submission of my last report, the liberation of additional areas of South Korea has necessitated an increase in the number of civil assistance teams and the availability of local governmental officials to reinstitute civil government in these liberated areas. Action currently is being taken to dispatch a newly formed civil assistance team to the province of Cholla Namdo and to augment teams whose area of responsibility has increased. Government officials and police of northern areas of South Korea have been alerted for re-entry into their respective areas when the military situation will permit.

It has been necessary to continue the control of movement of refugees, and to hold the local population in home communities. Return of refugees to their home communities is permitted whenever practicable, however, military operations and condition of liberated areas have precluded mass movement of refugees to the north.

The program of extensive DDT dusting and immunization referred to in my last report is being prosecuted vigorously in order to prevent an outbreak or spread of communicable diseases. Although scattered cases of smallpox and typhus continue to be reported, there has been no general outbreak of diseases of epidemic proportions in the areas under control of United Nations forces. With continued military progress, it is anticipated that there will be an increasing demand for medical supplies in the war-damaged areas to care for the wounded and to prevent the spread of disease.

Contributions to date by United Nations member nations are valued at approximately 15 million dollars. Since it is of vital importance that relief supplies continue to flow into Korea in order to prevent disease, starvation and unrest, member nations are urged to continue their contributions in order that the humanitarian responsibilities imposed upon the United Nations may be accomplished.

In the dissemination of United Nations leaflets to enemy troops in Korea, increased emphasis is being placed on safe conduct passes, which explain to the soldier the humane treatment guaranteed him by the United Nations in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and urge him to cease resistance. In addition to a message to the enemy soldier in either Chinese or Korean, these leaflets contain English and Korean instructions to United Nations soldiers, directing them to treat the bearer as an honorable Prisoner of War, and take him to the nearest officer. Prisoner interrogation reports show that such leaflets are influencing many enemy soldiers despite Communist efforts to intimidate them with false allegations concerning United Nations treatment of prisoners. Approximately 250 million copies of some 133 different leaflets have now been used in Korea. The schedule of United Nations radio broadcasts to Korea has been augmented with the addition of three new informational programs designed to stimulate listener interest and bolster Korean morale.

Conclusion.—As I pointed out on my last inspection of the Korean battle front, I am entirely satisfied with the situation at the front where the enemy has suffered a tactical reverse of measurable proportion. His losses have been among the bloodiest of modern times. As these are from Communist China's finest troops, it will be difficult to adequately replace them. The enemy is finding it an entirely different problem fighting 350 miles from his base then when he had this "sanctuary" in his immediate rear, with our air and naval forces practically zeroed out. He is paying now for the illusion, so falsely but effectively propagandized when Communist China initiated undeclared war that he had decisively defeated these same forces. Our strategic plan, notwithstanding the enemy's great numerical superiority, is indeed working well and I have just directed a resumption of the initiative by our forces. All ranks of this international force are covering themselves with distinction and I again wish to especially commend the outstanding teamwork of the three Services under the skillful direction of their able field commanders, General Ridgway, Admiral Struble and General Partridge. Our successes are in great part due to the smooth synchronization of the power of the three arms. This, indeed, is the most vital factor in modern war.

VI. GENERAL MacARTHUR'S MESSAGE TO VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS AND RELATED POLICY STATEMENTS

A. The President's message to the Congress, July 19, 1950

[From House Document No. 646, 81st Congress]

To the Congress of the United States:

I am reporting to the Congress on the situation which has been created in Korea, and on the actions which this Nation has taken, as a member of the United Nations, to meet this situation. I am also laying before the Congress my views concerning the significance of these events for this Nation and the world, and certain recommendations for legislative action which I believe should be taken at this time.

A 4 o'clock in the morning, Sunday, June 25, Korean time, armed forces from north of the thirty-eighth parallel invaded the Republic of Korea.

The Republic of Korea was established as an independent nation in August 1948, after a free election held under the auspices of the United Nations. This election, which was originally intended to cover all of Korea, was held only in the part of the Korean peninsula south of the thirty-eighth parallel, because the Soviet Government, which occupied the peninsula north of that parallel, refused to allow the election to be held in the area under its control.

The United States, and a majority of the other members of the United Nations, have recognized the Republic of Korea. The admission of Korea to the United Nations has been blocked by the Soviet veto.

In December 1948 the Soviet Government stated that it had withdrawn its occupation troops from northern Korea, and that a local regime had been established there. The authorities in northern Korea continued to refuse to permit United Nations observers to pass the thirty-eighth parallel to supervise or observe a free election, or to verify the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Nevertheless, the United Nations continued its efforts to obtain a freely elected government for all of Korea and, at the time of the attack, a United Nations Commission, made up of representatives of seven nations—Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Turkey—was in the Republic of Korea.

Just 1 day before the attack of June 25, field observers attached to the United Nations Commission on Korea had completed a routine tour, lasting 2 weeks, of the military positions of the Republic of Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The report of these international observers stated that the Army of the Republic of Korea was organized entirely for defense. The observers found the parallel guarded on the south side by small bodies of troops in scattered outposts, with roving patrols. They found no concentration of troops and no preparation to attack. The observers concluded that the absence of armor, air support, heavy artillery, and military supplies precluded any offensive action by the forces of the Republic of Korea.

On June 25, within a few hours after the invasion was launched from the north, the Commission reported to the United Nations that the attack had come without warning and without provocation.

The reports from the Commission make it unmistakably clear that the attack was naked, deliberate, unprovoked aggression, without a shadow of justification.

This outright breach of the peace, in violation of the United Nations Charter, created a real and present danger to the security of every nation. This attack was, in addition, a demonstration of contempt for the United Nations, since it was an attempt to settle, by military aggression, a question which the United Nations had been working to settle by peaceful means.

The attack on the Republic of Korea, therefore, was a clear challenge to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and to the specific actions taken by the United Nations in Korea. If this challenge had not been met squarely, the effectiveness of the United Nations would have been all but ended, and the hope of mankind that the United Nations would develop into an institution of world order would have been shattered.

Prompt action was imperative. The Security Council of the United Nations met, at the request of the United States, in New York at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Sunday, June 25, eastern daylight time. Since there is a 14-hour difference in time between Korea and New York, this meant that the Council convened just 24 hours after the attack began.

At this meeting the Security Council passed a resolution which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of the invading troops to the thirty-eighth parallel, and which requested the members of the United Nations to refrain from giving aid to the northern aggressors and to assist in the execution of this resolution. The representative of the Soviet Union to the Security Council stayed away from the meeting, and the Soviet Government has refused to support the Council's resolution.

The attack launched on June 25 moved ahead rapidly. The tactical surprise gained by the aggressors, and their superiority in planes, tanks, and artillery, forced the lightly armed defenders to retreat. The speed, the scale, and the coordination of the attack left no doubt that it had been plotted long in advance.

When the attack came, our Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, began the immediate evacuation of American women and children from the danger zone. To protect this evacuation, air cover and sea cover were provided by the commander in chief of United States forces in the Far East, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. In response to urgent appeals from the Government of Korea, General MacArthur was immediately authorized to send supplies of ammunition to the Korean defenders. These supplies were sent by air transport, with fighter protection. The United States Seventh Fleet was ordered north from the Philippines, so that it might be available in the area in case of need.

Throughout Monday, June 26, the invaders continued their attack with no heed to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations. Accordingly, in order to support the resolution, and on the unanimous advice of our civil and military authorities, I ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

On Tuesday, June 27, when the United Nations Commission in Korea had reported that the northern troops had neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn to the thirty-eighth parallel, the United Nations Security Council met again and passed a second resolution, recommending that members of the United Nations furnish to the Republic of Korea such aid as might be necessary to repel the attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. The representative of the Soviet Union to the Security Council stayed away from this meeting also, and the Soviet Government has refused to support the Council's resolution.

The vigorous and unhesitating actions of the United Nations and the United States in the face of this aggression met with an immediate and overwhelming response throughout the free world. The first blow of aggression had brought dismay and anxiety to the hearts of men the world over. The fateful events of the 1930's when aggression unopposed bred more aggression and eventually war, were fresh in our memory.

But the free nations had learned the lesson of history. Their determined and united actions uplifted the spirit of freemen everywhere. As a result, where there had been dismay there is hope; where there had been anxiety there is firm determination.

Fifty-two of the 59 member nations have supported the United Nations action to restore peace in Korea.

A number of member nations have offered military support or other types of assistance for the United Nations action to repel the aggressors in Korea. In a third resolution, passed on July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the United Nations flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated as commander of these forces. These are important steps forward in the development of a United Nations system of collective security. Already, aircraft of two nations—Australia and Great Britain—and naval vessels of five nations—Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand—have been made available for operations in the Korean area, along with forces of Korea and the United States, under General MacArthur's command. The other offers of assistance that have been, and will continue to be made, will be coordinated by the United Nations and by the unified command, in order to support the effort in Korea to maximum advantage.

All the members of the United Nations who have endorsed the action of the Security Council realize the significance of the step that has been taken. This united and resolute action to put down lawless aggression is a milestone toward the establishment of a rule of law among nations.

Only a few countries have failed to support the common action to restore the peace. The most important of these is the Soviet Union.

Since the Soviet representative had refused to participate in the meetings of the Security Council which took action regarding Korea, the United States brought the matter directly to the attention of the Soviet Government in Moscow. On June 27, we requested the Soviet Government, in view of its known close relations with the North Korean regime, to use its influence to have the invaders withdraw at once.

The Soviet Government, in its reply on June 29 and in subsequent statements, has taken the position that the attack launched by the North Korean forces was provoked by the Republic of Korea, and that the actions of the United Nations Security Council were illegal.

These Soviet claims are flatly disproved by the facts.

The attitude of the Soviet Government toward the aggression against the Republic of Korea is in direct contradiction to its often expressed intention to work with other nations to achieve peace in the world.

For our part, we shall continue to support the United Nations action to restore peace in the Korean area.

As the situation has developed, I have authorized a number of measures to be taken. Within the first week of the fighting, General MacArthur reported, after a visit to the front, that the forces from North Korea were continuing to drive south, and further support to the Republic of Korea was needed. Accordingly, General MacArthur was authorized to use United States Army troops in Korea, and to use United States aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy to conduct missions against specific military targets in Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel, where necessary to carry out the United Nations resolution. General MacArthur was also directed to blockade the Korean coast.

The attacking forces from the north have continued to move forward, although their advance has been slowed down. The troops of the Republic of Korea, though initially overwhelmed by the tanks and artillery of the surprise attack by the invaders, have been reorganized and are fighting bravely.

United States forces, as they have arrived in the area, have fought with great valor. The Army troops have been conducting a very difficult delaying operation with skill and determination, outnumbered many times over by attacking troops, spearheaded by tanks. Despite the bad weather of the rainy season, our troops have been valiantly supported by the air and naval forces of both the United States and other members of the United Nations.

In this connection, I think it is important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood. It should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle. The United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force. Consequently, we were not deterred by the relative immediate superiority of the attacking forces, by the fact that our base of supplies was 5,000 miles away, or by the further fact that we would have to supply our forces through port facilities that are far from satisfactory.

We are moving as rapidly as possible to bring to bear on the fighting front larger forces and heavier equipment, and to increase our naval and air superiority. But it will take time, men, and material to slow down the forces of aggression, bring those forces to a halt, and throw them back.

Nevertheless, our assistance to the Republic of Korea has prevented the invaders from crushing that nation in a few days—as they had evidently expected to do. We are determined to support the United Nations in its effort to restore peace and security to Korea, and its effort to assure the people of Korea an opportunity to choose their own form of government free from coercion, as expressed in the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948.

In addition to the direct military effort we and other members of the United Nations are making in Korea, the outbreak of aggression there requires us to consider its implications for peace throughout the world. The attack upon the Republic of Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that the international Communist movement is prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. We must therefore recognize the possibility that armed aggression may take place in other areas.

In view of this, I have already directed that United States forces in support of the Philippines be strengthened, and that military assistance be speeded up to the Philippine Government and to the Associated States of Indochina and to the forces of France in Indochina. I have also ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa, and I have requested the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. These steps were at once reported to the United Nations Security Council.

Our action in regard to Formosa was a matter of elementary security. The peace and stability of the Pacific area had been violently disturbed by the attack on Korea. Attacks elsewhere in the Pacific area would have enlarged the Korean crisis, thereby rendering much more difficult the carrying out of our obligations to the United Nations in Korea.

In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. With peace reestablished, even the most complex political questions are susceptible of solution. In the presence of brutal and unprovoked aggression, however, some of these questions may have to be held in abeyance in the interest of the essential security of all.

The outbreak of aggression in the Far East does not, of course, lessen but, instead, increases the importance of the common strength of the free nations in other parts of the world. The attack on the Republic of Korea gives added urgency to the efforts of the free nations to increase and to unify their common strength, in order to deter a potential aggressor.

To be able to accomplish this objective, the free nations must maintain a sufficient defensive military strength in being and, even more important, a solid basis of economic strength, capable of rapid mobilization in the event of emergency.

The strong cooperative efforts that have been made by the United States and other free nations, since the end of World War II, to restore economic vitality to Europe and other parts of the world, and the cooperative efforts we have begun in order to increase the productive capacity of underdeveloped areas, are extremely important contributions to the growing economic strength of all the free nations, and will be of even greater importance in the future.

We have been increasing our common defensive strength under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the North Atlantic Treaty, which are collective security arrangements within the framework of the United Nations Charter. We have also taken action to bolster the military defenses of individual free nations, such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

The defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty area were considered a matter of great urgency by the North Atlantic Council in London this spring. Recent events make it even more urgent than it was at that time to build and maintain these defenses.

Under all the circumstances it is apparent that the United States is required to increase its military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea but also to increase our common defense, with other free nations, against further aggression.

The increased strength which is needed falls into three categories:

In the first place, to meet the situation in Korea, we shall need to send additional men, equipment, and supplies to General MacArthur's command as rapidly as possible.

In the second place, the world situation requires that we increase substantially the size and matériel support of our Armed Forces, over and above the increases which are needed in Korea.

In the third place, we must assist the free nations associated with us in common defense to augment their military strength.

Of the three categories I have just enumerated, the first two involve increases in our own military manpower, and in the matériel support that our men must have.

To meet the increased requirements for military manpower, I have authorized the Secretary of Defense to exceed the budgeted strength of military personnel for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and to use the Selective Service System to such extent as may be required in order to obtain the increased strength which we must have. I have also authorized the Secretary of Defense to meet the need for military manpower by calling into active Federal service as many National Guard units and as many units and individuals of the Reserve forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces as may be required.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep our military manpower needs under constant study, in order that further increases may be made as required. There are now statutory limits on the sizes of the armed forces and, since we may need to exceed these limits, I recommend that they be removed.

To increase the level of our military strength will also require additional supplies and equipment. Procurement of many items has already been accelerated, in some cases for use in Korea, in others to replace reserve stocks which are now being sent to Korea, and in still others to add to our general level of preparedness. Further increases in procurement, resulting in a higher rate of production of military equipment and supplies will be necessary.

The increases in the size of the armed forces, and the additional supplies and equipment which will be needed, will require additional appropriations. Within the next few days, I will transmit to the Congress specific requests for appropriations in the amount of approximately 10 billion dollars.

These requests for appropriations will be addressed to the needs of our own military forces. Earlier, I referred to the fact that we must also assist other free nations in the strengthening of our common defenses. The action we must take to accomplish this is just as important as the measures required to strengthen our own forces.

The authorization bill for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1951, now before the House of Representatives, is an important immediate step toward the strengthening of our collective security. It should be enacted without delay.

But it is now clear that the free nations of the world must step up their common security program. The other nations associated with us in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, like ourselves, will need to divert additional economic resources to defense purposes. In order to enable the nations associated with us to make their maximum contribution to our common defense, further assistance on our part will be required. Additional assistance may also be needed to increase the strength of certain other free nations whose security is vital to our own.

In the case of the North Atlantic area these requirements will reflect the consultations now going on with the other nations associated with us in the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as it is possible to determine what each nation will need to do, I shall lay before the Congress a request for such funds as are shown to be necessary to the attainment and maintenance of our common strength at an adequate level.

The steps which we must take to support the United Nations action in Korea, and to increase our own strength and the common defense of the free world, will necessarily have repercussions upon our domestic economy.

Many of our young men are in battle now, or soon will be. Others must be trained. The equipment and supplies they need, and those required for adequate emergency reserves, must be produced. They must be made available promptly, at reasonable cost, and without disrupting the efficient functioning of the economy.

We must continue to recognize that our strength is not to be measured in military terms alone. Our power to join in a common defense of peace rests fundamentally on the productive capacity and energies of our people. In all that we do, therefore, we must make sure that the economic strength which is at the base of our security is not impaired, but continues to grow.

Our economy has tremendous productive power. Our total output of goods and services is now running at an annual rate of nearly 270 billion dollars—over 100 billion dollars higher than in 1939. The rate is now about 13 billion dollars higher than a year ago, and about 8 billion dollars higher than the previous record rate reached in 1948. All the foregoing figures have been adjusted for price changes and are, therefore, a measure of actual output. The index of industrial production, now at 197, is 12 percent higher than the average for last year, and 81 percent higher than in 1939.

We now have 61½ million people in civilian employment. There are 16 million more people in productive jobs than there were in 1939. We are now producing 11 million more tons of steel a year than in the peak war year 1944. Electric power output has risen from 128 billion kilowatt-hours in 1939, to 228 billion hours in 1944, to 317 billion hours now. Food production is about a third higher than it ever was before the war, and is practically as high as it was during the war years, when we were sending far more food abroad than we are now.

The potential productive power of our economy is even greater. We can achieve some immediate increase in production by employing men and facilities not now fully utilized. And we can continue to increase our total annual output each year, by putting to use the increasing skills of our growing population and the higher productive capacity which results from plant expansion, new inventions, and more efficient methods of production.

With this enormous economic strength, the new and necessary programs I am now recommending can be undertaken with confidence in the ability of our economy to bear the strains involved. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the demands for military purposes that are now foreseeable, in an economy which is already operating at a very high level, will require substantial redirection of economic resources.

Under the program for increasing military strength which I have outlined above, military and related procurement will need to be expanded at a more rapid rate than total production can be expanded. Some materials were in short supply even before the Korean situation developed. The steel industry, for example, was operating at capacity levels, and even so was not able to satisfy all market demands. Some other construction materials, and certain other products, were also under pressure and their prices were rising, even before the outbreak in Korea.

The substantial speed-up of military procurement will intensify these shortages. Action must be taken to insure that these shortages do not interfere with or delay the materials and the supplies needed for the national defense.

Further, the dollars spent now for military purposes will have a magnified effect upon the economy as a whole, since they will be added to the high level of current civilian demand. These increased pressures, if neglected, could drive us into a general inflationary situation. The best evidence of this is the recent price advances in many raw materials and in the cost of living, even upon the mere expectancy of increased military outlays.

In these circumstances we must take action to insure that the increased national-defense needs will be met, and that in the process we do not bring on an inflation, with its resulting hardship for every family.

At the same time we must recognize that it will be necessary for a number of years to support continuing defense expenditures, including assistance to other nations, at a higher level than we had previously planned. Therefore, the economic measures we take now must be planned and used in such a manner as to develop and maintain our economic strength for the long run as well as the short run.

I am recommending certain legislative measures to help achieve these objectives. I believe that each of them should be promptly enacted. We must be sure to take the steps that are necessary now, or we shall surely be required to take much more drastic steps later on.

First, we should adopt such direct measures as are now necessary to assure prompt and adequate supplies of goods for military and essential civilian use. I therefore recommend that the Congress now enact legislation authorizing the Government to establish priorities and allocate materials as necessary to promote the natural security; to limit the use of materials for nonessential purposes; to prevent inventory hoarding; and to requisition supplies and materials needed for the national defense, particularly excessive and unnecessary inventories.

Second, we must promptly adopt some general measures to compensate for the growth of demand caused by the expansion of military programs in a period of high civilian incomes. I am directing all executive agencies to conduct a detailed review of Government programs, for the purpose of modifying them wherever practicable to lessen the demand upon services, commodities, raw materials, manpower, and facilities which are in competition with those needed for national defense. The Government, as well as the public, must exercise great restraint in the use of those goods and services which are needed for our increased defense efforts.

Nevertheless, the increased appropriations for the Department of Defense, plus the defense-related appropriations which I have recently submitted for power development and atomic energy, and others which will be necessary for such purposes as stockpiling, will mean sharply increased Federal expenditures. For this reason we should increase Federal revenues more sharply than I have previously recommended, in order to reduce the inflationary effect of the Government deficit.

There are two fundamental principles which must guide us in framing measures to obtain these additional revenues:

(*a*) We must make every effort to finance the greatest possible amount of needed expenditures by taxation. The increase of taxes is our basic weapon in offsetting the inflationary pressures exerted by enlarged Government expenditures. Heavier taxes will make general controls less necessary.

(*b*) We must provide for a balanced system of taxation which makes a fair distribution of the tax burden among the different groups of individuals and business concerns in the Nation. A balanced tax program should also have as a major aim the elimination of profiteering.

At an appropriate time, as soon as the necessary studies are completed, I shall present to the Congress a program based on these principles to assure the financing of our needs in a manner which will be fair to all our citizens, which will help prevent inflation, and which will maintain the fiscal position of the Nation in the soundest possible condition.

As a further important safeguard against inflation, we shall need to restrain credit expansion. I recommend that the Congress now authorize the control of consumer credit and credit used for commodity speculation. In the housing field, where Government credit is an important factor, I have directed that certain available credit restraints be applied, and I recommend that further controls be authorized, particularly to restrain expansion of privately financed real-estate credit. These actions will not only reduce the upward pressure on prices, but will also reduce the demand for certain critical materials which are required for the production of military equipment.

Third, we must take steps to accelerate and increase the production of essential materials, products, and services. I recommend, therefore.

that the Congress authorize, for national-defense purposes, production loan guaranties and loans to increase production. I also recommend that the Congress authorize the making of long-term contracts and other means to encourage the production of certain materials in short supply.

In the forthcoming Midyear Economic Report, I shall discuss in greater detail the current economic situation, and the economic measures which I have recommended. If these measures are made available promptly, and firmly administered, I believe we will be able to meet military needs without serious disruption of the economy.

If we are to be successful, there must be sensible and restrained action by businessmen, labor, farmers, and consumers. The people of this country know the seriousness of inflation, and will, I am sure, do everything they can to see that it does not come upon us. However, if a sharp rise in prices should make it necessary, I shall not hesitate to recommend the more drastic measures of price control and rationing.

The hard facts of the present situation require relentless determination and firm action. The course of the fighting thus far in Korea shows that we can expect no easy solution to the conflict there. We are confronted in Korea with well-supplied, well-led forces which have been long trained for aggressive action. We and the other members of the United Nations who have joined in the effort to restore peace in Korea must expect a hard and costly military operation.

We must also prepare ourselves better to fulfill our responsibilities toward the preservation of international peace and security against possible further aggression. In this effort, we will not flinch in the face of danger or difficulty.

The free world has made it clear, through the United Nations, that lawless aggression will be met with force. This is the significance of Korea—and it is a significance whose importance cannot be overestimated.

I shall not attempt to predict the course of events. But I am sure that those who have it in their power to unleash or withhold acts of armed aggression must realize that new recourse to aggression in the world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace.

The United States can be proud of the part it has played in the United Nations action in this crisis. We can be proud of the unhesitating support of the American people for the resolute actions taken to halt the aggression in Korea and to support the cause of world peace.

The Congress of the United States, by its strong, bipartisan support of the steps we are taking and by repeated actions in support of international cooperation, has contributed most vitally to the cause of peace. The expressions of support which have been forthcoming from the leaders of both political parties for the actions of our Government and of the United Nations in dealing with the present crisis, have buttressed the firm morale of the entire free world in the face of this challenge.

The American people, together with other free peoples, seek a new era in world affairs. We seek a world where all men may live in peace and freedom, with steadily improving living conditions, under governments of their own free choice.

For ourselves, we seek no territory or dominations over others. We are determined to maintain our democratic institutions so that Americans now and in the future can enjoy personal liberty, economic opportunity, and political equality. We are concerned with advancing our prosperity and our well-being as a nation, but we know that our future is inseparably joined with the future of other free peoples.

We will follow the course we have chosen with courage and with faith, because we carry in our hearts the flame of freedom. We are fighting for liberty and for peace—and with God's blessing we shall succeed.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 19, 1950.*

B. Letter, Ambassador Austin to Secretary-General Lie, August 25, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1950]

There has been circulated to members of the Security Council a paper which charges the United States with aggression against Formosa. The paper asks the Security Council to consider the question of Formosa.

The United States Government does not intend to discuss at this time this paper or the ridiculous falsehoods which it contains. It does wish to take this occasion to make a further statement about the Formosan question.

On June 27 the United States representative read at the Security Council the following statement of the President of the United States:

"In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done but, on the contrary, have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances, I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations, and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations, issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

"Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

"I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

"I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

"I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

"I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council."

Since then, the President of the United States on July 19 made the following declaration in a message to the Congress:

"In addition to the direct military effort we and other members of the United Nations are making in Korea, the outbreak of aggression there requires us to consider its implications for peace throughout the world. The attack upon the Republic of Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that the international Communist movement is prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. We must, therefore, recognize the possibility that armed aggression may take place in other areas.

"In view of this, I have already directed that United States forces in support of the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance be speeded up to the Philippine Government and to the Associated States of Indochina, and to the forces of France in Indochina. I have also ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa, and I have requested the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. These steps were at once reported to the United Nations Security Council.

"Our action in regard to Formosa was a matter of elementary security. The peace and stability of the Pacific area had been violently disturbed by the attack on Korea. Attacks elsewhere in the Pacific area would have enlarged the Korean crisis, thereby rendering much more difficult the carrying out of our obligations to the United Nations in Korea.

"In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. With peace reestablished, even the most complex political questions are susceptible of solution. In the presence of brutal and unprovoked aggression, however, some of these questions may have to be held in abeyance in the interest of the essential security of all."

These statements and the facts to which they related make perfectly clear certain fundamental points which the people of the world will have clearly in mind:

1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations Forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression on the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

5. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation here or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

7. We do not believe that the Security Council need be or will be diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression. Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force. If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the President of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda which is the Complaint of Aggression Against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict.

I request that this letter be circulated to members of the Security Council.

C. Letter of the President to Ambassador Austin, August 28, 1950

[From New York Times, August 29, 1950]

As I told you on the telephone this morning I want to congratulate you on your able presentation of the views of the United States Government in the Security Council of the United Nations from the first onset of the aggression against the Republic of Korea Throughout the entire course of the proceedings you have represented this Government with great effectiveness and in full accordance with my directions.

The letter which you addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25 on the subject of Formosa admirably sums up the fundamental position of this Government as it had been stated by me on June 27 and in my Message to the Congress on July 19. You have clearly set forth in that letter the heart and essence of the problem. You have faithfully set down my views as they were then and as they are now.

To the end that there be no misunderstanding concerning the position of the Government of the United States with respect to Formosa, it may be useful to repeat here the seven fundamental points which you so clearly stated in your letter to Mr. Lie.

"1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

"2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression of the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

"3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

"4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

"5. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

"6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation here, or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

"7. We do not believe that the Security Council need be, or will be, diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression.

"Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force.

"If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the president of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda, which is the complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict."

These seven points accurately record the position of the United States.

In the forthcoming discussion of the problem in the Security Council you will continue to have my complete support.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

AUGUST 27, 1950.

D. Message of General MacArthur to Veterans of Foreign Wars

[From New York Times, August 29, 1950]

Your inspiring message of the 17th has moved me deeply and I trust that you will convey to all of my comrades-in-arms of the Veterans of Foreign Wars assembled on the occasion of our Fifty-first Annual National Encampment my assurance that their confidence and support will give this command much added strength to meet the tests of battle which lie immediately ahead.

Tell them that I am happy to report that their successors in arms now engaging the enemy along our battle lines in South Korea are exemplifying that same high standard of devotion, fortitude, and valor which characterized their own march to victory when they themselves engaged in combat in the field.

From senior commanders down through all ranks, their tactical skill, their invincible determination, and their fighting qualities against a fanatical foe, well trained, expertly directed and heavily armed, have upheld our country's finest traditions.

Toward victory, however difficult the road, they are giving an account of themselves which should make every American heart beat with pride and infinite satisfaction.

A New Battle Line

In view of misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific, I believe it in the public interest to avail myself of this opportunity to state my views thereon to you, all of whom, having fought overseas, understand broad strategic concepts.

To begin with, any appraisal of that strategic potential requires an appreciation of the changes wrought in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines.

That salient was not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack us. The Pacific was a potential area of advancement for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All of this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it.

Indeed, it acts as a protective shield to all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area we control to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free Allies. From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostock to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful with our control of the sea lanes and the air over these lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modern ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would come to failure.

A Peaceful Lake

Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader—it assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.

It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression. If we hold this line we may have peace—lose it and war is inevitable.

The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hand of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of this defensive perimeter, 100 to 150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly segments—Okinawa and the Philippines—than any point in continental Asia.

At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration of the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities.

An enemy force utilizing those installations currently available could increase by 100 per cent the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa as compared to operations based on the mainland and at the same time could direct damaging air attacks with fighter-type aircraft against friendly installations in the Philippines, which are currently beyond the range of fighters based on the mainland. Our air supremacy at once would become doubtful.

Strategic Formosa

As a result of its geographic location and base potential, utilization of Formosa by a military power hostile to the United States may either counter-balance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front line position.

Formosa in the hands of such a hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counter-offensive operations by friendly forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.

This unsinkable carrier-tender has the capacity to operate from ten to twenty air groups of types ranging from jet fighters to B-29 type bombers as well as to provide forward operating facilities for short-range coastal submarines.

In acquiring this forward submarine base, the efficacy of the short-range submarine would be so enormously increased by the additional radius of activity as to threaten completely sea traffic from the south and interdict all set lanes in the Western Pacific. Submarine blockade by the enemy with all its destructive ramifications would thereby become a virtual certainty.

Should Formosa fall and bases thereafter come into the hands of a potential enemy of the United States, the latter will have acquired an additional "fleet" which will have been obtained and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost than could its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tenders.

Current estimates of air and submarine resources in the Far East indicate the capability of such a potential enemy to extend his forces southward and still maintain an imposing degree of military strength for employment elsewhere in the Pacific area.

A Historical Function

Historically, Formosa has been used as a springboard for just such military aggression directed against areas to the south. The most notable and recent example was the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, it played an important part as a staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys. The supporting air forces of Japan's Army and Navy were based on fields situated along southern Formosa.

From 1942 through 1944 Formosa was a vital link in the transportation and communication chain which stretched from Japan through Okinawa and the Philippines to Southeast Asia. As the United States carrier forces advanced into the Western Pacific, the bases on Formosa assumed an increasingly greater role in the Japanese defense scheme.

Should Formosa fall into the hands of a hostile power, history would repeat itself. Its military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to breach and neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific basin.

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia.

Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grant that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership—to quickly turn on a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation—and they underestimate the Oriental mentality. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment, for few of its people fail accurately to appraise the safeguard such determination brings to their free institutions.

To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy. It would shift any future battle area 5,000 miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents, our own home coast; it would completely expose our friends in the Philippines, our friends in Australia and New Zealand, our friends in Indonesia, our friends in Japan, and other areas, to the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery against liberty, for atheism as against God.

The decision of President Truman on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all of the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

E. Message from Secretary of Defense Johnson to General MacArthur, August 26, 1950

The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations

F. Cablegram from General MacArthur to national commander, VFW, August 27, 1950

[From Washington Times-Herald, August 28, 1950]

I regret to inform you that I have been directed to withdraw my message to the national encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

G. Message of the President to General MacArthur, August 29, 1950

[From New York Times, August 30, 1950]

I am sending you for your information the text of a letter which I sent to Ambassador Austin dated Aug. 27. I am sure that when you examine this letter, and the letter which Ambassador Austin addressed to Trygve Lie on Aug. 25 (a copy of which I am told was sent to your headquarters that night), you will understand why my action of the 26th in directing the withdrawal of your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was necessary.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman have given me a comprehensive report of their conversations with you and of their visit to the United Nations forces now fighting under your command in Korea. Their reports were most satisfactory and highly gratifying to me.

VII. INCHON LANDING AND RECAPTURE OF SEOUL, SEPTEMBER 1950

[NOTE.—See Sixth Report of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, October 21, 1950, appearing in section V, above.]

A. Message of General MacArthur on return of Government of Korea to Seoul, September 29, 1950

[From New York Times, September 29, 1950]

By the grace of merciful Providence our forces fighting under the standard of that greatest hope and inspiration of mankind, the United Nations, have liberated this ancient capital city of Korea. It has been freed from the despotism of Communist rule and its citizens once more have the opportunity for that immutable concept of life which holds invincibly to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity.

The ravages of war which have been visited upon your land, Mr. President, by those forces of evil which seek to subvert the spiritual qualities of modern civilization, have been viewed with universal concern and distress. And fifty-three nations of the earth rose up in righteous wrath and indignation and pledged their full effort toward your relief.

Such was the spiritual revulsion against the march of imperialistic communism seeking the conquest, exploitation and enslavement of others. It reflects an invincible union of men and ideals against which no material weapons could long prevail and while it is inevitable force must meet force, it offers hope for the ultimate peaceful triumph of that spiritual quality without which the human mind cannot produce sound and enduring ideas. It is through the spirit that we must save the flesh.

In behalf of the United Nations I am happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the seat of your Government, that from it you may the better fulfill your constitutional responsibility. It is my fervent hope that a beneficent providence will give you and all of your public officials the wisdom and strength to meet your perplexing problems in a spirit of benevolence and justice, that from the travail of the past there may emerge a new and hopeful dawn for the people of Korea.

In humble and devout manifestation of gratitude to the Almighty God for bringing this decisive victory to our arms, I ask that all present rise and join me in reciting the Lord's Prayer:

"Our Father which art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us. And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil: For Thine is the Kingdom and the power and the glory forever. Amen."

Mr. President, my officers and I will now resume our military duties and leave you and your Government to the discharge of civil responsibility.

B. Message from the President to General MacArthur, September 29, 1950

[From State Department Bulletin, October 9, 1950]

I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can match either the delaying action where you traded space for time in which to build up your forces or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I am particularly impressed by the splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy, and Air Force, and wish you would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those services—Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy, and Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to your gallant forces—soldiers, sailors, marines, and air men—from the United States and other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all and say to all of you from all of us at home, "Well and nobly done."

C. Reply of General MacArthur thereto

[From State Department Bulletin, October 9, 1950]

I am most grateful for your generous message which I shall transmit to the elements of this command. It will be a source of inspiration and strength to all concerned.

D. General MacArthur's statement of surrender terms, October 1, 1950

[From State Department Bulletin, October 9, 1950]

To the Commander in Chief, North Korean Forces:

The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct and I call upon you at once to liberate all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to such places as I indicate. North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care dictated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

E. General MacArthur's surrender demand to North Korean forces, October 9, 1950

[From New York Times, October 9, 1950]

This is to inform you of the action taken by the United Nations General Assembly on Oct. 8 [Oct. 7, United States time], 1950, in adopting the resolution appended thereto.

In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as United Nations Commander in Chief, for the last time, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities.

And I call upon all North Koreans to cooperate fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified independent democratic government of Korea assured that they will be treated justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and rehabilitate all parts to a unified Korea.

Unless immediate response is made by you in the name of the North Korean Government I shall at once proceed to take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
General of the Army, United States Army, Commander in Chief.

VIII. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GENERAL MacARTHUR AT WAKE ISLAND, OCTOBER 15, 1950

A. The President's announcement, October 10, 1950

[From New York Times, October 11, 1950]

General MacArthur and I are making a quick trip over the coming week-end to meet in the Pacific.

When I see him I shall express to him the appreciation and gratitude of the people and Government of the United States for the great service which he is rendering to world peace. As Commander in Chief of United Nations forces in Korea, he has been acting for the world organization as well as for us. His mission has been to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area, as called for by the United Nations. He is carrying out his mission with the imagination, courage, and effectiveness which have marked his entire service as one of our greatest military leaders.

I shall discuss with him the final phase of United Nations action in Korea. In this phase, the United Nations command will be working closely with the United Nations Commission which has just been created by the General Assembly and given heavy responsibilities for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea.

We must proceed rapidly with our part in the organization of the United Nations relief and reconstruction program in order to give the Korean people a chance to live in peace. Secretary Acheson in his opening address to the General Assembly stressed the importance of this great opportunity to demonstrate the capacity of the world organization to reestablish the economic and social life of Korea, which has suffered cruelly as a result of aggression.

The successful accomplishment of this peaceful mission of reconstruction can serve as a pattern for other efforts to improve the lot of people all over the world. The task of reconstruction in Korea will be a heavy one and will require a major effort by the United Nations; the United States will carry on its full share of this load.

The only interest of the United States is to help carry out these great purposes of the United Nations in Korea. We have absolutely no interest in obtaining any special position for the United States in Korea, nor do we wish to retain bases or other military installations in that country. We should like to get our armed forces out and back to their other duties at the earliest moment consistent with the fulfillment of our obligations as a member of the United Nations.

Naturally, I shall take advantage of this opportunity to discuss with General MacArthur other matters within his responsibility.

B. The President's statement relative to his meeting with General MacArthur, October 15, 1950

[From New York Times, October 16, 1950]

I have met with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur for the purpose of getting first hand information and ideas from him. I did not wish to take him away from the scene of action in Korea any longer than necessary, and, therefore, I came to meet him at Wake. Our conference has been highly satisfactory.

The very complete unanimity of view which prevailed enabled us to finish our discussions rapidly in order to meet General MacArthur's desire to return at the earliest possible moment. It was apparent that the excellent coordination which has existed between Washington and the field, to which General MacArthur paid tribute, greatly facilitated the discussion.

After I had talked with General MacArthur privately, we met together with our advisers. These joint talks were then followed by technical consultations in which the following participated:

General MacArthur and Ambassador John Muccio; Mr. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President; Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet; Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup.

Primarily, we talked about the problems in Korea which are General MacArthur's most pressing responsibilities. I asked him for information on the military aspects.

I got from him a clear picture of the heroism and high capacity of the United Nations forces under his command. We also discussed the steps necessary to bring peace and security to the area as rapidly as possible in accordance with the intent of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and in order to get our armed forces out of Korea as soon as their United Nations mission is completed.

We devoted a good deal of time to the major problem of peaceful reconstruction of Korea which the United Nations is facing and to the solution of which we intend to make the best contribution of which the United States is capable.

This is a challenging task which must be done properly if we are to achieve the peaceful goals for which the United Nations has been fighting.

The success which has attended the combined military effort must be supplemented by both spiritual and material rehabilitation. It is essentially a task of helping the Koreans to do a job which they can do for themselves better than anyone else can do it for them.

The United Nations can, however, render essential help with supplies and technical advice as well as with the vital problem of rebuilding their educational system.

Meanwhile, I can say I was greatly impressed with what General MacArthur and Ambassador Muccio told me about what has already been done and is now being done to bring order out of chaos and to restore to the Korean people the chance for a good life in peace.

For example, the main rail line from Inchon to Suwon was opened to rail traffic in less than ten days after the Inchon landing. The rail line from Pusan to the west bank of the Han River opposite Seoul was open to one-way rail traffic about Oct. 8. Bridge and highway reconstruction is progressing rapidly. Power and the water supply in Seoul were reestablished within a week after the reentry into the capital.

General MacArthur paid a particularly fine tribute to the service being rendered in Korea by Ambassador Muccio.

I asked General MacArthur also to explain at first hand his views on the future of Japan with which I was already generally familiar through his written reports. As already announced, we are moving forward with preliminary negotiations for a peace treaty to which Japan is entitled.

General MacArthur and I look forward with confidence to a new Japan which will be both peaceful and prosperous.

I also asked General MacArthur to tell me his ideas on the ways in which the United States can most effectively promote its policies of assisting the United Nations to promote and maintain international peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

On all these matters, I have found our talks most helpful and I am very glad to have had this chance to talk them over with one of America's great soldier-statesmen, who is also now serving the unique position of the first Commander in Chief of United Nations peace forces.

We are fully aware of the dangers which lie ahead, but we are confident that we can surmount these dangers with three assets which we have:

First, unqualified devotion to peace.

Second, unity with our fellow peace-loving members of the United Nations.

Third, our determination and growing strength.

C. The President's address at San Francisco, October 17, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, October 30, 1950]

I have just returned from Wake Island, where I had a very satisfactory conference with General Douglas MacArthur.

I understand that there has been speculation about why I made this trip. There is really no mystery about it. I went because I wanted to talk to General MacArthur.

There is no substitute for personal conversation with the commander in the field who knows the problems there from first-hand experience. He has information at his fingertips which can be of help to all of us in deciding upon the right policies in these critical times.

I went out to Wake Island to see General MacArthur because I did not want to take him far away from Korea, where he is conducting very important operations with great success. Events are moving swiftly over there now, and I did not feel he should be away from his post too long.

I have come back from this conference with increased confidence in our long-range ability to maintain world peace.

At Wake Island, we talked over the Far Eastern situation and its relationship to the problem of world peace. I asked General MacArthur for his ideas on the way in which the United States can most effectively assist the United Nations in promoting and maintaining peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

We discussed Japan and the need for an early Japanese peace treaty. Both of us look forward with confidence to a new Japan which will be peaceful and prosperous.

United Nations Action in Korea

General MacArthur told me about the fighting in Korea. He described the magnificent achievements of all the United Nations forces serving under his command. Along with the soldiers of the Republic of Korea, these forces have now turned back the tide of aggression. More fighting men are coming from free nations all over the world. I am confident that these forces will soon restore peace to the whole of Korea.

We Americans naturally take special pride in the superb achievements of our own soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. They have written a glorious new page in military history. We can all be proud of them.

It is also a source of pride to us that our country was asked to furnish the first commander of United Nations' troops. It is fortunate for the world that we had the right man for this purpose—a man who is a very great soldier—General Douglas MacArthur.

The United Nations action in Korea is of supreme importance for all of the peoples of the world.

For the first time in history, the nations who want peace have taken up arms under the banner of an international organization to put down aggression. Under that banner, the banner of the United Nations, they are succeeding. This is a tremendous step forward in the age-old struggle to establish the rule of law in the world.

The people of San Francisco have shown that they appreciate the importance of the United Nations as a vital force in world affairs.

I am told that in this area alone 71 organizations are celebrating United Nations Week.

The United Nations was established here in this very building 5 years ago. It was founded in the hope and in the belief that mankind could have just and lasting peace.

Today, as a result of the Korean struggle, the United Nations is stronger than it has ever been. We know now that the United Nations can create a system of international order with the authority to maintain peace.

When I met with General MacArthur, we discussed plans for completing the task of bringing peace to Korea. We talked about the plans for establishing a "unified, independent, and democratic" government in that country in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

It has been our policy, ever since World War II, to achieve these results for Korea.

Our sole purpose in Korea is to establish peace and independence. Our troops will stay there only so long as they are needed by the United Nations for that purpose. We seek no territory or special privilege. Let this be crystal clear to all—we have no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere.

No country in the world which really wants peace has any reason to fear the United States.

The only victory we seek is the victory of peace.

The United Nations forces in Korea are making spectacular progress. But the fighting there is not yet over. The North Korean Communists still refuse to acknowledge the authority of the United Nations. They continue to put up stubborn, but futile, resistance.

The United Nations forces are growing in strength and are now far superior to the forces which still oppose them. The power of the Korean Communists to resist effectively will soon be at an end.

Rehabilitation for Korea

However, the job of the United Nations in Korea will not end when the fighting stops. There is a big task of rehabilitation to be done. As a result of the Communist aggression, Korea has suffered terrible destruction. Thousands upon thousands of people are homeless, and there is serious danger of famine and disease in the coming winter months.

The United Nations is already extending relief to ease the suffering which the Communist invasion has brought about and it is preparing to help the Koreans rebuild their homes and restore their factories.

General MacArthur and Ambassador Muccio gave me a vivid picture of the way in which the process of reconstruction has already begun. Railroads are being restored, bridges are being rebuilt, and public utilities are beginning to function.

We will use the resources of our army and our Economic Cooperation Administration to meet the immediate emergency. We will give our strong support to the United Nations program of relief and reconstruction that will soon be started. The United States will do its full part to help build a free, united, and self-supporting Korean Republic.

In a very real sense, the unity of the free nations in meeting the aggression in Korea is the result of a firmly held purpose to support peace and freedom—a purpose which the free nations have pursued together over the years.

The name "United Nations" was first used in the dark days of the Second World War by the countries then allied to put down another aggression.

From that day until this, the cause of peace has been strengthened by an active policy of cooperation among the free nations. It is not by chance, but as a result of that steady policy, that 53 members of the United Nations rallied immediately to meet the unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea.

It has been as a part of that same policy and common purpose that we have joined during the past 5 years in building up the strength of the peace-loving forces of the world. We have contributed to this end through the Marshall Plan in Europe and through economic assistance in many other parts of the world. We have also contributed to this end through military aid to countries threatened by aggression. All around the world, the free nations have been gaining strength.

We have to recognize that, as we have moved steadily along in the postwar years, our policy of building a peaceful world has met constant opposition from the Soviet Union.

Soviet Obstructionism

Here, in San Francisco 5 years ago, we hoped that the Soviet Union would cooperate in this effort to build a lasting peace.

But Communist imperialism would not have it so. Instead of working with other governments in mutual respect and cooperation, the Soviet Union attempted to extend its control over other peoples. It embarked upon a new colonialism—Soviet style. This new colonialism has already brought under its complete control and exploitation many countries which used to be free. Moreover, the Soviet Union has refused to cooperate and has not allowed its satellites to cooperate with those nations it could not control.

In the United Nations, the Soviet Union has persisted in obstruction. It has refused to share in activities devoted to the great economic, social, and spiritual causes recognized in the United Nations Charter. For months on end, it even boycotted the Security Council.

These tactics of the Soviet Union have imposed an increasingly greater strain upon the fabric of world peace. Aggression and threats of aggression, aided and abetted by obstructionism in the United Nations, have caused grave concern among the nations which are honestly seeking peace. The response of the free world to the aggression in Korea has given those nations new confidence. But events in Korea have also made it more apparent than ever that the evil spirit of aggression is still abroad in the world. So long as this is true, we are all faced with a clear and present danger.

Today, we face a violent and cynical attack upon our democratic faith, upon every hope of a decent and free life—indeed, upon every concept of human dignity. Those who support this evil purpose are prepared to back it to the limit with every device, including military force.

The Soviet Union and its colonial satellites are maintaining armed forces of great size and strength. In both Europe and Asia, their vast armies pose a constant threat to world peace. So long as they persist in maintaining these forces and in using them to intimidate other countries, the free men of the world have but one choice if they are to remain free. They must oppose strength with strength.

The Task To Maintain Peace

This is not a task for the United States alone. It is a task for the free nations to undertake together. And the free nations are undertaking it together.

In the United Nations, Secretary of State Acheson has proposed a plan for "Uniting For Peace," to make it possible for the General Assembly to act quickly and effectively in case of any further outbreak of aggression.

In our own country, and in cooperation with other countries, we are continuing to build armed forces strong enough to make it clear that aggression will not pay.

Our military establishment moved the necessary men and supplies into Korea, 5,000 miles away, in an amazingly brief period of time. This remarkable accomplishment should not delude us into any false sense of security. We must be better armed and equipped than we are today if we are to be protected from the dangers which still face us.

We must continue to increase our production for military purposes. We must continue to increase the strength of our armed forces—Army, Navy, and Air Force. We must devote more of our resources to military purposes, and less to civilian consumption.

All this will be difficult, and it will exact many sacrifices. But we are aware of the dangers we face. We are going to be prepared to meet them. Let no aggressor make any mistake about that. We value our independence and our free way of life in this country and we will give all that we have to preserve them. We are going ahead in dead earnest to build up our defenses. There will be no let-down because of the successes achieved in Korea.

As we go forward, let us remember that we are not increasing our armed strength because we want to. We are increasing our armed strength because Soviet policies leave us no other choice. The Soviet Union can change this situation. It has only to give concrete and positive proof of its intention to work for peace. If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it must prove it—not by glittering promises and false propaganda, but by living up to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it—and could have proved it on any day since last June 25th—by joining the rest of the United Nations, in calling upon the North Koreans to lay down their arms at once.

If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it by lifting the iron curtain and permitting the free exchange of information and ideas. If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it by joining in the efforts of the United Nations to establish a workable system of collective security—a system which will permit the elimination of the atomic bomb and the drastic reduction and regulation of all other arms and armed forces.

But until the Soviet Union does these things, until it gives real proof of peaceful intentions, we are determined to build up the common defensive strength of the free world. This is the choice we have made. We have made it firmly and resolutely. But it is not a choice we have made gladly. We are not a militaristic nation. We have no desire for conquest or military glory.

Economic Progress for Asia

Our national history began with a revolutionary idea—the idea of human freedom and political equality. We have been guided by the light of that idea down to this day. The forces of Communist imperialism dread this revolutionary idea because it produces an intolerable contrast to their own system. They know that our strength comes from the freedom and the well-being of our citizens. We are strong because we never stop working for better education for all our people, for fair wages and better living conditions, for more opportunities for business, and better lives for our farmers. We are strong because of our social security system, because of our labor unions, because of our agricultural program. We are strong because we use our democratic institutions continually to achieve a better life for all the people of our country.

This is the source of our strength. And this idea—this endlessly revolutionary idea of human freedom and political equality—is what we held out to all nations as the answer to the tyranny of international communism. We have seen this idea work in our own country. We know that it acknowledges no barriers of race, or nation, or creed. We know that it means progress for all men.

The international Communist movement, far from being revolutionary, is the most reactionary movement in the world today. It is violently opposed to the freedom of the individual because, in that Communist system, the state is supreme. It is equally opposed to the freedom of other nations because, in that Communist system, it is Soviet Russia which must be supreme.

When General MacArthur and I discussed the whole problem of peace in the Far East, we recognized that this is far more than a military problem.

Today, the peoples of the Far East, as well as peoples in other parts of the world, are struggling with the false revolution of communism. Soviet communism makes the false claim to these peoples that it stands for progress and human advancement. Actually, it seeks to turn them into the colonial slaves of a new imperialism. In this time of crisis, we ask the peoples of the Far East to understand us as we try to understand them. We are not trying to push blueprints upon them as ready-made answers for all their complicated problems. Every people must develop according to its own particular genius and must express its own moral and cultural values in its own way.

We believe that we have much in common with the peoples of the Far East. Their older civilizations have much to teach us. We hope our new developments may be helpful to them.

We know that the peoples of Asia cherish their freedom and independence. We sympathize with that desire and will help them to attain and defend their independence. Our entire history proclaims our policy on that point. Our men are fighting now in Asia to help secure the freedom and independence of a small nation which was brutally attacked.

We know that the peoples of Asia have problems of social injustice to solve. They want their farmers to own their land and to enjoy the fruits of their toil. That is one of our great national principles also. We believe in the family-size farm. That is the basis of our agriculture and has strongly influenced our form of government.

We know that the peoples of Asia want their industrial workers to have their full measure of freedom and rising standards of living. So do we. That is the basis of our industrial society in this country.

We know that the peoples of Asia have problems of production; they need to produce more food and clothing and shelter. It is in this field that we can make a special contribution by sharing with others the productive techniques which we have discovered in our own experience.

We are not strangers to the Far East. For more than a century, our missionaries, doctors, teachers, traders, and businessmen have knit many ties of friendship between us. If we can be of help, we are ready to offer it—but only to those who want it. Through the Economic Cooperation Administration, Point 4, and in many other ways, we are trying to help the peoples of other countries to improve their living standards. We will continue these programs in cooperation with the United Nations. Even as we undertake the necessary burdens of defense against aggression, we will help to expand the work of aiding human progress. Otherwise, measures of defense alone will have little value.

We seek full partnership with the peoples of Asia, as with all other peoples, in the defense and support of the ideals which we and they have written into the Charter of the United Nations. This is the partnership of peace.

I have spoken to you tonight about some of the things which all of us are thinking about as we press ahead to finish our job in Korea. At a time when our forces under General MacArthur are locked in combat with a stubborn enemy, it is essential for us to understand what our broad purposes are and see clearly the kind of world we seek to build. As your President, I realize what it means to the homes of America to have the youth of our land called to meet aggression. These are the most solemn decisions and impose the heaviest responsibility upon those who must make them. I have told you tonight why we must do what we are doing. We hate war, but we love our liberties. We will not see them destroyed. We want peace, but it must be a peace founded upon justice. That American policy is as old as our Republic, and it is stronger today than ever before in our history. We intend to keep it that way.

IX. NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES

[NOTE.—See Tenth Report of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, December 27, 1950, appearing in section V, above.]

A. Special communiqué of General MacArthur, November 24, 1950

[From UN Security Council Release, November 27, 1950]

The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea against the new Red armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our Air

Forces of all types, have, for the last three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited.

The eastern sector of the pincer, with noteworthy and effective naval support, has steadily advanced in a brilliant tactical movement and has now reached a commanding enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy's geographical potential.

This morning the western sector of the pincer moved forward in general assault in an effort to complete the compression and close the vise.

If successful this should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight.

B. Cablegram from General MacArthur to Ray Henle, editor, Sun Oil Company's Three Star Extra, November 28, 1950

[From Washington Post, November 29, 1950]

In reply to question contained in your cable of November 28 apparently greatly exaggerated statements have been attributed to some informal comments passed between my field commanders and myself in a jocular vein expressive of the universal hope for an early termination of hostilities. The evident physical impossibility of fulfillment of the statement attributed to me should be its own best refutation. At no time have I ever attempted to predict the course or termination of this or any other military campaign.

X. ENTRY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES INTO KOREAN MILITARY OPERATIONS

[NOTE.—See Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, dated November 6, 1950, December 27, 1950, and January 31, 1951, appearing in section V, above.]

A. Special report of General MacArthur to the Security Council, United Nations, November 5, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, November 27, 1950]

I herewith submit a special report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea which I believe should be brought to the attention of the United Nations.

The United Nations Forces in Korea are continuing their drive to the north and their efforts to destroy further the effectiveness of the enemy as a fighting force are proving successful. However, presently in certain areas of Korea, the United Nations Forces are meeting a new foe. It is apparent to our fighting forces, and our intelligence agencies have confirmed the fact, that the United Nations are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units deployed for action against the forces of the United Command.

Hereafter, in summary form, are confirmed intelligence reports substantiating the fact that forces other than Korean are resisting our efforts to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations:

A. 22 August: Approximately 50 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 7,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of the Sui-Ho reservoir; damage, none; time 1600K; weather, 10 miles visibility, high broken clouds.

B. 24 August: Approximately 40 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 10,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none; time 1500K; weather, 20 miles visibility.

C. 15 October: Anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of Yalu River against a flight of 4 F–51's flying near the Sinuiju airfield on the Korean side of the river; damage, 1 aircraft total loss; time, 1445I; weather, overcast at 8,000 feet; 8 to 10 miles visibility.

D. 16 October: The 370th Regiment of the 124th Division of the Chinese Communist 42nd Army, consisting of approximately 2,500 troops, crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Wan Po Jin, and proceeded to the area of Chosen and Fusen Dams in North Korea where they came in contact with U. N. forces approximately 40 miles north of Hamhung.

E. 17 October: Approximately 15 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 10,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none; time 1200I; weather, 8 miles visibility, low clouds 2,300 feet.

F. 20 October: A Chinese Communist Task Force known as the "56th" unit, consisting of approximately 5,000 troops, crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Antung and deployed to positions in Korea south of the Sui-Ho Dam. A captured Chinese Communist soldier of this Task Force states that his group was organized out of the regular Chinese Communist 40th Army stationed at Antung, Manchuria.

G. 1 November: A flight of F–51's was attacked early in the afternoon by 6 to 9 Jet aircraft which flew across the Yalu River into Manchuria. No damage was done to US aircraft. A red star was observed on the top of the right wing on one of the Jet aircraft.

H. 1 November: Anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu River directed against a flight of 13 F–80 aircraft was observed in the vicinity of Sinuiju at 1345 hours. This resulted in the total loss of 1 U. N. aircraft.

I. 30 October: Interrogation of 19 Chinese prisoners of war identified two additional regiments of 124 CCF Division, the 371 and the 372 in the vicinity of Changjin.

J. 2 November: Interrogation of prisoners of war indicates the 54 CCF unit in Korea. This unit is reported to have same organization as 55 and 56 units, but to be drawn from the 112, 113, and 114 Divisions of the 38 CCF Army.

K. 3 November: Further interrogation of Chinese prisoners of war indicates 56 CCF unit organized from elements of 118, 119, and 120 CCF Divisions of the 40 CCF Army.

L. 4 November: As of this date, a total of 35 CCF prisoners had been taken in Korea.

The continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the hostile attitude assumed by such forces, either inside or outside Korea, are matters which it is incumbent upon me to bring at once to the attention of the U. N.

B. Statement of the President, November 16, 1950

[From New York Times, November 17, 1950]

The Security Council has before it a resolution concerning the grave situation caused by the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. This resolution, introduced by the representatives of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, reaffirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate, to protect fully legitimate Korean and Chinese interests in the frontier zone, and to withdraw the United Nations forces from Korea as soon as stability has been restored and a unified, independent and democratic government established throughout Korea.

This resolution further calls upon all states and authorities to withdraw immediately from Korea all individuals or units which are assisting the North Korean forces. I am sure that all members of the Security Council genuinely interested in restoring peace in the Far East will not only support this resolution but also use their influence to obtain compliance with it.

United Nations forces now are being attacked from the safety of a privileged sanctuary. Planes operating from bases in China cross over into Korea to attack United Nations ground and air forces and then flee back across the border. Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces are being reinforced, supplied and equipped from bases behind the safety of the Sino-Korean border.

The pretext which the Chinese Communist advance for taking offensive action against United Nations forces in Korea from behind the protection afforded by the Sino-Korean border is their professed belief that these forces intend to carry hostilities across the frontier into Chinese territory.

The resolutions and every other action taken by the United Nations demonstrate beyond any doubt that no such intention has ever been entertained. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly stated that it is the intention of the United Nations to localize the conflict and to withdraw its forces from Korea as soon as the situation permits.

Speaking for the United States Government and people, I can give assurance that we support and are acting within the limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China.

So far as the United States is concerned, I wish to state unequivocally that because of our deep devotion to the cause of world peace and our long-standing friendship for the people of China we will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East.

If the Chinese Communist authorities or people believe otherwise, it can only be because they are being deceived by those whose advantage it is to prolong and extend hostilities in the Far East against the interests of all Far Eastern people.

Let it be understood, however, that a desire for peace, in order to be effective, must be shared by all concerned. If the Chinese Communists share the desire of the United Nations for peace and security in the Far East they will not take upon themselves the responsibility for obstructing the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

C. Special communiqué issued by General MacArthur, November 28, 1950

[From New York Times, November 29, 1950]

Enemy reactions developed in the course of our assault operations of the past four days disclose that a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea.

There exists the obvious intent and preparation for support of these forces by heavy reinforcements now concentrated within the privileged sanctuary north of the international boundary and constantly moving forward.

Consequently, we face an entirely new war. This has shattered the high hopes we entertained that the intervention of the Chinese was only of a token nature on a volunteer and individual basis as publicly announced, and that therefore the war in Korea could be brought to a rapid close by our movement to the international boundary and the prompt withdrawal thereafter of United Nations forces, leaving Korean problems for settlement by the Koreans themselves.

It now appears to have been the enemy's intent, in breaking off contact with our forces some two weeks ago, to secure the time necessary surreptitiously to build up for a later surprise assault upon our lines in overwhelming force, taking advantage of the freezing of all rivers and roadbeds which would have materially reduced the effectiveness of our air interdiction and permitted a greatly accelerated forward movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. This plan has been disrupted by our own offensive action, which forced upon the enemy a premature engagement.

General MacArthur later issued this additional paragraph to the communiqué:

This situation, repugnant as it may be, poses issues beyond the authority of the United Nations military council—issues which must find their solution within the councils of the United Nations and chancelleries of the world.

D. General MacArthur's exchange of communications with Arthur Krock, November 1950

(1) *Arthur Krock's message to General MacArthur, November 29, 1950*

[From New York Times, December 1, 1950]

Answering criticisms for military action beyond Thirty-eighth Parallel or Pyongyang some officials here saying for non-attribution but for publication that every time such stop-point was suggested you replied you would not accept responsibility for security of your troops if decision was made; that this faced authorities with dilemma of taking risk replacing you with elections coming on or letting you proceed against their political and diplomatic judgment and against some high military judgments also.

ARTHUR KROCK.

(2) *General MacArthur's reply, November 30, 1950*

[From New York Times, December 1, 1950]

Reference query contained in your radio of the twenty-ninth, there is no validity whatsoever to the anonymous gossip to which you refer. Every strategic and tactical movement made by the United Nations Command has been in complete accordance with United Nations resolutions and in compliance with the directives under which I operate, every major step having been previously reported and fully approved.

I have received no suggestion from any authoritative source that in the execution of its mission the Command should stop at the Thirty-eighth Parallel or Pyongyang, or at any other line short of the international boundary. To have done so would have required revision of the resolutions of the United Nations and the directives received in implementation thereof.

It is historically inaccurate to attribute any degree of responsibility for the onslaught of the Chinese Communist armies to the strategic course of the campaign itself. The decision by the Chinese Communist leaders to wage war against the United Nations could only have been a basic one, long premeditated and carried into execution as direct result of the defeat of their satellite North Korean armies. Thanks for bringing this misleading anonymous gossip to my attention.

MACARTHUR,
Commander in Chief, Far East Command.

E. Statement of the President, November 30, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1950]

Recent developments in Korea confront the world with a serious crisis. The Chinese Communist leaders have sent their troops from Manchuria to launch a strong and well-organized attack against the United Nations forces in North Korea. This has been done despite prolonged and earnest efforts to bring home to the Communist leaders of China the plain fact that neither the United Nations nor the United States has any aggressive intentions toward China. Because of the historic friendship between the people of the United States and China, it is particularly shocking to us to think that Chinese are being forced into battle against our troops in the United Nations command.

The Chinese attack was made in great force, and it still continues. It has resulted in the forced withdrawal of large parts of the United Nations command. The battlefield situation is uncertain at this time. We may suffer reverses as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea.

The forces of the United Nations are in Korea to put down an aggression that threatens not only the whole fabric of the United Nations but all human hopes of peace and justice. If the United Nations yields to the forces of aggression, no nation will be safe or secure. If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread through Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival.

We have committed ourselves to the cause of a just and peaceful world order through the United Nations. We stand by that commitment.

We shall meet the new situation in three ways. We shall continue to work in the United Nations for concerted action to halt this aggression in Korea. We shall intensify our efforts to help other free nations strengthen their defenses in order to meet the threat of aggression elsewhere. We shall rapidly increase our own military strength.

In the United Nations, the first step is action by the Security Council to halt this aggression. Ambassador Warren Austin is pressing for such action. We shall exert every effort to help bring the full influence of the United Nations to bear on the situation in Korea.

Some had hoped that the normal peaceful process of discussion and negotiation, which is provided through the United Nations, could be successfully entered into with the present Chinese Communist delegation at Lake Success. There is, however, no indication that the representatives of Communist China are willing to engage in this process. Instead of discussing the real issues, they have been making violent and wholly false statements of the type which have often been used by the Soviet representatives in an effort to prevent the Security Council from acting.

We hope that the Chinese people will not continue to be forced or deceived into serving the ends of Russian colonial policy in Asia. I am certain that, if the Chinese people now under the control of the communists were free to speak for themselves, they would denounce this aggression against the United Nations.

Because this new act of aggression in Korea is only a part of a world-wide pattern of danger to all the free nations of the world, it is more necessary than ever before for us to increase at a very rapid rate the combined military strength of the free nations. It is more necessary than ever that integrated forces in Europe under a Supreme Command be established at once.

With respect to our own defense, I shall submit a supplemental request for appropriations needed immediately to increase the size and effectiveness of our armed forces. The request will include a substantial amount for the Atomic Energy Commission in addition to large amounts for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

I expect to confer tomorrow with Congressional leaders and ask them to give urgent consideration to these appropriations.

This is a time for all our citizens to lay aside differences and unite in firmness and mutual determination to do what is best for our country and the cause of freedom throughout the world. This country is the keystone of the hopes of mankind for peace and justice. We must show that we are guided by a common purpose and a common faith.

F. The President's message to the Congress, December 1, 1950

[From House Document No. 726, Eighty-first Congress]

To the Congress of the United States:

I am today transmitting to the Congress a request for additional funds to strengthen our defenses. The gravity of the world situation requires that these funds be made available with the utmost speed.

I am recommending additional appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1951 in the amount of 16.8 billion dollars.

These funds are needed to support our part in the United Nations military action in Korea, and to increase the size and readiness of our Armed Forces should action become necessary in other parts of the world.

Together with the funds appropriated in the General Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1951, and those appropriated in the Supplemental Appropriation Act for fiscal 1951, this will make a total of 41.8 billion dollars for the United States military forces for the current fiscal year.

I am also recommending a supplemental appropriation for the Atomic Energy Commission in the amount of $1,050,000,000. These funds will enable the Commission to enlarge its production capacity substantially. The new facilities will provide larger capacity for the production of fissionable materials, and for the fabrication of such materials into atomic weapons. The fissionable materials thus produced can be utilized either in weapons or as fuels for power-producing atomic reactors. The program for building these additional facilities has been developed after thorough study over the last few months.

The further expansion of our military forces and of our atomic energy enterprise are directed toward strengthening the defenses of the United States and of the entire free world. This expansion is a matter of great urgency, which can be understood and evaluated only against the background of present critical world conditions.

United States troops are now fighting as part of the United Nations command in Korea. They are fighting for freedom and against tyranny—for law and order and against brutal aggression. The attack of the North Korean Communists on their peaceful fellow-countrymen in June was in defiance of the United Nations and was an attack upon the security of peaceful nations everywhere. Their action, if unchecked, would have blasted all hope of a just and lasting peace—for if open aggression had been unopposed in Korea, it would have been an invitation to aggression elsewhere.

In that crisis, the United Nations acted, and the United States strongly supported that action—for the people of this country knew that our own freedom was as much at stake as the freedom of the Korean people. We knew that the issue was nothing less than the survival of freedom everywhere. If freemen did not stand together against aggression, there could be no hope for peace. This was essentially a moral decision. We did not hesitate, even though we knew we would have to operate at the end of lengthy supply lines, and would initially be faced with overwhelming odds.

There were serious reverses at first, but the courage and skill of our men, and those of other free nations, working together under brilliant leadership, drove the aggressors back.

It soon became evident that North Koreans alone could not have prepared the kind of well-organized, well-armed attack which was launched against the Republic of Korea. As Ambassador Austin proved in the Security Council of the United Nations, the aggressors were armed with Soviet Russian weapons. From the early days of the attack, it became clear that the North Korean forces were being supplemented and armed from across the frontier. Men and equipment were coming out of those dark places which lie behind the iron curtain.

As the United Nations forces continued to defeat the aggressors and continued to advance in their mission of liberation, Chinese Communist participation in the aggression became more blatant. General MacArthur, as Commander of the United Nations forces, reported to the United Nations Security Council on November 5 the proof of this participation.

Despite this outside Communist aid, United Nations troops were well on the way to success in their mission of restoring peace and independence in Korea when the Chinese Communists a few days ago sent their troops into action on a large scale on the side of the aggressor.

The present aggression is thus revealed as a long-calculated move to defy the United Nations and to destroy the Republic of Korea which was giving a demonstration to the peoples of Asia of the advantages of life in an independent, national, non-Communist state.

The present attack on the United Nations forces by the Chinese Communists is a new act of aggression—equally as naked, deliberate, and unprovoked as the earlier aggression of the North Korean Communists. Cutting through the fog of Communist propaganda, this fact stands unmistakably clear: the Chinese Communists, without a shadow of justification, crossed the border of a neighboring country and attacked United Nations troops who were on a mission to restore peace under the direction of the organization representing mankind's best hope for freedom and justice.

The Chinese Communists have acted presumably with full knowledge of the dreadful consequences their action may bring on them. The Chinese people have been engaged in fighting within their own country for years, and in the process their lands and factories have been laid waste and their young men killed. Nothing but further misery can come to the Chinese people from the reckless course of aggression into which they have been led by the Communists.

The United Nations resolutions, the statements of responsible officials in every free country, the actions of the United Nations command in Korea, all have proved beyond any possible misunderstanding that the United Nations action in Korea presented no threat to legitimate Chinese interests. The United States especially has a long history of friendship for the Chinese people and support for Chinese independence. There is no conceivable justification for the attack of the Chinese Communists upon the United Nations forces.

The only explanation is that these Chinese have been misled or forced into their reckless attack—an act which can only bring tragedy to themselves—to further the imperialist designs of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists have acted, and they must bear the responsibility for those acts. They have attacked a United Nations force composed of men from Australia, Canada, France, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United Nations force they have attacked includes also Indian and Swedish hospital units. It is a force now being supplemented by troops from Belgium, Colombia, Greece, and Luxemburg. Fifty-three members of the United Nations are supporting this common effort to stop aggression. The Chinese Communists struck at all of these countries when they started to make war against the United Nations.

The United Nations troops are defending themselves vigorously, and will do so with increasing effectiveness as their forces regroup. At Lake Success, the United Nations is now considering how best to halt this new aggression and bring to an end the fighting in Korea.

Meanwhile, two facts are clear:

First, the moral issue now is the same as it was in June. The aggression of the Chinese Communists is a direct assault upon the United Nations, and upon the principles of international law and order which are its foundation. By their action, the Chinese Communist leaders have proved themselves lawbreakers in the community of nations. If there is to be any hope for world peace, the nations which truly want peace must stand together in opposing this new aggression, just as they did in opposing the original attack from North Korea.

Second, this aggression casts a more ominous shadow over the prospects for world peace. We see no issue between the Chinese Communists and the free nations, or between the Soviet Union and the free nations, which could not be honorably solved by peaceful means. We continue to stand ready in good faith to seek solutions in that way. But the Chinese Communist leaders, who are known to be in close relations with the Kremlin, have not hesitated to make a large-scale assault upon United Nations troops. The leaders of Communist imperialism could not help but know that this action involved grave risk of world war. Their present aggressive actions seem utterly inconsistent with any peaceful intention.

In the face of this situation, the United States and the other free nations have no choice but to increase their military strength very rapidly. As freemen, dedicated to the peaceful advancement of human well-being, we have not made this choice gladly. But we have made it firmly and definitely, and we will not falter or turn back.

Prior to this new act of aggression by the Chinese Communists, a supplemental estimate of appropriations for our Armed Forces was being prepared. This supplemental estimate, which I am transmitting to the Congress today, provides for large additional appropriations for the current fiscal year.

When the Communists of North Korea brutually assaulted the Republic of Korea last June, the strength of our Armed Forces stood at approximately 1½ million men and women; today, 5 months later, the manpower strength of our Armed Forces has been increased by more than 50 percent, to more than 2¼ million men and women; and our goal, until this most recent act of aggression, has been a strength of 2,800,000 by the end of the current fiscal year. Now, we face the necessity of having to raise our sights, both in terms of manpower and in terms of production.

This prospect makes it essential that the funds I am now requesting be made available speedily in order to build up our military strength as rapidly as possible. About $9,000,000,000 of these new funds will be used for major military procurement, and to expand facilities for military production.

The appropriation request I am transmitting today is not a war budget. That would obviously require far more money.

However, the immediate appropriation of these funds will permit us to make the fastest possible progress in increasing our strength. This action will permit us to go ahead at once to step up rapidly the size of the Armed Forces and the rate of military training. It will permit us to go ahead at once to increase rapidly the rate of production of planes, tanks, and other military equipment. At the same time, we can be going ahead with plans for such further expansion as may be necessary, and any additional funds required for that purpose can be requested when and as such plans are worked out.

These measures will put us in a position to move speedily into an increased state of mobilization if the situation grows worse. If the situation improves, we can level off the size of forces and the rate of production of military goods as may be appropriate. In any case, we must be prepared to endure a long period of tension.

I wish to emphasize again, as I have before, that the situation we are in requires from every one of us the utmost devotion and willingness to do his full part. In this critical time, the national interest is paramount, and all partisan or selfish considerations must be subordinated.

The United States is today strong and free. Whatever may come, I know the people of this country will do everything in their power to increase that strength and protect our precious freedom.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *December 1, 1950.*

G. The President's communiqué of December 8, 1950, regarding his conferences with Prime Minister Attlee

[From Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1950]

Since Prime Minister Attlee arrived in Washington on December 4, six meetings between the President and Mr. Attlee have been held. Among those who participated as advisers to the President were the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, the Secretary of Defense Gen. George C. Marshall, the Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, the Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, W. Averell Harriman, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, W. Stuart Symington, and Ambassador-designate Walter S. Gifford. Mr. Attlee's advisers included the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver S. Franks, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Sir Roger Makins, and R. H. Scott of the Foreign Office and Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief of the Economic Planning Staff.

At the conclusion of their conferences, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following joint statement:

We have reviewed together the outstanding problems facing our two countries in international affairs. The objectives of our two nations in foreign policy are the same: to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life.

We first reviewed the changed aspect of world affairs arising from the massive intervention of Chinese Communists in Korea. We have discussed the problems of the Far East and the situation as it now presents itself in Europe. We have surveyed the economic problems and the defense programs of our respective countries, and particularly the existing and threatened shortages of raw materials. We have considered the arrangements for the defense of the Atlantic community, and our future course in the United Nations.

The unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the discussions. There is no difference between us as to the nature of the threat which our countries face or the basic policies which must be pursued to overcome it. We recognize, that many of the problems which we have discussed can only be decided through the procedures of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The peoples of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace which recent weeks have made clear to all.

The situation in Korea is one of great gravity and far-reaching consequences. By the end of October, the forces of the United Nations had all but completed the mission set for them by the United Nations "to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." A free and unified Korea—the objective which the United Nations has long sought—was well on the way to being realized. At that point Chinese Communist forces entered Korea in large numbers, and on November 27 launched a large-scale attack on the United Nations troops. The United Nations forces have the advantage of superior air power and naval support, but on the ground they are confronted by a heavy numerical superiority.

The United Nations forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the recommendation of the United Nations. The United Nations has not changed the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will continue to discharge their responsibilities.

We were in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting peace and the future of the United Nations as an instrument for world peace depend upon strong support for resistance against aggression.

For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation. The same principles of international conduct should be applied to this situation as are applied, in accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to any threat to world peace. Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. We are confident that the great majority of the United Nations takes the same view. If the Chinese on their side display any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best be maintained. For our part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold them.

We considered two questions regarding China which are already before the United Nations. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two Governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People's Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the seating of the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations. We have discussed our difference of view on this point and are determined to prevent it from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.

On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agree that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends.

The free nations of Asia have given strong support to the United Nations and have worked for world peace. Communist aggression in Korea increases the danger to the security and independence of these nations. We reaffirm our intention to continue to help them.

The pressure of Communist expansion existed in Europe and elsewhere long before the aggression against Korea, and measures were taken to meet it. The need to strengthen the forces of collective security had already been recognized and action for this purpose is under way. Clearly, decisions regarding the Far East have their repercussions and effects elsewhere. In considering the necessities of the Far Eastern situation, we have kept in mind the urgency of building up the strength of the whole free world. We are in complete agreement on the need for immediate action by all the North Atlantic Treaty countries to intensify their efforts to build up their defenses and to strengthen the Atlantic community.

We recognize that adequate defense forces are essential if war is to be prevented.

Accordingly, we have reached the following conclusions:

1. The military capabilities of the United States and the United Kingdom should be increased as rapidly as possible.

2. The two countries should expand the production of arms which can be used by the forces of all the free nations that are joined together in common defense. Together with those other nations the United States and the United Kingdom should continue to work out mutual arrangements by which all will contribute appropriately to the common defense.

We agreed that as soon as the plan now nearing completion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for an effective integrated force for the defense of Europe is approved, a Supreme Commander should be appointed. It is our joint desire that this appointment shall be made soon.

In addition to these decisions on increasing our military strength, we have agreed that the maintenance of healthy civilian economies is of vital importance to the success of our defense efforts. We agreed that, while defense production must be given the highest practicable priority in the case of raw materials whose supply is inadequate, the essential civilian requirements of the free countries must be met so far as practicable. In order to obtain the necessary materials and to devote them as rapidly as possible to these priority purposes, we have agreed to work closely together for the purpose of increasing supplies of raw materials. We have recognized the necessity of international action to assure that basic raw materials are distributed equitably in accordance with defense and essential civilian needs. We discussed certain immediate problems of raw materials shortages and consideration of these specific matters will continue. We are fully conscious of the increasing necessity of preventing materials and items of strategic importance from flowing into the hands of those who might use them against the free world.

In the circumstances which confront us throughout the world our nations have no other choice but to devote themselves with all vigor to the building up of our defense forces. We shall do this purely as a defensive measure. We believe that the Communist leaders of the Soviet Union and China could, if they chose, modify their conduct in such a way as to make these defense preparations unnecessary. We shall do everything that we can, through whatever channels are open to us, to impress this view upon them and to seek a peaceful solution of existing issues.

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.

In this critical period, it is a source of satisfaction to us that the views of our Governments on basic problems are so similar. We believe that this identity of aims will enable our Governments to carry out their determination to work together to strengthen the unity which has already been achieved among the free nations and to defend those values which are of fundamental importance to the people we represent.

XI. UNITED NATIONS ACTION, DECEMBER 14, 1950, TO FEBRUARY 1, 1951

A. Cease-fire resolution, December 14, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, December 25, 1950]

The General Assembly,

Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons including himself to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.

B. Report to the General Assembly from group on cease-fire in Korea, January 2, 1951

[From Department of State Bulletin, January 15, 1951]

[1.] On 14 December 1950 the General Assembly adopted the following resolution which had been sponsored by thirteen Asian Powers:

> The General Assembly,
>
> VIEWING with grave concern the situation in the Far East,
>
> ANXIOUS that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
>
> *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.

2. In pursuance of the resolution, the President forthwith constituted a group consisting of Mr. L. B. Pearson of Canada, Sir Benegal N. Rau of India and himself, and announced this fact to the General Assembly. The Group met almost immediately afterwards and decided to associate the Secretary-General of the United Nations with its work.

3. A copy of the resolution was sent on 15 December to Ambassador Wu, the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China who was then in New York.

4. On 15 December, as a first step in carrying out its task the Group consulted the representatives of the Unified Command as to what they considered to be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire. The suggestions which emerged from this consultation and which in the circumstances the Group felt constituted a reasonable basis for discussion, are summarized below:

(1) All governments and authorities concerned, including the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities, shall order and enforce a cessation of all acts of armed force in Korea. This cease-fire shall apply to all of Korea.

(2) There shall be established a demilitarised area across Korea of approximately twenty miles in depth with the southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel.

(3) All ground forces shall remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear; forces, including guerrillas, within or in advance of the demilitarised area must be moved to the rear of the demilitarised area; opposing air forces shall respect the demilitarised zone and the areas beyond the zone; opposing Naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces to the limit of 3 miles from shore.

(4) Supervision of the cease-fire shall be by a United Nations Commission whose members and designated observers shall insure full compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. They shall have free

and unlimited access to the whole of Korea. All governments and authorities shall co-operate with the Cease-Fire Commission and its designated observers in the performance of their duties.

(5) All governments and authorities shall cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or personnel, including volunteers, and the introduction of additional war equipment and material. Such equipment and material will not include supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Cease-Fire Commission.

(6) Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, pending final settlement of the Korean question.

(7) Appropriate provision shall be made in the cease-fire arrangements in regard to steps to insure (a) the security of the forces; (b) the movement of refugees; and (c) the handling of other specific problems arising out of the cease-fire, including civil government and police power in the demilitarised zone.

(8) The General Assembly should be asked to confirm the cease-fire arrangements, which should continue in effect until superseded by further steps approved by the United Nations.

5. The Group then attempted to consult the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and, for this purpose, sent a message by hand to Ambassador Wu and repeated it by cable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Peking. The text of this message is reproduced below:

> DEAR AMBASSADOR WU, As you have already been informed by Resolution 1717, a copy of which was sent to you yesterday, a Committee was set up by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the previous day, December 14, consisting of myself and my two colleagues, Sir Benegal Rau of India, and Mr. L. B. Pearson of Canada, charged with the duty of determining whether it is possible to arrange appropriate and satisfactory conditions for a cease-fire in Korea. The purpose of this cease-fire in Korea will be to prevent the conflict from spreading to other area, to put an end to the fighting in Korea, and to provide an opportunity for considering what further steps should be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
>
> The above Committee has now met representatives of the Unified Command in Korea, and has discussed with them, in an exploratory manner, possible conditions upon which a cease-fire might be established. Since the Government of the Communist People's Republic of China has expressed strong views on the future of Korea, and about the present state of warfare in that country, and since Chinese are participating in that warfare, the Committee wishes also to discuss with your Government or its representatives, and with the military authorities in command of the forces operating in North Korea possible conditions upon which a cease-fire might be established. For this purpose, we desire to see you at your earliest convenience, and we should be grateful to know when a meeting can be arranged.
>
> We realised that your Government which sent you here with other objects in mind, may prefer other arrangements by which a cease-fire can be discussed with them. We wish your Govern-

> ment to know that, in the interests of stopping the fighting in Korea and of facilitating a just settlement of the issues there in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, we are prepared to discuss cease-fire arrangements with your Government or its representatives either here or elsewhere, as would be mutually convenient. We urge only that arrangements for these discussions should be made with the least possible delay. With this in mind, we are sending the text of this communication directly to your Government by telegram.
>
> Yours sincerely, NASROLLAH ENTEZAM.
>
> *December 16, 1950.*

6. On 18 December, Mr. Pearson, on behalf of the Group, submitted a brief preliminary account of its activities to the First Committee, hoping that a fuller report would be made in the near future.

7. On 16 December, the President, acting on behalf of the Group, had availed himself of the good offices of the Swedish Delegation to transmit through the Swedish Embassy in Peking a request to the Central People's Government that Ambassador Wu be instructed to stay on in New York and discuss with the Group the possibility of arranging a cease-fire. The reply to the request, communicated to the President on 21 December, through the same channel was as follows:

> The Central People's Government acknowledges receipt of a message dated 18th December 1950 from Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly, transmitted via the Swedish Government and ask the Swedish Government to transmit the following reply to Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly.
>
> The representative of the People's Republic of China neither participated in nor agreed to the adoption of the Resolution concerning the so-called 3-man Committee for Cease Fire in Korea by United Nations General Assembly. The Central People's Government has repeatedly declared that the Central People's Government would regard as illegal and null and void all major resolutions especially those concerning Asia which might be adopted by the United Nations without the participation and approval of the duly appointed delegates of the People's Republic of China. Therefore the Central People's Government cannot instruct its representative General Wu to continue to remain in Lake Success for negotiations with the above-mentioned 3-men illegal Committee. After the Security Council unreasonably voted against the "Complaint against the United States armed aggression against Taiwan" raised by the People's Republic of China General Wu was instructed by the Central People's Government to continue to stay at Lake Success for participation in the discussion of "the complaint of the U. S. aggression against China" submitted by the USSR representative; although he has waited for a long time and until the United Nations General Assembly was declared adjourned, he was still not given the opportunity to speak. Under such circumstances, the Central People's Government deems that there is no more necessity for General Wu and his staff to remain at Lake Success and has therefore instructed him to start their homeward journey on December 19.

> 2. As to the question of how the United Nations may get in touch with the Korean Democratic People's Republic the Central People's Government deems that there is no more necessity for address direct inquiry to the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic.

8. On 19 December, acting on a recommendation from the sponsors of the twelve-Power resolution introduced in the First Committee on 12 December, the Group sent another message to the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government. This was intended to remove any possible misunderstandings which may have arisen out of the separation of the twelve-Power resolution from the thirteen-Power resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December. The text of the message is given below:

> CHOU EN-LAI,
> *Minister for Foreign Affairs*
> *Central People's Government of People's Republic of China*
> *(Peking, China)*
>
> In the consideration which you are giving to our earlier message, we are anxious that there should be no misunderstanding as to the relationship between the United Nations Resolution establishing a cease fire group, and resolution proposed by twelve Asian Government, recommending appointment of a committee to meet as soon as possible and make recommendations for peaceful settlement of existing issues in Far East. It is our clear understanding and also that of the twelve Asian sponsors, that once a cease fire arrangement had been achieved, the negotiations visualised in the second resolution should be proceeded with at once. Indeed, the preamble to cease fire resolution states specifically that steps should be taken for a peaceful settlement when fighting in Korea is ended. It is also our view, as well as that of the twelve Asian governments sponsoring the second resolution, that Government of the Peoples Republic of China should be included in the Negotiating Committee referred to in that resolution. We feel that this Committee could become an effective channel for seeking peaceful solution of existing issues in Far East between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. For that purpose, in our opinion, it should be set up with minimum of delay, but to make that possible a "cease fire" arrangement must be put into effect. This point of view has been communicated to your Delegation which left New York today, and we express the hope that you will give full weight to it.
>
> Committee of the General Assembly
> NASROLLAH ENTEZAM,
> *President of the General Assembly*
> SIR BENEGAL RAU
> LESTER B. PEARSON

9. On 23 December, the President of the General Assembly, in his capacity as such, received from the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government the text of a statement issued by the latter in Peking on 22 December explaining the attitude of the Central People's Government on the Resolution constituting the Cease-Fire Group and on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This docu-

ment is reproduced as an Annex. It appears to be in the nature of an answer to the Group's message of 16 December.

10. In these circumstances and in spite of its best efforts, the Group regrets that it has been unable to pursue discussion of a satisfactory cease-fire arrangement. It therefore feels that no recommendation in regard to a cease-fire can usefully be made by it at this time.

ANNEX I TO THE REPORT OF THE GROUP ON CEASE FIRE IN KOREA

(*Cablegram dated 23 December 1950 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China addressed to the President of the General Assembly*)

PEKING, *December 23, 1950.*

NASROLLAH ENTEZAM,
President of the Fifth Session
of the United Nations General Assembly,
Lake Success.

The attitude of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the so-called "three man committee for cease-fire in Korea" and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is to be found in my statement issued on December 22. Besides being broadcast by the Hsiu Hua News Agency on the same date, the said statement is hereby transmitted by cable for your information.

CHOU EN-LAI,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Central Peoples Government of the
Peoples Republic of China,

PEKING, *December 22, 1950.*

Statement by Chou En-Lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the resolution concerning the "three-man committee for cease-fire in Korea" illegally adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, on December 14, 1950.

The General Assembly of the United Nations illegally adopted a resolution submitted by thirteen nations concerning a so-called cease-fire in Korea. This resolution provided for the establishment of a three-man committee, consisting of the President of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, Entezam, the Indian Delegate Rau, and the Canadian Delegate Pearson both appointed by him, to conduct talks to determine whether it is possible to arrange appropriate and satisfactory conditions for a cease-fire in Korea, and then to make recommendations to the United Nations General Assembly. With reference to this resolution, Chou En-Lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central Peoples Government, the Peoples Republic of China, issues the following statement:

"1" The Representative of the Peoples Republic of China neither participated in nor agreed to the adoption of the resolution concerning the so-called "three-man committee for cease-fire in Korea" by the United Nations General Assembly. Prior to this, the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China had repeatedly declared that the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China would regard as illegal and null and void all resolutions on major problems, especially those concerning the major problems of Asia, which might be adopted by the United Nations without the participation and concurrence of the duly appointed Delegates of the Peoples Republic of China. Therefore, the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and its Delegates are not prepared to make any contract with the above mentioned illegal "three-man committee".

"2" The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China has always held and still holds that the hostilities in Korea should be speedily brought to an end. In order to end the hostilities in Korea, genuine peace must be restored in Korea, and the Korean people must have genuine freedom to settle their own problems. The reason why the hostilities in Korea have not yet been put to an end is precicesly because of the fact that the United States Government has despatched troops to invade Korea and is continuing and extending its policies of agression and war. As far back as the beginning of the hostilities in Korea, we here stood for the peaceful settlement and localization of the Korean problem. For this reason, the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and that of the USSR have repeatedly proposed that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea, and that the Korean people be left alone to settle the Korean problem themselves. However, the United States Government not only rejected such a proposal, but also rejected negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. When the invading troops of the United States arrogantly crossed the 38th parallel, at the beginning of the month of October, the United States Government, recklessly ignoring warnings from all quarters and following the provocative crossing of the border by Syngman Rhee in June, thoroughly destroyed, and hence obliterated forever this demarcation line of political geography. In the latter part of November, when the Representative of the Peoples Republic of China was invited to take part in the discussion by the Security Council on the charge against United States aggression in Taiwan, he again submitted the proposal that the United States and other foreign troops be all withdrawn from Korea, and that the People of South and North Korea be left alone to settle their domestic affairs. But the United Nations Security Council, under the domination of the United States, rejected this reasonable peace proposal from the Government of the Peoples Republic of China. From this it is evident that since the United States Government has from the very beginning refused to withdraw its troops, it has absolutely no sincerity in ending the hostilities in Korea, still less in letting the Korean people have genuine peace and freedom.

"3" This being the case, why does the American Delegate, Mr. Austin, now favour an immediate cease-fire in Korea, and why does President Truman also express willingness to conduct negotiations to settle the hostilities in Korea? It is not difficult to understand that, when the American invading troops were landing at Inchon, crossing the 38th parallel or pressing toward the Yalu River, they did not favour an immediate cease-fire and were not willing to conduct negotiations. It is only today when the American invading troops have sustained defeat, that they favour an immediate cease-fire and the conducting of negotiations after the cease-fire. Very obviously, they opposed peace yesterday, so that the United States might continue to extend her aggression; and they favour a cease-fire today, so that the United States may gain a breathing space and prepare to attack again, or at least hold their present aggressive position in preparation for further advance. What they care about is not the interests of the Korean people and the Asian peoples, nor those of the American people. They are only interested in how American imperialists can maintain their invading troops and aggressive activities in Korea, how they can continue to invade and occupy China's Taiwan and how they can intensify the preparation for war in the capitalist world. Therefore, the Representative of MacArthur's Headquarters said bluntly that they could accept a cease-fire only on a military basis and without any political conditions. This means that, all the status of aggression will remain the same after the cease-fire, so that they can fight again when they are prepared. Further, they could take this opportunity to declare the existence of a state of emergency and to prepare for mobilisation in the United States, in Western Europe and Japan, thus driving the peoples of the United States, Western Europe and Japan down into the abyss of war. Is this not what Messrs. Truman, Acheson, Marshall and MacArthur are doing now? With reference to the so-called proposal for cease-fire first and negotiations afterward, irrespective of the fact that the proposal by the twelve nations had neither been adopted by the Security Council nor by the United Nations General Assembly and irrespective of what countries are to be included in the negotiating conference and even if all these had been agreed upon, the agenda and contents of the negotiation could still be discussed endlessly after the cease-fire. If the conference is not a conference of the legal Security Council or of the legal Five Power conferences, or is not affiliated to them, the U. S. Government in the last resort can still manipulate its voting machine. Thus to discuss the cease-fire and start negotiations not on the basis of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settling of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves is to act hypocritically and would therefore suit the designs of the U. S. Government, and hence cannot satisfy the sincere desire of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The three-man committee—a cease fire on the spot—peace negotiations—launching of a huge offensive this Marshall formula is not in the least unfamiliar to the Chinese people, because in 1946, General Marshall assisted Chiang Kai Shek in this way, repeatedly for a whole year, and in the end had to admit failure and leave. Will the people of China, who had learned this lesson in 1946 and later gained victory, fall into such trap today? No, the old trick of General Marshall will not work again in the United Nations.

"4" Moreover, the present issues are definitely not confined to the Korean problem. While the United States Government was engineering the hostilities in Korea, it despatched the Seventh Fleet to invade China's Taiwan and then bombed North-East China, fired on Chinese merchant vessels and extended its aggression in East Asia. Against all this, the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China has repeatedly lodged charges with the United Nations. But under American domination, the majority in the United Nations has not only upheld American aggression against Korea and supported American invasion and occupation of Taiwan, the bombing of North-East China, but also rejected the three proposals submitted by our representative on the charge against the United States for armed aggression against Taiwan, and shelved the charge of the United States aggression against China made by the Delegate of the Soviet Union.

Our Representative was kept waiting for a long time and until the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly was indefinitely adjourned, he was not given a chance to speak.

This attitude which was taken by the majority of the United Nations under the domination of the Anglo-American bloc, obviously violates the United Nations Charter and its purposes. They are furthering rather than checking American aggression. They are undermining rather than defending world peace.

What particularly arouses the world's indignation is that, in spite of the fact that during the past several months the United Nations held innumerable discussions on China or on important questions concerning China, the Delegates of the Peoples Republic of China, who are the only Representatives of the four hundred and seventy-five million people of China, are still being kept out of the doors of the United Nations, whereas the Representatives of a handful of the Chiang Kai Shek reactionary remnants are still being allowed to usurp the seats of the Chinese Delegation in the United Nations. To such an extent the Chinese people have been slighted and insulted!

Therefore, the Chinese people, who, impelled by righteous indignation, have risen to volunteer in resisting the United States and helping Korea, and thus protecting their homes and defending their country are absolutely reasonable and justified in so doing. The Chinese peoples' volunteers, who have been forced to take up arms side by side with the Korean Peoples' Army to resist the American aggressors, under the Unified Command of the Government of the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic, are fighting for their own existence, fighting to aid Korea and fighting for the peace of East Asia as well as the peace of the whole world.

"5" It must be pointed out that the proposal for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem submitted by the majority of the Delegates of the thirteen Asian and Arabian nations was originally based on their desire for peace, and this is understandable. But they have failed to see through the whole intrigue of the United States Government in supporting the proposal for a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards, and therefore they have not seriously considered the basic proposals of the Chinese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

The original thirteen-nation resolution was not wholly palatable to the United States Government, so it was separated into two resolutions. The first resolution, or the resolution providing for the so-called "three man committee for cease-fire in Korea", which is satisfactory to the United States, was, under pressure, given priority for discusson and was consequently adopted by the United Nationals General Assembly. But the second resolution, or the resolution providing for a so-called "negotiating conference" "negotiating commission", with which the United States was either not satisfied, or not quite satisfied, was therefore shelved for the time being.

The difference between these two resolutions was remarkably demonstrated by the attitude of the Philippine Delegate. The Philippine Delegate, who always follows in the footsteps of the United States, only agreed to the first resolution but withdrew from the second resolution. This trick of close co-operation displayed by the Philippines in the role of demanding a cease-fire and by the United States in the role supporting it has thus been exposed.

From this fact itself, the lesson can be drawn that if the Asian and Arabian nations wish to gain genuine peace, they must free themselves from United States pressure and must abandon the "three man committee for cease-fire in Korea", and give up the idea of cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards.

"6" The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China solemnly declares that the Chinese people eagerly hope that the hostilities in Korea can be settled peacefully. We firmly insist that, as a basis for negotiating for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, and Koera's domestic affairs must be settled by the Korean people themselves. The American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan. And the Representatives of the Peoples Republic of China must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations. These points are not only the justified demands of the Chinese people and the Korean people; they are also the urgent desire of all progressive public opinion throughout the world. To put aside these points would make it impossible to settle peacefully the Korean problem and the important problems of Asia.

C. Statement by the President on resolution to declare Chinese Communists aggressors, January 25, 1951

[From Release, January 25, 1951]

Ambassador Austin has fully and forcefully presented the views of this Government on our attitude toward aggression by the Chinese Communists. These views have the solid support of the Executive, the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Each member of the United Nations must make its own decision on this issue. For my part, I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor. The question of what can and should be done about the aggression in Korea of course must be discussed with all other friendly nations.

Obviously this is no time for rash or unwise action. This is a time for clear thinking and firmness.

Let me stress again that the American resolution contains—as all our proposals have contained—a method for bringing about a cease fire, and opening the way for peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.

D. Resolution of General Assembly of United Nations declaring Communist Government of China an aggressor, February 1, 1951

[From UN release, Feb. 1, 1951]

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea,

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has not accepted United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,

1. *Finds* that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

2. *Calls upon* the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

3. *Affirms* the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

4. *Calls upon* all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

5. *Calls upon* all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

6. *Requests* a Committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee referred to in the following paragraph reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

7. *Affirms* that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

XII. DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY, DECEMBER 16, 1950

A. Radio address by the President, December 15, 1950

[From Department of State Bulletin, December 25, 1950]

I am talking to you tonight about what our country is up against and what we are going to do about it. Our homes, our Nation, all the things we believe in, are in great danger. This danger has been created by the rulers of the Soviet Union.

For 5 years we have been working for peace and justice among nations. We have helped to bring the free nations of the world together in a great movement to establish a lasting peace. Against this movement for peace, the rulers of the Soviet Union have been waging a relentless attack. They have tried to undermine or overwhelm the free nations, one by one. They have used threats and treachery and violence.

In June, the forces of Communist imperialism broke out into open warfare in Korea. The United Nations moved to put down this act of aggression and, by October, had all but succeeded. Then, in November, the Communists threw their Chinese armies into the battle against the free nations.

By this act they have shown that they are now willing to push the world to the brink of a general war to get what they want. This is the real meaning of the events that have been taking place in Korea. That is why we are in such grave danger.

The future of civilization depends on what we do—on what we do now, and in the months ahead. We have the strength and we have the courage to overcome the danger that threatens our country. We must act calmly, wisely, and resolutely.

Four Tasks for National Safety

Here are the things we will do:

First, we will continue to uphold and, if necessary, to defend with arms, the principles of the United Nations—the principles of freedom and justice.

Second, we will continue to work with the other free nations to strengthen our combined defenses.

Third, we will build up our own Army, Navy, and Air Force, and make more weapons for ourselves and our allies.

Fourth, we will expand our economy and keep it on an even keel.

Now, I want to talk to you about each one of these things.

Upholding the Principles of the United Nations

First, we will continue to uphold the principles of the United Nations. We have no aggressive purpose. We will not use our strength for aggression. We are a tolerant and a restrained people, deeply aware of our moral responsibilities and deeply aware of the horrors of war. We believe in settling differences by peaceful means, and we have made honest efforts to bring about disarmament. We will continue those efforts, but we cannot yield to aggression.

Though the present situation is highly dangerous, we do not believe that war is inevitable. There is no conflict between the legitimate interests of the free world and those of the Soviet Union that cannot be settled by peaceful means. We will continue to take every honorable step we can to avoid general war.

But we will not engage in appeasement. The world learned from Munich that security cannot be bought by appeasement.

We are ready, as we have always been, to take part in efforts to reach a peaceful solution of the conflict in Korea. In fact, our representatives at Lake Success are taking part in just such efforts today.

We do not yet know whether the Chinese Communists are willing to enter into honest negotiations to settle the conflict in Korea. If negotiations are possible, we shall strive for a settlement that will make Korea a united, independent, and democratic country. That is what the Korean people want, and that is what the United Nations has decided they are entitled to have.

Meanwhile, our troops in Korea are continuing to do their best to uphold the United Nations. General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, who returned a few days ago from Korea, reported that our military forces there are well organized and well equipped. I am confident that our military forces, together with their comrades in arms from many nations, will continue to give a good account of themselves. They know they are fighting for the freedom and security of their own homes and families.

Strengthening Our Combined Defenses

The danger we face exists not only in Korea. Therefore, the second thing we are going to do is to increase our efforts, with other free nations, to build up defenses against aggression in other parts of the world. In dealing with the Korean crisis, we are not going to ignore the danger of aggression elsewhere. There is actual warfare in the Far East, but Europe and the rest of the world are also in great danger. The same menace—the menace of Communist aggression—threatens Europe as well as Asia.

To combat this menace, other free nations need our help, and we need theirs. We must work with a sense of real partnership and common purpose with these nations. We must stand firm with our allies, who have shown their courage and their love of freedom.

The United States, Canada, and the 10 nations of Western Europe who are united with us in the North Atlantic Treaty, have already begun to create combined military defenses. Secretary of State Acheson is flying to Europe on Sunday. He and representatives of these nations will complete the arrangements for setting up a joint army, navy, and air force to defend Europe. The defense of Europe is of the utmost importance to the security of the United States.

We will continue to provide assistance to European countries and to other free countries in other parts of the world, because their defense is also important to our own defense.

The Communist rulers are trying their hardest to split the free nations apart. If they should succeed, they would do staggering damage to the cause of freedom. Unity with our allies is now, and must continue to be, the foundation of our effort.

Working together, the free nations can create military forces strong enough to convince the Communist rulers that they cannot gain by aggression. Working together, the free nations can present the common front, backed by strength, which is necessary if we are to be in a position to negotiate successfully with the Kremlin for peaceful settlements. Working together, we hope we can prevent another world war.

In order to succeed, we, in our country, have a big job ahead of us.

Increasing our military power

That is why the third thing we must do to meet the present danger is to step up our own defense program.

We are expanding our Armed Forces very rapidly. We are speeding up the production of military equipment for our own Armed Forces and for our allies. We have a large Navy. We have a powerful Air Force. We have units around which a strong army can be built. But, measured against the danger that confronts us, our forces are not adequate.

On June 25, when the Communists invaded the Republic of Korea, we had less than one and a half million men and women in our Army, Navy, and Air Force. Today, our military strength has reached about two and a half million. Our next step is to increase the number of men and women on active duty to nearly three and a half million.

I have directed the Armed Forces to accomplish this as soon as possible. The Army and the Navy will be able to do this within a few months. It will take the Air Force somewhat longer. In addition to these men and women on active duty, we have about two million more in the National Guard and the reserves who are subject to call.

As part of the process of achieving a speedier build-up, the number of men to be called up under the Selective Service System has been raised, and two additional National Guard divisions are being ordered to active duty in January.

At the same time, we will have a very rapid speed-up in the production of military equipment. Within one year we will be turning out planes at five times the present rate of production. Within one year, combat vehicles will be coming off the production line at four times today's rate. Within one year the rate of production of electronics equipment for defense will have multiplied four and a half times.

These will not be weapons for our own Armed Forces alone. They will constitute an arsenal for the defense of freedom. Out of this arsenal, we will be able to send weapons to other free nations, to add to what they can produce for their own defenses. And in this same arsenal we will provide a large reserve of weapons to equip additional units in our own Armed Forces whenever that may be necessary.

Furthermore, while we are working toward these immediate goals in manpower and equipment, we will also expand our training and production facilities so as to make possible a very rapid expansion to full mobilization if that becomes necessary.

We can handle this production program, but it will require hard work. It will require us to make a lot of changes in our ordinary ways of doing things.

Expanding our economy

And this brings me to our fourth big job. In order to build the military strength we need, we will have to expand our production greatly. We must also prevent inflation and stabilize the cost of living.

If we are to make the weapons we need soon enough, we shall have to cut back on many lines of civilian production. But we cannot build up and maintain our armed might, and the industrial strength underlying it, simply by cutting back civilian production. We must produce more—more steel, more copper, more aluminum, more electric power, more cotton, more of many other things.

We must set very high targets and be willing to make an all-out effort to reach them. Workers will be called upon to work more hours. More women and more young people and older workers will be needed in our plants and factories. Farmers will have to set higher production goals. Businessmen will have to put all their "know-how" to work to increase production.

A defense effort of the size we must now undertake will inevitably push prices up, unless we take positive action to hold them down.

We have already taken a number of steps. We have put restrictions on credit buying. We have increased taxes. I hope that the Congress will enact an excess profits tax at this session. Still further taxes will be needed. We cannot escape paying the cost of our military program. The more we pay by taxes now, the better we can hold prices down. I have directed that recommendations be prepared, for early submission to the Congress, to put the increased cost of defense as nearly as possible on a "pay-as-you-go" basis.

I have also instructed the Director of the Budget to reduce the nonmilitary expenditures in the new Federal Budget to the minimum required to give effective support to the defense effort.

The measures I have just mentioned—credit control, higher taxes, and reduced nonmilitary expenditures—are essential. They are our primary defense against inflation, because they strike at the sources of inflation. But, as we move into a greatly increased defense effort, we must also take direct measures to keep prices in line.

The Government is starting at once to impose price controls upon a number of materials and products. These will be mainly items important to defense production and the cost of living. In those fields where price control is imposed, the Government will also undertake to stabilize wages, as the law requires.

In the immediate future, a series of control orders will be announced by the Economic Stabilization Agency.

In addition, the Agency will announce fair standards for prices and wages in those cases where mandatory controls are not imposed. I ask everyone concerned not to set prices and wages higher than these standards will allow. If these standards are violated, it will speed up the imposition of mandatory controls, including roll-backs where needed.

As we move ahead with this mobilization effort, there will be increased need for central control over the many Government activities in this field. Accordingly, I am establishing an Office of Defense Mobilization. I am appointing Mr. Charles E. Wilson to be Director of this Office. Mr. Wilson is resigning as president of the General Electric Company to take this job. In his new position he will be responsible for directing all the mobilization activities of the Government, including production, procurement, manpower, transportation, and economic stabilization.

The Government is also moving forward with preparations for civil defense. I have appointed former Governor Millard Caldwell of Florida to be Federal Civilian Defense Administrator.

In addition I have recommended legislation to the Congress which will authorize the Federal Government to help States and cities in their civil defense preparations. I hope the Congress will enact this legislation soon, so that the civil defense work which has already started can be greatly speeded up.

Protection of Our Freedom

These are our plans for making our country stronger. As we go forward, we must keep clearly in mind the meaning of what we are doing. Our freedom is in danger.

Sometimes we may forget just what freedom means to us. It is as close to us, as important to us, as the air we breathe. Freedom is in our homes, in our schools, in our churches. It is in our work and our Government and the right to vote as we please. Those are the things that would be taken from us if communism should win.

Because our freedom is in danger we are united in its defense. Let no aggressor think we are divided. Our great strength is the loyalty and fellowship of a free people. We pull together when we are in trouble, and we do it by our own choice, not out of fear, but out of love for the great values of our American life, that we all have a share in.

In this great defense effort that we are undertaking, things may not always go as smoothly as we would wish, either in Washington or in your home town. But remember that we are building our defenses in the democratic way and not by the iron rule of dictatorship.

Those of us who work in the Government will do our best. But the outcome depends, as it has always depended, on the spirit and energy of our people.

The job of building a stronger America must be done on our farms, in our factories, and in our homes. It must be done by every one of us, wherever we are, and whatever our jobs may be.

Our Responsibilities as Individuals

In this time of danger, each of us must accept an individual responsibility for the good of the country.

Unfortunately, at this moment, a railway union and a large number of its members are out on an unlawful strike that has partially paralyzed our railroad system.

This action has already begun to slow down our industry. It is interfering with the movement of troops; it is holding up equipment for our fighting forces; and our civilian population has begun to suffer. This strike is a danger to the security of our Nation.

As Commander-in-Chief, therefore, I call upon the union and its striking members to return to work immediately. I ask you men who are on strike to realize that, no matter how serious you believe your grievances are, nothing can excuse the fact that you are adding to your country's danger. I ask you, in the name of our country, to return immediately to your posts of duty.

Our fighting men in Korea have set an example that should inspire us all. Attacked by superior numbers, and in the bitterest of winter weather, they were resolute, steady, and determined. Their steadfast courage in the face of reverses is one of the most heroic stories in our country's history.

In the days ahead, each of us should measure his own efforts, his own sacrifices, by the standard of our heroic men in Korea.

Many of you who are young people will serve in the Armed Forces of your country. Nothing you will do later in life will be of greater benefit to your homes, your communities, or your friends.

Many others of you will have to work longer hours in factories, in mines, or mills. Think of this not as longer hours, but as more planes, more tanks, more ships, more of all the things that are needed for the defense of your homes and your way of life.

All of us will have to pay more taxes and do without things we like. Think of this not as a sacrifice but as an opportunity, an opportunity to defend the best kind of life that men have ever devised on this earth.

As I speak to you tonight, aggression has won a military advantage in Korea. We should not try to hide or explain away that fact. By the same token, we should draw renewed courage and faith from the response of the free world to that aggression. What the free nations have done in Korea is right, and men, all over the world, know that it is right. Whatever temporary set-backs there may be, the right will prevail in the end.

Because of all these things I have been talking about with you, I will issue a proclamation tomorrow morning declaring that a national emergency exists. This will call upon every citizen to put aside his personal interests for the good of our country. All of our energies must be devoted to the tasks ahead of us.

Our Responsibilities as a Nation

No nation has ever had a greater responsibility than ours has at this moment. We must remember that we are the leaders of the free world. We must understand that we cannot achieve peace by ourselves, but only by cooperating with other free nations and with the men and women who love freedom everywhere.

We must remember that our goal is not war but peace. Throughout the world, our name stands for international justice and for a world based on the principles of law and order. We must keep it that way. We are willing to negotiate differences, but we will not yield to aggression. Appeasement of evil is not the road to peace.

The American people have always met danger with courage and determination. I am confident we will do that now, and, with God's help, we shall keep our freedom.

B. Presidential Proclamation 2914, December 16, 1950

[From 15 Federal Register 9029]

WHEREAS recent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat to the peace of the world and imperil the efforts of this country and those of the United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict; and

WHEREAS world conquest by Communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world; and

WHEREAS, if the goal of Communist imperialism were to be achieved, the people of this country would no longer enjoy the full and rich life they have with God's help built for themselves and their children; they would no longer enjoy the blessings of the freedom of worshipping as they severally choose, the freedom of reading and listening to what they choose, the right of free speech including the right to criticize their Government, the right to choose those who conduct their Government, the right to engage freely in collective bargaining, the right to engage freely in their own business enterprises, and the many other freedoms and rights which are a part of our way of life; and

WHEREAS the increasing menace of the forces of Communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as speedily as possible:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, do proclaim the existence of a national emergency, which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made through the United Nations and otherwise to bring about lasting peace.

I summon all citizens to make a united effort for the security and well-being of our beloved country and to place its needs foremost in thought and action that the full moral and material strength of the Nation may be readied for the dangers which threaten us.

I summon our farmers, our workers in industry, and our businessmen to make a mighty production effort to meet the defense requirements of the Nation and to this end to eliminate all waste and inefficiency and to subordinate all lesser interests to the common good.

I summon every person and every community to make, with a spirit of neighborliness, whatever sacrifices are necessary for the welfare of the Nation.

I summon all State and local leaders and officials to cooperate fully with the military and civilian defense agencies of the United States in the national defense program.

I summon all citizens to be loyal to the principles upon which our Nation is founded, to keep faith with our friends and allies, and to be firm in our devotion to the peaceful purposes for which the United Nations was founded.

I am confident that we will meet the dangers that confront us with courage and determination, strong in the faith that we can thereby "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

[SEAL] IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this sixteenth day of December in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-fifth.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

By the President:
DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State.

XIII. THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JANUARY 8, 1951

A. Text of message

[From House Document No. 389, Eighty-first Congress]

MR. PRESIDENT, MR. SPEAKER, MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS:

A year ago I reported to this Congress that the state of the Union was good. I am happy to be able to report to you today that the state of the Union continues to be good. Our Republic continues to increase in the enjoyment of freedom within its borders and to offer strength and encouragement to all those who love freedom throughout the world.

During the past year we have made notable progress in strengthening the foundations of peace and freedom, abroad and at home.

We have taken important steps in securing the North Atlantic community against aggression. We have continued our successful support of European recovery. We have returned to our established policy of expanding international trade through reciprocal agreement. We have strengthened our support of the United Nations.

While great problems still confront us, the greatest danger has receded—the possibility which faced us 3 years ago that most of Europe and the Mediterranean area might collapse under totalitarian pressure. Today, the free peoples of the world have new vigor and new hope for the cause of peace.

In our domestic affairs, we have made notable advances toward broader opportunity and a better life for all our citizens.

We have met and reversed the first significant downturn in economic activity since the war. In accomplishing this, Government programs for maintaining employment and purchasing power have been of tremendous benefit. As the result of these programs, and the wisdom and good judgment of our businessmen and workers, major readjustments have been made without widespread suffering.

During the past year, we have also made a good start in providing housing for low-income groups; we have raised minimum wages; we have gone forward with the development of our natural resources; we have given greater assurance of stability to the farmer; and we have improved the organization and efficiency of our Government.

Today, by the grace of God, we stand a free and prosperous nation with greater possibilities for the future than any people have ever had before.

We are now, in this year of 1950, nearing the midpoint of the twentieth century.

The first half of this century will be known as the most turbulent and eventful period in recorded history. The swift pace of events promises to make the next 50 years decisive in the history of man on this planet.

The scientific and industrial revolution which began two centuries ago has, in the last 50 years, caught up the peoples of the globe in a common destiny. Two world-shattering wars have proved that no corner of the earth can be isolated from the affairs of mankind.

The human race has reached a turning point. Man has opened the secrets of nature and mastered new powers. If he uses them wisely, he can reach new heights of civilization. If he uses them foolishly, they may destroy him.

Man must create the moral and legal framework for the world which will insure that his new powers are used for good and not for evil. In shaping the outcome, the people of the United States will play a leading role.

Among all the great changes that have occurred in the last 50 years, none is more important than the change in the position of the United States in world affairs. Fifty years ago we were a country devoted largely to our own internal affairs. Our industry was growing, and we had new interests in the Far East and in the Caribbean, but we were primarily concerned with the development of vast areas of our own continental territory.

Today our population has doubled. Our national production has risen from about 50 billion dollars, in terms of today's prices, to the staggering figure of 255 billions dollars a year. We have a more productive economic system and a greater industrial potential than any other nation on the globe. Our standard of living is an inspiration for all other peoples. Even the slightest changes in our economic and social life have their effect on other countries all around the world.

Our tremendous strength has brought with it tremendous responsibilities. We have moved from the outer edge to the center of world affairs. Other nations look to us for a wise exercise of our economic and military strength, and for vigorous support of the ideals of representative government and a free society. We will not fail them.

Our objective in the world is peace. Our country has joined with others in the task of achieving peace. We know now that this is not an easy task, or a short one. But we are determined to see it through. Both of our great political parties are committed to working together—and I am sure they will continue to work together—to achieve this end. We are prepared to devote our energy and our resources to this task, because we know that our own security and the future of mankind are at stake.

Our success in working with other nations to achieve peace depends largely on what we do at home. We must preserve our national strength. Strength is not simply a matter of arms and force. It is a matter of economic growth, and social health, and vigorous institutions, public and private. We can achieve peace only if we maintain our productive energy, our democratic institutions, and our firm belief in individual freedom.

Our surest guide in the days that lie ahead will be the spirit in which this great Republic was founded. We must make our decisions in the conviction that all men are created equal, that they are equally entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the duty of government is to serve these ends.

This country of ours has experienced many blessings, but none greater than its dedication to these principles. At every point in our history these ideals have served to correct our failures and shortcomings, to spur us on to greater efforts, and to keep clearly before us the primary purpose of our existence as a nation. They have enshrined for us, as a principle of government, the moral imperative to do justice, and the divine command to mean to love one another.

These principles give meaning to all that we do.

In foreign policy they mean that we can never be tolerant of oppression or tyranny. They mean that we must throw our weight on the side of greater freedom and a better life for all peoples. These principles confirm us in carrying out the specific programs for peace which we have already begun.

We shall continue to give our wholehearted support to the United Nations. We believe that this organization can ultimately provide the framework of international law and morality without which mankind cannot survive. It has already set up new standards for the conduct of nations in the Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Genocide. It is moving ahead to give meaning to the concept of world brotherhood through a wide variety of cultural, economic, and technical activities.

The events of the past year again showed the value of the United Nations in bringing about the peaceful adjustment of tense international controversies. In Indonesia and in Palestine the efforts of the United Nations have put a stop to bloodshed and paved the way to peaceful settlements.

We are working toward the time when the United Nations will control weapons of mass destruction and will have the forces to preserve international law and order. While the world remains unsettled, however, and as long as our own security and the security of the free world require, we will maintain a strong and well-balanced defense organization. The Selective Service System is an essential part of our defense plans, and it must be continued.

Under the principles of the United Nations Charter we must continue to share in the common defense of free nations against aggression. At the last session this Congress laid the basis for this joint effort. We now must put into effect the common defense plans that are being worked out.

We shall continue our efforts for world economic recovery, because world prosperity is the only sure foundation for permanent peace.

As an immediate means to this end we must continue our support of the European recovery program. This program has achieved great success in the first 2 years of operation, but it has not yet been completed. If we were to stop this program now, or cripple it, just because it is succeeding, we should be doing exactly what the enemies of democracy want us to do. We should be just as foolish as a man who, for reasons of false economy, failed to put a roof on his house after building the foundation and the walls.

World prosperity also requires that we do all we can to expand world trade. As a major step in this direction we should promptly join the International Trade Organization. The purpose of this organization, which the United States has been foremost in creating, is to establish a code of fair practice, and an international authority for adjusting differences in international commercal relations. It is an effort to prevent the kind of anarchy and irresponsibility in world trade which did so much to bring about the world depression in the 1930's.

An expanding world economy requires the improvement of living standards and the development of resources in areas where human poverty and misery now prevail. Without such improvement, the recovery of Europe and the future of our own economy will not be secure. I urge that the Congress adopt the legislation now before it to provide for increasing the flow of technical assistance and capital investment to underdeveloped regions.

It is more essential now than ever, if the ideals of freedom and representative government are to prevail in these areas, and particularly in the Far East, that their people experience, in their own lives, the benefits of scientific and economic advances. This program will require the movement of large amounts of capital from the industrial nations, and particularly from the United States, to productive uses in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Recent world events make prompt action imperative.

This program is in the interest of all peoples; and it has nothing in common with either the old imperialism of the last century or the new imperialism of the Communists.

Our aim for a peaceful, democratic world of free peoples will be achieved in the long run, not by force of arms, but by an appeal to the minds and hearts of men. If the peace policy of the democratic nations is to be successful, they must demonstrate that the benefits of their way of life can be increased and extended to all nations and all races.

In the world today we are confronted with the danger that the rising demand of people everywhere for freedom and a better life may be corrupted and betrayed by the false promises of communism. In its ruthless struggle for power, communism seizes upon our imperfections, and takes advantage of the delays and set-backs which the democratic nations experience in their effort to secure a better life for their citizens. This challenge to us is more than a military challenge. It is a challenge to the honesty of our profession of the democratic faith; it is a challenge to the efficiency and stability of our economic system; it is a challenge to our willingness to work with other peoples for world peace and world prosperity.

For my part I welcome the challenge. I believe that our country, at this crucial point in world history, will meet that challenge successfully. I believe that, in cooperation with the other free nations of the world, we shall extend the full benefits of the democratic way of life to millions who do not now enjoy them, and preserve mankind from dictatorship and tyranny.

I believe that we shall succeed in our struggle for peace, because I have seen the success we have had in our own country in following the principles of freedom. Over the last 50 years the ideals of liberty and equal opportunity to which our Nation is dedicated have been increasingly realized in the lives of our people.

The ideal of equal opportunity no longer means simply the opportunity which a man has to advance beyond his fellows. Some of our citizens do achieve greater success than others as a reward for individual merit and effort, and this is as it should be. At the same time our country must be more than a land of opportunity for a select few. It must be a land of opportunity for all of us. In such a land all can grow and prosper together.

The simple truth that we can all go forward together is often questioned by selfish or short-sighted persons. It is strange that this is so, for this proposition is so clearly demonstrated by our national history. During the last 50 years, for example, our Nation has grown enormously in material well-being. This growth has come about, not by concentrating the benefits of our progress in the hands of a few, but by increasing the wealth of the great body of our citizens.

In the last 50 years the income of the average family has increased so greatly that its buying power has doubled. The average hours of work have declined from 60 to 40 a week, while the hourly production of the average worker has tripled. Average wages, allowing for price changes, have increased from about 45 cents an hour to $1.40 an hour.

We have accomplished what to earlier ages of mankind would have been a miracle—we work shorter hours, we produce more, and we live better.

Increasing freedom from poverty and drudgery has given a fuller meaning to American life. Our people are better educated; we have more opportunities for travel and recreation and enjoyment of the arts. We enjoy more personal liberty in the United States today than ever before.

If we can continue in the spirt of cooperative adventure which has marked the recent years of our progress, we can expect further scientific advances, further increases in our standard of living, and a still wider enjoyment of democratic freedom.

No one, of course, can foretell the future exactly. However, if we assume that we shall grow as fast in the future as we have grown in the past, we can get a good idea of how much our country should grow over the next 50 years.

At present our total national production is $255,000,000,000 a year. Our working population and our output per worker are increasing. If our productive power continues to increase at the same rate as it has increased for the past 50 years, our total national production 50 years from now will be nearly four times as much as it is today. Allowing for the expected growth in population, this would mean that the real income of the average family in the year 2000 A. D. would be about three times what it is today.

These are estimates of what we can do in the future, but we can reach these heights only if we follow the right policies. We have learned by bitter experience that progress is not automatic—that wrong policies lead to depression and disaster. We cannot achieve these gains unless we have a stable economy and avoid the catastrophes of boom and bust that have set us back in the past.

These gains cannot be achieved unless our businessmen maintain their spirit of initiative and enterprise and operate in a competitive economic system. They cannot be achieved unless our working men and women and their unions help to increase productivity and obtain for labor a fair share of the benefits of our economic system. They cannot be achieved unless we have a stable and prosperous agriculture. They cannot be achieved unless we conserve and develop our natural resources in the public interest. Our system will not work unless our people are healthy, well-educated, and confident of the future. It will not work unless all citizens can participate fully in our national life.

In achieving these gains, the Government has a special responsibility to help create and maintain the conditions which will permit the growth we know is possible. Foremost among these conditions is the need for a fair distribution of our increasing prosperity among all the great groups of our population who help to bring it about—business, labor, and agriculture.

Businessmen must continue to have the incentives necessary for investment and for the development of new lines of enterprise. In the future growth of this country lie possibilities for hundreds of thousands of new and independent businesses. As our national production increases, as it doubles and redoubles in the next 50 years, the number of independent and competing enterprises should also increase. If the number does not increase, our constantly growing economy will fall under the control of a few dominant economic groups whose powers will be so great that they will be a challenge to democratic institutions.

To avoid this danger, we must curb monopoly and provide aids to independent business so that it may have the credit and capital to compete in a system of free enterprise. I recommend that the Congress complete action at this session on the pending bill to close the loopholes in the Clayton Act which now permit monopolistic mergers. I also hope before this session is over to transmit to the Congress a series of proposals to strengthen the antimonopoly laws, to assist small business, and to encourage the growth of new enterprises.

In the case of labor free collective bargaining must be protected and encouraged. Collective bargaining is not only a fundamental economic freedom for labor; it is also a strengthening and stabilizing influence for our whole economy.

The Federal statute now governing labor relations is punitive in purpose and one-sided in operation. This statute is, and always has been, inconsistent with the practice of true and effective collective bargaining. It should be repealed and replaced by a law that is fair to all and in harmony with our democratic ideals.

A full understanding of the problems of modern labor relations is of such importance that I recommend the establishment of a Labor Extension Service to encourage educational activities in this field.

Another essential for our continued growth is a stable and prosperous agriculture. For many years we have been building a program to give the farmer a reasonable measure of protection against the special hazards to which he is exposed. That program was improved at the last session of the Congress. However, our farm legislation is still not adequate.

Although the Congress has properly declared as a matter of national policy that safeguards must be maintained against slumps in farm prices, there are serious shortcomings in the nethods now available for carrying out this policy. Mandatory price supports should be provided for the commodities not now covered which are major sources of farm income.

Moreover, we should provide a method of supporting farm income at fair levels which will, at the same time, avoid piling up unmanageable surpluses and allow consumers to obtain the full benefit of our abundant agricultural production. A system of production payments gives the greatest promise of accomplishing this purpose. I recommend that the use of such a system be authorized.

One of the most important factors in our continued growth is the construction of more good, up-to-date housing. In a country such as ours there is no reason why decent homes should not be within the reach of all. With the help of various Government programs we have made great progress in the last few years in increasing the number of homes.

Despite this increase there is still an acute shortage of housing for the lower- and middle-income groups, especially in large metropolitan areas. We have laid the ground work for relieving the plight of lower-income families in the Housing Act of 1949. To aid middle-income families, I recommend that the Congress enact new legislation authorizing a vigorous program to help cooperatives and other nonprofit groups build housing which these families can afford.

Rent control has done a great deal to prevent the housing shortage from having had worse effects during this period of postwar adjustment. Rent control is still necessary to prevent widespread hardship and sharp curtailment of the buying power of millions of consumers in metropolitan areas. I recommend, therefore, that rent control be continued for another year.

If we are to achieve a better life for all, the natural resources of the country must be regarded as a public trust. We must use our precious assets of soil, water, forest, and grassland in such a way that they become constantly more productive and more valuable. Government investment in the conservation and development of our resources is necessary to the future economic expansion of the country.

We need to enlarge the production and transmission of public power. This is true not only in those regions which have already received great benefits from Federal power projects, but also in regions such as New England where the benefits of large-scale public power development have not yet been experienced.

In our hydroelectric and irrigation undertakings, as well as in our other resource programs, we must continue policies to assure that their benefits will be spread among the many and not restricted to a favored few.

Important resource legislation which should be passed at this session includes the authorization of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project and the establishment of the Columbia Valley Administration.

Through wise Government policies and Government expenditures for the conservation and development of our natural resources we can be sure of transmitting to our children and our children's children a country far richer and more productive than the one we know today.

The value of our natural resources is constantly being increased by the progress of science. Research is finding new ways of using such natural assets as minerals, sea water, and plant life. In the peaceful development of atomic energy, particularly, we stand on the threshold of new wonders. The first experimental machines for producing useful power from atomic energy are now under construction. We have made only the first beginnings in this field, but in the perspective of history they may loom larger than the first airplane, or even the first tools that started man on the road to civilization.

To take full advantage of the increasing possibilities of nature, we must equip ourselves with increasing knowledge. Government has a responsibility to see that our country maintains its position in the advance of science. As a step toward this end, the Congress should complete action on the measure to create a National Science Foundation.

Another duty of the Government is to promote the economic security, the health, and the education of its citizens. By so doing we strengthen both our economy and the structure of our society. In a nation as rich as ours all citizens should be able to live in decency and health.

Our social security system should be developed into the main reliance of our people for basic protection against the economic hazards of old age, unemployment, and illness. I earnestly hope that the Congress will complete action at this session on legislation to increase the benefits and extend the coverage of old-age and survivors insurance. The widespread movements to provide pensions in private industry dramatizes the need for improvements in the public insurance system.

I also urge that the Congress strengthen our unemployment compensation law to meet present-day needs more adequately. The economic downturn of the past year was the first real test that our system of unemployment insurance has had to meet. That test has proved the wisdom of the system, but it has also made strikingly apparent the need for improving its operation and increasing its coverage and its benefits.

In the field of health, there are immense opportunities to extend to more of our people the benefits of the amazing advances in medical science. We have made a good beginning in expanding our hospitals, but we must go on to remedy the shortages of doctors, nurses, and public health services, and to establish a system of medical insurance which will enable all Americans to afford good medical care.

We must take immediate steps to strengthen our educational system. In many parts of our country young people are being handicapped for life because of a poor education. The rapidly increasing number of children of school age, coupled with the shortage of qualified teachers, makes this problem more critical each year. I believe that the Congress should no longer delay in providing Federal assistance to the States so that they can maintain adequate schools.

As we go forward in achieving greater economic security and greater opportunity for all our people, we should make every effort to extend the benefits of our democratic institutions to every citizen. The religious ideals which we profess, and the heritage of freedom which we have received from the past, clearly place that duty upon us. I again urge the Congress to enact the civil rights proposals I made in February 1948. These are proposals for the enactment of Federal statutes which will protect all our people in the exercise of their democratic rights and their search for economic opportunity, grant statehood to Alaska and Hawaii, provide a greater measure of self-government for our island possessions, and accord home rule to the District of Columbia. Some of those proposals have been before the Congress for a long time. Those who oppose them, as well as those who favor them, should recognize that it is the duty of the elected representatives of the people to let these proposals come to a vote.

Our democratic ideals, as well as our own best interests, require that we do our fair share in providing homes for the unfortunate victims of war and tyranny. In so doing we shall add strength to our democracy through the abilities and skills which these men and women will bring here. I urge the prompt enactment by the Congress of the legislation now before it to extend and broaden the existing displaced persons law and remove its discriminatory features.

The measures I am recommending to the Congress concerning both our foreign and our domestic policies represent a carefully considered program to meet our national needs. It is a program which necessarily requires large expenditures of funds. More than 70 percent of the Government's expenditures are required to meet the costs of past wars and to work for world peace. This is the dominant factor in our fiscal policy. At the same time the Government must make substantial expenditures which are necessary to the growth and expansion of the domestic economy.

At present, largely because of the ill-considered tax reduction of the Eightieth Congress, the Government is not receiving enough revenue to meet its necessary expenditures.

To meet this situation I am proposing that Federal expenditures be held to the lowest levels consistent with our international requirements and the essential needs of economic growth and the well-being of our people. At the same time we must guard against the folly of attempting budget slashes which would impair our prospects for peace or cripple the programs essential to our national strength.

The budget recommendations I shall shortly transmit to the Congress show that we can expect a substantial improvement in our fiscal position over the next few years, as the cost of some of the extraordinary postwar programs declines, and as Government revenue rises as a result of growth in employment and national income. To further improve our fiscal outlook, we should make some changes in our tax system which will reduce present inequities, stimulate business activity, and yield a moderate amount of additional revenue. I expect to transmit specific recommendations to the Congress on this subject at an early date.

The fiscal policy I am recommending is the quickest and safest way of achieving a balanced budget.

As we move forward into the second half of the twentieth century we must always bear in mind the central purpose of our national life.

We do not seek material prosperity for ourselves because we love luxury; we do not aid other nations because we wish to increase our power. We have not devised programs for the security and well-being of our people because we are afraid or unwilling to take risks. This is not the meaning of our past history or our present course.

We work for a better life for all, so that all men may put to good use the great gifts with which they have been endowed by their Creator. We seek to establish those material conditions of life in which, without exception, men may live in dignity, perform useful work, serve their communities, and worship God as they see fit.

These may seem simple goals, but they are not little ones. They are worth a great deal more than all the empires and conquests of history. They are not to be achieved by military aggression or political fanaticism. They are to be achieved by humbler means—by hard work, by a spirit of self-restraint in our dealings with one another, and by a deep devotion to the principles of justice and equality.

It should make us truly thankful, as we look back to the beginnings of this country, that we have come so far along the road to a better life for all. It should make us humble to think, as we look ahead, how much farther we have to go to accomplish, at home and abroad, the objectives that were set out for us at the founding of this Nation.

As we approach the halfway mark in the twentieth century, we should ask for continued strength and guidance from that Almighty Power who has placed before us such great opportunities for the good of mankind in the years to come.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 4, 1950.

XIV. PROPOSED ARMING OF ADDITIONAL SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS

A. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, January 4, 1951

[From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

4 Jan 51

To: Commander in Chief United Nations Command, Tokyo, Japan
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The problem of arming additional ROK man power is under consideration by JCS. Foll info is furnished:

A. No machine guns, mortars, anti-tank guns or artillery can be made available from the ZI; however, the following can be made available in a reasonably short time:

(1) 160,000 Model 1903 rifles, with a backup of spare parts for 50,000.

(2) 70,000 M3 submachine guns.

(3) 150,000 M1 carbines.

(4) 8,000 Model 1918 Browning automatic rifles.

B. Ammo supply for the M3 submachine guns, the Browning auto rifles, 100,000 Model 1903 rifles and 100,000 M1 carbines is feasible.

2. Based on availability of above weapons it appears that ROK forces could be increased from 200,000 to 300,000 men, armed with

rifles, auto rifles, carbines and submachine guns. However, unless used in part to form new divisions, which would be relatively ineffective due to lack of infantry supporting weapons and artillery. It is probable that only on the order of 75,000 can be effectively utilized initially, with an ultimate build-up to approximately 100,000 in the following type organizations:

A. Augment the rifle strength of ROK division and other U. N. forces.

B. Form special units for guarding lines of communication and for operations against Communist guerrillas.

C. Conduct guerrilla operations in Communist-held territory.

3. JCS are of the opinion that recruitment for new units should include, but not be limited to, the membership of the Korean Youth Corps and/or any other group in the ROK. Arms should be issued only to organized units under the control and discipline of the military authorities in Korea.

4. Request your comment and recommendations to include:

A. Total number of additional ROK personnel that can be profitably employed.

B. Method of employment, namely, new divisions, additional strength in current divisions, etc.

C. Length of time required to organize and train additional man power.

D. Other points in connection with current problem.

B. Reply thereto by General MacArthur, January 6, 1951

[From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

6 Jan., '51

From: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan
To: Department of the Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Considered here that influence of past and possible future events is of importance equal to or greater than matériel availability in analyzing problem of arming additional ROK man power.

Continued effort has been made since 25 June, 1950 to effect the most practicable utilization of Korea personnel. In addition to materially augmenting the ROK army members of the Youth Corps and other qualified males have been supplied with signficant quantities of small arms for the purpose of strengthening police units, anti-guerrilla security elements and creation of special organizations to operate in enemy-held territory. Despite the relatively large number of non-army personnel now under arms, enemy guerrilla units continue to operate effectively in many widely scattered regions of South Korea. Friendly guerrilla forces, however, have accomplished little in Communist rear areas—primarily due to lack of strong willed leadership.

The type and quantity of weapons indicated by JCS as being currently available would have equal application to equipping the National Police Reserve of Japan, the immediate requirements for which were stated. Unless the quantities listed in JCS message are in excess of the current and foreseeable needs of the NPRJ, it is possible that the overall interests of the U. S. will be better served by making these weapons available to increase the security of Japan rather than arming additional ROK forces.

In view of the probable restricted size of the battlefield in which we may operate in the near future, and the high priority of NPRJ requirements, the value of attempting to organize, train and arm additional ROK forces in the immediate future appears questionable. It is considered that the short-range requirement can best be met by utilizing available man power to replace losses in existing ROK units rather than creating new organizations. The long-range requirement for or desirability of arming additional ROK personnel appears to be dependent primarily upon determination of the future U. S. military position with respect to both the Korean campaign and the generally critical situation in the Far East.

XV. WASHINGTON DIRECTIVES RELATIVE TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON POLICY AND RELEASES BY GENERAL MacARTHUR

A. General MacArthur's interview by editors of magazine U. S. News and World Report, December 1, 1950

[From New York Times, December 2, 1950. See also U. S. News and World Report, December 8, 1950, pp. 16–22]

Q. Were there any warnings from the U. N. or otherwise about the dangers of a winter offensive?

A. There were no warnings, nor were any warnings necessary. A winter offensive is as hard on the enemy as upon friendly forces. To have assumed defensive positions awaiting spring would not have avoided the rigors of the winter climate, for to hold these positions would require constant fighting during the winter months and it would have given the enemy an opportunity to mass his forces for a demolishing attack—with every assurance that he would jump off just as soon as a satisfactory military balance had been achieved, without waiting for the advent of spring.

Q. Was there adequate knowledge of Chinese strength?

A. When the line of battle moved northward following the Inchon landing, the area of possible detection and interdiction of enemy movements contracted until there was left but a night's march from the border sanctuary for Chinese Communist forces to the area of hostilities. This provided means for Chinese Communist authorities to move troops forward under cover of darkness and rugged terrain with little possibility of detection short of assault tactics with resulting unit identifications from prisoner of war interrogations. Air reconnaissance across the border is prohibited.

Q. In planning large operations, is Washington as well as the U. N. kept advised in advance, or is this planning entirely the responsibility of area commanders?

A. Major operations are all reported and approved prior to being launched.

Q. Did you expect the winter offensive to be lengthy or a pushover?

A. We had hoped that the offensive launched on October 20 would prove decisive action. Had there been but an outer crust of enemy force in front of our lines the enveloping pressure from east and west would have effected its destruction. Had we failed to assault and uncover enemy strength and intentions the opportunity secretly to build up from available resources of all China would inevitably encompass our destruction.

Q. Was this estimate based on the belief that Chinese strength was not more than 60,000?

A. The tactical course taken was the only one which the situation permitted.

Q. Would you describe the present situation as "critical and serious, but not hopeless?"

A. Yes, definitely, unless one completely discounts the combined resources of the free nations engaged in the Korean conflict.

Q. Are the Chinese supply lines vulnerable to air attack?

A. Within Manchuria the Chinese supply lines are protected from our air attack. South of the border for many miles along the river line, they can enter trails leading up through rugged terrain. Under the worst conditions, troops and supplies could be moved forward under cover of night with little possibility of air detection, an essential to air interdiction.

Q. Are the limitations which prevent unlimited pursuit of Chinese large forces and unlimited attack on their bases regarded by you as a handicap to effective military operations?

A. An enormous handicap, without precedent in military history.

Q. Are there any signs of Russian divisions being mobilized on their border?

A. No detection of such mobilization.

Q. What accounts for the fact that an enemy without air power can make effective progress against forces possessing considerable air power?

A. The limitations aforementioned, plus the type of maneuver which renders air support of ground operations extremely difficult and the curtailment of the strategic potentiality of the air because of the sanctuary of neutrality immediately behind the battle area.

Q. Is there a significant lesson in this for United States planning?

A. Yes.

Q. Nine out of ten persons on the street here and throughout the country are asking why the atom bomb is not being used. Can anything be said as to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the bomb in the type of operations in which you are now engaged?

A. My comment would be inappropriate at this time.

Q. In the type of warfare now going on in Korea, are there large enough concentrations of enemy troops in any one area to make the bomb effective, assuming all other objections to its use had been removed?

A. (Same as preceding question.)

Q. Public information here is that Chinese troops became visible October 19, but there is no official recognition here of that fact. Was official information concerning the build up of Chinese troops transmitted here and to the U. N. during October?

A. Daily intelligence reports were submitted to Washington.

Q. The argument is being advanced here that war with China could be carried on by sea and air only and by giving moral and material support to Chinese guerrillas. Do you believe that such a war could be carried on successfully without substantial use of U. N. troops?

A. Modern warfare requires a combination and complete co-ordination of all three arms. I would not care to discuss the potentialities with respect to any particular area.

B. General MacArthur's message to Hugh Baillie, president of the United Press, December 1, 1950

[From New York Times, December 2, 1950]

Never before has the patience of man been more sorely tried nor high standards of human behavior been more patiently and firmly upheld than during the course of the Korean campaigns.

From the initiation of the North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea until the total defeat of the North Korean armies, support from the Communist Chinese from behind the privileged sanctuary of neutral boundaries was open and notorious and all-inclusive.

Long lines of supply from the international boundary to the southern battlefront offered some opportunity for air interdiction and proved a tortuous route, with much that entered destroyed before reaching its destination.

When the lines of battle moved northward following the Inchon landing, however, the area of possible interdiction of such supply movements contracted until there was left but a night's march from the border sanctuary to the area of immediate hostilities.

This provided the means for the Chinese Communist authorities to move troops as well as supplies forward in great force and quantity with the ability to elude air detection and interdiction under cover of darkness and rugged terrain.

Red strength revealed

Our general assault launched on Nov. 20 revealed that, availing themselves of these distinct military advantages, Chinese Communist forces in army corps and divisional organization of an estimated aggregate strength of over 200,000 men then confronted our lines.

Such revelation, through the timeliness of our attack, disclosed that the tactic of the North Koreans in initially effecting preparations for war behind the concealment of political boundaries, and then striking with overwhelming force without warning or notice of belligerency, was followed without variation by the Chinese Communists.

This strategic plan—which may well find repetition in future aggressions—undoubtedly envisaged a massing, under cover of concealment, of such a powerful force as to enable the complete destruction of the United Nations command and conquest of all Korea, unquestionably the Communist objective, in one invincible movement.

The premature exposure of the plan, while not denying the enemy some tactical success through force of numbers although at staggering personnel loss, resulted in a partial strategic failure.

The existing situation under which the United Nations command is confronted with a new and fresh and well-trained and equipped enemy of vastly superior and ever-increasing numbers initiating an entirely new war to cover the North Korean defeat, results largely from the acceptance of military odds without precedent in history—the odds of permitting offensive action without defensive retaliation.

Odds are accepted

These odds have been and are being cheerfully accepted in the effort to uphold the high principles and standards which have characterized guiding policy and given nobility to the cause for which we fight, and to further the universal desire that the war be localized.

Indeed, throughout the war against the North Koreans we meticulously respected and held inviolate the international boundary and I at no time even recommended that authority be granted to retaliate beyond it.

Against such odds, officers and men of all services and participating nations have fought and, if need be, will continue to fight with unexcelled gallantry.

With this background of devotion to high principles and invincible determination to achieve the stated objectives of the United Nations, it is disturbing indeed to note the irresponsible comments appearing in responsible sections of the European press. There appears to be a general failure, intentional or from misinformation, to comprehend the mission prescribed for this command by resolutions of the United Nations of which their governments were joint architects and directors, or fairly to recognize that in success or adversity this command has proceeded unerringly in compliance with controlling policies and directives.

Attitude held selfish

I can only attribute this to a somewhat selfish though most shortsighted viewpoint.

To the European the welfare and security of Europe is naturally paramount. He has no fear of attack from the West, solely from the East. It is not unusual therefore that he sees in every dedication of friendly resource toward the stabilization of Asia but a substraction from that available for the betterment and security of Europe.

This is, of course, fallacious reasoning. Any breach of freedom in the East carries with it a sinister threat to freedom in the West.

The issue is a global one and failure to comprehend this fact carries the germs of freedom's ultimate destruction.

If the fight is not waged with courage and invincible determination to meet the challenge here, it will indeed be fought, and possibly lost, on the battlefields of Europe.

Every strategic and tactical movement made by the United Nations command has been in complete accordance with United Nations resolutions and in compliance with the directive under which I operate, every major step having been previously reported and fully approved.

I have received no suggestion from any authoritative source that in the execution of its mission the command should stop at the Thirty-eighth Parallel or Pyongyang, or at any other line short of the international boundary.

To have done so would have required revision of the resolutions of the United Nations and the directives received in implementation thereof.

It is historically inaccurate to attribute any degree of responsibility for the onslaught of the Chinese Communist armies to the strategic course of the campaign itself.

The decision by the Chinese Communist leaders to wage war against the United Nations could only have been a basic one, long premeditated and carried into execution as a direct result of the defeat of their satellite North Korean armies.

C. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, December 6, 1950

[From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

6 Dec., '50

From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan (and other commanders):

"1. The President, as of 5 Dec., forwarded a memo to all Cabinet members and to the chairman N. S. R. B., administrator E. C. A., director C. I. A., administrator E. S. A. and director Selective Service, which reads as follows:

" 'In the light of the present critical international situation, and until further written notice from me, I wish that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. This applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington.

" 'No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

" 'No speech, press release, or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

" 'In addition to the copies submitted to the Departments of State or Defense for clearance, advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be submitted to the White House for information.

" 'The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people, but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government.

"2. He also forwarded the following to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense:

" 'In addition to the policy expressed in my memorandum of this date to the heads of departments, concerning the clearance of speeches and statements, I wish the following steps to be taken:

" 'Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States.'

"3. The above is transmitted to you for guidance and appropriate action."

D. General MacArthur's communiqué on withdrawal from Hungnam, December 26, 1950

[From New York Times, December 26, 1950]

The amphibious movement of the Tenth Corps from the Hungnam sector to a juncture with the Eighth Army has been successfully completed with but light casualties and no matériel loss.

This operation has been conducted with great skill and coordination by the Army. Efficiency has characterized the conduct of all personnel.

It has completed the readjustment of our positions made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war.

The real test of the United Nations Command was when it was suddenly and without the customary notice of belligerency confronted by this new power in overwhelming force and yet survived without marked diminunition of its strength and resources or loss of its fluidity of movement and maneuver. This it has done and has come through well.

With the successful close of this phase of our operations, I believe it pertinent to review briefly the military events of the recent past.

In the latter days of October our forces were advancing from the south and northeast in columns of pursuit to destroy the North Korean remnants and complete the prescribed mission of restoring order and unification to all of Korea.

End was in sight

The end of the campaign was clearly in sight when some of our units met with surprise assault by Chinese Communist elements of unknown organization and strength.

In the face of this new force, the Eighth Army was withdrawn to a closely integrated front, to there await the logistical build-up which would permit resumption of our advance in attack formation.

Meanwhile, every effort was made to assess enemy strength and intentions in light of this new reinforcement repeatedly and publicly declared by Chinese Communist authorities to be only on an individual volunteer basis.

Political intelligence failed to penetrate the iron curtain and provided no substantial information of intent.

Field intelligence was handicapped by the severest limitations. Aerial reconnaissance beyond the border, which was the normal source of field intelligence, was forbidden. Avenues of advance from border sanctuary to battle area, only a night's march, provided maximum natural concealment.

No intelligence service in the world could have surmounted such handicaps to determine to any substantial degree enemy strength, movements and intentions. This left ground reconnaissance in force as the proper, indeed the sole, expedient. Not until 24 November did our logistical position permit resumption of forward operations.

We hoped that the Army would be opposed by no more than a token Chinese force to support previous commitments but short of a full Chinese commitment to major operations.

Reassurances Failed

Political reassurances that the United Nations Command would not violate the international border were universally believed to have failed to convince the Chinese authorities.

The free world wanted the integrity of our purpose fully understood and accordingly renewed assurances were publicly given by me as military commander upon the resumption of our advance that the Eighth Army would be returned to its home station in Japan just as soon as the Korean border area had been cleared of hostile forces.

This but expressed our hopes—indeed the hopes of all men of goodwill—through re-emphasis of our military objectives. Unfortunately, in some quarters it has been otherwise interpreted and my intent misrepresented.

Our advance was the final test of Chinese intentions. Events subsequently have disclosed that neither political nor military reassurances could have had the slightest influence upon the momentous decision underlying Red China's commitment of her forces to war.

The Eighth Army and affiliated United Nations units met powerful enemy resistance along the entire line—resistance which unmasked the fiction of "volunteer" participation and disclosed the massive deployment of the Fourth Chinese Field Army, an important segment of the entire Chinese Communist military strength, in a formation of nine corps abreast in column of divisions to an aggregate of twenty-seven divisions, with elements of the Third Field Army discovered in initial deployment immediately to the rear.

Despite their initial valiant resistance, some of the R. O. K. (Republic of Korea) forces were overwhelmed by this massive array. This exposed the Eighth Army's right flank and required its withdrawal.

No Loss of Cohesion

These withdrawal operations, made in accordance with plans previously prepared against any such eventuality, were skillfully conducted without loss of cohesion and with all units remaining intact.

The gallant Second Infantry Division and the equally gallant Turkish Brigade, being directly exposed by the gap torn through R. O. K. forces, took the heaviest attendant pressure, but the enemy, caught off balance in the midst of build-up operations, had not yet developed the strength to enable exploitation of the break-through which would have imperiled the Eighth Army.

Fortunate presence of the Tenth Corps on the enemy's flank forced him to divide his forces and thus further weaken his offensive capabilities achieved at that stage of his build-up operations against the Eighth Army.

In its broad implications I consider that these operations, initiated on 24 November and carried through to this redeployment, have served a very significant purpose—possibly in general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted during the course of the Korean campaign.

The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations command but without attaining a decision.

Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or even detect, we did not achieve the United Nations objective.

But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed before too late secret political and military decisions of enormous scope and threw off balance enemy military preparations aimed at surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces with one mighty extended blow.

No command ever fought more gallantly or efficiently under unparalleled conditions of restraint and handicap, and no command could have acquitted itself to better advantage under prescribed missions and delimitations involving unprecedented risk and jeopardy.

E. Statement of General MacArthur, February 13, 1951

[From New York Times, February 14, 1951]

What the future has in store in Korea continues to be largely dependent upon international considerations, and decisions not yet known here. Meanwhile, the command is doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it. Our field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to lengthen the enemy's supply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destructiveness of our air power, has worked well.

In the development of this strategy the Eighth Army has achieved local tactical successes through maximum exploitation of the air's massive blows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies but in the evaluation of these successes sight must not be lost of the enemy's remaining potential for reinforcement and resupply. We must not fall into the error of evaluating such tactical successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat just as many erred in assessing our strategic withdrawals in the fact of Communist China's commitment to war as a decisive defeat inflicted upon us.

We are still engaged in a war of maneuver with the object of inflicting as heavy a punishment upon the enemy as possible, striving constantly to keep him off balance to prevent his obtaining and holding the tactical initiative while at the same time avoiding the hazards inherent in his numerical superiority.

The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved and the relatively small force which could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such strategy would insure destruction of our forces piecemeal. Talk of crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel at the present stage of the campaign, except by scattered patrol action incidental to the tactical situation, is purely academic.

From a military standpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority of our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in undeclared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage of sanctuary protection for his military potential against our counterattack upon Chinese soil, before we can seriously consider conducting major operations north of that geographic line.

Meanwhile, however, the complete coordination of our land, sea and air forces and the consequent smooth synchronization of their combined operations, with each arm contributing its full part, continues to inflict terrific losses upon the enemy. General Ridgway is proving himself a brilliant and worthy successor to General Walker in command of the Eighth Army and with Admiral Struble in command of the fleet and General Partridge in command of the air comprise an ideal trio of field commanders.

F. Statement of General MacArthur, March 7, 1951

[From New York Times, March 8, 1951]

Progress of the campaign continues to be satisfactory, with all three services—Army, Navy and Air—performing well their completely coordinated tactical missions. Designed to meet abnormal military inhibitions, our strategic plan, involving constant movement to keep the enemy off balance with a corresponding limitation upon his initiative, remains unaltered.

Our selection of the battle area furthermore has forced him into the military disadvantage of fighting far from his base and permitted greater employment of our air and sea arms against which he has little defense. There has been a resultant continuing and exhausting attrition upon both his manpower and supplies. There should be no illusions in this matter, however. In such a campaign of maneuver, as our battle lines shift north the supply position of the enemy will progressively improve, just as inversely the effectiveness of our air potential will progressively diminish, thus in turn causing his numerical ground superiority to become of increasing battlefield significance.

Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and matériel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves.

The exact place of stabilization is of necessity a fluctuating variable dependent upon the shifting relative strengths of forces committed and will constantly move up or down. Even now there are indications that the enemy is attempting to build up from China a new and massive offensive for the spring. These are the salient factors which must continue to delimit strategical thinking and planning as the campaign proceeds.

This does not alter the fact, however, that the heavy toll we have taken of the enemy's military power since its commitment to war in Korea cannot fail to weaken his hold upon the Chinese nation and people and materially dampen his ardor for engaging in other aggressive adventures in Asia.

Even under our existing conditions of restraint it should be clearly evident to the Communist foes now committed against us that they cannot hope to impose their will in Korea by military force. They have failed twice—once through North Korean forces, and now through the military might of the army of Communist China. Theirs was the aggression in both cases. Theirs has been the double failure. That they should continue this savage slaughter despite an almost hopeless chance of ultimate military success is a measure of wanton disregard of international decencies and restraints and displays a complete contempt for the sanctity of human life.

No longer is there even a shallow pretense of concern for the welfare of the Korean nation and people, now being so ruthlessly and senselessly sacrificed. Through endless blood it is apparently hoped to enforce either international banditry or blackmail.

Vital decisions have yet to be made—decisions far beyond the scope of the authority vested in me as the military commander, decisions which are neither solely political nor solely military, but which must provide on the highest international levels an answer to the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea.

G. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 20, 1951

[From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

20 Mar., 51.

To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan.
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th Parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for U. N. forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.

H. Statement of General MacArthur, March 24, 1951

[From New York Times, March 24, 1951. NOTE: As reprinted in New York Times, April 12, 1951, this statement is dated at Tokyo "25 March 1951". See also Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3940.]

Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply caused by our 'round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain, and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset vulnerability inherent in such deficiences.

Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists, as in our case, and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.

Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

I. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 24, 1951

[From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951]

24 March 51

To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff, personal for MacArthur

The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must be co-ordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December.

The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions.

J. Letters exchanged by Honorable Joseph W. Martin, Jr., and General MacArthur, March 1951

(1) *Letter from Honorable Joseph W. Martin, Jr. to General MacArthur, March 8, 1951*

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938]

OFFICE OF THE MINORITY LEADER,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., March 8, 1951.

General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command.

MY DEAR GENERAL: In the current discussions on foreign policy and overall strategy many of us have been distressed that, although the European aspects have been heavily emphasized, we have been without the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command.

I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for the safety of the world that policies of the United States embrace the broadest possible strategy and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not weaken our position in Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N. Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea.

I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on a radio hook-up.

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect you command is enormous. May success be yours in the gigantic undertaking which you direct.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR.

(2) *Reply thereto by General MacArthur, March 20, 1951*

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938. See also Daily Congressional Record, April 5, 1951, p. 3482]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
Tokyo, Japan, March 20, 1951.

Hon. JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR.,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MARTIN: I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am,

Faithfully yours,

Douglas MacArthur.

K. Messages exchanged by editor, The Freeman magazine, and General MacArthur, March–April 1951

(*1*) *Message from Henry Hazlitt to General MacArthur, March 31, 1951*

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 24, 1951, p. 4378. See also The Freeman, April 23, 1951, p. 453]

March 31, 1951.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
Tokyo:

Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported New York Times, March 31, dispatch from Taegu? Previous statements President Rhee reported requests for such arms.

The Freeman, Henry Hazlitt, *Editor.*

(*2*) *Reply thereto by General MacArthur, April 5, 1951*

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 24, 1951, p. 4378. See also The Freeman, April 23, 1951, p. 453]

April 5.

Henry Hazlitt,
Editor, the Freeman:

I have delayed reply to your message of the 31st pending receipt here of the referenced New York Times dispatch. There is nothing I can add to the information therein contained. The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government, and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.

Cordial personal regards,

MacArthur,
CINCFE, Tokyo, Japan.

(3) *New York Times dispatch, Taegu, Korea, March 30, 1951*

[From New York Times, March 31, 1951]

South Korea is beginning to release some of the men in its army reserve camps because the Government cannot equip them or even feed or clothe them.

Confronted by a dangerously spiraling inflation and with very little funds in the treasury, the Defense Ministry reluctantly put out orders permitting 120,000 men between the ages of 26 and 40 to return to their farms and villages. If the economic crisis worsens the Army may be compelled to authorize other more drastic releases from the special reserve pool of manpower it has been keeping in its "stand-by camps."

The inability of the Army to utilize any of its immediate manpower reserves of 400,000 men, who had been rounded up by the Government to prepare for the fight against the Communist armies, has become one of the top political issues here. It has shaped up into a quarrel that is helping to widen the chasm between the National Assembly and the Administration of President Syngman Rhee.

The propaganda perils inherent in any kind of "demobilization" program for the South Korean Army, whatever the causes may be that make it necessary, are obvious to all Koreans when they see troop replacements continually coming into the country to fill up the ranks of fighters from thirteen foreign nations. President Rhee has told the United Nations that he is prepared to supply 500,000 men in addition to the 250,000 South Koreans who are now fighting and he has repeatedly asked for guns to arm at least some of the 100,000 members of the National Guard, the first echelon of the Army reserves. But it is the 400,000 "stand-by reservists" waiting in collection camps for formal induction into the army who have produced the storm in the Assembly and forces the Defense Ministry to take steps it would rather not take.

"VOLUNTEERS" ROUNDED UP

The 400,000 from whose ranks 120,000 are now to be released are officially called "volunteers." They were rounded up last November and December when the Chinese began their heavy drive southward and were placed into collection camps to keep them out of the hands of the enemy and provide a central pool of manpower for the South Korean Army.

The Government was confident that the arms it needed to equip the additional units would be forthcoming without long delay and so the men were kept in camps. But as each week went by, it became increasingly apparent that even the 100,000 uniformed members of the National Guard were having trouble getting arms.

With the country itself continuing on the economic down-grade, the "volunteers" in the camps became a major problem. Complaints began to be aired in the National Assembly that most were suffering from malnutrition and cold and that their families almost equally hard up because the men were getting no pay.

It was disclosed today officially that at least 30,000 of those being released were sick and a query brought the official reply from the

Army that the illness was malnutrition, which the Army declares the men had been suffering from when they had been picked up and put into the camps. It has been openly charged in the Assembly that some 20,000 of the "volunteers" died this winter in the camps.

The Defense Ministry, painfully short on money, is already having difficulty in paying the troops of the Regular Army—50 cents a month for a private and $12 monthly for a lieutenant general—and the additional problem of supplying clothes and food for 400,000 future soldiers is an enormous one.

When the complaints began pouring into the Assembly concerning the sorry condition of the collection camps, there were some acrid comments from the floor and these increased fast when the Assembly unsuccessfully tried to pin down the responsibility and correct the condition.

The Ministry of Social Affairs told the Assembly that it could do nothing about the men in the camps because, technically speaking, they were not refugees, and the Ministry of Defense told the Assembly that the camps were, technically speaking, not yet an official part of the Army. An irate Assembly has now twice, almost unanimously each time, voted to recommend that all those in the camps who cannot be adequately cared for be returned to their homes.

L. Message of General MacArthur to Newsweek Magazine, published April 16, 1951

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 12, 1951, p. 3841]

The statement contained in your issue of April second to the effect that prior to the issuance of my statement on March 24 of the military situation in Korea I had been furnished a copy of a policy statement by the President cleared by the governments having military forces in Korea is entirely without basis in fact. I have never seen such a statement and do not know if it even exists. Please publish this in the interest of truth.

XVI. RELIEF OF GENERAL MacARTHUR FROM COMMAND

A. Message relieving General MacArthur of command, April 10, 1951

I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U. S. Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message.

B. Statement of the President relative to the relief of General MacArthur, April 10, 1951

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

C. Letter of Ambassador Austin to Secretary-General Lie, April 11, 1951

[From UN release, April 11, 1951]

Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform the Security Council that the President of the United States has today relieved General Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General of the military forces which the members of the United Nations have made available to the Unified Command under the United States, pursuant to the Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, and has designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

D. Radio address of the President relative to the relief of General MacArthur, April 11, 1951

[From Washington Post, April 12, 1951]

I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this:

We are trying to prevent a third world war.

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot—and will not—sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how is the best way to meet it?

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one.

If they had followed the right policies in the 1930's—if the free countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the dictators, and if they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression was small—there probably would have been no World War II.

If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.

This is a lesson that most people in this country have learned thoroughly. This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And, since the end of World War II, we have been putting that lesson into practice—we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by the aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency.

The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made.

The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia.

I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which came to us after the attack. It is a report of a speech a Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs last May, one month before South Korea was invaded. The report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully prepared plot. Here is part of what the Communist officer, who had been trained in Moscow, told his men: "Our forces," he said, "are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June * * * the coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward liberation of Asia."

Notice that he uses the word "liberation." That is Communist double-talk meaning "conquest."

I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: "In order to successfully undertake the long awaited world revolution, we must first unify Asia. * * * Java, Indo-China, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets * * * the United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States."

That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and that is what they have been trying to do.

Again, "liberation" in Commie language, means "conquest."

They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin.

This plan of conquest is in flat contradiction to what we believe. We believe that Korea belongs to the Koreans. We believe that India belongs to the Indians. We believe that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East and it is the basis of peace everywhere else.

The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. The Chinese Communists massed 44 well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean Communists were beaten.

The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task.

But so far it has been successful.

So far, we have prevented World War III.

So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding, and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight and that they will stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indo-China and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the time-table of conquest.

In Korea itself, there are signs that the enemy is building up his ground forces for a new mass offensive. We also know that there have been large increases in the enemy's available air forces.

If a new attack comes I feel confident it will be turned back. The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well equipped. They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world.

The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The Communist rulers may press the attack against us. They may take further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow. The Communists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which could lead to a general relaxation of tensions in the Far East. The decision is theirs, because the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the conflict if possible.

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war—not to start one. The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

But you may ask why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor. Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full scale war with Red China?

It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong—tragically wrong—for us to take the initiative in extending the war.

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.

Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea—and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

If the Communists authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: To make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted, to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have, therefore, considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action, General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important that any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The new commander, Lieut. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: The fighting must stop.

Two. Concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: There must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective—to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing, we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

E. Comment upon relief of General MacArthur by Major General Courtney Whitney, April 12, 1951

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, pp. 3940–3941]

In clarification of news dispatches from the United States making reference to the President's directive of December 6 enjoining against the issuance of public statements on foreign policy without reference to the State Department for clearance, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, of General MacArthur's staff, today pointed out the following:

1. The directive of December 6 was not directed to General MacArthur personally but was directed to all executive agencies of the Government.
2. Immediately after its receipt, General MacArthur submitted a proposed communiqué to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who informed him, among other things, that it was not necessary to submit communiqués referencing military operations.
3. The President, in a press conference in January, appeared to this headquarters to specifically define General MacArthur's authority, but denied that there was any curb on his authority "to speak freely on the Korean War."
4. Furthermore, the directive of December 6, by its terms and spirit, was interpreted at this headquarters as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiqués, correspondence, or personal conversations with others.
5. The general feels that he has complied meticulously with all directives he has received, not only recently, but throughout his entire military service.
6. The general has interpreted both his statement of March 24 and his letter to Congressman Joseph Martin, dispatched from here 4 days prior thereto, as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within the area of his uncontested authority to speak. The one bore no slightest relationship to the other.
7. The reference to arms for reserve elements of the Republic of Korea was taken from a top-secret message of early January while the Army's retrograde movement from Seoul was in progress and conditions indicated the possibility of evacuation. Subsequently, when our initiative had been reassumed, General MacArthur, within his capability to arm, authorized a 25-percent increase in each Republic of Korea division, the increase to be in infantry riflemen. It was obviously quite beyond the capability of this theatre to arm and equip 500,000 more Koreans. Their utilization, therefore, became a matter of political policy under the global military-assistance program.

F. Address of General MacArthur to joint meeting of the Congress, April 19, 1951

[From Daily Congressional Record, April 19, 1951, pp. 4233–4235]

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of the Congress, I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride; humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. [Applause.]

Here are centered the hopes, and aspirations, and faith of the entire human race.

I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American. I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life with but one purpose in mind, to serve my country. [Applause.]

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is but to court disaster for the whole.

While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.

There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. [Applause.] If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort.

The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe. [Applause.]

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration of the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity and heretofore unfelt dignity and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers, as the whole epi-center of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started. In this situation it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction [applause]; the dignity of equality, not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standards of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of a normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto, the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack. The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free allies.

From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would be doomed to failure. Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader—it assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression.

The holding of this littoral defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof, for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment. This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. [Applause.]

For that reason I have strongly recommended in the past as a matter of military urgency that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. [Applause.]

Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington.

To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China up to 50 years ago was completely nonhomogeneous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost nonexistent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chan So Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime, to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant aggressive tendencies. Through these past 50 years, the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia which for its own purposes is allied with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism. There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and avid to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies. I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are at present parallel to those of the Soviet, but I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea, but also in Indochina and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the south, reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time. [Applause.]

The Japanese people since the war have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government, committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise and social justice. [Applause.] Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside, and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battle front without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. [Applause.] I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious—nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race. [Applause.]

Of our former wards, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them, as in our hour of need they did not fail us. [Applause.] A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the Government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. [Applause.]

The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government; and politically, economically, and socially appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surrounding areas I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in the support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint proved a sound one. [Applause.] As I say, a brief and sound one as we hurled back the invaders and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming. [Applause.]

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China—and such was never given a thought—the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old. [Applause.]

Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize sanctuary, protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary:

First, the intensification of our economic blockade against China.

Second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.

Third, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria. [Applause.]

Fourth, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland. [Applause.]

For entertaining these views all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Applause, the Members rising.]

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa; if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without; and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory. We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign, with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution. Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the 2d of September 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese Nation on the battleship *Missouri*, I formally cautioned as follows:

"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start, workable methods were found insofar as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2,000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh." [Applause.]

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory—not prolonged indecision. [Applause.] In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory. [Applause.]

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means—where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer. [Applause.] Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that as military action is confined to its territorial limits, it condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment, while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation. Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. [Applause.] They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were "Don't scuttle the Pacific." [Applause.]

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there and I can report to you without reservation they are splendid in every way. [Applause.] It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always. [Applause.]

I am closing my 52 years of military service. [Applause.] When I joined the Army even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that—

"Old soldiers never die; they just fade away." And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away—an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good-by.

APPENDIX QQ

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
August 17, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Senate Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: On August 17, 1951, the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, constituted to hold hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur and the military situation in the Far East, adopted the following resolution:

"That the Committees transmit and report to the Senate for its information the hearings and the records with their appendixes.

"That the Committee file no further report, that no views or conclusions be denominated as majority or minority views or conclusions but that members be permitted before September 1st to file their views and conclusions with the Chairman, and that said views be printed in the appendix."

In accordance with that resolution, the undersigned members of said Joint Committee transmit herewith views which they each adopt as individual members of said Joint Committee in connection with the hearings above referred to.

This document, representing the individual views of the undersigned, is to be incorporated in the appendix of the records of the hearings which are to be transmitted to the Senate for its information in accordance with the resolution above set out.

Respectfully submitted.

STYLES BRIDGES.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER.
HARRY P. CAIN.
WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.
H. ALEXANDER SMITH.
ALEXANDER WILEY.
RALPH E. FLANDERS.
OWEN BREWSTER.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
August 17, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Joint Committees on Investigation Into Far East Policy,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Without endorsing all the statements in the compilation of views to which this letter is appended, I agree with its criticism of the way in which General MacArthur's dismissal was handled and communism was given a "green light" in China and Korea. I concur in its tribute to the valor of our troops.

I shall very soon submit my own views on the other issues raised by the investigation.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr.,
United States Senator.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
August 17, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: At Senator Saltonstall's request, I submit herewith for your attention his statement relative to the MacArthur hearings.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN B. FISHER,
Secretary to Senator Saltonstall.

(Enclosure.)

STATEMENT OF SENATOR SALTONSTALL

I join in most of the individual conclusions contained in the above report, particularly that concerning the valor of our men, but I do not agree with all the bases upon which these conclusions are reached. I therefore add the following few thoughts of my own.

At the conclusion of the hearings held jointly by the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a statement was prepared by Senator Russell, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, with regard to those hearings and their significance. This statement was unanimously approved by the membership of both Committees. I personally endorsed it then and enthusiastically approve that statement now.

I did not personally believe that any further Committee comment was required beyond this statement of Chairman Russell. Since, however, it appears that individual views are to be published, I would like to add briefly my own views.

Let me say first that I do not intend to draw conclusions on this vital matter on the basis of the personal strength or weaknesses of any one witness. They are all highly responsible officials of our government and whether or not we like them personally, we must do our utmost in these difficult times to maintain the confidences of our friends throughout the world in our leadership and our objectives.

I believe that by reason of the unusually ample coverage given these hearings, the American people have had an excellent opportunity to form their own judgments as to General MacArthur's removal and with regard to the problems of foreign policy that have been illuminated by it.

I believe that the feeling is now almost unanimous that the President clearly had the right as Commander-in-Chief under our Constitution to dismiss General MacArthur from his command. The General himself agrees to that.

I do, however, feel that the method by which the dismissal was carried out showed a lack of judgment and foresight on the part of the President. I believe it showed a total lack of appreciation of a great American and of the service which he has for half a century rendered our nation. It is, I feel, unseemingly at any time that those who have served America should be so lightly considered and so abruptly dismissed.

I believe these hearings proved that General MacArthur did not consciously violate the orders of his military superiors. They did reveal, however, that here in Washington and in other capitals throughout the world General MacArthur's periodic public statements caused considerable doubt as to whether he was in sympathy with the orders of his superiors. The created serious doubt as to whether he or the President, through the Department of State, was the spokesman for our government's position in the Far East. This doubt and uncertainty seem to me to make clear the need for any commanding general to return periodically to Washington to report on his own activities, to review the problems of his command as they relate to our total policy and to refresh himself as to the attitudes and objectives of our government relative to other nations in the world.

In 1949, I urged strongly and voted that General MacArthur be ordered back to the United States for a review of just such matters, and for a report to the President and the Congress on the problems of the Far East as he saw them.

Had this been done, I believe the unfortunate situation resultiig in his dismissal might never have occurred. A thorough mutual understanding of the problems and policies involved would undoubtedly have prevented this regrettable result.

Boiled down, the differences between General MacArthur and his superiors in Washington on the conduct of affairs in Korea and China are not great. They concern primarily the fundamental policy question as to whether the United Nations, for which we are carrying the major share of the load, should carry out an aggressive war by bombing in Manchuria over the Yalu River, and by conducting reconnaissance over China itself, or whether we should contain the fighting to Korea alone. General MacArthur had a positive policy, which if successful would end the fighting with a prompt victory. The Administration's policy, as I see it, can win only by the wearing down of the Chinese Communists. Whatever happens, the valor of our fighting men has been magnificent.

The hearings unquestionably emphasized, clarified and crystallized the policies of the Administration, as never before, on (1) the necessity of maintaining Formosa in free hands as an adjunct of our security, (2) the impossibility of permitting Communist China to shoot her way into the United Nations, and (3) putting off indefinitely the recognition of Communist China by the Government of the United States.

I believe that while serious and even tragic mistakes have without question been made by the Administration at the Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta conferences, with resulting unfortunate and dangerous consequences to the future security of this country, our present task and duty are to deal with the present and with the future and to look ahead to the solving of the difficulties that confront us rather than look backward in anger and with recriminations.

These hearings also brought more clearly to the minds of all of us the relationship of the Far East to our problem in Europe. It has hammered into our minds the stringent necessity of preserving our military and economic strength in order to build up our security to our best advantage and of promoting thereby greater opportunities for a more peaceful world.

Clear-headed and positive action taken now and in the future is, I believe, the best possible medicine that we can apply if we are to restore an ailing foreign policy to full and effective health.

In final emphasis of the foregoing comments, I quote from the Joint Statement of June 27, unanimously approved by both the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees:

"But the free world has no cause for dismay. The fact that we do not always speak with a single voice does not mean that we have weakened in our united purpose. The objectives of the people of the United States are unchanged by anything that has transpired during this ordeal of controversy. We are unshaken in our determination to defend ourselves and to cooperate to the limit of our capabilities with all of those free nations determined to survive in freedom."

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF CERTAIN MEMBERS

OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

AND

FOREIGN RELATIONS

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

RELATING TO

HEARINGS HELD ON THE DISMISSAL OF GENERAL MacARTHUR AND THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MAY 3–JUNE 27, 1951

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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

Report of certain members of the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate

(Pursuant to unanimous consent agreement of the Senate, April 25, 1951)

PREAMBLE

For 7 weeks ending June 27, 1951, the Senate Armed Services Committee, acting jointly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, conducted a searching inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the circumstances surrounding the recall of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

As a result of this investigation we, members of the joint committee, have established certain facts. We have reached definite conclusions.

Believing that we have a clear responsibility to the Nation in this matter, and convinced that the discussion of a cessation of hostilities—in progress at the time of this writing—should not distract attention from fundamental questions in the conduct of our national affairs abroad, we have determined to make our conclusions public.

INTRODUCTION

The unanimous-consent agreement of the United States Senate was adopted in this way:[1]

"Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, Gen. Douglas MacArthur has accepted the invitation of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to appear before that committee on May 3. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has requested that it be permitted to meet with us in a joint meeting. I ask unanimous consent that that may be done, for the purpose of that meeting as well as subsequent hearings on the subject.

"The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

"Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

"Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

"Mr. WHERRY. Is it contemplated that the two committees will sit jointly in continuous meetings?

"Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; both for the purpose of hearing General MacArthur, and for the purpose of subsequent hearings to be held on the same subject."

Acting upon this unanimous-consent agreement the two committees commenced hearings in executive session on May 3, 1951, and continued the hearings until June 27, 1951.

Over 2,000,000 words of testimony were taken from the 13 witnesses who appeared in the following order:

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army
Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.
Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State
Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, United States Army
Louis A. Johnson, former Secretary of Defense
Vice Adm. Oscar C. Badger, United States Navy
Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Honorary Reserve, United States Army
Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., United States Air Force
Maj. Gen. David C. Barr, United States Army

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[1] Congressional Record, April 25, 1951, p. 4434.

In addition to the oral testimony, numerous statements and communications were received, examined, and made a part of the record.

At the conclusion of the hearings, on June 28, 1951, Chairman Russell, with the unanimous consent of both committees, issued a declaration of principles. This brief statement defended the necessity for the inquiry and the manner in which the committees had carried out their task.

The chairman reiterated his conviction that a frank discussion of differences of opinion concerning the far eastern military situation would strengthen the unity of purpose of our people. He assured the nations of the free world that the objectives of the United States were not shaken by the "MacArthur controversy." He concluded by warning the Communist world that such frank discussions of policy disagreements were a part of the democratic process, adding strength and not weakness to our "relentless quest for our ultimate security." [2]

So far this is the only statement given to the Nation following the long and extensive inquiry.

We cannot rest at this point. Numerous significant facts were developed as a result of the investigation. We believe that the Nation is entitled to a summation of these facts and an analysis of them. Such materials are presented in the pages following.

They consist of—

I. The legislative background of the inquiry.
II. A brief chronology of the significant events preceding the inquiry.
III. A brief commentary concerning the witnesses appearing before the committee.
IV. Areas of agreement (those significant facts which were conclusively proved and are not subject to serious disagreement).
V. Areas of disagreement (those significant facts which were proved to the satisfaction of the signers of this report).
VI. Conclusions.

PART I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THIS INQUIRY

At 1 a. m., eastern standard time, on April 10, 1951, President Truman released the following message which he had sent relieving General MacArthur as supreme commander, Allied Powers; commander in chief, United Nations Command; commander in chief, Far East; and commanding general, United States Army, Far East:

"I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as supreme commander, Allied powers; commander in chief, United Nations Command; commander in chief, Far East; and commanding general, United States Army, Far East.

"You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

"My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message." [3]

Simultaneously with the release of the message, the President issued the following statement:

"With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

"Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

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[2] Press release, Joint Armed Services-Foreign Relations Committee, June 28, 1951.

[3] Compilation of certain published information on the military situation in the Far East, Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1951, hereafter referred to as "Compilation," p. 188.

"General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for this distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case." [4]

In order that the United Nations be officially informed of this development, on April 11, 1951, Ambassador Austin addressed a letter to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, in which he stated:

"Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform the Security Council that the President of the United States has today relieved Gen. Douglas MacArthur as the commanding general of the military forces which the members of the United Nations have made available to the unified command under the United States, pursuant to the Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, and has designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor." [4]

On the same evening the President defended his course of action in a radio address to the American people.

That this abrupt action on the part of the President shocked the American people was evidenced by the hundreds of thousands of letters, telegrams, and phone calls which poured into the offices of the Congressmen and Senators in Washington. The reaction of the American people was swiftly transmitted to the floor of the United States Senate, where in rapid succession the following legislative action occurred:

1. Wherry resolution

The dismissal of General MacArthur resulted on Wednesday, April 11, in a series of protests on the floor of the United States Senate. Minority Leader Kenneth Wherry, of Nebraska, introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 24, stating that the dismissal of General MacArthur had "precipitated a situation fraught with danger to the national defense," [5] and indicating that the dismissal had "struck a blow to the national unity." [6] Senator Wherry's resolution highly praised General MacArthur and expressed the will of the Senate that the general "be hereby invited to present his views and recommendations for policies and courses in Korea and Asia generally to a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives." [6]

2. Armed Services Committee

On Friday, April 13, acting on a prior request of Senator Styles Bridges (Republican, New Hampshire), the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive session, voted unanimously to conduct an inquiry into the facts surrounding the relief of General MacArthur.

3. Ferguson resolution

During succeeding days, additional addresses of protest against the President's action were made on the floor of the Senate. On April 17, Senator Homer Ferguson (Republican, Michigan) introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 25 the purpose of which was to set up a joint bipartisan committee of 24 Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States "to gather such data, to conduct such interviews, to take such testimony and to hold such hearings as it may determine necessary for a complete evaluation of the United States policies in the Far East and their relation to the foreign and military policies of the United States as a whole." [7] The joint committee was to consist of 12 Members of the Senate, including two members of each party from the Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services Committees, with similar representation from the counterpart committees of the House of Representatives.

Immediately after the introduction of Senator Ferguson's resolution, Senator Richard Russell (Democrat, Georgia) stated that "the Senate Committee on Armed Services which I should think, under section 134 (a) of the legislative reorganization law, has primary jurisdiction in this field, has already held a meeting on the subject." [8]

He stated that "the committee unanimously agreed—which means that all the members of the committee who were present agreed—and we had a very full attendance of members from both parties, that the Senate Committee on Armed Services should conduct an inquiry into all the facts and circumstances surrounding the recent events in the Far East that have stirred the American people so deeply." [9]

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[4] Ibid., p. 189.
[5] United States Congressional Record, p. 3712.
[6] Ibid., p. 3712.
[7] Ibid., p. 4051, April 17, 1951.
[8] Ibid., p. 4052.

Senator Russell added that pursuant to that unanimous agreement he had "communicated with General MacArthur and requested his appearance before the committee. The general has accepted the invitation, although the time and place of the meetings have not yet been designated." [9]

4. Foreign Relations Committee

Senator Russell indicated that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally (Democrat, Texas), had called him that morning and suggested there be a joint meeting of the two committees on that issue. Senator Connally had indicated, said Senator Russell, that "inasmuch as the Committee on Armed Services had already inaugurated this inquiry, he thought it would be appropriate for (Senator Russell) to preside over the joint meeting of the committee." [9] Senator Russell indicated that he would take up that request with the Armed Services Committee.

Senator Russell indicated further that his committee had already requested the presence of the Secretary of Defense before the Armed Services Committee on the following day, Wednesday, April 18, but in view of the fact that General MacArthur was to appear on Thursday (April 19) before the Congress and also in view of the fact that "complications have arisen through the submission of the concurrent resolution of the Senator from Michigan" [9] Senator Russell was going to postpone until a later date Secretary of Defense Marshall's testimony.

Senator Ferguson stated that the purpose of his concurrent resolution was to "broaden the base of the investigation so that the people back home would know that the subject had been gone into thoroughly by a fully representative committee of the legislative branch, specifically created for the purpose of enlightening the public on this single but highly important question." [10]

Late that day, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent that after convening on Thursday the Senate would stand in recess to attend a joint meeting with the House, to hear an address by General MacArthur. Thereupon, by unanimous consent, Senator Wherry's Senate Concurrent Resolution 24 was tabled.

5. MacArthur address

On Thursday, April 19, the Senate and House met in joint session to hear the address by General MacArthur.[11]

6. Consent for joint hearing

On April 25, Senator Russell asked unanimous consent for the purpose of holding Joint Foreign Relation-Armed Services Committee hearings to hear General MacArthur and consent was granted.[12]

7. The fight for open hearings

On April 30 the joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations met and after considerable debate decided by a vote of 16 to 6 to hold the proposed hearings in executive session.[13]

On May 3, Senator Arthur V. Watkins (Republican, Utah) introduced Senate Resolution 137 whose purpose was to authorize any Member of the Senate to attend as an observer any hearing or other meeting whether executive or open, held by the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, in accordance with the order of the Senate of April 25, 1951.[14]

That same day the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees voted to permit Members of the Senate who were not members of the committees to attend the hearings.

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[9] Ibid., p. 4052.

[10] Ibid., p. 4054.

[11] See appendix for General MacArthur's address.

[12] Compilation, p. 3.

[13] The roll-call vote on the question of closed versus open hearings was as follows:

For closed: Connally, Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Russell, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Tobey.

For open: Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, Hickenlooper, Cain, Flanders. In voting to commerce the hearing in executive session, Senator Smith, Republican, New Jersey, specifically stated that if General MacArthur desired open hearings he should have them. Chairman Russell agreed.

[14] Congressional Record, May 3, 1951, p. 4891.

Senator Ferguson cited the fact that his concurrent resolution had been ordered to "lie on the table," and that it could not be brought up for action until there was an adjournment of the Senate.

Senator Wherry moved that the Senate adjourn until 5 p. m., that day, and his motion was agreed to by a vote of 43 yeas to 41 nays.

Senator Wherry contended, however, that the issue was worthy of a clear-cut decision by the full Senate.

The Senate on May 4, defeated by 37 yeas to 40 nays Senator Wherry's motion to take up Senate Resolution 137.

The defeat of Senate Resolution 137 by the margin of three votes culminated an unsuccessful floor fight to force open public hearings. Proponents of the open hearings argued that public interest in the issues transcended in importance the remote possibility that vital information might be furnished the enemy through errors in judgment or a slip of the tongue.

Opponents of open hearings, led by Senator Russell, contended that security considerations demanded closed hearings.

After defeating Senate Resolution 137, the majority devised a unique system of supplying transcripts to the press.

Before the press received the transcript it was submitted to Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, United States Navy, and Adrian Fisher, Legal Adviser to the State Department. They deleted all information which in their opinion would adversely effect the security of our Nation. The joint committee maintained the right to supervise and to question and reinsert, if desired, any material which was deleted in this fashion.

The system made the approved transcript available to the public approximately 2 hours after the appearance of each witness.

PART II. CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS

With the commencement of the actual hearings, there began a review of the events which had preceded the dismissal. The following are some of the most important dates in that connection.

February 11, 1945: Yalta agreement.[15]

August 14, 1945: Japanese surrender announced by President.

September 9, 1945: United States troops formally accepted the surrender of Japanese forces south of the thirty-eighth parallel, and the United States Army military government in Korea was established.

November 14, 1947: The UN General Assembly resolved that there should be a free election by secret ballot in Korea and that subsequently all foreign troops should be withdrawn.

August 15, 1948: Following the May 10 election held in South Korea under the auspices of the U. N. Temporary Commission, the Government of the Republic of Korea was established with Syngman Rhee as President and Army military government in Korea was terminated.

September 9, 1948: The Supreme People's Council in North Korea formally declared the establishment of a Democratic People's Republic of Korea, claiming jurisdiction over the entire country. This government was subsequently recognized by the Soviet Union and her satellite states.

April 8, 1949: Russia vetoed the admission of the Korean Republic to the United Nations.

July 1, 1949: The United States Army withdrew American occupation forces in accordance with the UN resolution. Only a small contingent numbering 500 officers and men remained to train Korean forces.

August 1, 1949: China white paper issued by State Department.

January 5, 1950: President Truman announces no further arms aid to the Republic of China or Formosa.

June 25, 1950: North Korean Communist forces attacked South Korean defense positions south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The UN Security Council at 5:45 p. m. that day adopted a resolution by a vote of 9 to 0 (Yugoslavia abstaining and the U. S. S. R. absent) calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel. All members were requested to "* * * render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."[16]

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[15] See appendix for text of Yalta agreement.

[16] Compilation, p. 11.

June 27, 1950: At 12 noon, President Truman revealed that pursuant to the Security Council's call to UN Members, he had ordered United States air and sea units "* * * to give the Korean Government troops cover and support"[17] and that he had asked Moscow to act to terminate the fighting in Korea.

At 10:45 p. m., that night, the Security Council adopted a resolution sponsored by the United States, requesting the member states to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea "* * * to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."[18]

June 30, 1950: President Truman stated he had authorized General MacArthur to use supporting ground units, and for the air forces "to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast."[19] Within hours, a battalion of United States Infantry was ashore in Korea.

June 30, 1950: Republic of China offered 33,000 of its troops from Formosa to support UN action; offer refused.

July 8, 1950: President Truman named General MacArthur as United Nations commander.

August 28, 1950: General MacArthur in a message intended for the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Encampment opposed appeasement and defeatism which would lead to abandonment of Formosa.[20] This speech was withdrawn at White House request.

September 12, 1950: Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson resigned effective September 19.

September 12, 1950: Allies made successful amphibious landing.

October 15, 1950: A conference was held on Wake Island between President Truman and General MacArthur. President Truman issued a statement stating that a "very complete unanimity of view"[21] prevailed in the discussions covering Korea, Japan, and United States policy in the Pacific.

October 20, 1950: United States troops captured Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.

October 21, 1950: United States parachute troops landed deep inside North Korea.

October 28, 1950: Red Chinese Army elements identified in North Korea.

November 24, 1950: General MacArthur launched an end-of-the-war offensive.

November 27, 1950: An attack by four Chinese Red armies stalled and threw back General MacArthur's drive.

November 28, 1950: General MacArthur announced that United Nations forces in Korea faced an entirely new war because of the intervention of Red Chinese troops.

December 1, 1950: General MacArthur stated that the orders forbidding him to attack Chinese Communists north of the Korean border were putting the United Nations forces under "an enormous handicap without precedent in military history."[22]

December 6, 1950: Joint Chiefs of Staff advised General MacArthur of a Presidential general order requiring the clearance of speeches, press releases, and other statements concerning military policy with the Department of Defense and of similar materials concerning foreign policy with the Secretary of State.

The Joint Chiefs reported that the President had directed the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to order officials overseas " * * * including military commanders and diplomatic representatives * * * exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their Departments and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States."[23]

January 23, 1951: United States Senate unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the United Nations "to immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea."[24]

March 7, 1951: United Nations forces recaptured Seoul. General MacArthur reported that the battle line would remain in a theoretical military stalemate as long as there was "a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counteroffensive action" and no major additions to UN strength in Korea." [25]

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[17] Ibid., p. 11.
[18] Ibid., p. 13.
[19] Ibid., p. 14.
[20] Ibid., p. 121.
[21] Ibid., p. 126.
[22] Ibid., p. 175.
[23] Ibid., p. 178.
[24] Congressional Record, January 23, 1951, p. 583.

March 18, 1951: Former Speaker of the House Joseph W. Martin, Jr., sent a letter, inviting General MacArthur's views with regard to America's position in Asia.

March 20, 1951: General MacArthur, in reply, praised Martin's views and stated that the latter's position "* * * with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic" nor with United States tradition of mobilizing maximum counterforce to meet force. General MacArthur stressed that "here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest." [26]

March 20, 1951: Joint Chiefs of Staff advised MacArthur that the United Nations were "* * * now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea." The Joint Chiefs stated that the thirty-eighth parallel "has no military significance." MacArthur's recommendations on military procedure were invited.[27]

March 24, 1951: Joint Chiefs of Staff in a message to General MacArthur stated that the President had directed that his attention be called to the latter's order of December 6, 1950. The Joint Chiefs stated that "any further statements * * * must be coordinated" as provided in that order.

"The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for instructions." [28]

March 24, 1951: General MacArthur stated that "within the area of my authority as military commander * * * I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea * * * might be accomplished without further bloodshed." [29]

The State Department subsequently issued a statement that "the political issues which General MacArthur has stated are beyond his responsibility as a field commander, are being dealt with in the UN and by intergovernmental consultations." [30]

PART III. A BRIEF COMMENTARY ON THE WITNESSES APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

The work of the Joint Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, which has been in the nature of an investigation or inquiry, has been carried forth with a unity of purpose unique in the recent annals of the United States Senate.

Under the able and eminently fair chairmanship of the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Russell, members of the committee have pursued the common purpose of seeking the facts.

The Chairman received outstanding cooperation from the members of both committees who diligently pursued the inquiry, often working far into the night to discharge their other duties. The record time in which the committee received the tremendous volume of testimony and the careful preparation of questions by committee members bespeaks the seriousness with which the Senators approached their task.

The committee has come very close to objectivity. There have been differences; there have been contentions. In some cases, there have been bitter discussions. However, the issues have been confined to procedural matters and, for the most part, involved differences on how best to find the facts.

It is significant that divisions which have occurred within the committee have reflected unpartisan attitudes.

It has proved a stimulating experience to each of us to sit as one of 26 Senators engaged in a task of such importance as to outweight the considerations of partisan political advantage.

We have heard the testimony as United States Senators. We offer our conclusions as Americans. They are the result of our considered judgment after serious reflection and judicial examination of all the facts presented.

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[25] Op. cit., p. 182.
[26] Ibid., p. 186.
[27] Ibid., p. 183.
[28] Ibid., p. 184.
[29] Ibid., p. 184.
[30] Ibid., p. 7.

Since there has been over 2 million words of testimony delivered before the joint committee a brief commentary on the testimony of the various witnesses is essential.

1. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

From Thursday, May 3, 1951, through Saturday, May 5, 1951, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified before the joint committee. He read no prepared statement since it was his opinion that his address to the Congress had sufficiently stated his point of view.[31]

After almost 800 pages of testimony had been taken and the general had responded to literally hundreds of questions, the consensus of the members of the committee was summed up by Chairman Russell when he stated:

"General MacArthur, I wish to state to you that the 3 days that you have been here with us are without parallel in my legislative experience.

"I have never seen a man subjected to such a barrage of questions in so many fields and on so many varied subjects. I marvel at your physical endurance. More than that, I have been profoundly impressed by the vastness of your patience and the thoroughness and the frankness with which you have answered all of the questions that have been propounded.

"We have certainly drawn freely on your vast reservoir of knowledge and experience, not only as a great military captain, but as a civilian administrator of 80 million people."

Differences of opinion may exist between some committee members and General MacArthur. The general, however, presented that which, in his opinion, was the most desirable, positive program to end the war in Korea with victory and honor for the forces of the United Nations.

2. Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall

Beginning on May 7, 1951, and continuing thereafter for 7 days, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, who has served as Chief of Staff during World War II, special representative in China with ambassadorial rank during the critical period under discussion, and as Secretary of State during the formulation of many of the far-eastern policies, gave his views to the committee.

Obviously, the views, opinions and decisions of Secretary Marshall were of extreme importance to the work of the committee. The Secretary found it necessary in many instances to refer committee members to the Secretary of State or the Joint Chiefs of Staff for responsive replies.

The Secretary defended the many administration policies, in the formulation of which he had presumably played a part. It was the consensus that many of the questions which were raised by the committee were "peculiarly" within the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of National Defense was uninformed.

3. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

On May 15, 1951, and for 4 days thereafter, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed the military decisions and strategy pertaining to the Korean conflict.

All members of the committee were impressed with his comprehensive understanding of our military responsibilities.

General Bradley presented the reasons why from a military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that General MacArthur should be relieved. The reasons were as follows:

> (1) That by his public statements and by his official communications to the Joint Chiefs he had indicated that he was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea.
>
> (2) He had failed to comply with the Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making public statements.
>
> (3) The Joint Chiefs feel that the military must be controlled by the civilian authority in this country.[31a]

As the testimony of General Bradley developed, it became obvious that, as a subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, it was embarassing for him to contradict or differ with the basic concepts which had been previously outlined by the Secretary of Defense. As a result of this conviction, on May 24, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (Republican, Iowa), stated that in his opinion the calling of the three Chiefs of Staff would be a substantial repetition of the testimony of Secretary Marshall and General Bradley. After considerable discussion within the committee a motion was made to dispense with the testimony of the Chiefs of Staff. This motion was defeated and the committee continued with the hearings of testimony from high-ranking military officials.

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[31] See appendix for General MacArthur's address to the Congress.

[31a] Hearings, p. 878.

For 6 days the views of Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations,* were expressed to the committee and, although providing interesting highlights, in general they buttressed and corroborated the views previously expressed by their superiors.

4. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson

Beginning on June 1, 1951, and continuing for 8 days, President Truman's Secretary of State defended the Far Eastern policy of the United States and discussed his part in the recall of General MacArthur.

It is the opinion of the signers of this report that the Secretary of State did not always frankly and fully reveal the information requested of him. It would appear from the record, that, under his guidance, the objective of American foreign policy has been primarily to conciliate certain of our associates in the United Nations rather than to advance the security of the United States.

As the successive portions of this report will demonstrate, the Secretary of State was unable to defend successfully the postwar policies of the State Department in the Far East.

Mr. Acheson often agreed with policy statements phrased by committee members. Such agreement was astonishing since it implied a complete reversal of that which, on the record of events, had been presumed to be State Department policy.

5. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, United States Army, former Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek

On June 11, 12, and 13, General Wedemeyer testified on those aspects of the Far Eastern situation which were within his immediate experience. The frankness and obvious intellectual honesty of General Wedemeyer was impressive. In an impersonal and professional manner, the author of the suppressed Wedemeyer report demolished the military arguments which had been advanced to justify the political policy of the United States in the Far East. A highlight of his testimony was his unqualified statement that at any time a coalition government between Communists and Nationalists in China was impossible.

6. Former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Louis Johnson

On June 14 and 15, former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Louis Johnson, testified at the request of the committee.

He made the record clear that it was upon the recommendation of the State Department that the Armed Forces of the United States were committed to the Korean War. He clarified the divergent views between the State and Defense Departments as to the strategic importance of Formosa. The position of Defense was that Formosa was essential to our national security while State maintained Formosa was of slight importance.

Although he expressed confidence in our military leaders, one could not help but conclude that the former Secretary of Defense was convinced that the State Department was exerting too much political influence in military matters.

7. Vice Adm. Oscar Badger

On June 19, Admiral Badger gave the committee his views as to development of events in China since 1945. After his testimony it could only be concluded that the failure of the United States to deliver promptly sufficient arms and ammunition to the Republic of China was a major cause for its subsequent defeat by the Communists.

8. Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley

On June 20 and 21, General Hurley presented to the committee a complete exposition of the diplomacy during the period of the Yalta Conference. General Hurley maintained that Yalta was one of the greatest tragedies in the history of American diplomacy, since it appeased Russia and nullified the provisions of the Atlantic Charter.

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*The tragic and untimely death of Admiral Sherman has deprived our country of an outstanding naval leader.

Under intensive interrogation, General Hurley maintained his position. He left the firm impression with the committee that, in 1945, the United States had unquestionable power to make Russia respect her solemn agreements, but that we surrendered that power in the secret Yalta Agreement.

9. Maj. Gen. David C. Barr, United States Army, commander of the United States military mission in China in 1948

General Barr, commander of the United States military mission to China in 1948, vigorously defended the idea that the Communists overthrew the Government of the Republic of China due to the internal corruption of the Nationalist Government and the unwillingness of the Nationalist troops to fight.

He reiterated the State Department white paper thesis that in no case did the Chinese Nationalists lose any battles as the result of lack of ammunition, thus directly contradicting the testimony of Admiral Badger.

10. Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., United States Air Force

As commander of the Far East Bomber Command, General O'Donnell was in the best position to evaluate the effectiveness of air power in the Korean conflict. His testimony as to ability of the Air Force to inflict damage on Red China in accordance with the strategy advocated by General MacArthur was compelling.

As an Air Force officer of great experience and ability, General O'Donnell bluntly stated that it was his professional opinion that Rachin could be bombarded and destroyed without any damage to or encroachment on Soviet territory.[31b] He impressed the committee with the importance, from an airman's viewpoint, of the doctrine of "hot pursuit."

His testimony clearly indicated the inadvisability of allowing political decisions to overrule military judgments in the course of battle.

PART IV. AREAS OF AGREEMENT

The lengthy hearings extending over a period of weeks have produced remarkable results. Although the hearings began for the purpose of inquiring into the military situation in the Far East and the facts concerning the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, they soon broadened to include an examination of entire Far Eastern foreign policy of the United States with emphasis on the period since 1944.

The hearings began in the midst of turmoil and confusion. The American people were not clearly informed as to our objectives in the Far East. As the hearings progressed, the interrogation by members of both political parties developed information which forms the basis for a widening area of agreement. Many of the policies which have been announced and with which all are now in agreement were clearly defined for the first time in the forum provided by these hearings. The points of agreement emerge naturally from a detailed examination of the situation. They represent common-sense conclusions which anyone regardless of political party would draw after the facts had been set forth.

The conviction that the administration's Far East policy was one of appeasement toward communism was proven to be fact as a result of the investigation. Some significant reversals of this policy are directly attributable to the inquiry; for example, the administration's categorical statements regarding China and Formosa.

The hearings further revealed numerous situations in which no policy existed at all. The joint committee's revelation forced action.

Why was there a major shift by the State Department in its foreign policy? The reasons are several. One, the State Department found itself unable to defend policies in the face of the questions which were propounded to it. Two, the march of events in Korea itself has proven the wisdom of policies which the Department had previously for so long scorned. And, three, the ground swell of American public opinion, which expressed itself in one of the greatest floods of spontaneous correspondence which has ever descended upon the legislative and executive branch of the Government, required the State Department to alter policies which were disapproved by the public, which had been ill-informed and misinformed by the State Department on far-eastern affairs.

[31b] The United Nations air force had been prohibited from bombing Rachin, a supply depot, because State Department feared that attacking planes would violate Russian territory.

There follow the current areas in which there is a remarkable unanimity of agreement.

1. The right of the President to remove General MacArthur

No one disputes the President's authority and power to assign, reassign, or remove officers of the Armed Forces of the United States.[32] The President is given this authority under the Constitution and can remove personnel at his complete discretion.

This fact was recognized by all Senators participating in the inquiry as well as the witnesses appearing before the committee and by General MacArthur himself. The general, in answer to a query from Senator Bridges, said that he did not question the President's action in the slightest degree as his authority is clearly stated in the Constitution and is inherent in our system of Government. However, General MacArthur added that in his judgment the abrupt dismissal was not in the best interests of the United States. The summary recall necessitated turning over to his successor, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, without proper briefing, numerous responsibilities that not only affect the security of the United States, but very definitely involve the security and administration of Japan and the Far East.[33]

2. Method of removal ill-advised

The witnesses appearing before the Joint Armed Services-Foreign Relations Committee decried the method used in the removal of General MacArthur. Secretary Acheson, who has been one of the strongest critics of General MacArthur for many years, recognized the dominant attitude of the people when he stated "the effect of the relief of General MacArthur in Japan was one of very considerable shock when it was announced." [34]

During the interrogation of the various witnesses, the members of the committee attempted to have answered the big question as to why the summary dismissal of General MacArthur was necessary. They felt, and reflected the attitude of the people, that if there was some misunderstanding between the Commander in Chief and General MacArthur, he should have been ordered home for conferences in an attempt to reach a common ground of understanding.

Although all administration witnesses except Secretary Marshall agreed that possibly the removal could have been handled in some other way, they were bound to go along with a Presidential decision. General Bradley for example testified that, "I think, frankly, it would have been better had it been handled in a little different way." [34a] Secretary Marshall said that if he had to do it all over again, he would feel that the matter should be handled in the same fashion.[35]

The attitude of the people of the United States, as evidenced by the spontaneous receptions afforded General MacArthur, reflects their very clear understanding of this unusual situation.

3. MacArthur never violated military directives

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their statements that the general had not violated any military directives during the progress of the Korean campaign. General Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army, at first stated that General MacArthur had violated a military directive by using American troops on the Korean frontier. Under cross-examination General Collins altered his testimony as follows: "* * * it is true that answering the first question, I indicated that it was a violation of a directive, or words to that effect. I promptly corrected that * * *." [36]

It was further shown that General MacArthur's action was dictated by military necessity for the protection of our troops.

The Joint Chiefs stated that they were in general agreement with him on the strategy developed in Korea and recognized that no field commander can properly conduct a campaign unless he is permitted to do the job as he sees it on the scene.

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[32] The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control of the use thereof. The President's authority over the Armed Forces of the Nation is based on article 2, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which provided that he "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."

[33] Hearings before the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees inquiring into the military situation in the Far East, etc., p. 26, supra (hereafter referred to as Hearings).

[34] Ibid., p. 1753.

[34a] Ibid., p. 751.

[35] Ibid., p. 514.

[36] Ibid., p. 1299.

General Collins, Army Chief of Staff, said that he did not concur in the initial planning of the Inchon landing, but conceded later that it was a brilliant piece of military strategy.[37]

General MacArthur, both during his appearances before the joint session of Congress and while appearing as a witness before the Joint Armed Services, Foreign Relations Committee stated unequivocally that he had never to his knowledge violated a military directive.[38]

4. There was no serious disagreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur. The military in no way initiated or recommended the recall of General MacArthur

There was never any major disagreement between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the conduct of the campaign in Korea. All of the witnesses have joined in to praise General MacArthur as a great military strategist and one of the most brilliant military leaders in American history. The issue defined to the joint committee involves administration disagreement with MacArthur over the issuance of public statements carrying views allegedly contrary to the administration's foreign policy.

During the hearings the following exchange took place between Chairman Russell and Secretary of Defense George Marshall:

"Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, one of the issues here is as to whether or not General MacArthur directly or indirectly violated any orders or directives issued to him by you, as a representative of the Department of Defense or by the President of the United States. I would like to have you discuss that.

"Secretary MARSHALL. In relation to the conduct of the campaign, no, he has not, not that I can recall. In relation to public statements he has."[39]

Later in discussing this matter with Senator Wiley the following exchange took place:

"Senator WILEY. Don't you mean that to what you have referred to as policies he may have made counterrecommendations? There may have been disagreement. In your previous statement, however, you said he carried out every military policy. Do you mean that?

"Secretary MARSHALL. He did not violate these restrictions. He carried out the military directives, which is quite a different thing from the discussion of the limitations, as they were related to our allies, all of our allies in the conduct of that campaign."[40]

Evidence that the military in no way initiated or recommended the recall of General MacArthur can be found in the following comments from the record. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, Ambassador Harriman, and General Bradley were called to the White House on April 6, 1951, to attend the first of a series of meetings to discuss the removal of General MacArthur.

"Senator WILEY. All right General, who initiated that first meeting?

"Secretary MARSHALL. The first meeting was initiated by the President."[41]

General Omar Bradley described his participation in the MacArthur recall as follows:

"Chairman RUSSELL. When did you first learn or when were you first consulted with respect to the advisability of relieving General MacArthur of his several commands? When did you first learn that he was under discussion? When was your opinion asked?

"General BRADLEY. My first information that there was some concern being shown by the President over this was late the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th of April, when I received the information—I don't remember where from—but I think I received it from a telephone from someone; at which time I called the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for about 30 minutes, from 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon, and told them that the President was concerned about some statements that had been made by General MacArthur and that they should begin studying the military aspects of it. There was nothing more than that said about it.

"Chairman RUSSELL. When were you next approached with respect to this?

"General BRADLEY. On Friday, the 6th of April, there was a meeting in the President's office, right after a Cabinet meeting, at which they asked me to join certain others, including Mr. Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman, and we were with the President I would say, from around 11: 30 to 12: 30, and that is the first time I had heard first hand the concern of the President in the matter."[42]

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[37] Ibid., p. 1295.
[38] Ibid., pp. 27 and 283.
[39] Ibid., p. 341.
[40] Ibid., p. 414.
[41] Ibid., p. 421.

5. *The recommendations offered by General MacArthur were based on his sincere desire to bring about victory in Korea*

We agree that the recommendations offered by General MacArthur with regard to strategy were based on his sincere desire to bring to a victorious conclusion the mission to which his command had been committed in the Korean War. His recommendations with regard to policy, we believe, were based on his equally sincere conviction that we must have an affirmative plan to oppose the enemy which he defined as communism.

Every witness who commented on the policy or strategy advocated by General MacArthur specifically agreed that he was motivated only by the desire and conviction which so greatly impressed us. Whatever conclusion one may reach as to his opinions, there was no suggestion by anyone to impugn the motives of General MacArthur.[43]

A temporary lull in Korea, which later develops into a Far East Munich-type appeasement of the Chinese and Korean Communist aggressors, is no guarantee of peace or security for the free world. The Munich of 1938 for "peace in our time" lasted just 1 year.

6. *The integrity, ability, and accomplishments of General MacArthur were made clear by the testimony*

General MacArthur graduated from West Point in 1903, having attained a 4-year scholastic record of 98.14, which is the highest rating in the last 75 years. After serving in various military posts and establishments around the country and as an aide to his father, Lt. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, in the Philippines, he organized during the First World War the celebrated Rainbow (Forty-second) Division and became the youngest division commander in the United States Army. He was wounded and gassed while serving with the AEF and was commended for his leadership and ability by General Pershing and other high officers serving in the First World War.

After his return to the United States, he was appointed Superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point, where he served from 1919 to 1922. In that post he was the youngest general officer to serve as the administrator of the Academy. In quick succession, he was appointed United States Army Chief of Staff and military adviser to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. In this latter post, he held the rank of field marshal. In 1937 he retired to live in the Philippines and served both that Government and his own as a military adviser.

In 1941, he was recalled to active duty as a major general to command United States forces in the Far East. The same year he was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant general and the four-star rank of full general. His campaigns in the Pacific will go down in military annals as among the most daring military offensive actions in United States history, especially when it is recalled that the war in Europe received priority in men and matériel and that General MacArthur had to improvise his campaigns out of a minimum of military strength.

In 1944, he was promoted to General of the Army, our highest military rank. A year later he was appointed supreme Allied commander in the Pacific to receive the Japanese surrender and to command United States occupation forces in Japan.

The witnesses appearing before the committee stated that General MacArthur displayed great ability in his administration of the Japanese people. Each of these witnesses paid tribute to the eminent soldier and statesman. Some of these remarks from the record are:

General Marshall said:

"He is a brother Army officer, a man for whom I have tremendous respect as to his military abilities and military performances, and from all I can learn from his administration of Japan."[44]

General Bradley said:

"At the very outset, I want to make it clear that I would not say anything to discredit the long and illustrious career of General MacArthur. We may have different views on certain aspects of our Government's military policy, but that is not unusual.

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[42] Ibid., p. 739.
[43] Ibid., p. 1997.
[44] Ibid., p. 323.

"Certainly there have been no personal considerations in our differences of opinion. In matters of such great scope and such importance, many people have different ideas and might consequently recommend different courses of action." [45]

General Collins said:

"I think he is one of the most brilliant military leaders that this country has ever produced. Throughout his career, he has been brilliantly successful." [46]

General Vandenberg said:

"I have a great admiration for him, sir." [47]

Admiral Sherman said:

"I would like to add that preceding that statement, I told General Marshall that I was very fond of General MacArthur, that I had been associated with him for many years and what I had to say, I said with the utmost regret.[48]

"I would say that he was in the forefront among the strategists with respect to the coordinated use of land, sea, and air power." [49]

The Secretary of State Dean Acheson said:

"He played a very large part in the whole postwar administration, of course, as SCAP, and did a very fine job indeed." [50]

General Wedemeyer said:

"General MacArthur occupies a unique position in my judgment in this country. He is a generation ahead of many in the military hierarchy. He has had positions of great responsibility which involved not only military responsibility, but included diplomatic, political, and economic responsibility.[51]

"This man was an outstanding leader and had served his country for more than 50 years in an outstanding manner." [52]

Louis Johnson said:

"The stature of MacArthur is so great, his military record is so superb, and his desire to serve the country and what he believes are the country's interests, are so controlling, that if I had been one of those with whom the President conferred about ousting him, I would have asked that it be done a little differently whether he let me do it or somebody else." [53]

Chairman Russell said:

"On the permanent pages of our history are inscribed his achievements as one of the great captains of history through three armed conflicts; but he is not only a great military leader, his broad understanding and knowledge of the science of politics has enabled him to restore and stabilize a conquered country and to win for himself and his country the respect and affection of a people who were once our bitterest enemies." [54]

The President of the United States said:

"General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service he has rendered our country in posts of great responsibility." [55]

Furthermore the President has said:

"He [General MacArthur] is carrying out his mission with imagination, courage, and effectiveness which has marked his entire service as one of our greatest military leaders." [56]

Yet again the President has said:

"On all of these matters I have found our talks most helpful and I am very glad to have had this chance to talk them over with one of America's greatest soldier-statesmen who is also now serving the unique position of the first commander in chief of the United Nations peace forces.[57]

7. *MacArthur has prevented the spread of communism in Japan*

Realizing the chasm that exists between the thinking of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the Secretary of State, it is extremely significant that in his testimony

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[45] Ibid., p. 729.
[46] Ibid., p. 1279.
[47] Ibid., p. 1404.
[48] Ibid., p. 1537.
[49] Ibid., p. 1612.
[50] Ibid., p. 1980.
[51] Ibid., p. 2306.
[52] Ibid., p. 2346.
[53] Ibid., p. 2603.
[54] Ibid., p. 1.
[55] Compilation, p. 189.
[56] Compilation, p. 25.
[57] Compilation, p. 127, President's statement relative to his meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island, October 15, 1950.

Secretary of State Acheson admitted, after interrogation, that under General MacArthur's administration, Japan has come into the camp of the western powers.

This is not to say that the entire credit for retaining Japan as a bastion against communism in the Pacific belongs to General MacArthur, but acknowledgment must be made that under his wise and capable administration the Japanese people have been influenced and encouraged to embrace a concept of social and political ideals which more nearly conform to our system.

8. *The military potential of the United States was not maintained at a level commensurate with our political commitments or financial expenditures since V-J day*

It is recognized that, in 1945 and early 1946, the American people were exerting extreme pressure on the Defense Department to demobilize our armed services and restore our peacetime economy. During this period, however, the administration entered into a number of agreements which involved military obligations. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the adherence on the part of the United States to the system of collective security necessitated that the military potential of the Nation be maintained at a level sufficient to fulfill its obligations.

Despite the testimony of General Vandenberg that we have a "shoestring" air force and the testimony of Generals Marshall, Bradley, and Collins that we are unprepared, it must be remembered that, from fiscal year 1946 to 1950, the following sums have been expended by the Department of National Defense:

Expenditures for the Department of National Defense, fiscal years 1945 through 1950

1946	$45, 134, 000, 000
1947	14, 316, 000, 000
1948	10, 961, 000, 000
1949	11, 914, 000, 000
1950	12, 303, 000, 000
Total	94, 628, 000, 000
Estimates:	
1951	20, 994, 000, 000
1952	41, 421, 000, 000
Total	[1] 62, 415, 000, 000

[1] Federal Budget in Brief, issued by the Bureau of the Budget. Table, p. 44, entitled "Budget Expenditures by Functions." In 1945 Defense expenditures were $84,569,000,000. Much of this was used in the prosecution of World War II. What happened to the armament—planes, tanks, and guns—purchased with the balance?

The testimony of former Secretary of Defense Johnson and others established that in no instance could the present lack of military preparedness be attributed to the failure on the part of the Congress to appropriate funds requested for defense by the administration. As a matter of fact, witnesses recalled the well-known story that the Eightieth Congress appropriated sufficient funds toward the building of a 70-group air force but the Executive refused to authorize the use of the funds provided, and froze the air force to fewer than 48 groups (as late as June 1950) after the Berlin blockade and the Greek civil war had revealed the aggressive designs of communism. This is particularly significant since the Congress had been given to understand that our strategic concept of defense was based on overwhelming air power.

9. *None of the United Nations (with the obvious exception of Russia) had prior information of the June 25 attack despite repeated intelligence warnings*

The difficulty of precisely predicting the hour of an attack by the North Koreans is understandable. The aggressive tendencies which manifested themselves in constant maneuvers on the South Korean border were well reported. The explanation most frequently given is that every week end the North Koreans violated the South Korean border and then returned to the north with apologies. On June 25, however, they just kept on coming.

It is impossible to accept this explanation. The truth is that the attack took the South Koreans completely by surprise. Since the State Department and the United Nations had the sole responsibility in Korea, they must answer for the failure of the intelligence missions.

10. The failure to adequately train and supply equipment to the South Koreans made them tempting targets of aggression.

The testimony of the Secretary of State, General Marshall, and General Bradley constitutes a flat admission that the United States Government did not adequately arm and equip the South Korean forces.

Secretary of State Acheson admits that the South Koreans were not furnished with heavy arms, artillery, tanks, or aircraft. The excuse is that the United States in the years of 1948 and 1949 did not have such equipment available.[58] This is astonishing. Billions spent; no arms available.

The Secretary further testifies that the South Korean troops were not as well trained as the North Koreans[59] despite the fact that before the June attack Congress was informed by William C. Foster, then Deputy Administrator of the ECA, that the South Koreans were capable of resisting any aggression from the north.[60]

In continuing his testimony, the Secretary of State testified that, had we kept our troops in Korea, our very presence might have prevented the aggression which has cost so many American lives.[61]

This statement of Secretary Acheson's is difficult to understand in the light of the positive evidence submitted to the committee that the Executive had warning prior to June 25, 1950, of the strong possibility of Communist aggression.[67]

11. The publication of the Wedemeyer report on Korea might have alerted the Government and the people of the United States

General Wedemeyer, one of the best-informed Americans on problems of the Far East and a military planner of experience and authority, was sent to China and Korea in the summer of 1947 "for the purpose of making an appraisal of the political, economic, psychological, and military situations—current and projected."[63] He submitted a report. Secretary Marshall suppressed the report and accepted full responsibility for the suppression.[64]

We are not impressed by the ambiguous reasons given the committee for the suppression of the report. Its timely publication might have proven of immense advantage to the United States. The Secretary of State conceded that publication of the report, particularly that section dealing with Korea, might have served to alert the American people to the dangers of aggression at the thirty-eighth parallel.[65]

Wedemeyer's 1947 report on Korea, made public by this committee for the first time in April 1951, was a remarkably accurate prediction of events that subsequently occurred in Korea. It showed clearly that North Korea possessed an army with aggressive capabilities, thoroughly trained and armed by Soviet Russia.

It stated that the defensive constabulary set up in South Korea by the United States and the United Nations would be completely unable to cope with the North Korean Army.

It was a tragic error to suppress the Wedemeyer report—particularly that section dealing with Korea. We were shocked to find a copy of this report was never furnished to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.[66]

One portion of the Wedemeyer report contained a recommendation for the establishment of a United Nations guardianship for Manchuria and a trusteeship in Korea, which, if adopted, would have in the general's opinion changed the picture today in the Far East.[67]

As the General so forcefully testified:

"My purpose was to create a buffer * * * in those areas, where we would be able to preclude unilateral action on the part of Soviet-inspired, or Soviet-controlled, or Soviet-supported elements in the Far East."[68]

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[58] Hearing, p. 2010.

[59] Ibid., p. 2010.

[60] Ibid., p. 2009.

[61] Ibid., p. 2010.

[62] It is noted, that of the funds provided by Congress for additional military assistance to the Republic of Korea, only a few hundred dollars' worth of excess signal equipment had been shipped prior to June 25, 1950.

[63] White paper, p. 255.

[64] Hearings, p. 372.

[65] Ibid., p. 1987.

[66] Ibid., p. 1989.

[67] It is significant that Walton Butterworth, of the State Department, asked General Wedemeyer to make changes in this section of the report, and the General refused on the grounds of principle. Hearings, p. 2365.

[68] Ibid., p. 2367.

12. The involvement of the United States Armed Forces in the Korean conflict is without precedent in American history

The unusual nature of this conflict is tersely described in a report of the House of Representatives dated February 20, 1951, entitled "Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries." It reads:

"Since June 1950, United States military forces have been in action in Korea. The military engagement has been variously described as "police action," "war," "hostilities," and "defense against aggression." No declaration of war has been made by the Congress. The President has not proclaimed a state of war, nor have the North Koreans or Chinese Communist authorities. Nevertheless, the figure of 47,388 American battle casualties leaves no doubt that the United States is engaged in large-scale hostilities. What has happened in Korea can happen elsewhere in the world." [69]

As this exposition of the use of our Armed Forces explains:

"The action of the United States in Korea is in one sense unprecedented. For the first time the United States has committed large military forces in a foreign country in response to the action of an international organization." [69]

The fundamental issues raised by our intervention in Korea concern first the extent of the executive power to commit the United States to a military action, and, second, war-making powers of the National Legislature.

It is clear that in the resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, insofar as they involved military support for the Republic of Korea, the Security Council of the United Nations under article 39 of the Charter made *recommendations* with respect to assistance in Korea and not *decisions*. As the House report pointed out, only "decisions" of the Security Council are legally binding.

With respect to the President's power as Commander in Chief which has been exercised independently of the Congress on over 100 occasions since the founding of our Government, it must be pointed out that in every instance, except that of Korea, the use of this power has been "primarily for the protection of American lives or property or in defense against direct aggression and usually involved only small forces." [70]

The reference therefore to these previous involvements of United States Armed Forces provides no precedent either legal or factual for the United States intervention in Korea. It is likewise true that collective action by an international organization is without precedent in modern history.

13. The command function delegated to the United States by the UN has been subjected to veto by a minority of participating nations

By resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations on July 7, 1950, the military command functions in Korea were delegated to the United States.[71] The extent to which this command authority is absolute has never been defined clearly. It would appear that the allied commander, formerly General MacArthur and now General Ridgway, would have, subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs and the Commander in Chief, sufficient authority to take whatever measures might appear desirable to successfully carry out the military mission in Korea.

This theory of command function, however, has not worked out in practice. It appears that the United States has been unduly apprehensive of the opinions of our allies in carrying out its command authority. This is true in spite of the fact that the United States contributed nearly 95 percent of the manpower and material resources used to assist the Republic of Korea.

The timidity with which the United States exercised command is illustrated by the failure to apply the doctrine of "hot pursuit." This is a doctrine of criminal law which enables a peace officer to pursue a fleeing felon outside the area of his jurisdiction when he is close behind the culprit. The privileged sanctuary of Manchuria is comparable to the area outside the policeman's jurisdiction.

Testimony indicates that in January 1951 the allied commander, the Joint Chiefs, the President, and even the State Department unanimously agreed that the doctrine of hot pursuit should be invoked against enemy aircraft which attacked our Air Force south of the Yalu River. The Secretary of Defense accordingly asked the Secretary of State to inform our allies that we were contemplating such "hot pursuit." However, instead the Secretary of State took it upon himself to instruct our diplomatic representatives to obtain the views of only 6 of our 13 allies in Korea. All six, according to the Secretary of State, felt the application of the doctrine of "hot pursuit" was not wise. As a consequence, the decision of the United States military was disregarded.

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[69] H. Rept. No. 127, dated February 20, 1951, p. 1. It must be remembered that since the publication of this report our total casualties have exceeded 175,000.

[70] Ibid., p. 36.

[71] Compilation, p. 14.

The action of American officials in connection with the "hot pursuit" question is most difficult to understand. Witnesses agree that the Defense Establishment, after the decision to invoke "hot pursuit" had been approved by all responsible agencies of the American Government, requested the State Department to notify our allies in Korea of our intention to apply this doctrine.

Of course the command function delegated to the United States did not require us to notify our allies.

Testimony indicates that our diplomatic representatives were requested to contact the governments of 6 of our 13 allies in Korea in order to "*get the attitude.*" [72] It will be noted that this instruction was at variance with the request made by the Defense Department in that (1) Defense requested that our allies be *notified* and (2) Defense requested *all* allies be notified.

Secretary of State Acheson testified that our diplomatic representatives were not instructed to urge our allies to concur in acceptance of the "hot pursuit" doctrine.

In spite of numerous questions directed to this point, the committee never did publicly obtain the names of the six nations contacted nor the reason for the failure to contact other participating nations.

The consequence of this informal veto of our command authority is apparent. Enemy aircraft can fly from their Manchurian sanctuary in ever-increasing numbers to attack, not only our Air Forces, but also our Ground Forces in Korea. Failure to apply the "hot pursuit" technique places a life-and-death handicap on our airmen and has cost planes and personnel. While engaged in combat, in high-speed jet planes, our men have the additional obligation of keeping one eye on the Yalu River boundary.

14. The parallel has no military significance

The division of Korea was accepted as a devise to effect Japanese surrender.[73] The Soviets, under this arrangement, accepted the surrender of all Japanese troops located north of the thirty-eighth parallel, while the United States forces accepted the surrender of Japanese military units south of the parallel.

Although this division was originally accepted as a matter of temporary convenience, it was soon discovered that the Soviet Union regarded it as a definite boundary.

Failing in all efforts to gain Soviet cooperation in the consolidation of Korea, the United States presented the problem to the United Nations.

In November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations called for an election in Korea under the observation of a United Nations commission so that the people of Korea could choose a representative national assembly, draft a constitution, and establish a national government.

Soviet-controlled North Korea refused to allow the United Nations commission north of the parallel. As a result the free elections were confined to South Korea and the Republic was established on August 15, 1948.

A month later the Soviets announced the creation of a Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, claiming jurisdiction over the entire country.

On June 25, 1950, the Communist forces of North Korea began crossing the thirty-eighth parallel in force in a full-scale assault on the Republic of Korea. The lightly armed South Korean constabulary fell back under the weight of the initial thrust.

The President of the United States, with concurrence from his advisers, authorized the use of naval and air units to bolster the defense of South Korea.

After an on-the-spot survey, General MacArthur, supreme commander, Allied Powers, advised the President that the situation required the use of ground troops. The President accepted the advice of General MacArthur and ordered the use of United States military units on duty in Japan.

Since that time Korea has become a seesaw battleground. Seoul, the capital, has changed hands four times. UN troops reached the Yalu River last fall and the conflict in Korea seemed near a close. Then the Chinese Communists entered the conflict with four field armies. This enormously expanded the scope of the war.

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[72] Hearings, p. 2078.

[73] See Acheson's address before the American Newspaper Guild, Washington, D. C., June 29, 1950.

The thirty-eighth parallel has been crossed and recrossed as the armies fought up and down the narrow Korean peninsula. Several times the allied forces lost the initiative while waiting for a UN decision as to whether or not the thirty-eighth parallel could be crossed.

The problem of the parallel came up for discussion during the committee hearings. Witnesses appearing before the committee agree that the parallel has no military significance. General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave his views on the matter as follows:

"From a military point of view, as I have said, the thirty-eighth parallel means nothing, but we must realize politically it may have a lot of significance and that is why we would have liked to have some guidance along that area, which has not been given to us as yet by the United Nations." [74]

15. The political significance of the thirty-eighth parallel has never been satisfactorily explained

It would be expected, of all the witnesses, that Secretary of State Acheson could best explain the political significance of the thirty-eighth parallel. Nevertheless no clear exposition was forthcoming. He did say that "I think there was understanding about the policy, but * * * some of the nations associated with us did not think that there should be military decisions to advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel until the policy decision to do so had been taken by the United Nations, particularly by the nations contributing forces." [75]

On the same subject Secretary of Defense Marshall said:

"We regarded that there was no, you might say, legal prohibition against passing the thirty-eighth parallel; for that purpose, he would go ahead and do it; but a major advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel at this particular time when the situation had been restored was not to be undertaken without the approval, specific approval, of the Government." [76]

16. Limited war is impossible to define

The committee has heard much about "limited war." This is a new concept in warfare. Efforts to define limited war, to discover what the phrase means, have met with evasion.

Some historical examples of limited war were cited but it turned out that in each case the limitation was imposed by the inability of the commander to bring maximum power to bear. No illustration was given of a commander conducting a limited war when he had the opportunity for offensive effort and the resources to back it up.

The enemy in Korea fought with no holds barred. They had no Navy or they would have used it. They had a small air force, which was steadily expanded as the war went on and the full strength of this air force was thrown into battle.

We did have inescapable handicaps; witnesses testified to our limitations. But the idea of not exploiting the resources available in the face of an enemy exerting all his power is to us indefensible.

17. The identity of our real enemy has been established

Some witnesses—but not all—showed hesitation in identifying the real enemy with whom we have been engaged. That the outbreak in Korea was no local operation was manifest from the start. Subsequently, as the Chinese Communists poured in and planes and weapons of Russian manufacture appeared upon the scene, we had a practical demonstration of what Americans had already surmised: that the Korean aggression was an international Communist action. General MacArthur [77] so identified it as did Secretary Acheson, indirectly when he said that there was "Russian dominance in that (Chinese) regime." [78]

18. The Russian domination of Communist China was already known

The fact that Russia had an overwhelming influence in Communist China has been long known. For instance, Army Intelligence in 1945 drew up a documented report which demonstrated this influence and domination. A persistent and disturbing factor has been the reluctance of some State Department officials to accept this authoritative evidence. For instance, at the very time (1945) that Army Intelligence drafted its report, a trusted Foreign Service officer of the State Department, upon his return from an extended trip into the Red-controlled portions of China, told an American journalist that "the so-called Communists are agrarian reformers of a mild, democratic stripe more than anything else." [79]

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[74] Op. cit., p. 1072.
[75] Ibid., p. 2031.
[76] Ibid., p. 340.
[77] Ibid., p. 142.
[78] Ibid., p. 2109.

During these hearings Secretary Marshall himself, reflecting on his experiences in China in 1947, said:

"When I got out to China and looked the ground over, from the very start, and there was no doubt that the leadership of this group were Marxist Communists, and so stated in my presence, and insisted, in my presence, that they were.

"And, when I visited Yenan, in that mountain fastness of theirs, in their little theater building which they used for all sorts of purposes, and they had some kind of entertainment prepared for me—over the proscenium arch, was a large picture of Stalin; and I recall Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Prime Minister, came to me protestign, in Chungking, in the late winter or early spring of 1946, against the dragging of Stalin's portrait through the streets, in the mud.

"I have heard him assert not once but a number of times that he was a Marxist Communist. His story always was that they would approach the desired end, which was a Communist form of government, through, first the democratic processes, as they called them, until there was enough stability and industrial strength and development to permit them to go the whole way to a Marxist Communist state.

"The only phase of the agrarian belief would have been, I should suppose, the fact that most of the members of the party were of the agrarian type, as there were almost no industries within the Communist bounds in the early days of China.

"There was never any doubt in my mind, and never any though there was any misunderstanding about it." [80]

19. There has been a lack of adequate military support from United Nations allies

The Korean War was supposed to be a United Nations action. Forty-seven members of the international organization formally supported the operation but few contributed much practical assistance. (Turkey, considering her resources, was a notable exception.) The plain truth is that the United States has footed most of the bill in money and has furnished most of the men and equipment. Ninety percent of the casualties were American. Contributions of our UN allies total:

Country	Army (men)	Navy (men or ships)	Air Force (men or planes)
United Kingdom	12,000	10,000 [1]	2 squadrons RAF.
Canada	8,500	3 destroyers	
Australia	1,100	3 destroyers 1 frigate	1 fighter squadron.
New Zealand	(2)	2 frigates	
South Africa			1 squadron, 200 men.
Netherlands	1,060	1 destroyer	
Belgium	1,000		
Luxemburg	44		
Greece	1,000		8 aircraft.
France	1,122	1 gunboat	
Philippines	5,000		
Colombia	1,080	1 frigate	
Turkey	5,000		
Thailand	1,500	1 corvette 1 transport	"Small number."
Ethiopia	1,069		

[1] The 10,000 listed as manning ships from United Kingdom include personnel aboard ships of British Commonwealth countries.

[2] Exact number of New Zealanders unavailable.

NOTE.—In addition to the forces listed above, which are actually in the Korean area, a few other small contingents have been promised.

Source: Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times, July 9, 1951.

We are unable to comprehend why the administration persisted in its attitude of refusing the offer of 33,000 fighting men advanced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. At first administration spokesmen stated that any acceptance would result in an open invitation to extend the war to Red China. After the Chinese

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[79] Congressional Record, June 5, 1951, p. 6298 (Raymond Ludden, Foreign Service officer).

[80] Hearing, p. 377.

Communists entered the war the excuse for still refusing the Nationalistic troops was that this might provoke Russia into interfering in the Korean War.

The experience of our fighting men on the battlefields of Korea raise serious questions about the strength of the theory of collective security as it has been implemented thus far.

20. Some of our allies have displayed an unfortunate attitude with respect to economic sanctions against Red China

The attitude of some of our allies on the issue of applying economic sanctions against Communist China has been most discouraging. The lack of prompt, strong, positive American leadership on this question no doubt contributed to the confused manner in which sanctions have been applied, 6 months after Chinese Communist aggression took place.[82] It is most difficult to understand the willingness of nations to trade with a common enemy and take increased profits from the bloody conflict in Korea.

The technical definition of "goods which contribute to the war potential of the enemy" is not the real issue. It is the moral question which must be faced in a positive manner or it will undermine the United Nations and the world's latest effort to achieve peace through collective security.

World War II resulted from the failure to apply economic sanctions against the Fascist aggressors in the 1930's. This recent lesson should still be in sharp focus. The economy of China is at best precarious. Almost any commodity which Red China wants is of vital necessity to that nation's ability to wage war.

The United Nations waited precious months before taking a hesitant step in applying economic sanctions. Strict adherence to these sanctions by all nations would be a realistic way in which to support the cause of collective security. Economic sanctions are only as effective as is the will to resist the desire for profit of any member of the UN. One nation, failing to cooperate, will render useless the efforts of all others.

21. The Secretary of State has assumed military functions

A flagrant example of political interference in military decisions occurred in relation to the bombing of Rachin.

Rachin is an important supply depot located in northeast Korea close to the Siberian boundary near Vladivostok.

General MacArthur testified that as a military decision[83] he recommended the bombing of this town. This recommendation was approved by the JCS[84] and on one occasion an air strike was made on this target. On another occasion, the bombers returned because of poor visibility.

Gen. Emmet O'Donnell, commander of the Far East Bomber Command, testified that Rachin could be "bombarded and destroyed without any damage to or encroachment on Soviet territory."[85]

Yet under interrogation by Senator Cain, Secretary Acheson admitted that though he had no qualifications to evaluate military problems, nevertheless he *objected* to the bombing of Rachin holding that it was an "unimportant military supply center" the bombing of which "might cause involvement with the Soviet Union and the extension of hostilities."[86] Accordingly the authority of our Air Force to attack this enemy base was withdrawn.

State Department meddling in military matters is not new. Former Secretary of Defense Johnson testified "there had been trouble in Mr. Forrestal's time, and there was trouble in my time, and we tried to correct it. The Military Department is supposed to be concerned with military power; the State Department with political objectives, and when it comes up to the top we have to reconcile or else the Security Council and the President have to reconcile."[87]

22. The Communist objective is to take over "lock, stock, and barrel" any government of which communists become a part

The American people have long been puzzled as to how and why a coalition government of the Nationalists and the Communists was contemplated in China. The testimony of our State Department has been to the effect that the idea of a Communist coalition government originated with the Chinese Nationalists.[88]

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[82] See appendix III for the responses received thus far from United Nations members regarding sanctions.

[83] Hearings, p. 17.

[84] Ibid., p. 2276.

[85] Ibid., p. 3068.

[86] Ibid., p. 2276.

[87] Ibid., p. 2577.

[88] An allegation which is denied by officials of the Chinese Republic who claim the idea originated with the Chinese Communists.

The testimony of General Hurley, however, was to the effect that a group within the State Department, attached to the American Embassy in China, worked toward that end.[88a] The testimony of General Marshall corroborates the conclusion that an arms embargo and the threat of ending American military assistance was used to force Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to admit Communist elements into the government.[88b]

In the light of our previous experience in Poland, where communistic elements soon absorbed the whole government, and in other Balkan and central European countries, it should have been clear, and it was clear to all realistic Americans, that oil and water could not mix. Yet, on June 6, 1951, the Secretary of State was asked by Senator Wiley:

"Was there ever any chance in your opinion of actually bringing the two Chinese groups together to work in harmony?[89]

To which the Secretary replied:

"Yes, sir. This was the constant effort carried out through General Stilwell, Wedemeyer, Mr. Hurley, as the President's personal representative, and General Marshall after the war. It was the official policy of both the Nationalists and the Communists, and it was the view of all our military people that it was possible and it was the only way to get real Chinese fighting against the Japanese."[89]

On June 7, however, Senator Wiley asked the Secretary of State whether or not it was the objective of the Communists to take over every government in which they were a component part.

When Mr. Acheson evaded the question, Senator Wiley asked:

"That is the objective everywhere, isn't it?"

To which President Truman's Secretary of State replied:

"Yes, sir. That is their objective."[80]

A A comparison of the conflicting testimony of the Secretary of State on June 6 and June 7 cannot help but convince an unprejudiced, objective analyst that we urged the Generalissimo to take into his government Communist components with the full knowledge that we were requesting him to embrace the elements of his destruction.

23. The United States will support the Government of the Republic of China

All witnesses have agreed that it is and has been the firm and continuing policy of the Government of the United States to support the Government of the Republic of China. The United States recognized the Nationalist Government as the legal Government of China, as a faithful war ally, as the Government which was one of the founders of the United Nations and as a charter member of the Security Council.

All witnesses agreed it would be unthinkable that any government could "shoot its way into the United Nations."[90] Secretary Acheson stated that the Truman administration will strongly oppose the entry of Communist China into the United Nations as our representatives have done on 76 occasions when this issue was raised in the past. The Secretary of State reiterated previous statements to the effect that the United States would not exercise a veto on this issue, but he added that our Government would take the question to the Court of International Justice at The Hague if the United States ever found itself in the minority on a vote on this question.

No single individual at any time advocated, before this committee, the unseating of the Nationalist Government or the seating of the Communist government in the United Nations. Time will tell whether the administration will hold to this admirable determination or whether they will again yield to pressure.

24. Mismanagement and corruption in government is not confined to the Orient

We acknowledge that, in some instances, the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek is alleged to have been corrupt and decadent. It is equally true that this allegation is not unique in the twentieth-century world. Certainly there can be no greater corruption than that found in the Communist world wherein whole nations are forcibly brought to slavery by an organized minority which maintains itself by the force of sheer brutality.

It ill behooves the Government of the United States to level charges of corruption or decadence against any friendly nation. "People who live in glass houses should not throw stones."[91]

[88a] Ibid., p. 2905.
[88b] Ibid., p. 555, supra.
[89] Ibid., p. 1986.
[90] Ibid., p. 1728.
[91] Deep freeze, pastel mink, RFC, and organized crime and dope would furnish ample material for a Chinese writer to discuss corruption in some other quarter.

25. *The State Department directive of December 23, 1949, was a policy statement calculated to prepare the way for the abandonment of Formosa to the Chinese Reds*

On December 23, 1949, the State Department issued hundreds of copies of a secret directive concerning the attitude to be adopted by our representatives abroad in respect to Formosa.

It is now the contention of the Secretary of State that this directive did not reflect the policy of the United States Government, but was issued merely to be used for the purposes of propaganda in minimizing the importance of Formosa in the event that that island fell into Communists hands.[92]

The very form of this directive, which contains in the first 10 paragraphs a background summary of our policies regarding Formosa for the benefit of the Foreign Service officers who received it, belies this contention of President Truman's Secretary of State.

It is the candid opinion of the members concurring in this report that such an explanation fails to reflect the facts in the case. It seems perfectly clear that this directive of December 23, 1949, was an actual statement of policy on the part of the United States State Department in which we announced to our foreign representatives that Formosa was not of strategic importance to the United States and that its control by the Communists forces would not imperil our position in the Far East.

There is a sharp contrast between the testimony of the Secretary of State and that of subsequent witnesses about that directive. No matter how the directive is explained, it reflects little credit to the honor and dignity of the United States.

26. *The United States will not allow Formosa to fall into hostile hands*

Before the hearings began, there was serious question as to the policy of the United States with regard to the island of Formosa. The State Department directive of December 23, 1949, discussed the possible fall of Formosa and stated that the island had "no strategic value." Secretary of State Acheson's speech before the National Press Club in January of 1950 eliminated Formosa from our line of defense. It is little wonder therefore that the American people and the people of the Far East were confused as to the intention of this Government with regard to that island.

There is no question that the hearings smoked out some statements of policy with regard to this strategic outpost. The Secretary of State, under persistent interrogation, finally stated that Formosa must not "fall by force."[93] Under further questioning, the Secretary stated it was the policy of the United States "that we are not going to permit it (Formosa) to be taken by force and we are going to use all our means to prevent it from falling into unfreindly hands."[94]

The testimony of every responsible military official of our Government and the Secretary of Defense has elaborated on the strategic importance of this island to the security of the United States. It therefore, would seem that for once and all the policy of our country in regard to Formosa is clear.

27. *The successful completion of the Korean conflict is essential since United States cannot afford the costly attrition of manpower*

As has been stated previously in this report, the casualties, both combatant and noncombatant, in the Korean conflict have now approached the 200,000 figure.

The President of the United States at one time announced that there was no end in sight for the accordion-type warfare which, though allegedly inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese, was also taking its toll of the youth of this Nation.

The United States of America has a military potential which is far superior from a technological, economic, and industrial standpoint to that of any nation on the face of the earth. The area in which we are the most vulnerable as compared to our opponent is that of manpower. The youth of our Nation constitutes our greatest resource and they are not expendable.

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[92] Op. cit., p. 1671.

[93] Ibid., p. 2000.

[94] Ibid., p. 2001. The Secretary of State stated that we are not going to permit Formosa to be taken "by force." This may be misleading. It does not mean that he would not permit it to be given to the Chinese Communists by "agreement" probably within the United Nations.

28. *The termination of hostilities in Korea will not eliminate responsibility in that area*

The committee has been reminded constantly that the termination of hostilities in that area will not relieve the United Nations of the responsibility to rehabilitate the war-torn Republic of Korea. People who have suffered successive waves of aggression from Russia, Japan, North Korea, and the Chinese Communists must be given assistance.

It is not enough to snuff out the flames of aggression. The UN must be prepared to furnish the assistance necessary to restore Korea.

There must be no more hasty ill-considered decisions, such as the haphazard selection of the thirty-eighth parallel as a line of demarcation. We must plan for peace with the same devotion that we consider means of defense and victory. Following two world wars, our diplomats have lost what our fighting men have won.

29. *The administration had no positive plan for achieving a decisive victory*

The testimony revealed only one positive plan for victory in the Korean War, the plan advocated by General MacArthur. We understand the strategy advocated by General MacArthur must be qualified, as must all decisions, by the factor of time. What may have been correct in January was not necessarily correct in June.

However, the appealing aspect of the MacArthur program was that it aimed for victory. Such an aim was in complete accord with the traditional American way of fighting a war. It is apparent that those with military responsibility for the Korean planning rejected this aim.

The members of this committee are not military experts. We weighed the varying opinions of our strategic planners. The testimony of these men has varied almost to the extent of complete confusion.

This much is clear. The Truman administration had no plan to win. It offered the vague concept of limiting the war's area while permitting unlimited casualties. The immoral, un-Christian idea of killing Chinese until the Moscow puppets sue for peace is unacceptable. The corollary of suffering American casualties at the present rate also is unacceptable. Even in the early days of the war when there was a UN resolution which held out the possibility of recognition, a UN seat, and control of Formosa there was no disposition on the part of the Chinese Communists to end the fight.

We believe that a policy of victory must be announced to the American people in order to restore unity and confidence. It is too much to expect that our people will accept a limited war. Our policy must be to win. Our strategy must be devised to bring about decisive victory.

30. *The American Armed Forces are acquitting themselves gallantly*

Much of the testimony before the committee dealt with the administration's failures in the Far East. It was not a happy experience to listen to explanations, alibis, and evasions. However, there was one point on which witnesses agreed with heartwarming enthusiasm.

The soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of America are acquitting themselves with gallant distinction in Korea in accordance with the finest traditions of the United States. Often without adequate training, equipment, or clear-cut purpose, our fighting men have heroically overcome overwhelming manpower odds. They won the original war against North Korea. They would win the war against Chinese Communist oppression in Korea if someone in authority would untie their hands and let them fight to the full extent of their unlimited capabilities.

Part V. Areas of Disagreement

THOSE SIGNIFICANT FACTS WHICH WERE PROVED TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE SIGNERS OF THIS REPORT

Introduction

In the previous section of this report there were enumerated a series of areas of agreement in which the members of the joint committee showed a remarkable unanimity.

We now come to matters of a different character, events in which the administration was most intimately and directly concerned. The responsibility for the policies controlling these events we believe to be plain and inescapable. We believe that any citizen, reading the transcripts of the hearings and giving serious consideration to the evidence offered, would be forced to concur in the following opinions:

1. Yalta is a great tragedy of American diplomacy

The turning point of American foreign policy in the Far East was the Yalta Agreement of February 1945. The Secretary of State has vigorously defended the agreements made at Yalta as being essential to achieve the participation of Russia in the war against Japan. According to witnesses who defended the Yalta Agreement, the Japanese forces were then capable of terrific resistance. It was claimed that it would cost a million American casualties to invade the Japanese Islands. It was stated by the Secretary of State that, at the time of Yalta, we did not know whether or not we had an atomic bomb and, therefore, Russian military participation was essential.

The evidence of Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to China at this time, however, contradicts this "explanation" of Yalta. In the opinion of General Hurley:

"The surrender of the principles and objectives by the State Department at Yalta created the confusion, the crisis which confronts our Nation today."[95]

General MacArthur referred to Yalta as a great tragedy, stating that "one of the gravest mistakes that was ever made was to permit the Soviet to come down into China at Port Arthur, Dairen, and other places of that sort."[96]

Under questioning, it was established that at the time of Yalta the Japanese Navy was at the bottom of the ocean and American airpower had destroyed the Japanese industrial potential. Furthermore, with the economy of Japan dependent on imports, there was absolutely no doubt, from a military point of view, that the Japanesse home army would wither on the vine.

The testimony of Admiral Leahy in I Was There was to the effect that it was not the intention of President Roosevelt to invade the Japanese islands, but rather to bring to bear the might of American naval and air power. Admiral Leahy states that he believed that Russia should not be asked to participate in the Japanesse War, but that the military desired Russian participation and the President accepted their view.[97]

Testimony has been introduced into the record by Senator Bridges that there was prepared by 50 specialists in the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, the War Department, a study evaluating the desirability of Russian participation in the Japanese War and concluding that such participation should be prevented. (When asked to produce this paper, the Defense Department replied that it has not been able to find the document in question.)

The final and overwhelming evidence is that Secretary of War Stimson and Gen. Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Engineer District (wartime atom bomb agency) before Yalta, went to President Roosevelt and told him that the atom bomb was a certainty and would be ready for use by midsummer of 1945.[98] (Further, a Colonel Consodine of the Manhattan Engineer District flew to the island of Malta where he met with Secretary of State Stettinius and briefed him immediately prior to Yalta on the certainty of the atom bomb.)[99]

This myth, that the Russian participation in the Japanese War was a military necessity has been refuted adequately. History will record that at Yalta the United States repudiated some of its solemn obligations, yielded to Russian imperialism, and gave way to appeasement which will be regretted for decades and all for mythical reasons. The true reason for Yalta remains an inscrutable mystery. The result of Yalta remains a triumph for Communist diplomacy.

From John Hay to Cordell Hull, America maintained the "open door" in China. At Yalta America slammed the "open door."

2. The victory won by our Armed Forces in the Pacific has been squandered by our diplomats

In the year 1945 the United States was the dominant military power in the Far Pacific. With the assistance of our allies, excluding Russia, we had crushed the military might of the Japanese Empire. Our military position was unchallenged. Our diplomats were in a most excellent position for negotiation to maintain peace and stability in the area.

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[95] Ibid., p. 2839.

[96] Ibid., p. 128.

[97] I Was There, Leahy, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950, p. 318. Further evidence on this point was given by Admiral Earnest King, former Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter dated June 21, 1951, in which he said, "It was the belief of the Navy that Japan could and should be defeated without an invasion of the home islands." Hearings, p. 3055.

[98] Ibid., p. 3119.

[99] Ibid., p. 3120.

Our Chinese allies on the mainland in 1946 had begun to hammer at the Communist forces in the civil war within their land. They were making considerable headway late in 1946 in defeating this armed revolutionary movement.

However, our diplomats gave away our victory in secret agreements, so that in the year 1951, our foreign policy in the Far East stands revealed as a complete failure. China is in the hands of the Red; communism has swept through Asia; and we are involved in a war. Only Japan has been kept in the camp of the Western Powers, and the explanation for that may largely be found in the fact that our State Department exercised little authority in that area.

While Secretary Acheson's policies and those of his predecessors were largely instrumental in making 450 million of our former Chinese allies into enemies, General MacArthur's policies were largely instrumental in making 80 million former Japanese enemies into our friends.

It is doubtful if the annals of history reveal any similar instance wherein the fruits of victory, gained at such terrific cost in lives and treasure, have been so recklessly thrown away.

3. It has been impossible to determine who wrote the instructions for General Marshall on his mission to China

On November 27, 1945, the President accepted the resignation of Ambassador Patrick Hurley and announced the same day the appointment of General of the Army George C. Marshall to serve as his special representative in China. In the instructions issued to General Marshall, the President directed that he bring to bear the influence of the United States to the end that the "unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods" [1] might be achieved and concurrently to endeavor to effect a termination of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists.

This, of course, had to do with the efforts to bring about a coalition government in which the Communists were to participate alongside of the bitterly anti-Communist Nationalist Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Communists themselves have told all the world that their intention in participating in democratic processes of government is only to be considered as a stepping stone toward the ultimate creation of a Marxist Communist state.

Who wrote the instructions for the Marshall mission still remains a mystery despite repeated attempts on the part of members of this committee to ascertain this fact. Secretary Marshall stated that he did not write the instructions in the Presidential directive to him. The Secretary of State states that Secretary Marshall sat down and wrote his own instructions.

Senator Smith (Republican, New Jersey) referred to a communication from which a correspondent gave some personal views on the MacArthur situation. The final paragraph of the letter reads as follows:

"General Marshall was appointed and on December 11, 1945, sat down with Dean Acheson to write out the instructions President Truman was to give him." [2]

Senator Smith continued to read this letter. It contained reference to a report General MacArthur made in 1945 in which he evaluated the armed forces in China.

Having listened to the reading of the letter, General Marshall stated:

"In the first place I have not a recollection of that report of General MacArthur's, but I have a very decided recollection of the reference in there that I sat down in the State Department and drew up this policy. *I did not.*" [2]

Senator Smith had previously asked:

"Do you recall who had a hand in the preparation of the directives that sent you to China?" [1]

To which Secretary Marshall replied:

"At that time, Senator, Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; Mr. Acheson was Under Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; John Carter Vincent was the head of the China group in the State Department, certainly he had a hand in it. I do not know what others did.

"On my part, General Hull, who is now on duty in the Army headquarters, and was the head of the Operations Division during the war for me, he represented my interest so far as I was concerned in that, together with a man from Time magazine forces, who had helped me briefly in the latter part of the war in the preparation of my final report, and who the directorship of Time loaned me to take to China with me because he had been there throughout a good period of the war."[3]

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[1] China white paper, p. 132.

[2] Hearings, p. 467.

When Secretary Acheson testified on this subject, he supplied the Senators with his version of the Marshall instructions, which is shown in the transcript as follows:

Secretary Acheson said:

"At the end of November 1945, Secretary Byrnes and General Marshall met. This was after General Marshall had been asked to go to China.

"Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum suggesting the outline of instructions for him. General Marshall did not approve it.

"General Marshall said that he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some of his associates, in drafting the instructions.

"This he did; and a draft was prepared by him, in conjunction with four generals who were working very closely with General Marshall. This was submitted to Secretary Byrnes.

"On the 8th of December Secretary Byrnes made his suggestions to General Marshall, that is, suggestions of changes or alterations or additions to the draft prepared by General Marshall.

"General Marshall's draft, with Secretary Byrnes' suggestions, was discussed at a meeting in Secretary Byrnes' office on Sunday morning, December 9, 1945, by Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall, Mr. John Carter Vincent, General Hull, and myself. I was then Under Secretary of State.

"Those of us went over the instructions. General Marshall approved the suggestion made by Secretary Byrnes and we then had a completely agreed draft."[4]

The testimony from these two Cabinet officers is obviously contradictory. It is impossible to determine who actually wrote the instructions for General Marshall which contained the coalition policy which cost us our Chinese allies.

4. Some United States officials were so opposed to Chiang Kai-shek that they were automatically on the side of the "Red regime."

Evidence has been presented to the committee that some of the American officials assigned to assist the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China were so much opposed to Chiang and his government so as to be automatically on the side of the Chinese Communists.[5]

This committee did not attempt to explore fully the importance and widespread ramifications of this situation. However, the sworn testimony presented to this committee cannot be ignored. If the personal feelings of American diplomats operate to thwart the policy of their Government, there is a situation created which demands a complete and thorough inquiry.

It appears unlikely to us that the executive branch will undertake to expose this situation to the light of day. The situation strongly suggests that an appropriate committee of Congress endeavor to investigate this question and recommend remedial legislation.

5. It has not been the consistent policy of the United States to support the Republic of China

The Secretary of State testified it is the "firm and continuing" policy of the United States to support the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China. He stated this policy has been pursued by our Nation from the outbreak of World War II down to this very day.[6]

The evidence before the committee indicates that this policy has been neither firm nor continuous. On the contrary, the policy has been obscured by constant conflict within the State Department, in the press, and in public debate. There has not been and even today there is no unanimity of opinion in the Government on the subject of aid to the Republic of China.

A policy of supporting the Republic of China should have been the firm and continuing policy of the United States. President Chiang Kai-shek was and is the outstanding anti-Communist leader in Asia. Our enemy in Asia and throughout the world has been identified as Russian communism.

The administration cannot straddle the fence on this issue. It claims to have followed a policy of supporting Chiang. The China white paper is a blunt denial of Secretary Acheson's statement. We have not been convinced that Chiang lost

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[3] Ibid., p. 459.
[4] Ibid., p. 1848.
[5] See testimony of Gen. Patrick Hurley and white paper.
[6] Op. cit., p. 1738, supra.

China for any other reason than that he did not receive sufficient support, both moral and material, from the United States.

The importance of moral support in any conflict in Asia was emphasized by General Wedemeyer. He testified that lack of moral support was the key to the downfall of the Government of the Republic of China.[7]

Evidence of the continuing lack of moral support can be found in the quixotic attacks leveled by administration stalwarts, both in and out of Government, against President Chiang and all those who want to support him in his 25 years of struggle against communism and aggression.

The record is replete with the evidence of the lack of material support. Such military equipment as China Nationalists received in the critical days of the war against the Communist regime has been described as "moldy," broken, lacking parts, etc. One shipment of automatic weapons arrived without magazines, in such shape the guns were of no more value than broomsticks.[8]

Official Government reports show that since VJ-day our former enemies, Japan, Germany, and Italy, have each received more United States aid and assistance than our wartime ally and historic friend, the Republic of China.

The contention that the administration consistently and firmly supported the Chinese Republic is simply not true.

Further evidence that the administration did not support the Government of the Republic of China is shown in the orientation fact sheet "Army Talk." This was an official War Department Publication used in World War II to indoctrinate our soldiers. The issue, dated April 7, 1945, was entitled "Our Ally China" and the role of the Communists was discussed.[8a]

Throughout the article "Communist" was in quotation marks and it was pointed out that when we speak of the Chinese "Communist," we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "Communist." In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of Chinese farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves but rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese "Communists" are not like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese."

This astonishing orientation sheet continues to say:

"The situation is so complex and has such an involved history, that it is very difficult for any outsider to say definitely who is right and who is wrong. Probably some degree of right and wrong attaches 'to both sides.' The Communists say that they are trying to carry out certain economic and political reforms that the Kuomintang has up to now been unable or unwilling to make. Some American and other observers who have visited the 'Communists' agree that their program is a moderate one and that the things they have been doing in their areas are quite in accord with what we think of as liberal democracy."

Concluding the orientation is a brief discussion of Our Basic Concern which contains the statement that "the issue in China is not so much the tension that exists between the National Government and the Chinese "Communists" as it is between those elements within each camp who place their personal prestige, ideas, and ambitions ahead of winning the war."

American soldiers desiring to obtain more facts in regard to the problem of our Chinese ally were given a reference for further reading. That reference was The Making of Modern China by Owen Lattimore.

6. *If the Republic of China had received effective military aid from the United States they might have defeated the Communists*

Early in 1948 there were three high American officials in China, who felt the need for immediate action if China was to continue free of Communist domination. Theses officials, Ambassador Leighton Stuart, ECA Mission Chief Roger Lapham, and Vice Admiral Oscar Badger, journeyed to the north of China to see for themselves what could be done to stall the Communist advance and place the initiative in the hands of the Nationalist forces. They were impressed with the appearance, actions, and spirit of the armies of Gen. Fu Tsu Yi as well as the military stature of General Fu.

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[7] Ibid., p. 2317.

[8] Ibid., p. 2747.

[8a] See appendix IV.

At the time of this visit General Fu told the United States officials "that he could do little more than to keep the Communists out of the area with his equipped armies and that he was constantly employing them on a defensive basis to meet Communist thrusts from various directions."[9] However, the general went on to say "that if he could obtain equipment for the four additional trained armies he would then be able to set up an offensive to the northeast stabilizing the Chinhuangtao Hulutal corridor and for the eventual relief of Mukden."

He explained "that in relieving Mukden he could reopen a channel of supply for about 300,000 of the best troops in China (many of them American trained and equipped) which were cut off there and were very lacking in American munitions."[9]

Immediately after this conference with Gen. Fu Tsu Yi a recommendation was sent to the JCS specifically listing the equipment required, and which was estimated at a total value of $16 million. It was approved in July 1948 but no specific action was taken to implement the decision.

In November 1948, Admiral Badger received word that a ship was about to enter Tiensin with about 10 percent of the recommended equipment on board. He said:

"Well, that's pretty bad. It's too bad that isn't the full business, but maybe it will still have a morale effect."[10]

After the cargo was unloaded, Admiral Badger received a communication from General Fu reporting the deficiencies of the weapons. Of the total number, 480 of the machine guns lacked spare parts, tripod mounts, etc.; Thompson submachine guns had no magazines or clips, no loading machines for the loading of ammunition belts, only a thousand of the light machine guns with mounts and only a thousand clips for the 2,280 light machine guns. General Fu's commentary on this deplorable situation was according to Admiral Badger along the following lines:

"The above-mentioned weapons are not in good condition and, for the most part, cannot be used. I do not know how or why these weapons were forwarded in an incomplete state."[11]

As a result of the arrival of this long anticipated shipment of arms in such an unusable condition, General Fu's plans for an offensive collapsed. The troops were completely demoralized and in Admiral Badger's judgment this action "was the straw that broke the camel's back."[12]

The myth that the Republic of China fell because the Chinese troops refused to fight is again refuted by sworn testimony.

7. *The propaganda campaign against the Republic of China was vicious*

We have been greatly disturbed by the evidence which shows the terrific impact of the propaganda campaign against the Chinese Nationalist Government, originated by forces both within and without the United States. The constant attacks upon the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the repeated assaults upon the alleged corruption and graft of his associates softened the fiber of Nationalist resistance, especially since many of these attacks originated within a nation which claimed to be aiding and supporting the Republic of China.

It is clear that the defection of a friend is more destructive of morale than the victory of an enemy.

8. *The administration believed that the Chinese Communists would work in harmony with the Nationalists in a coalition government*

The habit of administration witnesses to contradict themselves during the course of this investigation did little to allay misgivings as to the conduct of our foreign affairs. Nowhere were these misgivings more pronounced than in discussions of the China policy when the Secretary of State was asked:

"Was there ever any chance in your opinion of actually bringing the two Chinese groups to work together in harmony?"

He replied "Yes, sir."[13] He then went on to say "it was the view of all our military people that it was possible and it was the only way to get real Chinese fighting against the Japanese." In direct contradiction to this statement is the statement of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer who certainly can qualify as a military expert in the Far East, that "I told him [General Marshall] very frankly that in my judgment he could not accomplish that mission. His mission was one that I thought was just like mixing oil and water." [14]

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[9] Ibid., p. 2746.
[10] Ibid., p. 2747.
[11] Ibid., p. 2747.
[12] Ibid., p. 2748.
[13] Ibid., p. 1986.

Later on the Secretary was asked if it was not the "objective" of Communists in every government in which they had a part, to take over that government "Lock, stock, and barrel." The Secretary admitted that it was and that just such "captures" had ocurred in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.[15]

Yet the administration persisted in pushing for a coalition policy for years after the Japanese had surrendered. The contention was made that the United States desired a "unified" China. The effort to achieve such unification was to insist upon an alliance of the Nationalists with the forces committed to their destruction, the Chinese Communists.

The admission that a policy could not be successful and, at the same time, adherence to that same policy, is a self-indictment.

9. The administration has been unduly preoccupied with the defense of America in Europe to the neglect of the defense of America in Asia

Since the days of Pearl Harbor, the American people have become used to the terms "global strategy," "global responsibilities," etc., and yet it is apparent to the signers of this report that the administration and the State Department have considered the globe to be much larger in its European aspects than in its Asiatic aspects.

While granting the importance of Europe and while recognizing the military and economic potential of that continent, we cannot help but feel that there has been a myopia approaching blindness whenever we have dealt with matters of the Pacific.

There has never been the same amount of effort expended on behalf af Asiatic matters by the State Department as there has been toward those of Europe. It is unfortunate, but true, that the State Department has been affected by a group who have interpreted Asiatic problems to the advantage of Russia rather than that of the United States.

In the present day, Asia is as important to the United States as Europe.

The situation in southeastern Asia is generally recognized as very menacing. Our temporizing in Korea might encourage the Chinese Reds to move in this area.

We can't attract and maintain the respect and friendship of the people of the Far East unless we demonstrate a sympathetic understanding toward their emerging nationalism.

10. The administration has sole responsibility for the failure of our far eastern policy

The abject failure of our far eastern policy, aimed at maintaining a friendly China and establishing a free and united Korea, is the sole responsibility of the State Department. No other department of our Government has, in fact or in theory, had responsibility for this failure. China is under the domination of a Communist regime and Korea, far from being free and united, is devastated by war and remains divided by an artificial boundary.

The administration failed to devise a policy to keep China free. It likewise failed to devise a technique to guarantee our victory by creating a free and unified Korea. While the Secretary of State claims it is administration policy to back a free government in China and to unify and free Korea, the facts belie his claims.

There have been desperate efforts to becloud this elementary failure. The administration and its apologists have sought to create the impression that the failure was achieved under bipartisan sponsorship, and that all must share the responsibility for the failure.

The record refutes this claim.

During the last 6 years, members of both political parties as well as interested citizens have voiced strong protests against the trends in Asia.

Many Members of Congress are on record as consistently opposing any concessions to the Asiatic Communists. As a result of these hearings the administration has shifted and has shown some signs of stiffening their attitude toward the Asiatic Communists.

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[14] Ibid., p. 2305.

[15] Ibid., pp. 2125–2126.

The argument for bipartisan responsibility is completely devastated by the statement of the late, great Senator from Michigan, Mr. Vandenberg, who on April 16, 1947, stated on the floor of the United States Senate:

"What the policy of the State Department is, I am unable to testify. There is a considerable amount of misunderstanding about the so-called bipartisan foreign policy in this country. I have tried to make that plain on several occasions. It is very narrowly channeled within very specific things, namely, the minor peace treaties in Europe and the activities of the United Nations. I have never been consulted about the Chinese policy or the Pan-American policy or many other policies, and I am not in a position to be an expert witness for the Senator from Nebraska. My information probably is a little more intimate than that of other Senators, but speaking generally, the facts are as I have indicated." [16]

11. The risk of precipitating world war III through adoption of a positive program for victory in Korea is no greater now than it was before

Administration witnesses have contended that we dare not press to victory in Korea lest we precipitate world war III. But the evidence shows that this risk was considered and debated when our troops were originally ordered into Korea.[17] The risk of another world war is no greater now than it was before.

Moreover, the decision to fight aggression in Korea was taken in the face of Soviet warnings that implementation of the Atlantic Pact for the defense of Western Europe would be interpreted as "provocative" by the Soviets and their satellites. This theme was repeated recently in the so-called "peace offer" of Mr. Malik.

This Nation has not hesitated to implement the Atlantic Pact, both with troops and supplies.

It is utterly inconsistent for the administration to take the calculated risk of provoking Russia in Europe and to cower at taking a similar risk in Asia. This is only another contradiction in American postwar diplomacy which confuses our own people and the free people throughout the world.

It appears of infinitely greater importance that the United States—with full UN backing—go ahead and crush the aggression in Korea where the Communists began it.[18]

12. The Korean conflict is improperly labeled a police action

The administration's attempts to label this bloody war as a "police action" is distinctly misleading. hTe statistics of the conflict prove it is a war of major importance by any historical yardstick.

Total casualties on both sides exceeded 1 million in the first year of the war. American casualties, even using the accounting method by which we differentiate between battle and nonbattle casualties, are close to 200,000 in the first year of the war. The Korean campaign has been the fourth largest war in our Nation's history. The casualties in the first 12 months were greater than the combined total of the four wars of the Revolution, 1812, Mexican, and Spanish-American.

It is acknowledged that the joint action of the United Nations in resisting aggression in Korea is unprecedented in modern times. Perhaps new terminology will have to be devised, but nevertheless, as Secretary Acheson was ultimately forced to state, " * * * in the usual sense of the word, there is a war." [19]

In addition to the suffering, sacrifices, and loss of life, this war, computed on the basis of increased Federal spending in the United States, has cost $10 billion.[20]

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[16] Congressional Record, April 16, 1947, p. 3474.

[17] The secret agreement between the Soviet and Red China is contrary to the UN Charter and in theory could outlaw Soviet Union. In addition, the provisions of article 103 of the UN Charter state: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

To admit that any action that the United Nations takes might provoke Russia to attack the forces of the United Nations is tantamount to admitting that the United Nations, as such, has ceased to be an effective political instrument.

The arguments that our actions will precipitate world war III are not accepted even by Secretary Acheson. He stated before the Foreign Relations Committee upon his return from the Brussels Conference that if a third world war came either in Europe or the Far East it would be started by the Russians. Nothing we could do, he added, would in any way alter the Russian timetable.

[18] Former Secretary of Defense Johnson said: "* * * The whole world looked to the majesty of strength of the United States to see what we were going to do about this picture" (Hearings, p. 2585).

[19] Ibid., p. 2014.

[20] Assistant Defense Secretary W. J. McNeil under pressure admitted that the present cost might total this amount (Washington Post, July 8, 1951).

13. Political considerations have prevented full exploitation of American air and naval superiority in the Korean War

We lay no claim to being military experts. However, it appears a matter of common sense that in any kind of warfare, one seeks to bring his maximum power to bear against his enemies' weaknesses.

In Korea, we find an almost exactly contrary strategy has prevailed. Our enemy had the advantage over us in manpower. Our advantage was in the air and on the sea. Yet in this situation our air power was shackled by a political decision against strategic strikes in Manchuria while our sea power was denied, through other political considerations, the opportunity of exploiting its superiority through the imposition of a blockade against the coast of Red China.

As Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell stated in this "bizarre war * * * we can learn a lot of bad habits."[21]

Further:

"The UN decision to restrict us to areas south of the Yalu definitely puts us under wraps and made us work against an inordinate disadvantage."[22]

14. The immoral policy of killing more Chinese Communists is unlikely to produce victory in Korea or to enhance the stature of the United States in the family of nations

The policy of the United States in Korea, as outlined in the testimony of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and others is that of destroying the effective core of the Communist Chinese armies by killing that government's trained soldiers, in the hope that someone will negotiate.[23] We hold that such a policy is essentially immoral, not likely to produce either victory in Korea or an end to aggression. At the same time such a policy tends to destroy the moral stature of the United States as a leader in the family of nations.

War in any form is abhorrent. War means other humane ways of settling disputes have failed. Only a nation without regard for the sanctity of human life could be committed to a policy of prolonged war with no intent at winning a victory. American policy, in every war in which this Nation has engaged, has been designed to win the conflict at the earliest possible moment with the least possible loss of human life—especially American life, but also the lives of those who oppose us.

15. It is difficult to secure information from an administration which is determined to keep the facts from the Congress and the people

In the course of these hearings, numerous important questions about the conduct of our Far East policy were put to witnesses. Repeatedly the witnesses sought to evade the questions, taking refuge in such phrases as, "I can't remember," "I don't recall," or "I will have to look it up."

The American people are aware of the administration's attitude in the past when efforts have been made to secure evidence of dishonesty or subversive activity in our Government.[24]

One of the worst evasions is the story of the "anonymous telegram."

Appearing in the transcript[25] is an utterly fantastic tale. Chairman Russell states:

"Mr. Secretary [Acheson], I at one time was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of this Government doing everything they possibly could to assist the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his struggle with the Chinese Communists. The thing that discouraged me more in that position than any other single thing was a telegram from the United States Chamber of Commerce in one of the largest cities of China."

The chairman continued to say that it was presented in executive session the previous year before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and also to the Armed Services Committee.

Secretary Acheson then testified as follows:

"This is a telegram which was sent to us, received by us on the 16th of March 1949, sent through our establishment, from the chamber of commerce of a city in China. I have asked that the name of the city not be used because I am advised that we are not sure that the people involved in this are all in a safe place." [26]

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[21] Op. cit., p. 3066.

[22] Ibid., p. 3091.

[23] "From the military point of view we hope that by inflicting severe casualties on the enemy and proving to them that 'they are not invincible, that they cannot gain anything by aggressive action, that it is too costly a matter, that they have been let down by Russia in getting in it, that they will be willing to negotiate a peace with the UN.' " (Gen. Omar Bradley, Hearings, p. 937.)

[24] See item 16 following.

[25] Hearings, p. 1971.

The Secretary clearly states: "This is from the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce." [27] and then read the long telegram into the record. It was a bitter indictment of the Nationalist regime, containing such statements as:

"Through our support of a decadent and ineffectual Nationalist Government, we have, not without a measure of truth, been accused of being party to the rape and eventual abandonment of the large part of China, and the people therein, to communism." [28]

Senator Knowland immediately raised objection to the reading of an anonymous telegram into the record and requested that the signatures be presented.[29]

Senator Wiley asked whether the signatures were Englishmen, Americans, or Chinese, to which Secretary Acheson replied, "This was sent from the American Chamber of Commerce in a city," but continued to say, "I do not know whether individuals' names were on it." Yet, when Senator Knowland pursued by asking, "Then it is an anonymous telegram?" the Secretary replied, "Well, no, this is a telegram from the consul saying that the American Chamber of Commerce asked him. * * *" To this, Senator Brewster replied, "You mean there is no name at all?" and the Secretary responded, "I do not know." [30]

Senator Knowland pointed out that the telegram might have been sent by a fellow traveler or even a Communist, and it was later disclosed that the city from which the telegram originated was, at the time the telegram was sent, in Communist hands.[30]

When asked by Chairman Russell the present location of the consul, the Secretary responded, "I will have to find that out, sir." [31]

Senator Smith of New Jersey inquired if the source of the telegram was investigated by the State Department in order to establish the reliability of the individuals or the group, and Secretary Acheson replied: "Well, I cannot tell you whether the investigation was made in China."

These rather embarrassing developments led Senator Russell to again explain that the State Department had presented the telegram in executive session of the Armed Services Committee a year or a year and a half ago; that it had "quite an impact on me at the time * * * and it made a very vivid impression on me." [32]

Now, we have here the State Department of the United States submitting a telegram which they claim came from the chairman of an American chamber of commerce in an undisclosed city which bitterly attacks our ally, Chiang Kai-shek.

Without knowing whether the communication is signed or whether indeed it had originated from any chamber of commerce and without conducting any investigation to determine the reliability of the informant, the Secretary of State of his own volition, at the time when our ally needed our support introduced this anonymous communication into the executive testimony, creating such an impact that, as Chairman Russell stated:

"The thing that discouraged me more in that position [support of Chiang Kai-shek] than any other single thing was a telegram from the United States Chamber of Commerce in one of the largest cities of China."

The only conclusion that we can draw from this story is that the Secretary of State abandoned the use of his critical faculties and judgment when it came to evaluating any evidence which supported the Communist viewpoint.

16. The problem of Communist infiltration in our Government is still unresolved

It is common knowledge that efforts toward Communist infiltration of the State Department have been persistent over the years. This is no idle charge. After long continued congressional *pressure*, some few convictions have been secured. Today Carl Marzani is serving a penitentiary sentence for concealing the fact that he had been a Communist organizer. The confessions of Julian Wadleigh were made under oath. Alger Hiss, one of President Roosevelt's confidential advisers, was convicted of perjury, involving his contacts with a Communist espionage ring operating within the Federal Government, and is now in prison.

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[26] Ibid., p. 1971.
[27] Ibid., p. 1972.
[28] Ibid., p. 1973.
[29] Ibid., p. 1973.
[30] Ibid., p. 1974.
[31] Ibid., p. 1974.
[32] Ibid., p. 1975.

This Communist infiltration has been a critical problem since 1933. At some stage, not yet clear to this committee, Communist influence began to affect our Far East policy. We have had the policy under review during these hearings. Witnesses discussed the activities of the State Department group who favored the Chinese Communists. We are satisfied that the truth about the pro-Communist State Department group has not yet been revealed. It should be noted that since the conclusion of these hearings the State Department has reluctantly admitted that it has numerous major loyalty cases under review.

The Executive has done nothing to assist Congress in its efforts to get at the truth about this infiltration. His consistent tactic is to refuse access to the full records when Congress asks for it. His consistent rejoinder to charges is the phrase "red herring."

There can be no confidence, no unity of purpose until this administration makes available to the public the facts; until the Executive demonstrates the desire to remove from our national institutions those who seek to destroy America. In the light of the continuous disclosures as to the substantial number of security risks discharged by the State Department, it is obvious that a serious situation of Communist infiltration has existed and still endangers our national security.[33]

17. The advice and information of our ablest and most experienced officials has been ignored

The inquiry revealed that it has become the habitual practice of the Executive to make decisions without thorough consultation with the ablest and most competent officials on the scene of action.

The testimony is replete with examples of this practice. A few are cited:

(*a*) The failure to consult MacArthur relative to the Yalta Conference.[34]

(*b*) The failure to inform Ambassador Hurley about the Yalta agreement at the time when he was actively representing this Government in China.[35]

(*c*) The granting of the Polish loan to the Communist satellite government over the vigorous protests of Arthur Bliss Lane, our Ambassador to Poland at the time.

(*d*) Failure to consult MacArthur before decision to fight in Korea.

(*e*) Failure of Marshall, on his way to China, to consult MacArthur on the Far East situation.

(*f*) Failure to adopt General Wedemeyer's recommendations on China and Korea as well as the suppression of his report.[36]

(*g*) Failure to follow Admiral Leahy's advice regarding the necessity for Russian entry into the Pacific War.

(*h*) Failure to follow the recommendations of Angus Ward and his subsequent exile to an obscure post in Africa.

(*i*) Failure to accept the advice of Admiral Badger relative to military assistance to the Republic of China.

This method of operation by our State Department has had devastating effects upon our Foreign Service officers. It has apparently resulted in a frustration and inertia, which has reacted unfavorably to our national security. The confidence and harmonious operation of our foreign relations demands that this tendency be reversed and that those who are entrusted with the responsibility of representing our Government abroad be kept informed and allowed to exercise their authority in conformance with our democratic traditions.

18. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Congress has the sole power to declare war

Although these hearings commenced as an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the recall of the General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, it was soon apparent that there was an underlying question of great constitutional significance; namely, the right of the Executive to involve this Nation in a war without consent of the Congress of the United States. In buttressing the position of the administration, citations have been made in the public record of over

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[33] To support this contention, it must be noted that on July 9, 1951, Senator McCarran (Democrat, Nevada), chairman of the recently created Senate Committee on Internal Security, announced after an executive session that "Facts have been developed which show definite Communist slanting of the Voice of America broadcasts, publications, and moving pictures sent abroad which are supposed to give the American viewpoint in the fight against communism."

[34] Op. cit., p. 128.

[35] Ibid., p. 2836.

[36] Ibid., p. 2293, supra.

150 instances where the Executive, utilizing his authority as Commander in Chief, has used the Armed Forces of the United States without the consent of Congress.[37]

House Document No. 127 shows that whenever the President has used the Armed Forces without the consent of Congress he has done it "as a result of direct aggression upon those forces or in protection of American lives or property."

In the Korean case, the Executive authorized large-scale military operations without the consent of the Congress. Since the President could make a personal decision of this character again, the constitutional question must be resolved.

The use of military forces to the extent of the Korean conflict falls squarely within the constitutional provisions of the war-making power of Congress, therefore, the action on the part of the Executive to intervene without the prior consent of Congress or immediate subsequent approval was ill-advised and should not be allowed to remain as a precedent in our constitutional history.

PART VI. CONCLUSIONS

An inquiry of the type of the MacArthur hearings would accomplish little for the public good unless those who participated arrived at some firm conclusions the implementation of which will strengthen our country.

We have examined all of the facts and in good faith submit to the public the following conclusions:

1. The inquiry was in the public interest

The inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General MacArthur has been very productive. As a result of the extensive testimony the public and the Members of Congress have for the first time in a decade been informed as to our policies in the Far East.

The hearings have revealed glaring mistakes, evasions, contradictions, and significant admissions which will enable the American people to more properly evaluate our future course of action.

We are satisfied that this investigation was in the public interest.

2. The removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional power of the President, but the circumstances were a shock to the national pride

Without debating the right of the President to remove any military leader it must be pointed out that the reasons assigned for the removal of General MacArthur were utterly inadequate to justify the act.

The "justification" for removal seems to have been built up after the removal rather than before.

The removal came 8 months after the victorious landing at Inchon, a military operation of an extremely hazardous character so brilliantly carried out as to rouse the outspoken admiration of all professional soldiers and our people generally.

Far more serious were the effects in the Far East of his curt and precipitate dismissal. There, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, prestige is associated with dignity and a due regard for decorum. General MacArthur was our senior general, a former Chief of Staff, and a distinguished commander in two World Wars.

His position in the Far East was unparalleled. He not only held the highest United States command, but he was also the general of the United States forces in Korea and supreme commander of the combined forces of the United Nations. He held these positions while still in command of and responsible for occupied Japan. As the executive, in carrying out the reconstruction of that defeated empire, he acted with extraordinary success. His energetic, intrepid, and vigorous prosecution of the conflict in Korea had deepened the regard in which he was justly held. That such an officer should be discarded overnight, as though he was merely a disgruntled subordinate, is deplorable. The unseeming haste of the dismissal further compromised the position of the United States, a position already badly shaken as a result of the unhappy events of the past 6 years.

Furthermore, there were still other serious repercussions. General MacArthur, testifying before the joint committee, said that "I have never known it in the American Army, and I know of no precedents any place. Being summarily relieved in that way made it impossible to carry out directives that I was working on at that moment. I had to turn them over to my successor, an admirable officer in every respect, General Ridgway, who was 350 miles away on the Korean front. I don't think there is any question that the interest of the United States was jeopardized in such a summary mode of turning over great responsibilities which involve the security of the country."[38]

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[37] Op. cit., H. Rept. No. 127, as quoted in detail under item 12, Agreements.

3. There was no serious disagreement between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to military strategy in Korea

The military played no part in initiating or recommending the recall of General MacArthur. The record reveals direct testimony from Secretary Marshall, General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman on this question. These witnesses testified clearly and unequivocally that the military *no more than concurred* in a previously made decision to recall General MacArthur.

At the outset, General Bradley refused to divulge conversations with the President, or to enumerate persons whom the President consulted relative to General MacArthur's recall. Under examination by Senator Wiley, General Bradley indicated that President Truman had not, however, requested General Bradley to maintain such matters confidential. Thus, General Bradley on his own initiative refused to give the details and would only give the conclusions of the talks.

When Senator Wiley made a motion to require General Bradley to divulge the actual conversations the chairman ruled against him and the committee upheld General Bradley's refusal to talk. Subsequent witnesses also refused to give the details of what went on in the White House conferences.

In any event, no evidence was presented to prove that any of the military had been responsible for initiating the action for General MacArthur's dismissal. Lastly, it should be noted that the committee still remains in the dark as to precisely what civilian influences were instrumental in the ouster of General MacArthur.[39]

4. Our Armed Forces have acquitted themselves with gallantry

In the midst of the sober reflections provoked by much that the inquiry has brought forth, we do not forget that in one respect the national honor has been nobly upheld: Our Armed Forces—land, sea, and air—have acquitted themselves with a gallantry unsurpassed in our history. If the recent conduct of our foreign affairs has been disheartening, the same cannot be said of the behavior of the heroic men and women who were given all but impossible tasks to carry out.

The forces first ordered into Korea were largely green troops. Assigned to stem as best they could the advance of an enemy overwhelming in numbers and battle experience, these sholdiers distinguished themselves by their fortitude. They were stubborn in retreat, suffering, as they had to do, reverses most punishing to morale.

Later, in the landings at Inchon, the superb coordination in action of all branches of the services roused universal admiration.

Above all, as the fighting has ebbed and flowed with no clear goal of victory to hearten and sustain them our forces have faithfully performed as the command directed.

The traditions of Lexington, Gettysburg, the Argonne, the Bulge, and Coral Sea, and Iwo Jima, have been upheld. In a world and time when stamina is being challenged on every hand, we may recall a surgeon's statement of the conditions under which the First Marine Division conducted their retreat from Hungham in December 1950:

"Thirty degrees below zero weather with no fires or warming tents, frozen C rations for food, snow for water, and the hills lined with screaming Chinese for 16 bloody miles * * *. Men arrived in Hajarn with a shell of ice around their feet inside their boots. Fifteen hundred were evacuated * * * by air, the remaining either being minor or the men refused to turn in, despite the pain and danger of permanent injury, in their desire to fight their way out with their comrades."

Such valor in the battle line deserves something better than indecision, irresolution, and equivocation in the ultimate center of command.

5. The administration's Far East policy has been a catastrophic failure

A candid survey of the position which the United States now occupies in the Orient leads to the conclusion that the adminstraton's management of affairs in the Far East represents the most desolate failure in the history of our foreign policy. This management has been heedless in its neglect of our interests; the upshot has been catastrophe. The single exception in the record is provided by Japan, where the reputation of the United States for firmness, generosity, and fair dealing has been nobly upheld. The irony provided by this exception lies in the fact that the person most responsible for our success in Japan—Gen. Douglas MacArthur—is the man whose dimissal provoked the investigation in which we have been engaged.

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[38] Hearings, p. 26.
[39] Ibid., p. 763, supra.

Let us briefly recall the historical background against which this catastrophe was played out:

For many years the Far East was a region of ancient and enfeebled kingdoms, intermittently subjected to the impositions and rapacity of predatory colonial powers. In these long-continued aggressions the United States had never participated. On the contrary, the United States had been scrupulous in carrying out agreements freely negotiated and had attained an enviable position in the esteem of oriental peoples.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century, the rivalry of the colonial powers in China had become so intense, the encroachments of Russia on the southern boundary of Siberia so threatening, that an international war seemed unavoidable.

In this situation the United States stated in the most categorical terms the position it had assumed in respect to China; it insisted upon the integrity of that country. Thereafter, over a period of years, this position was reaffirmed.

(Examples: The Open Door Note, 1899; the Boxer Rebellion Circular, 1900; the Nine Power Treaty, 1922; Secretary Hull's demands on the Japanese Ambassadors, 1941.)

In effect, the United States in its relations with China had adopted a self-denying ordinance, and so swift was the growth of American domestic wealth and strength that the power of its example was a persuasive argument against aggression by others.

In 1941, Japan directly challenged the position of the United States, and war followed. War in Europe, for other reasons, was an immediate concomitant and the preoccupation with European war meant that minimum resources of men and matériel could be devoted to the Pacific conflict. With this minimum, the Armed Forces of the United States—land, sea, and air—raised the far-eastern prestige of America to a height never before attained. Forswearing all idea of conquest, with the promise of Philippine independence fulfilled, Americans could justly say that the reputation of their country in the Far East was at its zenith.

Then, with an appalling swiftness, the position of the United States was undermined, compromised, and finally shattered. For this ruinous collapse, the administration in general and the State Department in particular has a direct and dreadful responsibility.

For years, the Russian Communists had plainly stated that international revolution was their aim. An international conspiratorial apparatus was under their control and in this apparatus the Chinese Communists had important places. Their hope of capturing the whole of China was freely acknowledged, their umbilical connection with Moscow well understood. The most intransigent enemy of the Chinese Communists was Chiang Kai-shek, and, for years before Pearl Harbor, he had carried on a war both against the invading Japanese and the Chinese Communists.

In 1943, at Cairo, the United States had made the most solemn undertaking that Korea should be set free and that territories previously wrested from the Chinese Republic should be restored. At the time of President Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, these commitments were presumably still in force. The secret agreements at Yalta were then unknown, not a single Russian soldier was engaged in the Far East, and the forces of the United States were within striking distance of the very heart of Japan.

On August 8, 1945, the Russians entered Manchuria, and after a few days of skirmishing, the Japanese resistance on the Asiatic mainland was over. There followed the movement of the Chinese Communists into the vacuum which the Russians conveniently provided. Later in the year (December 15, 1945), a formal demand by President Truman was served upon the Chinese calling for a cessation of hostilities between the Nationalists and the Communists and insisting that a "national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government."

In this manner the fatal coalition policy was imposed upon our ally.

President Truman has had four Secretaries of State:
Edward Stettinius (1945)
James F. Byrnes (1945–47)
George C. Marshall (1947–49)
Dean G. Acheson (1949 to present writing)

The first of these four men held office for only a few months and was little more than a temporary place holder.

The second, though he was present at Yalta, knew nothing of the secret agreements made there.[40] He has said that he learned of them as a result of a Moscow press statement, and that only diligent search unearthed th relevant documents in a White House safe.

The third, George C. Marshall, undertook the imposition of the coalition policy while acting as the President's special representative in China. After his appointment as Secretary of State in January 1947, he continued for almost 6 months the embargo on arms shipments to the Chinese Nationalists. While declaring that "intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate," [41] the administration in a most practical sense did so interfere and indirectly aided the ultimate Communist triumph China.

The fourth, Dean G. Acheson, is associated with a long series of vacillations and equivocations, the net result of which has been to encourage Communist aggression. His statement that the policy was to "wait until the dust settles" is an example of this. His speech at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, is another. In that speech, while drawing the Nation's "defensive perimeter" from the Aleutians to the Philippines, he pointedly omitted both South Korea and Formosa, thus implying that the United States would make no effort to repel a Communist invasion of either territory. Still anotoher illustration of Secretary Acheson's indirect encouragement of the Communists was his statement on May 31, 1950, to Members of Congress in the Library auditorium that the United States would not use the veto to prevent the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.

One of the most singular aspects of the administration's far-eastern policy is illustrated by its acknowledgement of the dynamic character of revolution. As Secretary Acheson has pointed out on so many occassions, international communism is a movement which plans to overthrow existing governments by force and violence if necessary. While holding this point of view our State Department has continually acted as though, if appeasement went far enough, the Russians and their satellites would consent to dwell peacefully side by side with the "free world."

It does not require prolonged reflection upon the disastrous results of the administration's far-eastern policy to draw some conclusions as to what the United States must do. Fear of Russia is no basis for a foreign policy; what we must have is a positive program based upon confidence in our abilities and resources.

6. The foreign policy of the United States since the middle 1940's has been based on expediency rather than the principles of liberty and justice

It has been extremely difficult to determine the full extent of the secret commitments which the administration has made. These commitments are the basis for a large part of our present foreign policy. The agreements made at Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, Quebec, Potsdam, and elsewhere [42] were largely international executive arrangements drawn without consideration of the treaty-making power of the United States Senate.

In the past the confirmation and implementation of international commitments has required the advice and consent of the Senate. Treaties were public documents, open to the inspection of any citizen.

Ten years of secrecy changed all this, Negotiations were affected by the precarious health of some who represented us; decisions were made by irresponsible people. Practices of this character confused our people and left them in ignorance of what had been undertaken in their name. These hearings broke through this wall of secrecy. For the first time in years a congressional committee has been able to force out enough information to piece together a coherent picture of a foreign situation, discouraging though the picture was.

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[40] Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 43.

[41] China white paper, p. 609.

[42] See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941–49, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Washington, 1950.

7. *The United States should never again become involved in war without the consent of the Congress*

Despite the legalistic administration arguments to the contrary, the fact remains that for the first time in the history of our Nation, the constitutional authority of Congress to declare war has been bypassed.

Recognizing the unique nature of the collective-security action of the United Nations, it is nevertheless our opinion that the Korean War should not be allowed to establish a precedent.

It is true that there was popular approval for the intervention of United States forces in Korea. It is also true, however, that this approval was, in measure, based upon the logical assumption that proper military plans and estimates were in existence. It was further assumed by most people that we were in a state of readiness to carry out whatever military objectives were assigned to our Armed Forces by our administration leaders.

Consultation after committment, as was the case in the Korean intervention is not in accordance with American constitutional procedures.

8. *Cessation of hostilities, based upon restoration of the status quo at the thirty-eighth parallel will be a victory for aggression*

If a truce is negotiated, based upon the restoration of the status quo at the thirty-eighth parallel, the Communists will remain in control of the northern half of the country, and the objectives of the United Nations will not have been fulfilled.[43] We should be on our guard against any Munichlike respites which are only surrenders in disguise and make the ultimate reckoning infinitely more costly.

The aggressor, of course, has suffered grave losses, but for that matter, so has the victim of the attack. Indeed, all of Korea is the loser; the land and its people have suffered irreparable harm.

Any peace short of the liberation and unification of Korea is a delusion. Any settlement at the thirty-eighth parallel is a Chinese Communist victory.

General MacArthur had driven the North Koreans to the Yalu and had victory within his grasp when this new and formidable enemy entered the field. To make a settlement south of the Yalu therefore is to admit the success of the Chinese aggressors.

The United States will be confronted with a staggering bill for relief and rehabilitation in Korea; the taxpayer will be paying for generations for the cost of the conflict; and our troops will be pinned down in South Korea indefinitely.

On the other hand, the North Koreans will be able to resume their aggression on any flimsy pretext at any convenient opportunity, and the Russians having utilized the entire conflict as a proving ground similar to Finland and Spain can precipitate war somewhere else in the world.

STYLES BRIDGES.
ALEXANDER WILEY.
H. ALEXANDER SMITH.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER.
WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.
HARRY P. CAIN.
OWEN BREWSTER.
RALPH E. FLANDERS.

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[43] See Shameful Chapter in History, by David Lawrence, Washington Star, July 10, 1951.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

THE CRIMEAN (YALTA) CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 4–11, 1945[1]

(A) PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February 1945; and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey). When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of ——— to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

" 'C. VOTING

" '1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

" '2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

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[1] A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1950, p. 27, supra.

> "'3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of ______ desires in advance of the Conference to present views of comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

"The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

"When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

> "The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

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[Approved protocol, printed following XIV.]

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

VI. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take apart and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshall Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) That the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare

(i) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the Communique of the Conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the quesof the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The Foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
M. MOLOTOV
ANTHONY EDEN

(B) PROTOCOL ON GERMAN REPARATIONS

The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind are to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
JOSEPH V. STALIN

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

(C) AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

JOSEPH V. STALIN
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

FEBRUARY 11, 1945

APPENDIX II

ADDRESS OF GENERAL MACARTHUR TO JOINT MEETING OF THE CONGRESS, APRIL 19, 1951

(From Daily Congressional Record, April 19, 1951, pp. 4233–4235)

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of the Congress, I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride; humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. [Applause.]

Here are centered the hopes, and aspirations, and faith of the entire human race.

I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American. I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life with but one purpose in mind, to serve my country. [Applause.]

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is but to court disaster for the whole.

While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.

There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. [Applause.] If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort.

The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe. [Applause.]

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration of the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity and heretofore unfelt dignity and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers, as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started. In this situation it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction [applause]; the dignity of equality, not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standards of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of a normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto, the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack. The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free allies.

From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would be doomed to failure. Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader—it assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defene is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression.

The holding of this littoral defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof, for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment. This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. [Applause.]

For that reason I have strongly recommended in the past as a matter of military urgency that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. [Applause.]

Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington.

To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China up to 50 years ago was completely nonhomogeneous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost nonexistent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chan So Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime, to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant aggressive tendencies.

Through these past 50 years, the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia which for its own purposes is allied with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism. There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and avid to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies. I have from the beginning believed that the Chinesse Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are at present parallel to those of the Soviet, but I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea, but also in Indochina and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the south, reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time. [Applause.]

The Japanese people since the war have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government, committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice. [Applause.] Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside, and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battle front without the slightest qualms as the effect to the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. [Applause.] I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious—nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race. [Applause.]

Of our former wards, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them, as in our hour of need they did not fail us. [Applause.] A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the Government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. [Applause.]

The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government; and politically, economically, and socially appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surrounding areas I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in the support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint proved a sound one. [Applause.] As I say, a brief and sound one as we hurled back the invaders and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming. [Applause.]

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China—and such was never given a thought—the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old. [Applause.]

Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize sanctuary protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary:

First, the intensification of our economic blockade against China.

Second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.

Third, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria. [Applause.]

Fourth, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland. [Applause.]

For entertaining these views all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Applause, the Members rising.]

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa; if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without; and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory. We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign, with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution. Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting.

I have long advocated its complete abolition as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the 2d of September 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese Nation on the battleship *Missouri*, I formally cautioned as follows:

"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start, workable methods were found insofar as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door.

"The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2,000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh." [Applause.]

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory—not prolonged indecision. [Applause.] In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory. [Applause.]

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that as military action is confined to its territorial limits, it condemns that Nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment, while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation. Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. [Applause.] They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were "Don't scuttle the Pacific." [Applause.]

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there and I can report to you without reservation they are splendid in every way. [Applause.] It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always. [Applause.]

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified the means—where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer. [Applause.] Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in his favor on a world-wide basis.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. [Applause.] When I joined the Army even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that—

"Old soldiers never die; they just fade away." And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away—an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Goodby.

APPENDIX III

[Army Talk—Orientation fact sheet 66, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., 7 April 1945]

NOTE FOR THIS WEEK'S DISCUSSION.—There are three main points to develop in this week's discussion: (1) China, in spite of her extreme poverty and lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained, well-equipped troops, has waged a heroic war against Japan; (2) A united, progressive China can hasten the final defeat of the enemy; the present internal political tension within the country is a serious problem; (3) Only a strong, forward-looking, democratic China can give leadership to the people of the Far East and function as a leading member of the United Nations. (Suggested references: Fact Sheets Nos. 27 and 28; also Changing China by George E. Taylor, and The Making of Modern China by Owen Lattimore—both of these volumes were issued in the basic reference library for Information and Education officers.)

OUR ALLY CHINA

There is no need to tell you that great numbers of American soldiers are fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. Many of them are fighting alongside our Chinese ally—on the soil of China. And many more—perhaps some of you—will eventually get there.

This is certainly not the first time you have talked about China—you have undoubtedly read articles about the Chinese people and their heroic struggle with the Japanese since as far back as 18 September 1931.

Today we will spend our hour in an attempt to get at several important points that we ought to know about China—there is a lot more to talk about but this will not be our only opportunity.

Newspaper stories, magazine articles, and books have been written about what is supposed to be going on within China. Sometimes authors tell conflicting stories. Often enough it is hard to tell whether the conflicting reports are the result of individual bias or inadequate information.

One hears a lot of phrases that seem to have special meaning: The Nationalist Government, the Chinese "Communists," guerrilla fighters, lack of unity, war lords, Japanese puppets, and so on. Later, we will try to get a clearer picture. Right now let us remember that China is big—China is poor—China has about 450 million people—people like yourself and myself—all of whom very likely want the same things that you and I do: peace, a chance to make a decent living, and a chance to have some fun out of life. There isn't a GI in our Army who doesn't want these things—and that is about the same for the Chinese GI.

China, like the United States—like any nation—has her problems. Some are internal, others are related to the War. We can't begin to consider all of them. But it is important for us to know how some of her major problems affect the United Nations war effort and how they will affect the peace to come.

We are vitally concerned in the affairs of our Chinese ally. We each need each other in the battle against Japan. And when the War has been won—we will still need each other. America and the world need a strong, forward-looking democratic China ready to give leadership to the people of the Far East and prepared to function as a leading member of the United Nations.

(*The foregoing may be useful as a brief introduction to the topic for discussion.*)

WHY IS CHINA BACKWARD?

(*Question: Why does China, by American standards, seem poverty-stricken and backward?*)

Many reasons might be given for China's poverty and economic backwardness. Here are a few of the most important.

1. *China has an enormous population.*—Even with all her dependencies, she is not a great deal larger than the United States, yet she has between three and four times as many people—about 450 million, as compared with the 130 million of the United States. Much of her land is either mountainous or so dry that it cannot support agriculture without artificial irrigation. As a result, most of her people are crowded upon a comparatively small part of the land. Forty-six Chinese farm families have to get a living out of the land that *one* American farm family of the same size would have.

As things now stand, the overcrowding of land means poverty for most people. About 80 percent of China's population are farmers. And it also means that in the past, the existence of an almost limitless supply of cheap manpower has acted as a definite check upon such a development of labor-saving machinery as we have had in the West.

2. *China is an old country.*—Considerable parts of China have been under continuous and intensive cultivation for more than 3,000 years, yet they still produce large crops today. This is only possible because of the infinite and painstaking toil that has been put into the soil by generation after generation of Chinese farmers. In the United States we have had quite a different situation. But that would happen if we were as crowded as the Chinese, or if we had been forced to stay settled on the same land for two or three thousand years. Taking these factors into account, perhaps it will be easier for us to realize what the Chinese are up against.

3. *China is poor in natural resources.*—Coal is the only basic resource that is plentiful, except for large deposits of a few of the rarer metals, such as tungsten. But in iron her known reserves would last only nine years at the annual U. S. rate of consumption. Her situation as to oil is even worse. This helps to explain why the Chinese are so far behind us in industrialization. They do not have our almost limitless and easily accessible natural resources. The annual output of iron in China is only three pounds per capita (as compared with 550 pounds in the United States), and even in coal she annually produces only 100 pounds per capita (as compared with 10,000 pounds in the United States).

Much of China has never been properly surveyed for minerals, and future explorations, especially in China's little known western regions, will undoubtedly reveal many hitherto unknown resources. As things stand today, these figures point clearly to why China is a poor country.

4. *China has been fighting a war, on her own soil, for seven years.*—Actually China's war with Japan began in 1931 when the Japanese struck in Manchuria. However, after rapidly overrunning this province, the Japanese turned to the problem of exploiting its resources, and did not strike again until 1937. But between 1937 and 1939 the Chinese had lost to the enemy precisely those parts of their country which were richest and economically most developed. They were forced back into the deep interior regions that were the least modernized parts of the country. Before 1937 that part of China which is now not occupied by the Japanese possessed only about ten percent of the industrial plants, and 20 percent of the railroads; it mined only 22 percent of China's coal and milled less than three percent of her flour.

Millions of Chinese preferred to flee from Japanese rule into the interior of Free China, thus complicating the problem of food and support. The entry of America and Britain into the Far Eastern war and the resulting blockade against our shipping made China's economic position worse rather than better, because its immediate result was to cut off China almost entirely from the outside world. Is it any wonder, then, that there is a terrible scarcity of almost all kinds of goods in Free China today; a resulting inflation that has raised price levels to several hundred times what they were in 1937; and that black markets and profiteering activities have sprung up on all sides? This blockade has reduced China's normal poverty to misery and suffering. Thousands of highly cultivated Chinese people who were accustomed to some of the normal comforts of living are gradually dropping below the minimum standard of health requirements. In spite of the profiteers who are fattening on the War, and in spite of certain other inequities in the distribution of wartime burdens, the harrowing fact remains that the average Chinese is living under conditions but one step removed from starvation. But in spite of all this, the Chinese are still fighting with us today, though the battle has not been going too well.

MILITARY SITUATION CRITICAL

(*Question: What is the present military situation?*)

At the start of 1945, the military situation in China looked worse than it has in all her seven years of war. The United Nations suffered a major defeat when the Japanese succeeded in joining together their forces in northern and southern China. Three major gains accrued to Japan from this move—she virtually established a continuous land corridor between her base in Manchuria and her conquest in Indo-China and the East Indies; she drove us from our principal airbases in South China; she placed herself in a position to prevent the Chinese from coming to our aid should we attempt a landing on the China coast.

At present Japan is garrisoning the coast of China, in greater strength, to prepare for the threat of American landings.

These gains by the Japanese have been blamed on many things—insufficient supplies from us, corruption and bad management in the Chinese government, and poor leadership in the Chinese Army. We shall take a close look at these complaints a little later.

IS GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATIC?

(*Question: Why do some people find it difficult to call China a "democracy"?*)

Since 1912 China has been a republic. We Americans have been told many things about China's heroic struggle for human freedom. But there are certain things that may seem startling or even appalling—things that don't seem to fit into the usual pattern of what we think of as a republic. A one-party form of government, for example, controlled by the Kuomintang (Gwoh-min-dahng) or National People's Party; a president but no popular elections; and governmental control over the press and other institutions that are run as private enterprises in our own country. In other words we find in China that the terms "republic" and "democracy" do not always necessarily mean the same thing. Though China, by abolishing the monarchy, has become a republic, she hasn't yet fully worked out the democratic processes that we think should go with a republican form of government.

WHO'S WHO IN THE CHINESE SITUATION

Chennault, Major General Claire L., commanded the famous "Flying Tiger" volunteer force of American airmen who fought for China before the United States entered the War. He now commands the U. S. 14th Air Force operating against the Japanese from bases in China.

Chiang Kai-shek is China's Generalissimo and Head of State. A follower of Sun Yat-sen, he became the most powerful leader in the country after Sun's death.

Chou En-Lai, Chu-Teh, and **Mao Tse-Tung** are leading Chinese Communist figures. Chiang fought them before the War and drove their forces into northern China, but they later united with him in resisting the Japanese. Chou En-lai has been one of the principal negotiators with Nationalist representatives in trying to settle the differences between the two groups.

Soong is the most important family name in modern China. T. V. Soong, one of the country's foremost financiers, was appointed Foreign Minister soon after Pearl Harbor. He succeeded H. H. Kung as Acting President of the Executive Yuan recently. His three sisters all married leading Chinese figures. One is the widow of Sun Yat-sen, one is the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, and one is the wife of H. H. Kung.

Sun Yat-sen, who died in 1925, was the great leader of modern China, and has been called "China's George Washington." His "Three Principles of the People"—nationalism, democracy, and livelihood—are the great guiding lights of the nation, to which most of its leaders subscribe in theory while sometimes quarreling about methods of achievement.

Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General Albert C., was placed in command of U. S. Army Forces in China when the CBI theater was divided after General Stilwell's recall. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan was given the India-Burma part of the command.

ONE-PARTY RULE

The control of the government by a single party, the Kuomintang, is the result of historical circumstances, for it was the Kuomintang that, under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, overthrew the monarchy in 1912. In China the men who created the revolution were a comparatively small group of ardent revolutionaries. They had to struggle against reactionary forces of all kinds. Thus the Kuomintang tends to look upon itself as a very special and select group, better qualified than others to lead China in her new path.

Sun Yat-sen and his followers believed that the introduction of representative government in China could only be done very slowly. Therefore they regarded the revolution as a gradual and continuing process that would include three different stages: The first, that of *military operations*, came to an end in 1929, after the Kuomintang armies, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had reunified China after the disorders that had followed the overthrow of the empire. The second stage that followed, that of *political tutelage*, was a period when China was being prepared, under the leadership of the Kuomintang, for full democratic government. In 1937 it was to have been followed by the third phase, that of full *constitutional government*, when the Kuomintang would give up its one-party rule and hand the government over to the entire Chinese people. But, unfortunately, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the same year made this last step impossible. Thus China still remains in the stage of political tutelage, and is still under the government of the Kuomintang.

During the last 100 years China has been politically weak—so weak that it has sometimes been referred to as "a loose sheet of sand." During the last 20 years the Kuomintang has done very much to change this situation, but in the process it has inevitably been led to the use of forceful and sometimes even repressive measures. Since 1937, too, its centralized control has been considerably increased. Whether China can make a smooth transition to consitutionalism at the end of the war, or whether reactionary forces win out is a question of vital importance.

ROLE OF THE "COMMUNISTS"

(Question: What is the difficulty between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists"?)

One of the most serious bars against the realization of full representative government in China is the continuing tension between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists." When we speak of the Chinese "Communists," we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "Communist." In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China's farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves, and rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese "Communists" are not, like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of the Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese.

The present situation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists" has a long and complex history behind it. The Chinese Communist Party got its real start when certain Soviet advisers were sent by the USSR to China in the early 1920's to help the Kuomintang in its work of uniting the country.

In the 1927, shortly before this unification was completed, a split developed between the Kuomintang and "Communist" groups, and in the years, following this split led to serious civil war, in the course of which the Kuomintang armies finally drove the "Communists" into the northwest part of China. Their capital is at Yenan (Yen-ahn) in Shensi (Shen-see) province.

But late in 1936, when the threat from Japan was growing, the feeling became general that this costly internal conflict must end. This resulted in the creation of an armed truce.

During the first years of the War this truce operated very well. But as the years passed by, and China became almost completely isolated from the outside world with resulting inflation and economic suffering of incredible proportions, the old tensions and mutual suspicions reappeared. The "Communists" accused the Kuomintang of failing to send them necessary military supplies and withholding the cooperation needed for the common struggle against Japan. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, accused the "Communists" of failing to obey the orders of the Central (Kuomintang) Government, and of wanting to set up an independent state for themselves in the northwest.

The situation is so complex and has such an involved history, that it is very difficult for any outsider to say definitely who is right and who is wrong. Probably some degree of right and wrong attaches to both sides. The "Communists" say that they are trying to carry out certain economic and political reforms that the Kuomintang has up till now been unable or unwilling to make. Some American and other observers who have visited the "Communists" agree that their program is a modern one, and that the things they have been doing in their areas are quite in accord with what we think as a liberal democracy.

In the early autumn of 1944, Chinese press censorship was temporarily relaxed and American correspondents in China were able to give us a clearer picture of the Chinese situation in general, a situation which came as somewhat of a shock to the American public.

NEED UNDERSTANDING AND HELP

We Americans are accustomed to newspapers which freely express their views. We have a long heritage of political freedom. We have fought for the rights of trial by jury, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech. With us the idea of a secret police run by a government is so obnoxious that no government would dare try it. But we sometimes forget that part of the reason that we have and keep these liberties is that we also have enough to eat, and a certain security in our lives which is unknown in the Orient. The years of war against Japan, the terrible malnutrition of the people and the internal conflicts have produced, in China, conditions which require both economic and political improvement. We, on our part, must try to understand China's problems and help her in solving them. All who know this patient people, cheerful under unbelievable hardships, believe they have a chance of coming through.

Recently there have been indications that internal affairs in China have been improving. Negotiations and talks between Chungking and Yenan have been continuing over the past nine months, with General Chou En-lai as the chief representative of the "Communists." Dr. T. V. Soong, whose attitude toward the "Communists" is considered moderate, has been made premier of the Central Government. Early in December 1944, the Generalissimo withdrew large numbers of troops from the armies that had been blockading the "Communists" for six years and rushed them south to Kweichow (Gway-joh) province where they have helped to repulse the Japanese. In March, Chiang announced a National Assembly to convene on 12 November 1945, to draw up a constitution. All parties, including the "Communists," are to be invited and all are to have equal status.

OUR BASIC CONCERN

(*Question: How would you summarize the essential problem of China?*)

In brief, our basic concern with China's problems is related to the winning of the War and the peace that will follow. China needs supplies—China needs well-trained and well-equipped troops—but perhaps most of all China needs internal unity.

The issue in China is not so much the tension that exists between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese "Communists" as it is between those elements within each camp who place their personal prestige, ideas, and ambitions ahead of winning of the War. A strong, democratic, and united China will hasten the end of the war in the Pacific and make it possible for China to assume her important role in the Far East and among the United Nations.

AIDS FOR DISCUSSION LEADERS

Following are some special guides for AAF, AGF, ASF, and Officer Group discussion leaders, also supplementary material for the background information of all group leaders. Importance of this material precludes printing this week of the usual Outline for Discussion.

SPECIAL GUIDES

Army Air Forces

Two phases of the Chinese situation will probably be of particular interest to Air Forces personnel: (a) the record made by the Air Transport Command in flying supplies across the Himalaya (Him-AHL-ah-yah) Mountains while the

Burma Road was closed; (b) the activities of our combat airmen in China. Here are a few basic facts on each operation:

(*a*) *"Flying the Hump"*.—After the Burma Road was closed by the Japanese in April 1942, the only way to supply China from India was by air. This involved flying cargo planes from fields in northeastern India over mountains as much as three miles high. At first the totals were small, but more planes, more fields, and improved methods boosted the record. A War Department report in October 1944 stated that 23,900 tons were flown over the "Hump" in one recent unnamed month, adding: "Air freight from India to China long ago started flowing in greater volume than ever went via the Burma Road." This was more than twice the tonnage for December 1943. In January of this year, General Stilwell said that 35,000 tons a month were now being flown in. The supplies carried included gasoline, munitions, trucks, and jeeps.

One writer, discussing the old Burma Road, which supplied 20,000 tons a month, said: "Such a supply line could hardly maintain a single American armored division in combat." It must be remembered, too, that supplies brought in had to be divided between General Stilwell's Chinese troops and General Chennault's air force. Also, part of the cargo had to be high octane gasoline for the Air Transport Command itself.

(*b*) *Combat air forces in China*.—The "Flying Tigers," the American Volunteer Group, had been fighting the Japanese for about five months before Pearl Harbor was attacked. Out of this organization ultimately grew the U. S. 14th Air Force. Starting almost entirely with fighter planes, this force eventually added medium and heavy-bombers. It has not only fought for the defense of China; it has aided our Pacific operations, having destroyed about 275,000 tons of Japanese shipping off the China coast in a single year's time. Chinese pilots trained by Americans make up part of the personnel.

The story of this air force has emphasized again the importance of air-ground coordination. The force has worked closely to support Chinese ground troops, but the fact that China and the Allies have not been able to equip ground forces on a sufficient scale has resulted in the enemy driving us out of many forward air bases simply by ground action. This is well worth pointing out to Air Forces personnel—that final victory against the Japanese in China can only come through combined action.

Army Ground Forces

Many Ground Forces discussion leaders may want to emphasize particularly the point that the United States may ultimately engage the main body of the Japanese army in China. One question is most likely to be raised in this connection: If the Japanese do fight on in China, will large numbers of American troops be sent there?

Any attempt to answer this question would be speculative, of course, but it is possible to point out the factors that will be involved.

One factor would be the scale of Japanese resistance in China. China's Chief of Staff estimated in February that the Japanese have assigned up to 50 divisions—two fifths of their army on the Chinese mainland—to prevent an American landing on the coast.

Another factor would be the extent to which China's military effort can be built up. China recently announced that 500,000 new men would be drafted by the end of March "to meet the demand for the all-out Chinese counter-offensive in conjunction with the coming landing of American forces on the China coast." The big need, however, will still be proper training and equipment for Chinese armies.

One other question of particular Ground Forces interest may arise: Would troops in China encounter a new set of conditions there?

In general, China's likely battle areas are not unusual fighting terrain. The country lies roughly in the same latitudes as the United States, with about the same range of climates. The outstanding terrain difficulties are mountain gorges in some sections and rivers which cause great floods from time to time. The enemy troops encountered are likely to be tough. China has been a great practical training ground for the Japanese, and many Japanese soldiers there have had years of experience in combat under the conditions our forces would meet there.

Army Service Forces

Emphasis upon supply is inevitable in any discussion of the Chinese war situation. For Service Forces groups, discussion leaders will have the opportunity to show in this particular theater more clearly than in most others just how vital supply activities are in relation to combat success. To an unprecedented degree, China's difficulties have been the result, not of lack of manpower, but of lack of the means to equip the millions of soldiers in its armies. It has necessarily been our task—a slow and painful one—to attack that problem.

The building of the Stilwell Road was an example of cooperative effort by ground and service troops. Some of the difficulties involved were described by Secretary of War Stimson in his press conference of 2 February 1945:

"The construction of the Ledo Road was a great engineering as well as military achievement. Part of the Ledo Road was built at a time when enemy attack and harassing raids were an ever-present possibility. Terrific rains, bottomless mud, mountains, jungles and malaria had to be overcome. Much of the job was done working around the clock 24 hours a day, using floodlights at night. During the last monsoon period a two-mile wooden causeway had to be built for maintenance purposes across a stretch of flooded jungle land inundated with four to six feet of water. This causeway, comprised of one million board feet of lumber, was cut by two G. I. lumber mills in the Hukawng Valley. Altogether 478 miles of road had to be built or improved from India to the China border. It is a permenent all-weather supply highway."

The road was started in December 1942, to that it took slightly over two years to complete. Though it is a two-way highway for most of its length, in some places it had to be hacked along the sides of 4,000-foot mountains and is scarcely more than a jeep-track. To build each mile of the road, engineers moved an average of 750,000 tons of rock and earth and laid 1,000 feet of culvert. In many cases they worked after dark by the light of oil flares.

In Burma, the troops faced malaria, dysentery, and leeches, in addition to the ever-present mountains and jungles. There was also the monsoon season, beginning in May and lasting four or five months; during that period, rainfall may be as high as 50 inches a month.

As in the case of "flying the Hump," (see Army Air Forces section), this road will not be a complete answer to China's supply problem. But as long as the Chinese knew that their allies were bending every effort to complete it, they had evidence of our good faith and the hope that ultimately more vital equipment would be on the way. They knew, too, that while the road was being built, trucks and stockpiles were being accumulated at its far end to be rushed to them as soon as possible.

The Chinese have had so little equipment to work with that a little more can mean a great deal to them. Service Forces troops will understand, for instance, how important a few trucks are to the Chinese Army when they are told that when the Burma Road was closed, it was estimated that there were perhaps 15,000 trucks operating on China's roads. Two years later, there were perhaps one-third that number which could operate regularly.

The vehicles in the first convoys coming in over the Stilwell Road will be left in China to ease this shortage. Drivers can be flown back over the Himalayas on return trips of the Air Transport Command.

Answers to the question—Will we need many supply troops in China?—are partly contained in the above information. It is clear that the scale on which Japanese troops fight in that theater will be the real determining factor. If there is major combat activity there over a long period, many Service Forces men will be kept busy. Some will be in port areas in India and Burma, or at supply dumps at one end or the other of the Stilwell Road. Others will be driving vehicles. Still others will be doing service and supply jobs in China. If we make landings on the China coast, large numbers of service troops would inevitably be involved. The importance of China in the Far Eastern picture, at any rate, advances the possibility that Service Forces men of all branches face the possibility of serving in or near that country.

Officer Discussions

Where separate officer discussion groups are held, there is an excellent opportunity to drive home a point in which understanding by leaders is very important: the whole subject of relations between Americans and Chinese as individuals. It is vital to emphasize:

1. That the Chinese have fought the Japanese with very little outside help, have suffered more than 5 million casualties, and have lost most of the best industrial facilities of their country.
2. That in spite of this, they still fight on, and that they have earned the right to our respect as good allies.

3. That although their standard of living is very low by comparison with ours, they are working for a better life, and that the ways in which they are like us are more important than any superficial differences between Chinese and Americans.

4. That the Chinese are a living proof of the falsehood of the Japanese claim that this is "a white man's war."

5. That American soldiers in China by their actions and attitudes are contributing to the picture that the Chinese people form of all of us and of our country. Behavior based on mistaken notions that the Chinese are "inferior" not only betrays a lack of familiarity with the ordeals China has been through; it can also do incalculable harm during the War and in the peace that follows.

A FEW INTERESTING FACTS ON CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS

China's first railroad, a line ten miles long between Shanghai and Woosung, was built in 1876. Shortly afterward it was completely torn up, owing to the superstitious fears of people living along the right-of-way, who believed it brought bad luck. But at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Chinese owned over 7,500 miles of railroad, exclusive of over 3,700 miles in Manchuria lost to the Japanese in 1931.

China's first motor highway was built in 1912. By 1937 there were about 70,000 miles, of which 15,500 were surfaced.

In 1912 there were almost no modern factories. But by 1937 there were 3,849, among them many cotton textile mills, having a total of over 5 million spindles.

In Free China, the region that before 1937 was the most backward part of China, this progress has been continued since 1937, despite overwhelming difficulties. In some fields it has even been speeded up. Here is part of what has happened:

Railways: About 800 miles built up to December 1942.

Highways: About 3,720 miles built up to the summer of 1942, and 3,350 miles under construction or surveyed.

Coal production has been increased in Free China by 59 percent; iron by over 150 percent; oil by 1,194 percent.

Of the 3,849 factories in prewar China, 452 have been moved to the interior. This involved the transport of over 120,000 tons of machinery and other equipment, much of which had to be taken apart and carried in small pieces for hundreds of miles on the backs of men.

Most of this progress in Free China has been made entirely by Chinese, without help from any outside source. Thus it is evident that the Chinese have both the ability and the determination to carry out the modernization of their country, even under the most heartbreaking conditions. After the War it will undoubtedly continue at a much faster rate.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

Bases and Cooperation

"Even if we destroy the Japanese fleet, we still couldn't defeat them on the sea. We have to have bases in China to cut off their lines to Manchuria. . . . I still feel that Japan will be defeated from bases in China."—Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, August 1944.

"Following on the heels of the Cabinet reorganization, and closely related to it, came important changes in the Chinese system of military supply and far closer cooperation between the Chinese and American high commands. . . .

"There is more likelihood that moderate elements in the Kuomintang will continue to gain power, adding to the chances of genuine cooperation between the National Government and the Communists. . . . Such cooperation, if attainable, will be of historical importance both in speeding the progress of the war and in strengthening the bases of the peace."—Donald M. Nelson, in a special report to the President, early this year.

Military and Economic Aid

Aside from its internal political problems, China's big problem has been supply. After Japan closed China's seaports and captured its best industrial areas in the early years of the War, both military and civilian demands grew harder to meet. Whole manufacturing plants were transported piece by piece and set up in the interior, but lack of modern methods and machinery has made the supply job tremendously difficult. Now, however, efforts we have made to aid the country are beginning to show results.

Ever since April 1942, when the Japanese closed the Burma Road, China has been almost entirely cut off from outside help except for supplies—at present, perhaps 35,000 tons monthly—being flown in over the Himalayas. In January the Japanese were finally driven from northern Burma so that engineers could complete a new road from Ledo through Myitkyina (MYIT-chi-nah) connecting with the old Burma Road near the Chinese border. The first convoys, carrying ammunition, ambulances, and medium and light artillery, have now passed over the route, which Chiang has named after General Stilwell, "in memory of his distinctive contribution and of the signal part which the Allied and Chinese forces under his direction played in the Burma campaign and in the building of the road. The world's longest oil pipeline, roughly paralleling the road, has also been constructed.

In another move to improve the Chinese supply situation, Donald M. Nelson, formerly chairman of our War Production Board, paid two visits to the country, the first in September 1944. As a result of that trip, Chiang agreed to the creation of a Chinese War Production Board. Nelson returned to this country in November for a talk with President Roosevelt, and then went back to China with a small group of production experts. The Americans worked with Chinese officials headed by the Minister of Economics, on a basic law granting wide powers to the new WPB. Arrangements were made for close liaison between it and U. S. Army Ordnance representatives in Chungking. Nelson also left behind him steel and alcohol experts to work with plant managers on output, quality, and cost. By the spring of this year, he estimated, China's total war production will double the November rate.

This program, of course, is mainly aimed at bettering China's war situation. It can be important for the future, too. As the Nelson report puts it: "The success of China's venture in planned war production, if properly followed up through American Government and business channels, will make for closer postwar economic relations between China and the United States. China has the capacity and the desire to develop herself industrially with American aid. If that aid is realistically planned, and if financial arrangements are put on a sound business basis, China should soon after the War began to replace Japan as the leading industrial nation of the Orient. In that event, a market of enormous size should progressively open up for American export industries."

Chiang States Aims

"Internally we strive for the realization of local autonomy throughout the country, consolidation of national unity, establishment of government by law and consummation of the democratic rule. Externally we seek to cultivate closer relations with our friendly nations, to win the war against aggression, to collaborate with our allies in establishing permanent world peace after the war, to develop our rich natural resources, and carry out economic reconstruction and to enhance the well-being of mankind through self-exertion as well as international collaboration."—Chiang Kai-shek, on the 32nd Anniversary of the Chinese Republic, 10 October 1943.

* * * * * * *

Chinese Strength and Weakness

"As a whole, Chinese people have incredible fortitude. I have rarely heard a Chinese complain about the miseries of wartime existence. China's remarkable spontaneous sense of humor, which makes it easy for Americans and Chinese to get on together, keeps the Chinese people sane and congenial during a period of bleakness and slowly accumulating disaster.

"These are some of the things for which the Chinese people are to be respected. But for our own self-respect we must be realistic about China's many shortcomings. Some of them are inevitable and cannot be remedied: some of them are due to the incompetence of a government that puts its political security ahead of the War against Japan. . . ."—Brooks Atkinson, N. Y. Times, 21 November 1944.

China and the Future

"China's future policies toward Japan, toward Russia, and toward colonial Asia, like China's domestic development within the homeland of the 450,000,000 Chinese, will be of primary concern to all men living in the world today. The abolition of the unequal treaties by America and Britain has already symbolized the end of the hundred years of China's semicolonial subjection. China's part in the final victory will give significance to that symbolic act by Britain and America; it will mark the beginning of the end of the colonial system as a whole.

"No longer will the destinies of Asia be dictated by imperial powers. Nor, on the other hand, is an Asiatic counter-imperialism to be expected. Japan tried that and failed. The truth is that we no longer live in a world of 'the European question,' the 'Balkan question,' 'the Russian question,' 'the Far Eastern question.' That era is over. Henceforth we live in a world where there are only local aspects of the world question. Whether we make a success of that new world will depend on the interaction of two things: the success or failure that each nation makes of its own affairs, and the success or failure of all nations in dealing with each other as neighbors in a world order."—Owen and Eleanor Lattimore in The Making of Modern China.

APPENDIX IV

[United Nations General Assembly, General, A/1841, 12 July 1951. Original: English]

ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE EMPLOYED TO MEET THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Reports from governments on measures taken in accordance with General Assembly resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951[1]

Communications have been received from the following governments:[2]

Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Burma
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
Canada
China
Colombia
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Sweden
Thailand
Turkey
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of South Africa
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Uriguay
Venezuela
Yemen
Yugoslavia

Non-member States:

Albania
Austria
Cambodia
Finland
Germany (Federal Republic of)
Hungary
Italy
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Laos
Romania
Spain
Viet-Nam

AUSTRALIA

17 JUNE 1951.

1. Before the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution, the Government of Australia had already undertaken measures to prevent the shipment of certain commodities and materials to the areas therein mentioned.

2. Such measures prohibited the export from Australia to those areas of all items and materials listed in sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the resolution.

3. On 16 May 1951, the Governor-General of Australia in Council adopted amendments to the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations designed to clarify and extend the powers of the Australian Minister for Trade and Customs to control such shipments from Australia.

4. These amendments were published in the *Government Gazette* of the Commonwealth of Australia of 18 May 1951, and came into force as and from that date.

5. The effect of the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations, as above amended, is to prevent the export to any destination without the permission of the Minister for Trade and Customs first obtained of (a) arms and directly warlike stores and equipment and (b) goods "in the opinion of the Governor-General

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[1] Communications concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 500 (V) received up to 21 June 1951 and incorporated in this document were previously given a limited distribution as Conference Paper #1 of the Additional Measures Committee. Future communications will be issued as addenda to the present document.

[2] Technical and legislative enclosures referred to in reports from governments and which are not attached to the present document are available for consultation in the Secretariat of the Additional Measures Committee.

(that is, in administrative practice, of the Minister) capable of being used for purposes of war".

6. The First Schedule (Part II) of the above Regulations includes under seventeen generic classifications all goods covered in category (b) of paragraph 5 above except ships. Export of ships of any kind is prohibited without the permission of the Minister under a separate regulation.

7. To summarize the position, the powers of prohibition extend to goods and commodities of any kind, including of course all goods and commodities listed in sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the resolution. Export to the areas specified in the resolution of all goods and commodities described in the resolution is in fact prohibited.

8. The above powers are exercised through the requirement that exporters must obtain export authorization for all goods exported from Australia. This requirement has been in operation for some years.

9. In practice, under the directions of the Comptroller-General of Customs, officers of Customs at Australian ports (including airports) refuse to authorize shipment of goods destined for the areas listed in the resolution which come under category (a) in paragraph 5 above, and refer to the central authority the question of authorizing shipment of any goods destined to those areas which come under the remaining heads of the list given in sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the resolution.

10. In addition to the control of exports directly destined for the areas specified in the resolution, methods are in operation to effectuate subparagraph 1 (d) of the resolution by supervision at the Australian source of exports in the categories mentioned to destinations other than those specified in the resolution where it is considered that there is any probability that such goods or materials might find their way to the specified areas.

11. In accordance with this procedure, enquiries are made in the country concerned through the Australian Government Trade Commissioners or Australian Diplomatic Mission, and assurances satisfactory to the Australian authorities are required as to end use and local consumption before export authorization is granted.

12. The Australian Government has initiated measures within the limits of its jurisdiction designed to ensure, so far as possible, that controls exercised by other States in accordance with the resolution are not circumvented. The Australian Government will co-operate fully with other States in carrying out the purposes of the resolution, and will hope to receive co-operation from other States when it is requested in giving full effect to its own controls.

13. The Australian Government will report hereafter on the further operation of the embargo as and when requested by the Additional Measures Committee.

BELGIUM

13 June 1951.

General Assembly resolution 500 (V) concerning additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, which was adopted on 18 May 1951, recommended in paragraph 1 that every State should report within thirty days to the Additional Measures Committee on the measures taken in accordance with the resolution.

The comments which, pursuant to this recommendation, the Belgium Government has instructed me to forward to the Additional Measures Committee refer to the various recommendations (a), (b), (c), and (d) set forth in the said paragraph 1.

These comments are as follows:

With regard to recommendation (a):

From the beginning of the aggression in Korea Belgium imposed an embargo on shipments of arms, ammunition and implements of war. Since November 1950, it has maintained an embargo on the shipment of atomic energy materials, petroleum and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war for the People's Republic of China and for North Korea.

With regard to recommendation (b):

The Belgian Government has determined which are the commodities the export of which to the People's Republic of China and to North Korea is prohibited, and has instructed the *Office central des contingents et licences* (Central Quotas and Licences Office) to put into effect the measures prohibiting or restricting exports to these countries and the measures of control necessitated by these prohibitions and restrictions.

With regard to recommendation (c):

1. Trans-shipment: Belgium recognizes that there are difficulties in connexion with the establishment of a system of trans-shipment licences in each State with respect to all the goods to which controls are applied by every other State pursuant to the resolution. Accordingly Belgium recognizes that the responsibility is principally that of the country of origin, and it undertakes to assist the country of origin to the fullest possible extent in obtaining and checking assurances given with regard to the end-use of such goods.

2. Belgium issues to countries, on their request, official documents certifying that any particular consignment of goods to be imported will actually enter Belgian Customs territory and will not be re-exported without authorization. Belgium also issues other official documents certifying the genuineness of the importation.

With regard to recommendation (d):

On this point, the report of the Additional Measures Committee to the General Assembly (document A/1799) makes the following comment:

"In addition to the measures described under recommendation (c) above, the co-operation required of each State by recommendation (d) would include the avoidance of any such expansion of its trade with China and North Korea in items embargoed by other States in pursuance of this resolution as would nullify or impair the effect of the controls applied by the latter to those items."

It goes without saying that in accordance with this interpretation, Belgium agrees to undertake, as far as the goods placed under embargo by other States in pursuance of the resolution are concerned, to avoid any expansion of its trade with Communist China which would nullify or impair the effect of control measures applied by these States to the goods in question.

I have the honour to request you to communicate to the Additional Measures Committee, before the expiry of the above-mentioned time-limit of thirty days, the text of this letter, which constitutes my Government's report to the Committee pursuant to resolution 500 (V).

(Signed) F. VAN LANGENHOVE,
Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations.

BRAZIL

16 JUNE 1951.

The Government of the United States of Brazil is taking all proper measures fully to insure the implementation of resolution 500 (V) adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951.

The export of strategic materials to any country being subject to previous export licenses under the terms of law 1310, of 16 January 1951, the Export and Import Department of the Bank of Brazil has been duly instructed by the Government of the United States of Brazil to refuse licenses for shipments to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of materials covered by sub-paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 500 (V) adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951. The Government of the United States of Brazil will, furthermore, endeavour to prevent, by all means within its jurisdiction, the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution.

Due legislative and executive action is being taken to formalize the embargo, and the Brazilian Government will periodically report to the Additional Measures Committee on any further development in this connexion, and is prepared to cooperate with other Member States in carrying out the purposes of the embargo as provided for in resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951.

BURMA

20 JUNE 1951.

The Ambassador of Burma to the United States presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to his savingram communicating the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951, has the honour, under instructions from the Government of the Union of Burman, to reply as follows:

In abstaining from voting on the resolution, the Burmese delegation clearly set out its Government's views in regard to the proposed measure. In effect, the resolution is only of academic interest to Burma. Exports from Burma to China during 1950 formed only 1.1 per cent of the value of Burma's total export during the year, and the commodities exported to China are not included in the prohibited list. In fact, most of the items which may be included in the prohibited list are themselves in short supply in Burma, and have to be imported from other countries. In consequence, their use in Burma is strictly controlled. This precludes the possibility of their re-export to China.

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(Previously circulated as A/1818.)

CANADA

16 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to submit to you for transmission to the Additional Measures Committee, in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 (e) of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May, the following report of the Canadian Government:

> The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951 was designed to support and supplement with economic measures the military action of United Nations forces in Korea and to assist in putting an end to the aggression. The export restrictions recommended in the resolution were less stringent than those which had already been imposed by the Canadian Government, and the resolution therefore did not necessitate changes in Canadian export regulations.
>
> From the beginning of the aggression in Korea there have been no shipments of arms, ammunition or implements of war from Canada to North Korea or China. On 9 December 1950, following the intervention of Chinese communist forces in the Korean war, the Canadian Government broadened the scope of its export controls in such a manner that individual export permits were made a requirement for the export of all commodities without exception to China, Hong Kong, Macao and North Korea.
>
> Not only are permits denied for the export, to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities, of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation material of strategic significance and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as recommended in the General Assembly's resolution, but in addition permits are denied for a very wide range of other goods which may be considered to be strategic.
>
> The Canadian Government will prevent by all means within its power the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States under the resolution and will co-operate fully with other States in carrying out the purposes of the embargo.
>
> The Canadian Government is pleased to submit this report to the Additional Measures Committee as recommended in the General Assembly's resolution and will be glad to make further reports at the request of the Committee.

(Signed) JOHN W. HOLMES,
Acting Permanent Representative
Of Canada to the United Nations.

CHINA

18 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to refer to your telegraphic message of 31 May 1951 communicating to my Government the text of the resolution concerning additional measures to be employed to meet aggression in Korea, adopted by the General Assembly at the 330th plenary meeting on 18 May 1951, and now, under instructions of my Government, to request you to transmit the following to the Additional Measures Committee:

1. Prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly concerning the additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, the Government of the Republic of China had already imposed a ban on movement of ships and shipment of commodities of any kind to areas under the control of North Korean authorities and of the Chinese communist régime. The ban has proved effective and is still being strictly enforced.

2. In order to supplement the above-mentioned measures and in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution under reference, the Government of the Republic of China has, on 11 June 1951, gazetted another set of regulations entitled "Regulations on additional control over exports from Taiwan." In addition to the enforcement of a complete ban on export of any material, commodity, or cargo of any kind from Taiwan to areas under the control of the Chinese communist régime and of North Korean authorities, the regulations have also instituted an export licensing system and other necessary machineries with a view to preventing the circumvention, by means of transshipment, re-export or otherwise, of controls applied by other States pursuant to the same resolution.

3. The Government of the Republic of China, while considering that the embargo, as recommended in the resolution, is not sufficient to support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea, will nevertheless take whatever action it may find necessary to co-operate with other States in implementation of the resolution. In this connexion, it cannot be over-emphasized that effectiveness of this embargo will necessarily depend upon the determination and vigour with which the embargo is to be carried out.

4. The Government of the Republic of China will keep this matter under constant review in the light of prevailing circumstances, and will put into effect further measures designed to deny contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the United Nations in Korea and to strengthen its co-operation with other States in this regard.

5. The present report is of a preliminary nature and further information will be furnished when necessary or at the request of the Additional Measures Committee.

(Signed) TINGFU F. TSIANG.

COLOMBIA

I

18 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to inform you, in accordance with instructions received from my Government, that Colombia is taking all the necessary administrative dispositions to apply an embargo on shipments to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorties of all the materials specified in resolution 500 (V) approved by the General Assembly at its 330th plenary meeting.

Therefore, none of the materials in reference will be shipped from Colombia in the future.

(Signed) FRANCISCO URRUTIA,
Deputy Representative of Colombia
to the United Nations.

II

23 JUNE 1951.

Have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Government of Colombia, which had previously been complying with resolution No. 500 of 18 May 1951, has just give formal effect to the embargo on strategic materials by Decree 1383 of 22 June 1951 which prohibits the export of strategic materials to communist China and North Korea. The regulations carrying this Decree into effect will include a list of such materials and rules to ensure that no exports can reach, either directly or indirectly, the above-mentioned countries or those lending them support in their present war of aggression.

GONZALO RESTREPO JARAMILLO,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(Previously circulated as A/1813.)

DENMARK

19 JUNE 1951.

Referring to the Secretary-General's cablegram of 22 May addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the additional measures employed to meet the aggression in Korea in accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 330th plenary meeting on 18 May 1951, I have the honour to inform you that on 9 February this year the Danish Ministry of Commerce issued a decree prohibiting the export of certain commodities of special importance for defense production. The commodities in question were listed in the above-mentioned decree by the Department of Commerce under the heading "A". A copy of the decree as well as English translations of the list are included; it contains commodities belonging to the categories included in the resolution which are produced in Denmark, in addition to a number of commodities which possibly might be shipped through Denmark in transit.

As far as Denmark is concerned, the embargo against China and North Korea so far has been carried out by refusing permission for export, re-export, transit-shipments across Danish territories or transit-shipments financed by Danish means, of commodities included in the above-mentioned list to territories under the control of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities.

I beg to add that Denmark is preparing a supplement to the already published commodity-list which, however, for technical reasons, will not be published in the immediate future. Detailed information concerning the above-mentioned expansion of the embargo will be submitted to you at a later date.

Finally, I shall ask you to notify the Additional Measures Committee that Denmark is prepared to co-operate with other countries in implementing the purpose of the above-mentioned resolution.

(Signed) WILLIAM BØRBERG.

(Enclosures: Decree of Ministry of Commerce prohibiting export of certain commodities. List of commodities in question.)

ECUADOR

28 MAY 1951.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your cablegram No. 60 of 21 May containing the text of the resolution concerning additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951 at its 330th plenary meeting, and take pleasure in informing you that my Ministry has given special attention and study to this matter.

L. NEFTALI PONCE,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

EL SALVADOR

21 JUNE 1951.

The Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 330th plenary meeting on 18 May last on additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, has the honour to inform him, in accordance with the provisions of the above-mentioned resolution, that the Government of El Salvador will apply a system of export controls which is already in force and that at the present time it is considering ways and means of improving that system to make such control more effective.

A detailed report on this matter will shortly be submitted to the Secretariat.

ETHIOPIA

13 JUNE 1951.

Have honor refer your telegram ninety-eight May twenty-first concerning additional measures employed member States designed deny contributions to military strength forces opposing United Nations Korea. Ministry's telegram first July 1950 stated in part "Imperial Ethiopian Government is withdrawing all assistance to regime ignoring recommendation". Since that date Imperial Ethiopian Customs Trade Exchange Control Authorities report no violations their instructions prevent all military and all economic assistance whatsoever to North Korean Administration. Likewise following General Assembly resolution 498 (V) of first February same authorities report no violation extension same ban Central People's Government of China. Moreover same authorities understanding instructions ascertain ultimate destination all economic shipments of possible assistance aggression including recent scrap iron shipment in order prevent as far as within jurisdiction Imperial Ethiopian Government economic assistance capable assisting military aggression in Korea. Imperial Ethiopian Government in accordance its support principles collective security desirous co-operate fully other member States carrying out purposes of embargo. Accordingly request continuing information steps taken other member States in order determine co-operating Ethiopian action.

Vice Minister.

FRANCE

I

18 JUNE 1951.

Resolution 500 (V) adopted on 18 May 1951 by the General Assembly recommends that States should report to the Additional Measures Committee on the measures taken in accordance with the provisions of the resolution. Pursuant to that recommendation, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to transmit to you a note enumerating the groups of products the export of which to territories under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities has been prohibited by the French Government.

I should be grateful if you would be so good as to transmit this note to the Additional Measures Committee.

(Signed) FRANCIS LACOSTE,
Minister Plenipotentiary
Acting Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations.

(Enclosure: List of products placed under embargo. Items listed are included in list annexed to communication II.)

II

5 JULY 1951.

On the instructions of my Government, and with further reference to my communication of 18 June, I have the honour to communicate to you herewith a report describing the measures taken by the French Government in conformity with resolution 500 (V) adopted on 18 May 1951 by the General Assembly. A detailed list of the items the export of which to areas under the control of the Cenral People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities has been prohibited by the French Government is annexed to this report.

(Signed) FRANCIS LACOSTE,
Minister Plenipotentiary
Acting Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations.

ANNEX

Report on the measures taken by the French Government in accordance with resolution 500 (V) of the General Assembly

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the French Government, desirous of doing everything in its power to support in the economic field the military effort undertaken by the United Nations to repel aggression, prohibited all exports from the territories under its authority to North Korea, and placed under very strict control exports of strategic items to the People's Republic of China. As it became increasingly clear that Chinese Communist forces were participating in the military operations against the United Nations forces in Korea, the Government tightened its controls in order to prevent goods of strategic value from being used to strengthen the military potential of the forces opposing the United Nations forces in Korea.

Following the recommendation contained in the General Assembly resolution of 18 May, and in order to adapt its own efforts to the collective effort contemplated in that recommendation, the French Government has taken the following measures:

1. In addition to the controls applied to items covered by the five categories mentioned in paragraph (a) of the recommendation, it drew up a list, in keeping with the general scope of the recommendations, of items not permitted to be exported to North Korea and continental China.

This list, which may be considered as the basis of the control of French exports to China, is not exhaustive and is being constantly revised so that the control in question may be made more effective.

2. The items mentioned in the list are subject to a system of export licenses. Whenever an application for such a license for continental China or North Korea is submitted to the Control Service, it is automatically refused.

3. Lest the purpose of this control be circumvented by means of exports to third countries, any application to export any of these items to a third country requires an authorization which is not granted until investigations have been made concerning the final destination of the item in question.

4. If it is proposed to re-export any items in this category which have previously been imported into France, an identical control is applied.

5. For cases where such items enter France under a system of temporary exemption from Customs duties (temporary admission, transit in bond), a special procedure has been introduced enabling their future destination to be checked.

6. Lastly, the French Government, in order to comply with the recommendation relating to the control of the final destination of exports of strategic items, has concluded agreements with a number of foreign Governments in order to ensure the effectiveness of the embargo.

ANNEX II

List of items the export of which to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities has been prohibited by the French Government

I. Machine tools:
  1. Vertical boring lathes
  2. Punching machines
  3. Screwing or tapping machines
  4. Grinding machines
  5. Axle lathes
  6. Crank shaft and cam-shaft lathes
  7. Hollow spindle lathes
  8. Automatic relieving lathes
  9. Automatic lathes
  10. Boring lathes
  11. Screw cutting milling machines
  12. Spar milling machines
  13. Planing machines
  14. Screw cutting machines
  15. Power hammers and high-powered tail hammers
  16. Forging machines
  17. Presses exerting a pressure of more than 1,000 tons
  18. Balancing machines
  19. Machines and equipment specially adapted for the machining of weapons
  20. Gear cutting machines
  21. Grinding or glazing machines
  22. Profiling machines

II. Chemical industry:
  A. Chemical equipment:
    1. Acid concentrating apparatus
    2. Apparatus for oxidizing ammonia
    3. Equipment for the production of chlorine gas or liquid chlorine
    4. Equipment for the liquefaction of gases and equipment for the manipulation of liquefied gases
    5. Hydrogen generating equipment
    6. Hydrogeneration equipment
    7. Equipment for oxidizing methanol
    8. Nitrifiers
    9. Sulphur extraction equipment
    10. High capacity compressors
    11. High pressure pumps
    12. Vacuum pumps
    13. Electrically controlled automatic valves

B. Chemical products:
    1. Anhydrous aluminum chloride
    2. Barium nitrate, barium chromate
    3. Active black
    4. Ethyl benzene
    5. Furfural, furfuryl alcohol and tetrahydrofurfuryl alcohol
    6. Glycols and compounds
    7. Hydrazine, hydrazine hydrate, salts of hydrazine
    8. Hydrogen peroxide in concentrated solutions in excess of 50 per cent
    9. Monochlorobenzene
    10. Pentaerythritol and Pentaerythritol tetranitrate
    11. Calcium and potassium permanganate
    12. Catalytic phosphoric acid (Victor)
    13. Picric acid (Trinitrophenol)
    14. Polyethylene
    15. Polymerised ethylene tetrafluoride
    16. Potassium tetroxide
    17. Thalium bromo-iodide
    18. Titanium tetrachloride

III. Petroleum production equipment and petroleum products.

IV. Electrical equipment:
    1. Special type electric furnaces
    2. Remote controls for projectors
    3. Condenser tubes
    4. High power Diesel engines
    5. High power electric engines

V. Industrial equipment and certain valuable items:
    1. Moulding equipment
    2. Laminating equipment
    3. Equipment for the manufacture of active black
    4. Industrial diamonds
    5. Synthetic graphite
    6. Strategic bearings

VI. Air, railway, road and sea transport material.

VII. Electronic equipment and precision instruments:
    1. Radar and radio apparatus (with the exception of commercial types) and their special parts
    2. Electronic lamps
    3. Infra-red gauges
    4. Electronic calculators
    5. Electrometers
    6. Apparatus for measuring virtual resistance
    7. Electronic microscope
    8. Non-spherical optical curve generators
    9. Special type recording oscillographs
    10. Cathode ray oscilloscopes
    11. Quartz
    12. Spectrographs

VIII. Metals:
    1. Scrap iron
    2. Special alloys
    3. Bismuth
    4. Cadmium
    5. Calcium
    6. Cobalt
    7. Copper
    8. Molybdenum
    9. Nickel
    10. Metallic sodium
    11. Tantalum
    12. Titanium
    13. Vanadium
    14. Zirconium

IX. Weapons and ammunition.

X. Equipment and products used in atomic research and production.

GREECE

18 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's communication dated 21 May 1951 transmitting the text of resolution 500 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951, with regard to additional measures to be employed to meet aggression in Korea.

Greece already applies an embargo on all exports to the North Korean area, in compliance with resolutions and recommendations 473 and 474 of the Security Council. Your Excellency was advised of my Government's decision to institute this embargo by my letter dated 5 July 1950.

With regard to resolution 500 (V), I have been instructed to inform you that the Greek Council of Ministers at its meeting of 12 June 1951 decided fully to comply with recommendations (a) and (b) contained in paragraph 1 of the resolution under reference. By the same decision the competent authorities have been directed to take the necessary steps for the implementation of recommendation (c) as well as to co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo as provided in recommendation (d).

Your Excellency will oblige me by kindly communicating this letter to the Additional Measures Committee within the time limit set.

(Signed) ALEXIS KYROU,
Permanent Representative of Greece
to the United Nations.

HONDURAS

15 JUNE 1951.

The Permanent Delegation of Honduras has the honour to submit, in accordance with sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1 of the resolution (A/1805) adopted on 18 May 1951 by the General Assembly, the following communication from the Honduras Government which is a copy of a letter from the Under-Secretary of War to the Foreign Minister:

"SECRETARIAT OF STATE FOR WAR,
"THE NAVY AND AVIATION—No. 001472,
"Tegucigalpa, D. C., 5 June 1951.

"TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"I have the honour to reply to your Department's note No. 12048 A. G., with which was sent a communication from the delegation of Honduras to the United Nations concerning the embargo on strategic materials and other military supplies intended for areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities. As you know, the action taken by this Deparement has been confined to prohibiting all vessels flying the Honduran flag from calling at ports controlled by Communist China, and the transport of all strategic material and all other materials which might be used in the present military conflict by North Korea and the People's Republic of China. If the recommendations of the United Nations are to be complied with by our Government, the proposed economic measures arising out of them would have to be taken by the Secretariat of Financial and Related Affairs, and hence my Department suggests that it would be desirable to ask the said Secretariat of State to proceed accordingly."

As can be ascertained, the measures which have already been adopted by the Minister of War (Circular No. 18 dated 22 December 1950 and issued by the *Secretaria de Estado en los Despachos de Guerra, Marina y Aviacion*) constitutes the most practical application of the terms of the resolution. Other economic measures contained in the same resolution are certain to be acted upon by competent government authorities.

INDIA

16 JUNE 1951.

The Permanent Delegation of India to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to his savingram No. 8G of 21 May 1951, communicating the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 330th plenary meeting on 18 May 1951, has the honour, under instructions from the Government of India, to reply as follows:

> For reasons fully explained by the representative of India in the course of the debate, the Indian delegation had abstained from voting upon the resolution. The resolution does not, in effect, apply to India, because such limited trade as India has with China has been generally in regard to articles

which are not included in the prohibited list. Most of the items which may fall in the prohibited category of articles are in short supply in India and are imported from abroad and strictly controlled. The re-export of such imports is prohibited. There are certain indigenous products, namely machinery and mill work, which are not controlled, but there has not been any actual export of such articles to China, nor is there any demand for them from China. India's own need for such articles and desire to conserve supplies in the country, preclude the possibility of exporting them to China or any other country.

INDONESIA

5 July 1951.

Reference is made to resolution 500 (V) adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951.

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to invite your attention to the following:

Subsequent to the adoption of the resolution under reference, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, in an official statement, declared inter alia: "The Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia abstained from voting upon the resolution, thus acting in line with this country's active and independent foreign policy of contributing to the preservation of world peace."

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia further stated that "the fact show that until the present moment there have been on exports from Indonesia to the People's Republic of China of vital materials." I should like to emphasize in this connection that this situation stands until today; no exports or re-exports of strategic materials have taken place to the People's Republic of China and North Korea.

With reference to the fact that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly represents a recommendation to members of the United Nations which gives the opportunity to each member to determine what materials, in its opinion, are of strategic nature, my Government concluded its statement in the following words: "The Government of Indonesia, in the sense indicated above, will be able to honour the recommendation of the United Nations."

My Government has consequently drawn up the following list, setting out the commodities to which, in its opinion, the resolution of 18 May refers.

Category A. (This category comprises commodities actually being exported to countries other than the People's Republic of China and North Korea.)

Petroleum and petroleum derivatives
Rubber
Tin
Bauxite
Manganese ore
Coal
Industrial diamonds
Scrap iron
Hides
Kapok
Fibres

Category B. (This category comprises commodities which may become exportable in the future in which case they automatically fall under Category A.)

Nickel and nickel ore
Cobalt
Sulfur
Copper
Asbestos
Asfalt
Iron ore

The list will be kept under review and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia reserves the right to make such revisions therein as it considers necessary.

I should be grateful if you would bring the above to the attention of the Additional Measures Committee.

(Signed) L. N. Palar,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
to the United Nations
For the Republic of Indonesia.

IRAN

19 June 1951.

I have the honour to refer to your cablegram No. 110 of 22 May 1951, addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, transmitting the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951, requesting every State to report to the Additional Measures Committee on the measures taken in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution.

Upon instructions from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, I am to request your Excellency to transmit the following information to the Additional Measures Committee.

1. The Iranian Government takes this opportunity to reaffirm its constant policy to fulfill its international obligations.

2. The only Iranian export commodity which falls within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the above-mentioned resolution is petroleum.

3. Inasmuch as the oil industry has been nationalized in Iran, the Government of Iran is now taking steps to place an embargo on petroleum exports to the areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities.

4. In pursuance of this resolution the Mixed Committee and the Provisional Board of the Iranian National Oil Company have been requested to take action to give effect to the embargo.

(Signed) A. G. ARDALAN,
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of Iran to the United Nations.

ISRAEL

25 JUNE 1951.

The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the savingram No. SG 459/5/02 of 21 May 1951 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations communicating the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 330th plenary session on 18 May 1951 The Permanent Representative has been instructed by the Government of Israel to state, for the information of the Additional Measures Committee, that the Government of Israel which gave its support to the said resolution does not in fact conduct any trade with the areas therein indicated, and that his Government continues in this and in all other respects to observe the implementation of the resolution.

LUXEMBOURG

16 JUNE 1951.

Reference to the communications of 20 May and 15 June concerning resolution 500 (V) of 18 May last. In view of the fact that the regulation of import, export and transit of all commodities comes under the Economic Union of Belgium and Luxembourg the Government of Luxembourg refers to the report made by the Belgium Government.[1] relative to the measures for an embargo, these having a character which is common to the Economic Union.

MEXICO

25 MAY 1951.

The Permanent Delegation of Mexico to the United Nations cordially greets the Secretary-General and is pleased to acknowledge the receipt of his radiogram of the 21st of this month, in which is contained the text of the resolution concerning additional measures which will be employed in order to contain the aggression in Korea.

The text of this resolution has already been sent to the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs in charge of the Office.

NETHERLANDS

I

15 JUNE 1951.

Acting upon instructions received I have the honour to request that Your Excellency be good enough to transmit to the President of the Additional Measures Committee the enclosed reply with regard to the recommendations contained in resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951.

(Signed) D. J. VON BALLUSECK.

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[1] See pp. 3–5.

ANNEX I

15 JUNE 1951.

Statement of the Netherlands Government with regard to the recommendations contained in resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951

1. In accordance with existing regulations in the Netherlands the export of commodities to all destinations is subject to an export license. For the last several months no licenses have been granted for export to China and to North Korea of a great many commodities, as enumerated in the annex to this note.

2. Commodities not mentioned in the annex, but which fall under the categories enumerated in sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the recommendations of resolution 500 (V), have thus far in practice not been exported from the Netherlands either to China or to North Korea.

3 The re-export of commodities previously imported into the Netherlands is subject to the same restrictive measures as mentioned under 1 above.

4. By means of a system of end-use-check and through consultations with other friendly governments, undesirable deviation from the official destination of the commodities mentioned in the annex is made practically impossible. The recommendation under sub-paragraph 1 (c) of the resolution is thus being carried out in substance.

5. The Netherlands Government is fully prepared to give effect to the recommendations to co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo. To this end conversations have been started with several friendly governments.

6. For some time past no regular Netherlands shipping lines are calling at ports in the territories affected by the embargo. Tramping under Netherlands flag requires by law a license from the Netherlands Ministry of Transport for every journey, specified as to destination. Sufficient control over the movements of Netherlands shipping is thereby ensured. Moreover the contents of resolution 500 (V) have prompted the Netherlands Government to investigate whether the existing regulations governing Netherlands shipping need to be supplemented.

The annex to the present note enumerates, it may be added, only the principal commodities; a detailed list will be forwarded as soon as received.

ANNEX II

Netherlands embargo list on export to China and North Korea

(Summary List)

CHAPTER I

Group A

Conventional arms (heavy and small) and their ammunition for warfare on land, sea or air, and nuclear explosives:

1. Pistols, automatic pistols and revolvers.
2. Rifles, short rifles, carbines with rifled barrels with the exception of those intended or adapted to non-military uses.
3. Individual arms for rapid fire, machine guns, light machine guns.
4. Guns, howitzers and mortars.
5. Ammunition for arms enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 above.
6. Grenades, bombs and mines of all types.
7. Self-propelled missiles for use in the air or under water.
8. Apparatus, devices and equipment of all types for the launching and discharge of the implements enumerated in paragraphs 6 and 7 above.
9. Component parts and appliances of the arms, ammunition and implements enumerated above.
10. Powders and war explosives, encased or not; with the exclusion of all items necessary to a peacetime economy.
11. Nuclear explosives and radioactive materials and products having an intense radiation. All equipment for protection therefrom. Detection devices. Implements, products (manufactured articles) or materials essentially designed or used for research, manufacturing and practical application of those items.

Group B

Means of utilizing war arms with their equipment and appliances:

1. All vehicles designed or equipped for military arms, such as tanks, armoured cars and vehicles, their armoured plates, turrets, half tracks, tank engines and parts, and servicing vehicles.
2. Vessels of war of all categories. Special landing craft. Equipment for submarine mine-sweeping.
3. Aircraft, assembled or disassembled.
   Fuselage and flying surface of the items mentioned above.
   Catapults.
   Parachuting devices for personnel and material.
4. Specifically military elements of the equipment enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 above.
5. Material intended for the military equipment of vehicles, vessels or aircraft not included in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.
6. Equipment for the utilization of arms of group A and materials of group B and their components. Military lay-outs for telecommunications and similar lay-outs, and the components thereof.
   Training devices.
7. Computing stations. Military computing machines.
   Cryptographic machines.

Group C

All agents, products or substances essentially designed or manufactured for biological, chemical or incendiary warfare.

Group D

Patents, commercial licenses, documents, machines, equipment and tools especially intended for the manufacturing, the testing and the control of the implements, arms and ammunition enumerated in categories A, B and C.

CHAPTER II

Strategic Goods

A. Metal-working machinery.
B. Chemical equipment, including compressors, pumps, valves, containers, gauges for measuring pressures over 100 atmospheres and moulding machines for plastics.
C. Petroleum equipment.
D. Electrical equipment.
E. Power-generating equipment.
F. Metallurgical, mill and foundry equipment.
G. Rubber-working machinery.
H. Equipment for other specific industries.
    1. Carbon-black manufacturing plants.
    2. Radio-valve manufacturing machinery.
    3. Rayon manufacturing equipment.
I. Other general industrial equipment.
    1. Air-conditioning units.
    2. Compressors and blowers.
    3. Diamonds suitable for industrial use, including splints and borts (interpreted to include industrial diamonds, dust, and powder).
    4. All tools, including dies and slugs incorporating diamonds.
    5. Graphite (artificial), and carbon derived from petroleum coke.
    6. Abrasives:
        (a) Silicon carbide.
        (b) Corundum.
    7. Precipitators (electrostatic).
J. Transportation equipment.
    1. Vessels.
    2. Marine equipment.
    3. Automotive vehicles, or chassis.
    4. Railway equipment.
    5. Other transportation equipment.
        (a) Gyro-compasses; gyro-repeaters
        (b) Landing mats for aircraft.

K. Electronics.
  1. Radio and radar apparatus.
  2. Supplementary equipment and components for radio and radar.
  3. Electronic valves (tubes).
L. Precision instruments.
M. Metal and mineral manufactures.
N. Basic metals and mill products.
O. Minerals.
  1. Asbestos.
  2. Magnesiumsilicate.
  3. Mica.
P. Chemicals except those which are intended especially for use in the foodstuff-luxuries and cosmetic industries.
Q. Petroleum products.
R. Miscellaneous.
  1. Synthetic rubbers.
  2. Pneumatic tires and inner tubes, tire casings.
  3. Masterbatch.
  4. Optical glass.
S. Components and spare parts of the items mentioned above.

II

27 JUNE 1951.

Further to my note No. 1824 of 15 June 1951 I have the honour to forward to Your Excellency the annexed detailed list of commodities pertinent to the statement of the Netherlands Government with regard to the recommendations contained in resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951.

(Enclosure)

(Signed) D. J. VON BALLUSECK.

NEW ZEALAND

11 JUNE 1951.

The Minister of External Affairs presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with reference to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May on the subject of exports to the area under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities, particularly paragraph 1 (e) of the operative part of the resolution, has the honour to report as follows.

New Zealand is applying an embargo on the shipment to the areas in question of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war and transportation materials of strategic value.

Controls for this purpose are being applied under New Zealand's existing Export Control Regulations. In view of the limited volume of New Zealand's trade with the areas in question a suitable list of goods to be prohibited is not being determined in advance, but individual cases of proposed exports of goods falling within the categories mentioned in the previous paragraph are being dealt with as they arise. For example, it has already been decided to prohibit the export of wool from New Zealand to the destinations in question, and special measures have been taken to ensure that certain merchant vessels at present available for sale in New Zealand are not disposed of there.

New Zealand is ready to prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution and to co-operate with other States in carrying out the purpose of this embargo.

NORWAY

15 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to refer to your savingram of 21 May 1951 by which you communicated to me for transmittal to the Norwegian Government the text of the resolution 500 (V), concerning additional measures to be employed to meet aggression in Korea, adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951.

The Norwegian Government has now instructed me to request you to transmit the following information to the Additional Measures Committee pursuant to sub-paragraph 1 (e) of the said resolution.

The Norwegian Government has put into effect an embargo on the export to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of all the arms and materials mentioned in resolution 500 (V) of the General Assembly, and has also taken steps to prevent Norwegian ships from transporting such goods from Norway to those areas.

(Signed) BREDO STABELL,
Acting Permanent Representative
of Norway to the United Nations.

PAKISTAN

13 JUNE 1951.

With reference to General Assembly resolution 500 (V) which was adopted on 18 May, regarding additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, I am desired to convey the following information to the Additional Measures Committee through Your Excellency:

"The Government of Pakistan do not export or re-export to China any of the materials mentioned in the resolution."

(Signed) AHMED S. BOKHARI,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations.

PANAMA

24 MAY 1951.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your cablegram dated 21 May 1951 in which you communicate to this Ministry the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its plenary meeting held on 18 May 1951 concerning additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea.

In taking note of this resolution, a copy of which has been communicated to the competent authorities of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Treasury for appropriate action by them, I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) IGNACIO MOLINO, Jr.
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Panama.

PARAGUAY

18 JUNE 1951.

I am charged to inform you of the agreement and absolute support of Paraguay for General Assembly resolution 18 May regarding embargo strategic materials to Communist China and immediate adoption necessary measures conducive to strict fulfilment said resolution.—Minister for Foreign Affairs of Paraguay.

PERU

6 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to refer to your Excellency's cablegram No. 98 of 21 May 1951 concerning the text of a resolution on additional measures to be employed to meet the Chinese aggression in Korea.

In this connection I have pleasure in advising you that the Government of Peru has issued a Supreme Decree, a copy of which is enclosed, through which my country gives effect to the recommendations made by the United Nations with respect to this matter.

(Signed) MANUEL C. GALLAGHER,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru.

ANNEX

Supreme Decree issued by the Government of Peru

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC:

Considering:

That the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 330th plenary meeting on 18 May 1951, adopted a resolution concerning measures to meet the aggression in Korea through the application of economic restrictins which would supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea;

That Peru has condemned the aggression in Korea and has offered to concert its action with that of the other Member Nations for the purpose of re-establishing international peace and security;

That such action is on conformity with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations, approved by Legislative Resolution No. 10255 of 15 October 1945, and is in accordance with the provisions of Supreme Decree No. 349 of 17 July 1950;

With the concurrence of the Council of Ministers

Decrees:

Article 1—An embargo is hereby placed on the shipment to areas under the control of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value and items used in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war,

Article 2—The Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, War, the Navy and the Aviation shall be responsible, each in so far as he is concerned, for giving effect to this Decree.

Given at Government House, Lima, on 5 June 1951.

PHILIPPINES

I

18 June 1951.

In reply to your message of 21 May 1951, communicating the text of the resolution concerning additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951, I have the honor to transmit herewith a preliminary report on the measures taken by the Philippine Government in accordance with the above-cited resolution.

1. On 24 April 1950, Customs Administrative Order No. 106 was issued prohibiting the shipment and exportation of war materials, arms, munitions and implements of war.

2. Subsequently, Customs Circular Letter No. 547 was issued amplifying Administrative Order No. 106 so as to include strategic materials such as steel products, medicines and others.

3. On 21 November 1950, the Cabinet adopted a resolution prohibiting the exportation of scrap materials such as copper, lead, brass, iron and steel without previous clearance from the Secretary of National Defense.

4. On 3 April 1951, the Cabinet, on recommendation of the Department of Foreign Affairs, approved a resolution creating an inter-departmental committee to screen all exports of strategic materials. The committee was composed of representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Finance, the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Economic Co-ordination Administration, the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency and the Central Bank of the Philippines.

5. On 11 May 1951, the President signed Republic Act No. 613, entitled "An Act to regulate, control and/or prohibit certain exports from the Philippines, to authorize the President of the Philippines to issue rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, to provide penalties for the violation thereof and of the regulations issued thereunder, and for other purposes."

Republic Act No. 613 is designed to regulate, control or prohibit the export of machinery, spare parts, scrap metals, medicines, foodstuffs, abaca (hemp) seedlings, gasoline, oil, lubricants, military equipment and other supplies suitable for military use without a license issued and signed by the President of the Philippines upon the unanimous recommendation of a committee composed of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman, and the Secretary of National Defense and the Economic Co-ordination Administrator as members. Violations of this Act are punishable by a fine of not less than ₱5,000 or more than ₱10,000 or by imprisonment of not less than two years nor more than five years or by both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

The text of Republic Act No. 613 is herewith enclosed.

I am informed that a more comprehensive report is on its way and will be transmitted to you immediately upon receipt.

(Signed) Salvador P. Lopez,
Minister Plenipotentiary
and Chargé d' Affaires.

Enclosure: Republic Act No. 613.

II

25 JUNE 1951.

With reference to my letter, dated 18 June 1951, transmitting a preliminary report on the measures taken by the Philippine Government in accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951, I have the honor to transmit the attached report which was received today from the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. This report should be regarded as supplementary to the above-mentioned preliminary report.

(Signed) SALVADOR P. LOPEZ,
Minister Plenipotentiary
and Chargé d' Affaires.

ANNEX

Report of the Philippine Government on measures taken in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 500 (V) entitled "Additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea"

I. Introduction.

The Philippines, being a member of the Additional Measures Committee, took part in the discussions and consultations which resulted in the submittal of a resolution to the General Assembly which would give additional moral and material support to the United Nations forces fighting so valiantly in Korea.

The Philippine Government took the view that the application of an embargo on areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China represents the irreducible minimum of additional action which member states must take in support of United Nations action in Korea. The moral and psychological effects of an embargo were carefully considered, especially the argument that such an action might be unduly provocative and would close the avenues of conciliation and pacific settlement. But this argument has become somewhat thin and unrealistic. It was then felt by the Philippine delegation, as well as by other delegations, that the time had come when the United Nations must tie up all the loose ends of collective action against aggression in Korea. Curtailment of trade with Communist China would naturally reduce the latter's capacity for waging war in Korea.

The foregoing considerations guided the Philippine Government in its decision to support the General Assembly resolution.

II. Embargo measures in the Phillippines before adoption of the General Assembly resolution.

The Philippines, as early as 1950, had taken definite steps to prohibit the shipment and exportation of war materials, arms, ammunition, and implements of war by the issuance of Customs Administrative Order No. 106 dated 24 April 1950. This Order was later on amplified by Customs Circular Letter No. 547 so as to include in the prohibition the exportation of steel products, medicines, heavy equipment and others.

On 16 October 1950, the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines also submitted a list of strategic materials including those locally produced, the exportation of which was restrained. The Philippine Cabinet by Resolution dated 21 November 1950 prohibited the exportation of scrap metals, including steel, copper, lead, iron, except to the United States, and in the case of exportation to other areas, the approval of the Secretary of National Defense should first be secured.

By a Cabinet Resolution of 3 April 1951, an Inter-Departmental Committee on Exportation of Strategic Materials was created to screen applications for exports. The Committee was composed of representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Finance, Department of Commerce and Industry, Department of National Defense, Central Bank of the Philippines, Office of Economic Coordination and the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency. Except in meritorious cases, imported strategic materials, including scrap metals, were as a rule prohibited from re-exportation. Locally-produced strategic materials were prohibited from exportation to China, North Korea, Macao and Hongkong, except that, with respect of Hongkong, official representation are made on government to government level. These materials were likewise prohibited from exportation to other areas except to the United States, unless there is definite assurance that no trans-shipment to Communist or Communist-held areas will take place.

III. Republic Act 613

On 11 May 1951, the President of the Philippines signed Republic Act No. 613 creating a committee composed of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman, and the Secretary of National Defense and the Administrator of Economic Coordination as members. This Committee will screen applications for export or re-export, to any point outside of the Philippines, of machineries, spare parts, scrap metals, medicines, foodstuffs, abacá seedlings, gasoline, oil, lubricants, and military equipment or supplies, suitable for military use. The Committee can only recommend the issuance of a permit to be signed by the President if there is a unanimous finding that the articles sought to be exported does not prejudice the national security or the Government's programme of agricultural and industrial development.

IV. Measures taken after the adoption of the General Assembly resolution

In accordance with Republic Act No. 613, the President of the Philippines created on 15 June 1951 an export control committee to administer the rules and regulations governing shipment of goods from the Philippines to foreign countries. The committee is composed of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman, and the Secretary of National Defense and the Administrator of Economic Coordination as members.

An executive order implementing Republic Act No. 613 has been drafted for the signature of the President. The rules and regulations provide all precautions to prevent re-exportation in the guise of trans-shipment and in the interest of co-operating with other members of the United Nations to prevent diversion of strategic materials to communist, communist-held or troubled areas. Transshipment of cargoes passing through the Philippines shall be allowed only upon the issuance of clearance by the export control committee.

Items under the proposed executive order are classified into three categories: (1) articles which are absolutely banned for exportation; (2) articles that could be exported without the need of application and permit; and (3) articles, the exportation of which requires screening.

Copy of the executive order will be sent to the Additional Measures Committee as soon as it is approved and signed by the President.

POLAND

(Previously circulated as A/1811.)

SWEDEN

19 JUNE 1951.

1. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951, regarding embargo on the shipment of certain commodities to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities, invites every State to report within thirty days to the Additional Measures Committee on the measures taken in accordance with the resolution.

2. Accordingly, I have the honour to ask you to forward the following information to the Committee.

During the debate on this resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Swedish representative, in a declaration of vote, stated that no exports of impements of war or other commodities of strategic importance have taken place from Sweden to the People's Republic of China or to territories controlled by the North Korean authorities, and also that no such exports are envisaged under the present circumstances.

3. As to the administrative machinery necessary for the implementation of the policy set out in that declaration, I wish to give the following information.

Special legislation exists in Sweden providing for a strict control over the exports of arms, ammunition and other implements of war, as well as machines and tools for the production thereof. The object of this control, which, with some modifications, has been in effect since 1935, and which is applied to each individual shipment, is to establish a complete supervision by the Government over all exports of the commodities concerned, whether they originate in Sweden or not. One particular purpose of the legislation is to ensure, as far as possible, that the exported items are in fact intended for the use of the governmental authorities of the country of destination.

The exports of strategic commodities other than implements of war, as well as of all civilian commodities, are at present equally subject to complete control. Under the regulation now in force no such goods, whether they originate in Sweden or not, may be exported from Sweden to the destinations referred to in paragraph 2, above, if not covered by a license in each particular case.

4. The authorities granting export licenses will carefully observe the principles embodied in the Swedish declaration referred to in paragraph 2, above, with regard to both export and re-export as well as trans-shipment.

(Signed) G. VON OTTER,
Acting Representative.

THAILAND

16 JUNE 1951.

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency the following communication from His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"With reference to Your Excellency's telegram No. 87 communicating to me the text of the resolution concerning additional measures, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 May 1951, I have the honour to report the following:

"1. His Majesty's Government has approved the said resolution which had already been supported by the Thai delegate in the General Assembly.

"2. Prior to the resolution, a system of control over exports from the Kingdom of Thailand had already been in existence, covering the following items: foodstuffs, food-grain, timber, cotton, cotton yarns and other yarns, chemical fertilizers, all kinds of machines and accessories, agricultural implements, industrial equipment and tools, medical and pharmaceutical instruments, chemical products, cement and petroleum products. The exportation of any of the above items requires an export permit from the authorities.

"3. Arms and ammunition are already prohibited from export.

"4. Re-export of the goods is also prohibited.

"5. Additional lists are being drawn up to place lead ore and mineral, zinc, tin and other minerals produced in Thailand, castor oil, rubber and kapok under the same control.

"6. Instructions have been given to the authorities issuing export permits to deny them in case of export to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of North Korean authorities.

"7. His Majesty's Government has instituted a special organ composed of policy, customs, harbour and other authorities with a view to ensuring strict enforcement of the above system of control and prohibition.

"8. The Thai authorities are making every effort to prevent circumvention of the control on shipment applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution and are ready to co-operate with the authorities of other States in carrying out the purpose of this embargo."

(Signed) WAN WAITHAYAKON,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
Thailand to the United Nations.

TURKEY

18 JUNE 1951.

The Principal Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his savingram dated 21 May 1951, transmitting the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951 regarding additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea.

The Principal Permanent Representative, acting upon instructions of his Government, has the honour to bring the following to the notice of the Secretary-General with the request that this information be communicated to the Additional Measures Committee:

1. No arms or strategic material are exported from Turkey to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities.

2. The Government of the Turkish Republic accept the recommendation of the General Assembly contained in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the resolution adopted on 18 May 1951 relating to this matter.

3. The necessary steps are now being taken with a view to giving legal effect to this recommendation in accordance with the constitutional processes of the country.

4. Information with regard to the detailed measures to be adopted in this respect will be communicated to the Additional Measures Committee at a later date.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(Previously circulated as A/1819.)

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

I

15 JUNE 1951.

In compliance with sub-paragraph 1 (e) of General Assembly resolution 500 (V) adopted on 18 May 1951, on the additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, the Government of the Union of South Africa would be grateful if you would kindly advise the Additional Measures Committee that in order to give effect to the embargo recommended by the General Assembly, the Union Government have already taken the following measures:

1. No permits for the exportation to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities are issued in respect of all goods listed in schedules A and B of Government Notice 706 of 22 March 1951. Copies of the two schedules are attached.

2. No permits for the exportation to the aforementioned areas are issued in respect of atomic energy materials. This control is exercised by the South African Atomic Energy Board acting under power vested in it by Act No. 35 of 1948, e. g. Section 2, which reads as follows:

"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be vested in the State the sole right—

"(a) To search, prospect or mine for prescribed materials or in any manner to acquire any such material or to dispose thereof; or

"(b) To extract or isolate any such material from any substance or to concentrate, refine or process it, or to produce atomic energy.

"(2) The ownership in and control of all prescribed materials which have been mined, extracted or isolated by or on behalf of the Minister under the provisions of this Act, shall vest in the board on behalf of the State."

3. The Union Government are, moreover, taking steps to issue a Proclamation in terms of Section 119 of Customs Act 35 of 1944, which will prohibit the exportation or carriage coastwise to areas specified in paragraph 1, of munitions and all such other goods as are mentioned in Government Notice 2065 of 1 October 1948, which will thereby be deemed capable of being converted into or used in the manufacture of munitions. A copy of Government Notice 2065 is attached and I also quote for your information the text of Section 119 of Act 35 of 1944:

"119. POWER OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO PROHIBIT EXPORTATION OR CARRIAGE COASTWISE OF MUNITIONS—The Governor-General may, by proclamation in the Gazette, prohibit the exportation or the carriage coastwise to any place of munitions and any other goods which he deems capable of being converted into or used in the manufacture of munitions."

You will be informed immediately the Proclamation referred to has been issued.

4. The Union is not a producer and/or exporter of petroleum products on any large scale and is largely dependent on the import of these materials for its own requirements. Nevertheless, consideration is at present being given to the possible extension of the scope of Government Notice 706 (referred to in paragraph 1) by also bringing the export of all petroleum products under permit control.

(Signed) JORDAAN,
Deputy Permanent Representative of
the Union of South Africa to the United Nations.

Enclosures: Government Notice No. 706, Schedules A and B
Government Notice No. 2065.)

II

5 JULY 1951.

I have the honour to refer to my evenly numbered letter of 15 June 1951, concerning additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to inform you that the proclamation referred to in paragraph 3 of my letter has now been issued by the Government of the Union of South Africa.

I shall be grateful if the Additional Measures Committee could be informed accordingly.

(Signed) J. R. JORDAAN,
Deputy Permanent Representative.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(Previously circulated as A/1808.)

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

16 JUNE 1951.

In compliance with the recommendation in resolution 500 (V) adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May, concerning additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, I have the honour to transmit to you the following report on restrictions on exports to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities, imposed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in the territories for whose international relations His Majesty's Government are responsible.

The resolution passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 May, arising from the report of the Additional Measures Committee, recommended that every State should report to the Additional Measures Committee within thirty days, and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures taken in accordance with this resolution.

This report of the measures being taken by His Majesty's Government refers not only to the United Kingdom but to all the territories for whose international relations His Majesty's Government are responsible.

Since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, controls have been progressively imposed on trade between the United Kingdom and the territories for whose international relations His Majesty's Government are responsible on the one hand, and China on the other. Trade with North Korea was totally prohibited by His Majesty's Government as from 6 July 1950 and as from a date immediately after 21 August 1950 by the governments of the other territories for whose international relations His Majesty's Government are responsible. Trade with China has not been subject to comprehensive control embracing all goods, but controls and restrictions have been extended to particular classes of goods as the situation in Korea has developed and particularly since the direct intervention of Chinese forces in Korea.

All goods of the types set out in the annexed list are, or, subject to any necessary legislation in the territories concerned, shortly will be subject to export control and no exports or re-exports will be permitted to China from the United Kingdom or from any of the territories for whose international relations His Majesty's Government are responsible.

These measures will be kept under review and revisions made as His Majesty's Government consider necessary in the light of changing circumstances. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the above measures will ensure that no goods of the type referred to in the resolution of 18 May will be exported from the United Kingdom or from territories for whose international relations they are responsible, to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China or the North Korean authorities.

I should be grateful if you would bring this report to the attention of the Members of the Additional Measures Committee.

(Signed) GLADWYN JEBB.

ANNEX

Items subject to embargo for China

1. Arms, ammunition and implements of war, including aircraft and engines.
2. Atomic energy materials and equipment.
3. Petroleum products. Crude petroleum, and refined petroleum products. Naphtha, mineral spirits and solvents.

4. Transportation materials:
(a) Internal combustion engines.
(b) All motor vehicles (including tractors and motorcycles); trailers; and components and spares.
(c) Rails, locomotives and rolling-stock, and parts thereof.
(d) Ships and floating docks; including important parts.
(e) Cables suitable for harbour defence or minesweeping.
(f) Road and aerodrome construction machinery.
(g) Minesweeping equipment.
(h) Cranes.
(i) Nylon rope and parachute cloth.
(j) Containers suitable for use in storing or transporting petroleum of capacity of 4 gallons or more.

5. Metals, minerals and their manufactures:
(a) All classes of iron and steel products (including alloy steels) up to and including the finished stage and including barbed wire and steel wire strand and cable, iron and steel scrap.
(b) Metals, the following and alloys wholly or mainly thereof including ferro-alloys and scrap.

Aluminum
Antimony
Beryllium
Bismuth
Cadmium
Calcium
Cobat
Columbium
Copper
Lead
Germanium
Magnesium
Molybdenum
Nickel
Sodium
Strontium
Tantalum
Titanium
Tungsten
Vanadium
Zinc
Zirconium

(c) Items in the following fields:
(i) Items used for the production of alloy steels.
(ii) Low melting-point alloys.
(iii) Metals (and their compounds) used in connexion with petroleum warfare and military pyrotechnics.
(iv) Special abrasives for lens-grinding.
(v) Compounds constituting potential sources of metals listed under 5 (b) above.
(d) Asbestos and asbestos yarn, textiles and clothing.
(e) Strategic grades of mica.

6. Rubber and rubber products:
(a) Natural rubber (including latex and scrap).
(b) Synthetic rubber.
(c) Oil and fire-resisting rubber hosing and high pressure hosing.
(d) Tyres and tubes, other than those for pedal cycles.

7. Chemicals. Chemicals of importance in the production of:
(a) Chemical warfare preparations.
(b) Military pyrotechnics.
(c) Fuels for self-propelling missiles.
(d) Additives for mineral oils.
(e) Strategically important plastics.
(f) Explosives and stabilizers, detonators, initiators and plasticizers for explosives.
(g) Anti-freeze and de-icing preparations.
(h) Fluids of use in hydraulically-operated mechanisms.
(i) Materials having application in atomic energy.
(j) Special steels.
(k) Tyres and other rubber and synthetic rubber products.
(l) Refrigerants for use in tanks and submarines.
(m) Smoke screens and incendiary preparations.

8. Chemicals for use in the exploitation of mineral deposits and ores.

9. Catalysts for use in the manufacture of nitric acid.

10. Chemical and petroleum equipment and plant:
(a) For the production of poisonous gases.
(b) For the production of chemicals for explosives, propellants, etc.
(c) Equipment capable of being used for bacteriological warfare purposes.
(d) Petroleum refinery equipment.
(e) Oil-well drilling and exploration equipment.

11. Electronic (including ratio and radar) equipment:
    - (a) Radar and other radio-location equipment.
    - (b) Electronic devices designed or specially suitable for use in warfare.
    - (c) Communication equipment including cables.
    - (d) Valves and other components specially suitable for use in the above and machinery for making these valves and components.
    - (e) Tissue for use in electrical apparatus.
    - (f) Other materials having important applications in electronics.
12. Precision and scientific instruments:
    - (a) Laboratory instruments of importance in research in such strategic fields as atomic energy.
    - (b) Precision and scientific instruments capable of being used in the development, production and testing of military equipment.
    - (c) Telescopes, binoculars and special optical glass.
13. Other machinery and accessories of the following types:
    - (a) Metal-working machine tools.
    - (b) Specialized types of rubber machinery, and specialized machinery for making tyre fabric.
    - (c) Diamond tools and industrial diamonds.
    - (d) Ball and roller bearings.
    - (e) Electric generators and motors.
    - (f) Compressors for wind tunnels.
    - (g) Steel mill equipment.
    - (h) Non-ferrous metal concentrating, refining, alloying, rolling and casting equipment.
    - (i) Portable hand-held power tools.
    - (j) Welding machines and equipment (including electrodes).
    - (k) Measuring and testing instruments and machines for use in engineering workshops.
    - (l) Important abrasives.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

15 JUNE 1951.

I have the honor to present herewith the first report of the United States to the Additional Measures Committee on the measures taken in accordance with resolution 500 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951.

The controls applied by the United States on shipments to the Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities are more comprehensive than those called for by resolution 500 (V) and were placed in effect before that resolution was passed. Exports from the United States of arms, ammunition and implements of war (annex I) and atomic energy materials (annex II) to North Korea and to Communist China have not been authorized at any time, and exports of a number of other strategic articles were severely restricted and in some instances embargoed for some time prior to June 1950. Since the end of June 1950, the United States Government has permitted no shipments to North Korea and applied an embargo on shipments to Communist China not only of arms and munitions but also of atomic energy materials, petroleum products, and other items of strategic value included in the United States Positive List (annex III).

The scope of the economic measures applied against the Chinese Communists by the United States was greatly extended when it became unmistakably clear that they were engaged in large-scale military operations against United Nations forces in Korea. Since December 1950, the United States has not exported any materials whatever to Communist China. Vessels and aircraft documented or registered under United States laws have not been permitted to touch at any Chinese Communist port or area or to carry any cargo destined directly or indirectly for Communist China. Strict control has been exercised over commodities in transit through the United States destined for Communist China. All Communist China and North Korea assets within the United States have been blocked and subjected to stringent controls.

The United States believes that the United States Positive List contains items which would meet the intent of the General Assembly resolution of 18 May. Not all these items are included within the scope of sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the resolution. Nevertheless, the United States believes that the control of such items furthers the basic purpose of the resolution.

The scope and detail of the United States Munitions List, the list of atomic energy materials, and the United States Positive List may assist co-operating States in effecting the embargo by providing a basis for that efficient customs administration, control of transit trade, and control over transport of prohibited cargoes which it is the purpose of the resolution to accomplish. It may also contribute to the working out of such further measures in the field of economic controls as may become appropriate or necessary.

The United States will prevent by all means within its jurisdiction to circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States under the resolution and co-operate fully with other State and the Additional Measures Committee in carrying out the purposes of this embargo.

The following is a summary of the measures taken by the United States to control its trade with the aggressors:

The export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined by Presidential Proclamation 2776, of 13 April 1948, is controlled by the Secretary of State (annex I). The export of atomic energy materials as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is controlled by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (annex II). Shipments of such materials to Communist China and North Korea have not been authorized at any time. In November 1949, this policy was extended to include Hong Kong and Macao, as possible trans-shipment points, and only very limited materials for the use of these governments have been licensed since that time.

The export from the United States to foreign destinations of commodities in short supply and of strategic materials is controlled through the Positive List administered by the Department of Commerce under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949 (annex III). Commodities which appear on the Positive List are placed there after determination by the United States Government that they possess sufficient strategic value or are in such critical supply as to justify careful screening of destination and end-use. Such commodities cannot be exported to foreign destinations without validated export licenses.

From June 1950, shortly after the North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea, until December 1950, the United States Government was applying an embargo over shipments to Communist China of arms and munitions, petroleum products, atomic energy materials, and all other items on the United States Positive List.

Since June 1950, no shipments of any kind have been permitted to go to North Korea, and the subsequent measures outlined below have been applied to North Korea as well as Communist China.

As a precaution, in the light of the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean struggle, the Department of Commerce issued an order, effective 3 December 1950, subjecting all proposed exports from the United States to the mainland of China or to Hong Kong and Macao (as possible trans-shipment points) to a screening procedure in order to prevent Communist China from obtaining materials, the receipt of which by Communist China would be contrary to the objectives of the United Nations in Korea. The order revoked all general licenses for the exportation of any commodity, whether or not included on the Positive List, to Communist China and to Hong Kong and Macao.

On 7 December 1950, an additional Department of Commerce order was issued providing authorization for United States officials to stop shipments loaded under General Licenses if the ships came into United States ports en route. Since that date, accordingly, validated export licenses are required for all commodities intended for the destinations noted above if a vessel, whatever its registry, has not obtained clearance from the final port of departure in the United States for a foreign port or if, after receiving final celarance, the vessel transits the Panama Canal Zone. The order directed that shipments which were not licensed were required to be off-loaded prior to final clearance or proceeding through the Canal Zone. Under Department of Commerce orders effective 4 and 6 December 1950, shipments of all commodities, whether or not on the Positive List, originating in any foreign country moving in transit through the United States using the facilities of a foreign trade zone or manifested to the United States may not be exported to China, Manchuria, Hong Kong or Macao without a validated export license. The foregoing actions were taken under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949 (annex IV).

On 8 December 1950, the Department of Commerce, Under Secretary for Transportation, under the authority granted by Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, issued Transportation Order T-1. This order directed that no person should transport in any ship documented under the laws of the United States or in any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States any commodities at the time on the Positive List, or any article on the Munitions List, or any article controlled for export under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, to China, Manchuria, Hong Kong or Macao; and no person should dscharge from any such ship or aircraft any such commodity at these ports or areas, or at any other ports in transit to such destinations, without a validated export license, or unless authorization had been obtained from the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation. The prohibition applied to the ship or aircraft owner, master or any other officer or employee of the owner (annex V).

On 16 December 1950, the Department of State announced that the United States was taking measures to place under control all Chinese Communist assets within United States jurisdiction and was issuing regulations to prohibit ships of United States registry from calling at Chinese Communist ports until further notice. These actions were necessary to accomplish the effective control of the economic relationships between the United States and Communist China-North Korea envisaged by the 3 December requirement that no exports would be permitted to these destinations from the United States without validated export licenses (annex VI).

The Department of the Treasury accomplished this financial control by action under the Foreign Assets Regulations (pursuant to the first War Powers Act of 1941 and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 6 October 1917, as amended) blocking the United States assets of residents of China and North Korea. The blocking regulations forbade all transactions involving bank accounts and United States assets of the Communist Chinese and the North Korean regimes and their nationals unless Treasury approval was obtained. A series of blanket authorizations were included in the regulations, protecting individual Chinese and Koreans in the United States and abroad, where these persons were not acting on behalf of the North Korean or Chinese Communist regimes (annex VII).

The Department of Commerce accomplished its shipping controls by the issuance of Transportation Order T–2, under the authority of Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. This order provided, in substance, that no person should take any ship or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of the United States to any Chinese Communist port or area; that no person should transport, in any ship or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of the United States, cargo of any kind to Communist ports or to any other places under the control of the Chinese Communists, that no person should take on board any such ship or aircraft any cargo if he knows or has reason to believe that it is destined, directly or indirectly, for Communist China; and that no person should discharge from any such ship or aircraft any such cargo so destined at any place other than the port where the cargo was loaded, or within territory under United States jurisdiction, or in Japan. This order was made applicable to the owner, master, or any other officer, employee or agent of the owner of the ship or aircraft (annex VIII).

(Signed) Ernest A. Gross,
Acting Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.

Enclosures:

I. Enumeration of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War (Proclamation 2776 issued by the President of the United States on 26 March 1948).
II. List of Atomic Energy Materials.
III. Positive list of commodities.
IV. Excerpts from Comprehensive Export Schedule.
V. Transportation Order T–1.
VI. Statement issued by the Department of State on 16 December 1950, regarding control of United States economic relationships with Communist China.
VII. Foreign Assets Control Regulations.
VIII. Transportation Order T–2.

URUGUAY

16 June 1951.

I have the honour to address you, in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 (e) of the General Assembly resolution of 18 May 1951, for the purpose of asking you to advise the Collective Measures Committee that the Government of Uruguay has adopted each and every one of the measures conducive to the fulfillment of that resolution. In this regard, I have to inform you that at a later date I shall see that you receive complete details of the measures taken by my Government in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution of the Assembly.

(Signed) E. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT,
Permanent Representative of Uruguay
to the United Nations.

VENEZUELA

I

25 JUNE 1951.

In view of the provisions of Article 1, paragraph e, of resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951, I have the honour to request Your Excellency to be kind enough to inform the Additional Measures Committee that on 22 June the Government of Venezuela issued a decree prohibiting the export, re-export, and trans-shipment of the materials mentioned in the said resolution 500 (V) to the areas controlled by the North Korean authorities and by the People's Republic of China.

This decree also provides that the specific articles to which the above prohibition applies shall be defined in orders issued jointly by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Economic Development, Defence and Mines and Fuel.

It is similarly provided that the export, re-export and trans-shipment of the articles in question which are not destined for the areas in question shall be subject to such measures, requirements and formalities as may be laid down by the Ministries of Finance and Economic Development in order to ensure that they will not be used in the aforesaid areas.

Lastly, it is provided that persons infringing its provisions will incur a fine of up to one hundred thousand bolivares (Bs. 100,000).

(Signed) CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ,
Permanent Representative of Venezuela.

27 JUNE 1951.

Further to my Note No. 502 of 25 June last, I have the honour to send you herewith issue No. 23,561 of 22 June 1951 of the Official Gazette of the United States of Venezuela, containing the full text of Decree No. 198, which prohibits the exportation, re-exportation and trans-shipment through Venezuela ports of arms, ammunition and other strategic materials consigned to areas under the control of the North Korean authorties and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

(Signed) CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ,
Permanent Representative of Venezuela.

(Enclosure.)

YEMEN

27 JUNE 1951.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your cablegram of 15 June 1951 concerning measures taken by the Government of Yemen in accordance with General Assembly resolution 500 (V).

Pror to that, I had received instructions from my Government to the effect that it intends to carry out the provisions of said resolution which puts an embargo on Communist China and North Korea anr prohibits shipments of military supplies and equipment which could be used by them for further aggression.

Please consider this letter as an official reply from the Government of Yemen.

(Signed) ABDURRAHMAN A. ABUTALEB,
Delegate to the Interim Committee
Charge d'Affaires.

YUGOSLAVIA

18 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to refer to your message of 21 May 1951, transmitting resolution 500 (V) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 May 1951, sub-paragraph 1 (e) of the operative part of which recommends that Member States report to the Additional Measures Committee on measures taken in pursuance to the resolution.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has, in accordance with its general policy of support to measures designed to deny contributions to the military forces opposing the United Nations in Korea, given the most careful attention to the question of implementing the embargo provided for in sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the operative part of resolution 500 (V) and it has been in a position to establish that no shipments of commodities, falling within the embargo, had taken place, even prior to the adoption of the resolution, from the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the Government of North Korea. The necessary measures have now been taken to ensure that no change in this regard shall occur.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has also directed the Ministry of the Merchant Marine to take all the necessary steps to prevent any circumvention of controls of shipments applied by other States pursuant to the above resolution.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has instructed me, finally, to re-affirm its readiness to co-operate with the other States in carrying out the purposes of the resolution.

(Signed) Ales Bebler,
Permanent Representative of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations.

Non-Member States

ALBANIA

4 July 1951.

Referring to your telegram of 22 May 1951 transmitting to us the text of the resolution of 18 May concerning the establishment of an embargo against the People's Republic of China I have the honour to advise you that this Ministry cannot bring to the notice of the government of the People's Republic of Albania the contents of this resolution which is illegal and in contradiction with the charter of the United Nations. This resolution adopted by the General Assembly under direct pressure by the USA and the aggressive bloc led by it does not serve the security of peace and collaboration among the peoples which are the principal goal of the United Nations but on the contrary serves the aggressive and bellicose purposes of those who inspired it in expressing to you the assurance of my highest consideration, I request you to distribute the text of this telegram as a document to all Member States of the United Nations by order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the democratic People's Republic of Albania.

Mihal Prifti,
Vice-Minister.

AUSTRIA

23 May 1951.

I have the honour to inform you that your savingram (SG of 21 May 1951) containing the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 1951 concerning a strategic embargo on shipments under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities has been brought to the attention of the Government of the Republic of Austria.

(Signed) Franz Matsch,
Austrian Liaison Officer with the United Nations.

CAMBODIA

8 June 1951.

Have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your message concerning the embargo on the export of strategic commodities destined for China and North Korea and to inform you that Cambodia as far as the commodities enumerated in your message are concerned does not have any commercial relations with the countries in question.

Nealphleng.

FINLAND

23 May.

The Consulate General of Finland presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the communication ref. SG of 21 May 1951, signed by His Excellency, Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, regarding the text of the resolution concerning additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and has not failed immediately to bring this to the attention of the Government of Finland.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

18 JUNE 1951.

By a telegram dated 22 May you requested the Allied High Commission to transmit to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany a United Nations resolution on the additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea.

As requested by you, the resolution was brought to the attention of the Federal Government which, in reply, has asked me to communicate to you the attached text of a statement released on 7 June 1951.

(Signed) G. P. GLAIN,
Secretary-General.

Statement released on 7 June 1951

The Federal Government, considering the United Nations resolution of 18 May 1951 concerning the economic measures recommended to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, states the following:

At its preliminary meeting, on 18 May 1951, the United Nations General Assembly recommended a number of additional economic measures designed to support and supplement the action taken by the United Nations to meet the aggression in Korea. The resolution recommends that all States Members of the United Nations should apply an embargo on the shipment to China and North Korea of implements of war and strategic materials. In addition, it is recommended that Member States should ensure that all steps are taken to prevent any circumvention of this embargo, and, lastly that the States should cooperate closely with each other for the purpose of giving effect to these recommendations.

Although Germany is not a Member of the United Nations, the Federal Government, considering itself associated with the Western family of free nations, welcomes the above resolution as being calculated to bring about an early cessation of hostilities in the Far East. Accordingly, the Federal Government has ordered that, as from 1 June 1951, any exportation from the Federal Republic to China and North Korea requires a special license; such licenses are issued only by the Central Licensing Service at Frankfort/Main. In pursuance of this order, this service has been instructed not to grant export licenses for the shipment to China or North Korea of any goods which might be used directly or indirectly in the conduct of the war or for the manufacture of implements of war or strategic materials.

BONN, 7 *June 1951*

Released by the Federal Government's Press and Information Service.

HUNGARY

20 JUNE 1951.

The Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic has the honour to return herewith the savingram sent to the Legation on 21 May 1951.

Please be advised that the Legation does not desire to forward this communication to its Government.

(Signed) LAJOS NAGY,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the
Hungarian People's Republic.

ITALY

I

23 MAY 1951.

I have the honour to inform you that the Italian Government, fully aware of the importance of the closest co-operation among all nations in the present effort of the United Nations to check aggression and to safeguard peace and international security, has requested me to communicate to you that it will fully comply with the recommendation of the General Assembly of 21 May in regard to an embargo on shipments of certain materials to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities.

(Signed) GASTONE GUIDOTTI.

II

14 JUNE 1951.

Pursuant to my letter No. 991 of 23 May 1951, and while confirming that the Italian Government have complied with resolution 500 (V) of the General Assembly of the United Nations dated 18 May 1951 for the enforcement of an embargo on certain materials with regard to the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities, I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency, upon instructions received from my Government, that, in agreement with paragraph 1 of the said resolution, the Italian Government have decided to enforce the following measures:

(a) Embargo on exports to the territories controlled by the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China and by the North Korean authorities, of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

(b) The embargo affects a vast series of products that acquire a prevalent strategic character when used by a country at war because of their special characteristics, in that they may be directly employed in military operations or in war industries; the embargo likewise affects those machines that, owing to their large production capacity, can release a considerable amount of manpower which thus becomes available in other sectors, and those products whose strategic character is in ratio to their quantity.

With relation to the above decisions, the merchandise embargoed by the Italian Government can be listed as follows:

Metal-working machinery (boring machines, milling machines, grinding machines, lathes, thread cutting machines, forging hammers, presses, special equipment for the production of arms and ammunition, etc.); power generating equipment, electrical equipment, electronic instruments, industrial equipment (rolling mill equipment, type-curing presses, etc.), chemical equipment, petroleum equipment, chemical and petroleum products, rubber and rubber products, transportation equipment (land, sea and air), metals, minerals and their products.

Furthermore, exportation of any merchandise whatsoever towards the territories controlled by the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities can only be effected if authorized by an export license issued by the Ministry of Foreign Commerce.

All requests for export licenses submitted to the above-mentioned Ministry will be examined by a special inter-ministerial Committee, constituted for the purpose with the participation of specialized technicians, to the end of effectively enforcing the embargo measures recommended by the General Assembly. Control will be rigorously extended also to direct exportation to Hong Kong and Macao.

(c)–(d) The Italian Government have entered into special agreements with the governments of friendly Powers with regard to the implementation of a system of mutual control on transportation by sea, air or land of war materials and strategic equipment, with the purpose of avoiding, as far as possible, any non-authorized deflection towards the territories above-mentioned.

Finally, I wish to assure you that the Italian Government will use all the means at their disposal to ensure strict enforcement of the above-mentioned measures.

I would be grateful if Your Excellency could communicate the text of this letter to the Additional Measures Committee prior to the expiration of the time limit set forth in the above-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(Signed) GASTONE GUIDOTTI.

HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

24 MAY 1951.

Have honour acknowledge your telegram dated May twenty-two detailing General Assembly's Korea resolution and beg inform you Jordan Government noted its contents.

ANISTAS HANANIA,
Jordan Minister Foreign Affairs.

LAOS

I

6 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram 2275. The reply of the Government will be addressed to you in the near future.

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, LAOS.

II

8 JULY 1951.

Reference my telegram of 6 June 1951. The Royal Government of Laos declares its adherence to the principle expressed in the General Assembly's resolution of 18 May 1951. This Government is anxious to state that the present *de facto* situation in Laos conforms to the recommendations of the United Nations.

ROMANIA

8 JUNE 1951.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Romania in referring to the telegram of 21 MAY 1951 in which the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution of the General Assembly of 18 May 1951 entitled "Additional Measures to be Employed to Meet the Aggression in Korea" has the honour to communicate the following. The resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 18 May is illegal, being adopted in violation of the Charter of the United Nations in conformity with which the adoption of measures for the maintenance of peace and security in the form of an embargo is a question for the Security Council. This illegal resolution is a consequence of the activity of the aggressive bloc directed by the United States, which seeks to disguise its real activity in imposing slanderous resolutions against the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honour to communicate that the Government of the People's Republic of Romania cannot take note of the above-mentioned illegal resolution.

ANA PAUKER

SPAIN

23 JUNE 1951.

Had honour receive Your Excellency's cable 14 June informing me United Nations has recommended embargo on war materials for possible use Korean conflict and asking each state adopt measures indicated in General Assembly resolution complete text of which Your Excellency transmitted. Happy inform Your Excellency Spanish Government as demonstration international solidarity decided 22 June decree identical embargo.

ALBERTO MARTIN ARTAJO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

VIET NAM

15 JUNE 1951.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the text of the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its three hundred and thirtieth plenary meeting, held on 18 May 1951, concerning measures to be employed to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and particularly, the embargo on shipments to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities.

At the meeting held on 25 May 1951, the Cabinet Counsel of the Viet-Nam Government unanimously supported the General Asssembly's resolution and decided to take measures designed to prevent shipments to the above-mentioned countries of arms, ammunition and implements of war, transportation materials of strategic value and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war.

In that connexion, the Viet-Nam Government is directing its attention particularly to shipments of rubber, in order to prevent exports by roundabout routes to the areas under embargo.

Furthermore, considering that, for the embargo to be fully effective, it must also relate to items indispensable to the life of the people, the Government will prohibit export of rice to those countries.

Fully conscious of the lofty and peaceful aims of the United Nations in opposing the aggression in Korea, the Viet-Nam Government gives the assurance that it will wholeheartedly co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of the embargo recommended by the General Assembly.

(Signed) TRAN-VAN-HUU.

[United Nations General Assembly, fifth session. Item 76 of the agenda. A/1811, 1 June 1941. Original: English. General distribution on 5 June 1951]

INTERVENTION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN KOREA

ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE EMPLOYED TO MEET THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Communication dated 31 May 1951 from the permanent representative of Poland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat of the United Nations

NEW YORK, *31 May 1951.*

The delegation of Poland to the United Nations acknowledges receipt of the cablegram of the Secretariat of 21 May 1951 and, in reply to the request contained therein that the delegation should transmit to the Government of the Republic of Poland the text of the resolution of the General Assembly of 18 May 1951,[1] has the honour to make the following statement.

During the debate on the above-mentioned resolution in the First Committee on 17 May 1951, and at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 18 May 1951, the representative of Poland refused to participate in the deliberations as well as in the voting. The representative of Poland based his decision on the fact that the General Assembly has no right whatsoever to institute actions which lie within the competence of the Security Council and which the Charter, *expressis verbis*, through Article 11, excludes from the competence of the General Assembly. The representative of Poland pointed out that this resolution was being forced upon the United Nations, in violation of Chapter VII of the Charter, by the United States and the aggressive bloc in the United Nations, for the purpose of spreading the war and preventing a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. The representative of Poland pointed out that the reference made by the promoters of this resolution to the infamous and illegal Acheson plan did not justify the action but only increased its illegality. Since it was based on the illegal provisions of the Acheson plan, the action was itself illegal. The representative of Poland further pointed out that, in view of the above-mentioned considerations, he would consider the resolution illegal and not binding.

In these circumstances, and for the considerations which have been described, the delegation of Poland cannot transmit to the Government of the Republic of Poland the illegal resolution of 18 May 1951.

The delegation of Poland requests the Secretariat of the United Nations kindly to ensure that the present communication is published as a General Assembly document.

(Signed) JULIUSZ KATZ-SUCHY,
*Permanent Representative of Poland
to the United Nations.*

[United Nations General Assembly, fifth session, Item 76 of the agenda. General, A/1819, 12 June 1951. English. Original: Russian]

INTERVENTION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN KOREA

ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE EMPLOYED TO MEET THE AGGRESSOR IN KOREA

Communication dated 30 May 1951 from the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the fifth session of the General Assembly, addressed to the Secretariat of the United Nations

NEW YORK, *30 May 1951.*

With reference to the telegram from the United Nations Secretariat to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic containing a request to communicate to the Government of the Ukranian SSR the text of the General Assembly resolution of 18 May 1951,[1] the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR to the fifth session of the General Assembly, on the instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, begs to state as follows:

In view of the illegality of the said resolution, which was adopted under pressure from the United States of America and the aggressor bloc in the United Nations under United States leadership, as the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has already stated in the First Committee and at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR does not consider it possible to communicate to the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic this illegal resolution, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR to the fifth session of the General Assembly requests the Secretariat of the United Nations to issue this letter as a General Assembly document.

(Signed) S. DEMCHENKO,
Member of the Delegation of the Ukrainian SSR
of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly.

[United Nations General Assembly, fifth session, Item 76 of the agenda. General, A/1818, 12 June 1951. English. Original: Russian]

INTERVENTION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN KOREA

ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE EMPLOYED TO MEET THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Communication dated 30 May 1951 from the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the fifth session of the General Assembly, addressed to the Secretariat of the United Nations

NEW YORK, *30 May 1951.*

With reference to the telegram from the United Nations Secretariat to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic containing a request to communicate to the Government of the Byelorussian SSR the text of the General Assembly resolution of 18 May 1951,[1] the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR to the fifth session of the General Assembly, on the instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR, wishes to state that, in view of the illegality of the said resolution, which was imposed upon the General Assembly through the efforts of the United States of America and the aggressor bloc in the United Nations, as the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR has already stated at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR does not consider it possible to communicate to the Government of the Byelorussian SSR this illegal resolution, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR requests the Secretariat of the United Nations to issue this letter as a General Assembly document.

(Signed) V. SHVETSOV,
Member of the Delegation of the Byelorussian SSR
to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly.

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[1] See resolution 500 (V) (A/1805).

[United Nations General Assembly, fifth session. Item 76 of the agenda. General, A/1808, 1951. Original: English. General distribution on 6 June 1951.]

INTERVENTION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN KOREA

ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE EMPLOYED TO MEET THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Communication dated 31 May 1951 from the permanent delegation of Czechoslovakia to the Secretariat of the United Nations

NEW YORK, *31 May 1951.*

The permanent delegation of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations confirms the receipt of the cablegram of the Secretariat of the United Nations dated 21 May 1951, requesting transmittal to the Government of Czechoslovakia of the text of the resolution of the General Assembly of 18 May 1951,[1] and has the honour to make the following statement:

Since that resolution was illegally adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations under the pressure of the United States of America and in gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, its Article 41, as already pointed out by the Czechoslovak delegation both in the First Committee and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the permanent delegation of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations will not transmit this resolution to the Government of Czechoslovakia.

The permanent delegation of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations requests the Secretariat of the United Nations that this communication should be circulated as a General Assembly document.

(Signed) JIRI NOSEK,
Acting Permanent Representative of
Czechoslovakia to the United Nations.

[United Nations General Assembly, fifth session, Item 76 of the agenda. General, A/1808, 29 May 1951. English. Original: Russian]

INTERVENTION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN KOREA

ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE EMPLOYED TO MEET THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Note verbale dated 23 May 1951 from the Permanent Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretariat of the United Nations

NEW YORK, *23 May 1951.*

The Permanent Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations and, with reference to the telegram of 21 May 1951 containing a request to communicate to the Government of the USSR the text of the General Assembly resolution of 18 May 1951,[1] begs to state as follows:

In view of the illegality of the said resolution, which was adopted through the efforts of the United States of America and the aggressor bloc in the United Nations, as the Delegation of the Soviet Union has already stated in the First Committee and at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Permanent Delegation does not consider it possible to communicate to the Government of the USSR this illegal resolution, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

In returning the said telegram for the reasons stated above, the Permanent Delegation of the USSR to the United Nations requests the Secretariat of the United Nations to issue this letter as a General Assembly document.

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[1] See resolution 500 (V) (A/1805).

APPENDIX RR

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
August 24, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On August 17 I addressed to you a letter in your capacity as chairman of the combined Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services which conducted the investigation into the issues raised by General MacArthur's dismissal.

In this letter I indicated that I would soon submit to you my own individual views with respect to this question.

Accordingly, and in compliance with the terms of the resolution adopted by the combined committees on August 17, 1951, I herewith transmit my individual views for inclusion in the record to be, in turn, transmitted to the Senate.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr.,
United States Senator.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR LODGE

Following are my individual conclusions as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations which, sitting jointly with the Committee on Armed Services, conducted hearings on the issues raised by the relief of General MacArthur.

I. AS REGARDS GENERAL MAC ARTHUR

On April 11 the day that General MacArthur's recall was announced, I issued the following statement:

"General MacArthur is a brilliant soldier with a record of service to his country which is unique. Americans will always be grateful to him. It is a great pity that, due in large part to administration bungling and lack of foresight, differences arose which made it clearly impossible for him to continue, but the civil power—even though we lack confidence in those who hold it—must, under our system of Government, be supreme over the military. I hope that out of this distressing event will come the clarification of our aims in Korea and the relation of our far eastern policy to American security as a whole, which is so badly needed today."

This statement still stands. The evidence indicates:

1. That if there had been imagination, vision, and courage at the time of the Korean aggression, the administration would have responded to the mood of unity and dedication which then existed in America and would have developed such overwhelming military strength that effective pressure could have been put on the instigators of the aggression and the conflict between the Executive and General MacArthur would never have occurred. Instead, that mood of unity and dedication was allowed to fritter away.

2. That a fundamental difference of view did, however, develop and exists today.

3. That leaving out of account the future conduct of the war in Asia, there can be no question but that General MacArthur's administration in Japan should have been continued until the current negotiations regarding a treaty of peace with Japan had been concluded.

II. AS REGARDS THE PAST

1. The hearings underlined the now well know fact that our military victory at the end of World War II was accompanied and immediately followed by tragic miscalculations of such importance as to rob us of many of the fruits of victory. The utter disintegration of our Armed Forces well nigh destroyed the influence for peace which we possessed at the end of hostilities and made possible the colossal expansion of the Soviet Union. To this one mistake can be attributed most of our present-day troubles in the international field.

2. China turned from a land of traditional friendship with America into a bitter and aggressive Communist enemy. How much this disastrous change was due to causes beyond our control and how much it can be charged to

errors of individual Americans remains a mystery. 'n any case it occurred and those who happen to be in power must accept the blame for failure, just as they accept the credit for success.

3. The decision to leave Korea in June 1949 now appears as an error which undoubtedly played a big part in making an invasion of Korea seem to the aggressors to be a profitable venture. Had we kept the flag flying it is doubtful that the aggression would ever have taken place.

4. To these tragic miscalculations was added the tragic inadequacy of an reaction to the Korean War.

III. As Regards the Future

The hearings disclosed a vast area of agreement between General MacArthur and those in official positions, notably as regards the policy to be followed concerning the defense of America in Europe and generally throughout the world. Insofar as disagreements are concerned, the hearings raised the following prime controversial question: Should the United States bomb the bases used by the Chinese Communist armies in Manchuria?

This question is essentially a technical military one. The evidence shows, for example, that there have been days in the past when such a bombing would have been to the advantage of our troops, assuming always that the Soviets did not intervene. There were other days on which it would have been disadvantageous to our troops because they were concentrated in areas where the Chinese could have bombed them more easily than we could have hit the Chinese. The estimates that bombing the Chinese bases would give great immediate help to our troops and that the Communist air reaction against us either in South Korea or Japan would not be formidable are impressive. Of overriding importance was the testimony of General Vandenberg that our Air Force was not powerful enough to bomb the bases in Manchuria and at the same time carry out its mission of deterring the Soviet Union from direct aggression. Technical questions, which are frequently changing in accordance with the multiplicity of circumstances, are clearly questions which neither Congress nor the American public, with their lack of secret information and of background data of all sorts, can possibly decide.

The basic issue which this question raises hinges on one's estimate of Russian reactions—and General MacArthur was scruplously careful to point out that he did not speak as an expert on matters outside of the far eastern theater. Russian intentions are, of course, a matter involving knowledge of many subjects which are completely outside of the far eastern theater, inasmuch as the place where decisions are made is in Moscow, which is in European Russia. Unfortunately the committee heard none of the accepted American authorities on the Soviet Union, although it did hear the department heads who presumably have access to the best opinions. These officials were unanimous in the view—which they did not, however, exhaustively document—that the bombing of Manchurian bases would probably provoke the Soviet Union and they frowned on any policy of "drop bombs and take a chance."

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The fact that the bombing of Chinese bases is a technical question, should not blind us to the fact that the desire to end the war in Korea and thus keep faith with the troops is not a technical question at all. It is a long-range policy question and a moral question which are clearly within the power of Congress and of the American people to decide—which, indeed, they cannot avoid.

1. The evidence indicates unmistakably that we are not keeping faith with the soldiers in Korea insofar as making maximum use of the time which they are gaining for us is concerned. While they sacrifice their all over there we muddle along in an atmosphere of politics and business as usual over here.

2. The evidence shows that the Soviets are gaining on us in strategic aviation; are actually ahead of us in tactical aviation and in air defense; and that the current administration proposals will not give us this utterly vital superiority in air power. While the Army and Navy are equally vital, in the present state of the world aviation is the point of the spear. We should use the precious time which the men in Korea are gaining for us to build this strength as rapidly as possible. But we are not doing so.

3. The evidence further indicates that the real enemy in Korea is not the Chinese Communists, but Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia could doubtless end

the aggression in Korea immediately if it wanted to. General MacArthur's inference that the Korean War cannot be ended by military action in Korea alone seems eminently wise. There may be some dispute as to where any action which might be contemplated outside of Korea should be taken. But there can be no dispute that, if we were strong enough militarily, we could put the requisite diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin, that the war in Korea would end and that the further slaughter of our young men would stop. In these circumstances, our failure to build essential military strength as rapidly as possible is an unprecedented failure to support our own troops.

4. The evidence also shows that the effort to develop effective allies has not proceeded as rapidly or on as large a scale as should have been the case. Had we begun such an effort in 1945 by training selected young military leaders, there would at the time of the Korean outbreak have been effective and friendly military forces in many countries--notably in Korea and in China—where we have instead been required to use a disproportionate number of our own troops. In Europe, too, the development of military units of Volunteers for Freedom can mean legitimate saving of American manpower which singly cannot carry the load—on land, on sea, and in the air—which otherwise will be expected of it.

5. We should cease obliging the Soviet Union by splitting with our allies in one part of the world over what happens in the other. For the Soviets to succeed in using far eastern questions as a device to break up the North Atlantic Alliance would be the cheapest great victory in history and would brand our diplomacy as asinine before the world. The State Department, functioning effectively as a great persuader, should have been able to reconcile these problems so that we work together in the east and cooperate in the west in rapidly building an impressive military force. There is not only no conflict between these goals: success in one area makes for success in the other. These are not at all impossible goals for an American diplomacy which is functioning properly. By the same token, the application of firm diplomatic pressure, once we have rebuilt our military strength, so that the Soviet Union will become a peaceful member of the family of nations is a task which an efficiently functioning State Department should be able to perform.

6. But we cannot expect foreign policy and diplomacy to be conducted dynamically and with real drive and enthusiasm so long as there is the present lack of public confidence in the State Department. A year ago as a minority member of the Tydings committee of unhappy memory, I pointed out that it is absolutely vital that there be a new birth of public confidence in the State Department and outlined a series of steps to take which would have made important progress toward that end. The need for a new birth of public confidence in the State Department is even more pressing today—and it is tragic that some of the most essential steps to create that confidence have not been taken.

V. STRENGTH FOR PEACE

The application of pressure to the Kremlin need not bring war; the Kremlin makes war only on those who are weak or unready. The quickest way to prevent world war III from occurring is to end the so-called limited war which is now being fought. The longer it lasts the greater the chance of its spreading.

The delay in getting this country on a sufficiently strong military footing so that it will have the unquestioned initiative over the Soviet Union and can thereby achieve the organization of a durable peace is one of the tragic mysteries of this era and one which runs counter to our tradition. When the aggression broke out in Korea in June 1950, I assumed that it would be the signal for a major effort to regain the initiative which we had thrown away in 1945 and 1946 and quickly to put real pressure for peace on the Kremlin. Instead there came a series of unpleasant surprises indicating that this was not to be the policy. There was the failure immediately to change our military-manpower legislation in the summer and autumn of 1950. There was the custom of several American representatives at the United Nations to eat with and have smiling handshaking pictures taken with the representatives of the Soviet Union--the nation which, as we all knew, was responsible for the North Korean aggression and with whose representatives one can work without fraternizing. There is the "dog eat dog" and "every man for himself" attitude regarding control of inflation now prevalent in Washington.

All are indications of a belief that the "limited" war in Korea does not require us as citizens to do our full share. And month by month the cream of our young manhood—the recent West Point classes, the young leaders in our Army and Marine Reserve, the young men from every corner of America who serve in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—swell the casualty list. These casualties are a tragedy for us. They are equally a tragedy for Europe since so many of these young men would have been the leaders in the armed forces now being created for North Atlantic defense.

This does not challenge the decision—which is undoubtedly wise—not to involve more forces in Korea than are already involved there. I have confidence in our military leaders. It does not deny that we have made some headway in building strength and that the words of official policy often express sound ideas. But it does challenge the failure to take all measures within our power—economic, military, and political—to end the war through application of pressure on the Kremlin—and to do so as rapidly as we can.

Failure to do all in our power to support our troops is a new development in America. It is a most unhappy one, full of baleful consequences for the future. It shocks our national sense od decency.

We should without delay build air superiority. We should pay what it costs in taxes, in inconveniences and in sacrifice. In addition to building this weapon we should also rehabilitate our State Department so that it can use this weapon as part of a dynamic foreign policy to put firm pressure for peace on the Kremlin to end the war in Korea and become a civilized member of the family of nations. We can then organize the peace which we should have organized in 1945 and 1946—those years when we threw away our Armed Forces and the power for peace which we had won at the cost of a million casualties.

APPENDIX SS

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE

The one simple issue before the Joint Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees which conducted the investigation of General Douglas MacArthur's recall was, Did General MacArthur's conduct as field commander in Korea justify his recall?

It is a matter of deep regret to me that some of my Republican colleagues on the joint investigating committee saw fit to release a very highly partisan and biased report on the MacArthur case. It is a report which almost entirely avoids any discussion of the issue before the committee throughout the investigation, namely, Did MacArthur's conduct justify the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of our country's Armed Forces in removing MacArthur from command. The report of my Republican colleagues is for the most part irrelevant, immaterial, and inconsequential as far as having any bearing upon the basic issue involved in the MacArthur investigation. I am satisfied that time will prove that even as a bit of political strategy my Republican colleagues will discover that their report was a great mistake. Their long, irrelevant discourse about our country's foreign policy in Asia bears no relevancy to the question of whether or not it is proper conduct for a military commander in the field to set himself up as a competing voice with the President of the United States in the field of military and foreign policy of his Government and follow a course of conduct which on many occasions proved embarrassing for his superiors in their carrying out of their superior obligations and duties.

The transcript of record of the hearings contains ample evidence that General MacArthur was guilty time and time again of that kind of conduct, and therefore, his military superiors were justified in recommending his recall, and the President was justified in recalling him.

I do not yield to any of my Republican colleagues on the committee in criticism of many features of the foreign policy of the United States in Asia during the past several years. I have presented my criticisms of our foreign policy in Asia on many occasions, both in speeches in the Senate and elsewhere. On July 28, 1945, I presented in a speech in the Senate, a proposal for the recognition of the provisional government of Korea. That speech contains a forewarning that if the United States failed to support a recognition of the provisional government of Korea and failed to support within the United Nations the recognition by the United Nations of the independence of Korea in keeping with the principle of self-determination of the United Nations Charter, there was a great danger that Korea would fall as a ripe plum into Russia's lap. Before and since his speech of July 28, 1945, the junior Senator from Oregon has expressed many disagreements with the Democratic administration over its policies in Asia, including the partition of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel.

For example, it was my opinion that our Government should have taken a much more adamant stand by insisting upon greater control in the administration of the distribution of economic aid to Nationalist China, and greater control over the handling of military aid. It has always been my opinion that the Nationalist Chinese Government not only would have cooperated with the United States Government in a program of greater participation in the administration of military and economic aid to Nationalist China, but undoubtedly would have welcomed it if our Government had put its foot down and demanded as a condition of the granting of such aid that the United States have a greater voice in the supervision of the distribution and administration of the aid. Some of us in the Senate at the time urged such a course of action, but we were unable to get to first base with the administration on this issue. However, already the pages of history of the past few years record that the maladministration of both military and economic aid by the Nationalist Chinese Government played right into the hands of the Communist propaganda tactics of Communist Russia, whose leaders, we all know, are the power and driving force behind the Chinese Communist leaders.

Thus I could go on and cite many other issues connected with our Asiatic policy in regard to which I differed with the policy of the administration, such as the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, and such as the proposal of the State Department in January 1950 that the front line of defense of the United States in the Pacific was to be a line drawn from the Aleutians through Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines. At the time of that announcement the junior Senator from Oregon took the position from which he has never varied, that our proposal to withdraw to such a line of defense brought great discouragement to millions of people in those areas of Asia where freedom still has a chance of survival, against the growing threat of communism. It is my opinion that shifts of attitude toward the United States in some parts of Asia, including India, bear some cause to effect relationship to the proposed retraction of America's line of defense in the Pacific as announced by the State Department in January 1950.

However, my disagreements with the administration over many of its specific foreign policy proposals and actions in Asia during the past several years bear no more relevancy to the issue involved in the MacArthur recall than the views of my Republican colleagues on Asiatic policies, which they set forth at such great length in their so-called minority report on the MacArthur case.

What must not be lost sight of in this case is that under our constitutional form of government the civilian leaders of our Government determine our country's foreign and military policy and the function of our military officials is to carry out and execute those policies. Our forefathers who wrote the Constitution of the United States recognized that the liberties and freedoms of the American people would be jeopardized if military leaders at any time were allowed to take unto themselves the prerogatives, either directly or indirectly, of enunciating and executing foreign and military policies independent of their civilian superiors.

By making the President of the United States the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy under our Constitution, our founding fathers wrote into the Constitution not only a guaranty of civilian control of the military, but they also by the same language in the Constitution, placed an obligation and a duty upon any President of the United States at any time to see to it that military commanders either cooperate with their civilian superiors in carrying out the foreign military policy of our Government or be relieved of their command.

As I said at the time of the investigation of the MacArthur case by the joint committee, I repeat now, namely, I do not approve of the procedure which was followed in recalling MacArthur. I agreed with the great General Bradley who testified to the effect that a more appropriate way should have been followed in dismissing MacArthur. It was my view, and I said so at the time, that the President should have called MacArthur to the White House for a conference. It would have been perfectly feasible to have left General Ridgway in command of our forces in Korea and Japan, while MacArthur flew to Washington for a conference with his Commander in Chief. At that conference I would have had present the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, and such other top officials of our Government as the President in his discretion might have deemed advisable. At such a conference an attempt should have been made to see if there was any basis upon which the differences which had developed between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one hand, and MacArthur, on the other hand, could have been reconciled. The transcript of record of the hearings satisfied me that in all probability it would have been impossible at such a conference to find any acceptable basis of reconciliation. MacArthur's proposal to expand the war to the mainland of China at a time when the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that our offensive power was not yet strong enough to run the risk of an all-out war with Russia, was opposed strongly as a matter of policy not only by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also by our allies within the United Nations.

However, I think that MacArthur's brilliant past service in his various military positions throughout his long career entitled him to an opportunity to be heard at such a White House conference, before a final decision was made relative to his dismissal. If at such a conference a basis of reconciliation between MacArthur and his superiors could not have been found, then I think the President and General MacArthur, keeping in mind the best interests of national unity, should have attempted to set forth their differences of viewpoint in a dignified joint public statement, closing with the announcement that in view of those differences it had been agreed between them that MacArthur should submit his resignation as commander in the field, and that the President had accepted the resignation.

Nevertheless, the fact cannot be escaped that although one may differ with the procedure which was followed in removing MacArthur from his command, the controlling issue still remains, Was the President justified in removing him?

My Republican colleagues either in the joint statement by eight of them or in the separate statements by two of them, avoid a consideration of that basic issue by discussing matters irrelevant and immaterial to it.

Where do we find the answer to that issue? We find it in the transcript of record taken throughout the hearings. It is a record which was made by witnesses testifying under oath, and it contains not only their testimony but a large number of exhibits which tell the story of the frictions and differences which developed between MacArthur and his superiors, including both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States. It is a record which satisfied me completely that the President was not only justified in recalling MacArthur, but in view of MacArthur's conduct over the months since the outbreak of the Korean War, it became the President's duty to recall him. In fact, I think he should have recalled him many months before he did. The record of the hearings makes perfectly clear that MacArthur, in both his speech before the Congress and his testimony before the committee, sought to leave the false impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with his proposals to carry the war to the mainland of China, when the contrary was the fact. The record of the hearings shows that MacArthur was so out of sympathy with the military and foreign policy of his Government in Asia that he and his superiors came to deal at arm's length with each other at a time when complete mutual confidence and teamwork cooperation were essential in the interest of national security.

MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese Communist leaders to meet with him on the field of battle and negotiate a truce or be threatened with extension of the war to the mainland of China, which he knew at the time was contrary to the military and foreign policy of his Government and of the United Nations, was inexcusable and indefensible. It alone would have been adequate grounds for his recall because the record of the hearings shows that beyond doubt his ultimatum greatly embarrassed the President, who at that time was seeking to carry out negotiation within the United Nations for an agreement among our allies on terms and conditions which should be offered as a basis of a truce in Korea.

It is highly probable that MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese Communist leaders in regard to a truce, including his threat to expand the war to the mainland of China, if they did not comply with the ultimatum, destroyed the best chance that the United Nations have had for negotiating an honorable peace in Korea. The dissension within the United Nations which the MacArthur ultimatum created played into the Russian Communist propaganda tactics. For days thereafter, the Russian propaganda line followed the big lie technique of misrepresenting the actual facts and sought to give an exaggerated impression that most of the members of the United Nations were out of sympathy with the policies of the United States in Asia, when the fact is they only opposed the policies as enunciated by MacArthur.

Be that as it may, the official record of the hearings shows that MacArthur's ultimatum did cause a discontinuance of further discussions between our Government and the foreign ministers of our allies in the United Nations, until such a time as the policy of the United States in respect to MacArthur's proposal of expanding the war to the mainland of China was clarified.

In his speeches in this country since his recall, MacArthur has clearly convicted himself of having been so out of sympathy with the military and foreign policy of his Government that any President of the United States, be he Democrat or Republican, would have been derelict in his duty had he not removed such a commander from the field.

My Republican colleagues cannot escape the fact that the supremacy of a basic constitutional doctrine of vital importance to the freedom and liberty of every American was threatened by MacArthur's conduct; namely, the supremacy of civilian government over military cliques. Whenever a military commander wishes to conduct himself as MacArthur did and seeks to set himself up as a competing voice with that of the President on American military and foreign policy, he should first resign his command, put on civilian clothes, and carry the issue as a civilian to the people of the United States. That MacArthur did not do. Therefore, his recall was necessitated by his own misconduct.

The American people owe a great deal of gratitude for the courage and devotion to duty of the Secretary of Defense and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who unanimously testified that MacArthur's course of action justified his recall.

It is of course very regrettable that in such a critical period of our history at a time when unity of purpose among our people is essential to our national security, such an incident as the MacArthur case should have arisen to divide our people. However, one of the great strengths of our system of self-government is the devotion of our people to constitutional principles. History has taught us that we will remain strong in our individual liberties only to the extent that we hold fast to the checks and balances of our Constitution.

As the MacArthur case passes into history, it will have left another indelible lesson for future generations of Americans to profit by, namely, the preservation of a system of government by law requires that officials of government, both those in military and civilian posts, must not attempt to exceed their line of command or authority.

WAYNE MORSE.

APPENDIX TT

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, August 17, 1951.

HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request, made during the course of my testimony before the combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, that the following be submitted for the record of the hearings:

(*a*) The text of all of General MacArthur's statements which are regarded as having significance in connection with his dismissal.

(*b*) A full explanation as to why it is contended that of each of these statements was considered to be in violation of directives or in conflict with known policies of the United States.

In fulfilling this request, I must point out initially that the President has stated that while the culminating factor in his decision was the publicly announced offer by General MacArthur on March 24, 1951, to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict with the commander of the enemy forces, he had considered the necessity of relieving him on several previous occasions, because of public statements by General MacArthur voicing disagreement or discontent with the policies of his Government. President Truman cited specifically the occasion of General MacArthur's proposed message to the VFW which the President directed him to withdraw on August 26, 1950. At that time, you may recall, the reason for the President's action was stated to be that he felt there could be but one voice expressing the foreign policy of the United States.

I should also point out that there was no attempt to draw up a bill of particulars at the time of the discussions between the President and his advisers preceding General MacArthur's relief. Notwithstanding this, I am listing below some statements by General MacArthur which I regard as having significance in connection with his relief, together with my views as to why it was considered that each of these statements was in violation of directives or in conflict with known policies of the United States. In view of the fact that some of the statements or messages are rather long, and because the full text of each of them has already been printed in the document Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East, I shall not repeat their text as you have requested. A page reference in the document mentioned is indicated for each statement.

(a) General MacArthur's proposed message to the VFW (p. 115)

In the message directing General MacArthur to withdraw this message, it was stated that various features of it with respect to Formosa were in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations. Specifically, it was considered that the policy advocated by General MacArthur with regard to Formosa did not agree in all respects with the statement of policy expressed by President Truman in his message to Congress on July 19, 1950, which was reiterated by Ambassador Austin in a letter to Secretary General Trygve Lie, dated August 25, 1950.

(b) The exchange of messages with Arthur Krock, dated November 29 and 30 1950 (p. 137); General MacArthur's answers to question put to him by a reporter from the United States News and World Report, first published in the New York Times on December 2, 1950 (p. 174); General MacArthur's message to Mr. Hugh Baillie, president of the United Press, dated December 1, 1950 (p. 176).

These three statements, made almost simultaneously, did not violate any specific directive. Each of them did, however, include comments relating to military-political decisions which had been made with regard to the conduct of the Korean conflict, and to matters affecting our relations with our United Nations allies. Traditionally, such comments by a military commander are submitted for clearance beforehand.

The Presidential directive of December 5, 1950, requiring prior clearance of statements concerning military or foreign policy, was in large measure generated because of these statements.

(c) General MacArthur's statement of February 13, 1951 (p. 181)

The fourth and fifth paragraphs of this statement were considered to be comments on established military policies. Meticulous compliance with the directive of December 5 1950, would have required that this statement be submitted for prior clearance.

(d) General MacArthur's statement of March 7, 1951 (p. 182)

The last paragraph of this statement was considered to be a comment affecting both foreign and military policies. It should therefore have been submitted for prior clearance in accordance with the December 5, 1950, directive.

(e) General MacArthur's announcement of March 24, 1951 (p. 23)

This statement was considered to be a direct and complete violation of the directive of December 5, 1950. Apart from this violation, the statement was particularly ill-advised and ill-timed in view of the fact that General MacArthur had been informed on March 20 that the President was planning an announcement relative to a possible settlement in Korea. The effect of this statement, with its implied threat of the expansion of military operations to Red China if General MacArthur's invitation were not accepted, and because of its impact on the negotiations then being conducted with our United Nations allies as to the terms of the possible settlement, was to cause the President's proposal to be abandoned.

(f) General MacArthur's letter to Representative Martin, dated March 20, 1951 (p. 185)

This letter indicated once more General MacArthur's inability to give his wholehearted support to the foreign and military policies of his Government. Both directly and implicitly it took issue with the political and military decisions to delimit the area of the Korean conflict, if possible, and therefore to avoid the risk of using Chinese Nationalist troops. Still further, the next to last paragraph, emphasizing the importance of the Asian area over Europe, was a direct foreign-policy statement involving the reactions of all our allies in Western Europe and complicating our dealings with them. Once again the question was raised of whose voice spoke for the United States on foreign-policy matters.

(*g*) *General MacArthur's message to the editor of the Freeman magazine dated April 5, 1951 (p. 186)*

This statement became public during the time the President was considering with his advisers the relief of General MacArthur. Its significance was not so much that it violated a directive or conflicted with policy, but that the final sentence gave a misleading impression, in view of the fact that the decision not to arm additional South Korean units had been made largely because of General MacArthur's recommendation against it.

In furnishing the above, I wish to restate what I think is apparent from the testimony in the course of the hearings: that there was no single incident or statement which was the efficient cause of General MacArthur's relief, and that the fact that many of his statements were considered to be in violation of policies or directives was not the essential reason for his relief. In my testimony I stated at length my own reasons for supporting the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur. I stressed that it was not merely because General MacArthur had publicly expressed his disagreement with the foreign and military policies of the United States, but because by doing so it became doubtful whether, due to his open lack of sympathy with the established policies of the United States, he could any longer be permitted to exercise the authority of making the decisions required of a theater commander.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff each gave their separate reasons why they concurred, from a military point of view, in the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur. Their reasons were summarized by General Bradley in his testimony along the following lines:

"That by his public statements and by his official communications to us, he had indicated that he was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea. This would make it difficult for him to carry out Joint Chiefs of Staff directives. Since we had decided to try to confine the conflict to Korea and avoid a third world war, it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington.

"That General MacArthur had failed to comply with the Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public. He had also taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice and had made that statement public despite the fact that he knew the President had such a proposal under consideration from a governmental level.

"That the Joint Chiefs of Staff have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country."

It is plain, therefore, that the reasons behind the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur, and those of his advisers in concurring with the decision, were not merely that he violated directives or disagreed with military and foreign policy decisions. It was General MacArthur's course of conduct, pursued over a period of months, in publicizing his disagreement, thereby creating doubt and confusion in the minds of the American people and our United Nations allies as to whose voice expressed the foreign policy of the United States, and indicating that he could not give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and the United Nations, which led to the President's action, and the unanimous concurrence of his advisers.

Faithfully yours,

G. MARSHALL.

APPENDIX UU

AUGUST 18, 1951.

Hon. STYLES BRIDGES,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATER BRIDGES: There is enclosed a copy of a letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense with further reference to your request of June 12 for an intelligence study concerning the effect of Russian entry into the war against Japan.

This letter was received yesterday but was not brought to my attention in time to be taken up at the meeting of the committees. Unless you object, I shall instruct the staff to have the letter insered in the appendix of the record.

Sincerely,

RICHARD B. RUSSELL.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, August 16, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is with further regard to a request by Senator Bridges dated June 12, 1951, which you forwarded, that a copy of an intelligence study concerning the effect of Russian entry into the war against Japan be furnished for the use of the combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. Senator Bridges believes that such a study was prepared by a group of senior officers in G–2 of the War Department in the early spring of 1945.

In a letter dated June 20, 1951, I informed you that up to that time the Department of the Army had been unable to locate any document fitting the description given, but would continue to search for it. On June 21 Senator Bridges read into the record of the hearings a document bearing the date of April 21, 1945, which he believed to be a copy of the study in question. Senator Bridges also gave the names of 10 officers who he had been informed had shared in the preparation of the study.

The Department of the Army has continued to search for the document requested by Senator Bridges, but has not been able to locate it. In addition, the relevant portion of the June 21 record of the hearings was sent to 9 of the 10 officers named by Senator Bridges, and they were asked to furnish any information they could recollect concerning a study of the nature of the one read into the record. The tenth officer named by Senator Bridges, Col. Joseph A. Michela, is now deceased.

The replies received from the nine officers are similar in stating that the subject of Soviet participation in the war against Japan was discussed by the area specialists in G–2 early in 1945 and that their views on the subject were in general agreement with those expressed in the document quoted by Senator Bridges. However, only three of the officers concerned, Colonels Black, Truman Smith, and Yeaton, recalled participating in the preparation of such a study. One other officer, Colonel Kenyon, thought that the document quoted by Senator Bridges was familiar in thought and phraseology but could not identify it otherwise. The remaining five officers, Colonels Booth, Delaney, Jadwin, Mayer, and Harvey Smith, had no specific recollection of having participated in the preparation of such a study or having seen one like it.

Four of the nine officers concerned, Colonels Booth, Mayer, Truman Smith, and Harvey Smith, also commented that some of the language or thoughts expressed in the document quoted by Senator Bridges appear to be inappropriate or unlike those normally used in a G–2 study. Paragraphs 11 and 12 and the recommendation were mentioned specifically in this connection.

Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, at the time concerned, was also contacted in connection with the search for the study requested by Senator Bridges. He could not identify the document read into the record as being familiar to him.

The Department of the Army, in furtherance of its efforts to locate the study in question, communicated with the officers named as I outlined above, with the thought that they would be assisted in their search. Unfortunately, it cannot be found.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT W. LOVETT, *Acting Secretary.*

APPENDIX VV [1]

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington 25, D. C., August 31, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your letter of July 19, 1951, to the Secretary of State requesting the full text of the report of General Hurley, and to the letter from the Department of State to you dated August 2, 1951, enclosing the majority of the material requested and stating that the release of the remainder, composed of cables, was under consideration for cryptographic reasons.

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[1] See also Appendix LL.

Accordingly, originals of the enclosed cables were forwarded to this Department by the Department of State for clearance. The enclosures are in paraphrased form and have been declassified.

Faithfully yours,

Robert A. Lovett, *Acting Secretary.*

Enclosures:
Telegrams, Chungking:
January 31, 1945.
January 31, 1945.
January 31, 1945.
February 7, 1945.
February 17, 1945.
February 18, 1945.

Chungking, *January 31, 1945.*

Secretary of State from Hurley:

Agreement between the National Government of China, and Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China.

One. The Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China will work together for the unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.

Two. The present National Government is to be reorganized into a Coalition National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese Parties and non-Partisan political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for reforms in military, political, economic, and cultural affairs shall be promulgated and made effective. At the same time the National Military Council is to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of all anti-Japanese Armies.

Three. The Coalition National Government will support the principles of Sun Yat Sen for the establishment in China of a Government of the people, for the people, and by the people. The Coalition National Government will pursue policies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, the right to petition the Government for the redress of grievances, the right to writ of habeas corpus and the right of residence. The Coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make effective those two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.

Four. All anti-Japanese forces will observe and carry out the orders of the Coalition National Government and its United National Military Council and will be recognized by the Government and the Military Council. The supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equally distributed.

Five. The Coalition National Government of China recognizes the legality of the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party and all anti-Japanese Parties. (GD) Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Signed November 10, 1944 (GD) Patrick J. Hurley, Personal Representative of the President of the United States signed November 10, 1944.

Chungking, *January 31, 1945.*

Secretary of State from Hurley:

One. The National Government desirous of securing effective unification and concentration of all military forces in China for the purpose of accomplishing the speedy defeat of Japan, and looking forward to the post-war reconstruction of China, agrees to incorporate, after reorganization, the Chinese Communist forces in the National Army who will then receive equal treatment as the other units in respect to pay, allowance, munitions and other supplies; and to give recognition of the Chinese Communist Party as a legal political party.

Two. The Communist Party of China undertake to give their full support to the National Government in the prosecution of the war of resistance, and in the post-war reconstruction, and give over control of all their troops to the National Government, through the National Military Council. The National Government will designate some high ranking officer from among the Communist forces to membership in the National Military Council.

Three. The aim of the National Government, to which the Communist Party subscribe, is to carry out the three peoples' principles of Sun Yat Sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people and by the people, and will pursue policies designed to promote the progress and development of democratic processes in government.

In accordance with the provisions of the "outline of the program for the prosecution of the war of resistance and reconstruction," freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association and other civil liberties are hereby guaranteed, subject only to the specific needs of security in the effective prosecution of the war against Japan.

CHUNGKING, *January 31, 1945.*

Secretary of State from Hurley:

Never before has America made the effort to use its good offices in actual negotiations to bring about a unification of the military forces of China. Official personnel of this embassy have communicated with, observed or reported on the Communists, but none have negotiated with the communists for the unification of the Communists and National forces. For that reason we have no official personnel in the Embassy, except myself, prepared to make either decisions or reports on the subject which I am covering. I make this statement not as criticism but as a statement of fact.

I am dictating these reports to an Army stenographer. Meetings are being held among representatives of all American Agencies in China in an effort to do away with overlapping and conflicts. Regular conferences are being held under my supervision with the American military Commander and the Generalissimo. I am also carrying on my routine duties as ambassador. My aim is to coordinate American authorities in China. It is difficult for me personally to attend so many conferences and also handle my paper work. I have wired the Department suggesting a set-up for this Embassy which I hope will have attention when convenient.

Our action in attempting to unify the forces of China to help us defeat the enemy are justified by the fact that that enemy is relentless. The battle effect of a unified Communist Party and National Government military force would be equal to at least one fully equipped American Army. Much more consideration than has heretofore been given by America should be given to the effect of unification of the Chinese military forces. The Generalissimo and the American Commander have both given approval, advice and direction to my negotiations with the Communists.

Talks between the Chinese Communist Party and the National Government have been resumed. The communist Chou En-Lai and Dr. Soong of the Nationalists both are able debaters. From the outset, it was emphatically stated by both sides that there were many obstacles to any practical agreement between the two factions.

By way of background, I had at different times during the Stilwell controversy with the Generalissimo discussed the necessity of uniting China's military forces. I urged that if the military forces of China were united that the Japanese could be driven from China. The Generalissimo was willing to have me negotiate with the Communists in an effort to bring about unity. But Nationalists advised that the crimes committed by the Communists were so grave that reconciliation seemed out of the question.

The Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist troops, General Chu Teh, invited me on Sepember 11, 1944, to make a visit and personal investigation. This invitation was made on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the new Eighth and Fourth Route Communist Armies. I was to go to the Communists' city of Yenan. The Generalissimo was notified of this invitation. As he wished me to postpone this visit, I began extensive work with the Nationalist Government Committee. Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, now Minister of Information, and General Chang Tze-Chung, Director of political training of the national military council were members of this committee. According to the idea of Dr. Sun Yat San, China was to remain under one-party rule until a period of tutelage would make it ready to support a democratic government. The two gentlemen mentioned above were dedicated to this proposal. It was their view that the time had not arrived to institute a by-party or multi-party government. With the help of these two men and Dr. Soong, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Generalissimo, five points were evolved by me, some of them rather innocuous. The National Government Committee agreed with the five points. These points were suggested by me after conference with the local representatives of the Communist Party as well as after meetings between representatives of the National Government. With the advice and consent of the General and American Commander, on November 7, I flew to Yenan. I was received enthusiastically. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung in opening the first formal meeting expressed great admiration that I had come to Yenan at a time when it was necessary for my plane to be covered by fighter escorts. He stated that the meeting was so important that I had risked my life to come to see him. He stated that that fact impressed him with the earnestness of our desire to see all Chinese military forces united to defeat Japan and to prevent civil war in China. We argued, agreed, disagreed, denied, and admitted in the most strenuous but most friendly fashion and pulled and hauled my five points until they were finally revised. Two days and two nights were consumed. Mao Tse-Tung signed. Thus the Chinese Communists' proposal to the National Government. The whole document contained no unnecessary details and was included on one page. It was agreed that the document would remain secret until Mao Tse-Tung and myself agreed to publish it or until the negotiations were closed. Every precaution to keep it from becoming published has been taken by the National Government. The document is still secret. It would be injurious to our negotiations if the contents of the agreement should be made public. Therefore every precaution by the State Department should be taken. Even though I have outlined the documents and reports to the President, this is the first time that I have given the entire document. So that the State Department shall be fully informed in order to furnish me with direction, cooperation, and support in these negotiations, it is essential that the entire document be given at this time. November 10, 1944, is the date of the Communist Party five-point proposal to the National Government.

(Section 2.) I had contracted a heavy cold in Yenan. I was confined to my room the day after I returned (November 11). On that day a signed copy of the Communist proposals were sent to Dr. Soong and the others of the National Government. It was to be translated and given to the Generalissimo. Dr. Wang and Dr. Soong is a state of considerable perturbation, came to my room and Dr. Soong immediately said, "The Communists have sold you a bill of goods. Never will the National Government grant the Communists' request." Only one of the many defects in the proposal pointed out by him seemed to me to have merit. Dr. Soong said that the Communists had asked for a change in the name of the Chinese Government when what they really meant to say was that they desired a Coalition Administration. As this was trivial, I thought that it could be readily corrected. I maintained that the offer by the Communists had outlined at least a basis upon which to construct a settlement. Dr. Wang and Dr. Soong saw the Generalissimo before I did. He was convinced by them that an agreement on the Communist terms was impracticable. The Generalissimo argued that to agree to a Coalition Government would be an acknowledgement of total defeat of his party by the Communists. The acceptance of the plan he pointed out would have a serious effect on the war effort and at a time when the situation in China was already precarious would cause controversy. He also said that the proposed plan would be more convincing without the proposed plan outlined for China, in the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. I well understood that the National Government must be maintained and therefore of course I had deep sympathy with him. A collapse of the National Government would have caused chaos. The Communists authorized me to say to Chang Kai-shek that the Communists pledged themselves to support and sustain his leadership both as the President of the Government and as the Generalissimo. Pointing to the peculiar Chinese psychology, to accept the proposal would mean total defeat for him and his party, said the Generalissimo. He was kind enough, however, to say that the basis for settlement that I had obtained from the Communists would in his opinion be accepted as a settlement of the same kind of a controversy in Washington or in London. In order to avoid the word "coalition" I suggested to Generalissimo that he revise the Communist offer and call the result a multi-party or a by-party or a party representative government. In order to prevent the collapse of the National Government, I believe that an agreement between the Chinese Communist Party and the National Government would strengthen the Government both morally and politically. The arguments of General Chou En Lai, advising Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, who had accompanied me from Yenan to Chungking were as ineffective as my own. The Government finally and definitely declined the offer of settlement. Three-point counter proposal was made by the Government.

Even though Dr. Wang stated in meeting, that the three-point counterproposal was prepared by me and that it represented my idea of a fair compromise, this was not the fact. I replied publicly that there was not one word of the counterproposal that I considered mine and that I had not listed it as being my idea of an equitable compromise. I disclaim authorship of the three-point proposal. I would not denounce it. Even though I argued the three-point proposal with Gen. Chow En Lai and attempted to persuade him that it would be favorable on the whole should the Communists accept the proposal and thus be in cooperation with the National Government to effect a unification of a National and Chinese Communist forces for the defeat of the enemy, the three-point proposal was not, of course, acceptable to the Communist Party. The three-points proposal would provide for the recognition of the Chinese Communist Party as a regular political party in China and I pointed this out. It was at this juncture in the discussion that the Chinese Communists began to charge the Chinese Government with bad faith. They said that the Chinese Government intended to keep China divided against herself, did not desire to effect the unification of China and that the Chinese Government was in correspondence with Japan and was supported by the Imperialistic Governments of Southeast Asia. The numerous charges and countercharges of that period are not to be recited here. The representatives of the National Government charged all the atrocities committed in China during the civil war and much of those committed during the war of resistance to the Communists. Without having made any notable progress in his negotiations with the Government Chow En Lai returned to Yenan.

In all my negotiations with the Communists I have insisted that the United States will not (repeat not) supply or otherwise aid the Chinese Communists as a political party or as an insurrection against the National Government. Any aid to the Chinese Communist Party from the United States must go to that Party through the National Government of China. The Chinese Communist Party demands recognition both for itself and other Anti-Japanese Political Parties in China, in the policy-making agencies of the Government. The Communist Party demands the end of the single Party Government by the Kuomintang. The Chinese Communist Party had never mentioned to me that they desired to obtain control of the National Government until if and when they achieve control through political election.

The Communist Party says it will agree to submit its army to the control of the National Government if it is given proper representation in the National Government.

In both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party there is objection to the unification of the military forces of China. The Kuomintang Party points to the fact that it began as a Party of Sun Yat San, the Party of Reformation in China and has brought China through a revolution and through nearly 8 years of the war of resistance, and believes that they have been successful and that they have served China well. They are naturally reluctant to surrender and end one-party control of China. Members of Chinese Communist Party oppose unification with the Chinese National Government on the ground that the Government is incompetent, corrupt, and destructive of the welfare of China.

All of the representatives of the so called Imperialistic Colonial Powers of Southeast Asia are opposed to unification. It appears that the policy of the Imperialistic Powers is to keep China divided against herself.

Among some of our own military men there is objection to the coalition on the ground that the Communist Armed Party is stronger than the National Army. Thus they reason we should bypass the National Government and deal directly with the Communists. In my opinion this objection is based on mistaken and erroneous premises.

CHUNGKING, *7 February 1945.*

Secretary of State from Hurley:

This is part two.

As previously outlined, General Chou made no appreciable progress in his talks with the Government and returned to Yenan. During this period of his negotiations, I continuously discussed with Wang Shih-Chiek, T. V. Soong, General Chang Chik-Chung and the Generalissimo, the relations between the Government of China and the Communist Party of China. The National Committee for negotiations with the party now included as an ex officio member Dr. Soong. I was able to spend considerable time with the Generalissimo and eventually convinced him that without a settlement with the Communist Party we could not expect China to emerge from the war as a strong, free, united, democratic China, nor could we expect a unified military force in China. In addition, the Generalissimo was convinced that if he was going to have a unified military force in China under his control certain political concessions on his part would be necessary. His first concession was to change personnel in his cabinet. This improved the relations between the American military establishment and Embassy, the Chinese military establishment and the Chinese Government. There was some justified criticism of this action (that Chiang should do even more) by the Communists, by the American publicists and others, but those of us close to the situation realized that he had gone a long way and would make further concessions.

I informed the President of the U. S. regarding the Communists' controversy and the concessions to which the Kuomintang, the National Government and the Generalissimo would concede. The Generalissimo was prepared to agree to the following:

(1) A U. S. Army officer to work on a committee with a representative of the Communist Party and the Government to work out the problems of reincorporating the Communist troops in the Nationalist Army.

(2) Establishment of a coalition War Cabinet in fact, but not in name which would include Communists and other non-Kuomintang members.

(3) Include Communist representation in the Government.

(4) The Communists to be recognized as a legal political party.

(5) Organizing accordance to Chiang's New Year message a national congress prior to the end of the war.

(6) The Communist troops to be under the over-all command of a U. S. Army officer. (This point was included since it was the desire of both parties. However, I stated that my approval of this point would require direction from my government.)

It is my opinion that this approach had one weakness and I so informed the Generalissimo. He was giving a lot and getting very little in return, namely he was not obtaining control of the Communist Army by the Nationalist Government but at the same time was giving the Communists what they desire. The five-point proposal submitted to me (Part I) is the only document in which the Communists have outlined their requirements for submitting control of their forces to the Nationalist Government.

I have put together here the concessions made at various time by the Government and the Generalissimo.

The following is in substance the contents of a letter I received on December 8, 1944, from Chou En-Lai after his return to Yenan.

"The refusal of the Generalissimo and the National Government of our minimum five point proposal, clearly showing disagreement with our suggestions for a coalition government and united military council and the submission of the three point counterproposal, preclude the possibility of my returning to Chungking for further negotiations. We find it impossible to see any fundamental common basis in these new proposals. We feel that publication of our five-point proposal is now called for in order to inform the public and to bring out the changing attitude of the Government.

"Despite the fact that President Chiang has so limited the question of military cooperation between us that no easy solution can be achieved, we completely desire to continue to discuss with you and General Wedemeyer the concrete problems of our future military cooperation and to continue the closest contact with the United States Observers Section in Yenan. Chairman Mao Tsetung has especially asked me to express his deep thanks and appreciation for your sympathy and energetic efforts on behalf of unity in China."

All my communications with Yenan without exception were sent with the full knowledge and consent of the high officials of the National Government. I wrote Chou En-Lai that it was my understanding that the five-point offer of settlement proposed by the Chinese Communists was to form the basis of discussion and was not a "take it or leave it" proposition; that the Communist Party was willing to consider suggestions for amendments by the National Government and that the three-point offer in response to the Communist proposal was not the final word of the National Government; that both instruments were steps in the negotiations and it was my understanding that publication of the five-point Communist proposal would be withheld while negotiations were pending. I did not believe that negotiations had been terminated unless General Chou so wished them, and I knew that the National Government was disposed to make every effort to unify China. I felt it would be a great tragedy if the door were closed at this critical hour to further discussions.

General Chou replied on December 16, 1944, stating that the unexpected and flat rejection by the Kuomintang of the Communist five-point proposal caused a deadlock in the negotiations and rendered his return to Chungking useless. He indicated that this could not be construed as Communist discontent with the United States and that he agreed with my advice against the publication of the five points, but insisted that they should be made public when the appropriate time came. The one fundamental difficulty with respect to these negotiations, he felt, was the unwillingness of the Kuomintang to forsake one-party rule and accept the proposal for a "democratic coalition government."

I replied to General Chou En-Lai in a telegram on December 21, 1944, stating my belief that chances for success along the general lines of the Communist proposals would be "brighter than ever before if he would come again to Chungking." On December 24, Mao Tse-tung telegraphed me stating that General Chou was occupied with "important conference preparations" which made his departure from Yenan difficult. Mao stated that the National Government had not shown sufficient sincerity to warrant continuing negotiations on the basis of the five-point proposal and he suggested a conference in Yenan. On December 28, General Chou wrote me that the Communists would not be willing to continue abstract discussions on the question of accepting their proposal for a "democratic coalition government." He proposed instead the following four additional points which he requested me to communicate to the Chinese Government authorities "to see whether they are determined to realize democracy and unity": (1) The release of all political prisoners; (2) the withdrawal of Kuomintang forces surrounding the border region and those attacking the new Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Communist column; (3) the abolition of all oppressive regulations restricting the people's freedom; and (4) cessation of all secret service activity.

CHUNGKING, *February 17, 1945.*

Secretary of State from Hurley:

KUOMINTANG—Communist negotiations.

A telegram for Wedemeyer stated that General Chou En Lai had valuable and important information for Wedemeyer, *eyes alone*, who should decide its disposition in the United States. Chou was quoted as stating specifically that "General Hurley must not get this information as I don't trust his discretion." The information, it was said, was a definite and precise account of negotiations between the Japanese and the National Government for a sell-out of American interests. After further stating that part of the story was documented by copies of correspondence of high authority and involved some of the highest military and civilian personalities in government, the telegram concluded that the story was the "gravest charge against a responsible ally I ever heard from any responsible person." The writer of the telegram was sincere and I wish you to be convinced of that. He was honestly of the opinion that he was being given the foundation documents which would prove that an agreement had been entered into between the National Government of China and the Government of Japan.

All the reporting concerning an agreement between the National Government and Japan has been based on these documents. All the documents have been directed toward one purpose which is to discredit the National Government in China. Understand that in saying this I am not condemning either the diplomatic or military reporters for having been misled by the rumors. From the beginning, my own opinion was that the rumors were too unrealistic to be true.

General Wedemeyer recently handed to me, in the strictest confidence, 22 documents which had been brought from Yenan to him. They were for my inspection. After microfilming them for the files of the Embassy, I returned them to him. The first document consisted of the so-called proof of the negotiations between the Japanese and the Nationalists. It was written on unheaded paper, in Chinese. It was not signed or dated and it contained no CFU seal. In summary it stated as follows:

The Vice President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance of the Puppet Nanking Government, Chow Fu Hai, in August 1944, went to Japan to discuss peace terms. It was indicated to Chow by Koiso at that time that he would welcome Chiang Kai-shek's mediation between the Allies and Japan. In

September 1944, Mhibuyama, Jap Vice Minister of War, proceeded to Nanking to continue the talks. He presented five principles for discussion:

(1) The Nanking Government and Japan both to have equal standing in negotiations; (2) The withdrawal of Jap and United States forces from China; (3) After attitude of Chungking Government was made clear a guarantee of the withdrawal of Jap forces from China; (4) Relations between Nanking and Chungking Governments to be settled between themselves; and (5) As to future relations with England and the United States respect to be paid to the Chungking Government's opinion. Chow Fu Hai sent representatives with a series of peace proposals from the Generalissimo which included the above-mentioned five points. Chungking was urged to declare neutrality before American troops landed on the coast and Chow requested that Chungking send a high-ranking official to reside in Shanghai or Nanking to maintain contact with both Puppets and Japs. It was also stated that if peace with China was not obtained, Japan would move the capital to Hsingking or Kalgan, give up islands and carry center of war to Chinese continent—thus threatening to destroy Chinese economy, giving the Communists an opportunity to expand, and giving the upper hand to the United States Army. A letter was sent to Chow approving of proposals, offering an exchange of information and volunteering no attempt to bring Chungking and Nanking together. On his return to Nanking, the Puppet Ambassador to Japan urged one Lai Shih Hao to proceed to Chungking to discuss matters with Chiang. Li reportedly sent his son, Li Yin Shu, in his place. Li Yin Shu was formerly Assistant Manager of the Central Trust in Hongkong. Li Yin Shu left for Chungking in December 1944. "It is possible that Li will see a relative after he arrives in Chungking." End of Summary.

The second document prepared by the Communists and submitted under covering letter addressed to Wedemeyer by General Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist Forces, was entitled "Project and budget for destroying and bringing over Puppet forces during 1945."

Such is the "documentary proof" cited to show that these have been negotiations between the Japanese and the Chungking Governments.

I stated in part five of my telegram to the Department that I was not impressed by the belief held by certain American diplomatic and military officers that the Generalissimo had made a deal with Japan and that without such a deal his government would collapse. These are stock agreements of Imperialists, the Chinese Communist party, and other opponents of a United China that do not impress me, but as I stated, I was recounting them for the record. (Here a portion of the original telegram was garbled.) * * * If the document were true it would still fail to prove anything of the nature reported by our diplomatic agents and our military intelligence officers. The purpose of attempting to show an agreement between the Japanese and the National Government is more fully indicated in the analysis of the documents given below.

Following is a summary of the second document received from the Communists.

The Communists during 1944 won over approximately 3.8% of the total Puppet strength in China or 34,167 Puppet soldiers of the at present approximately 900,000 Puppet troops in China including 410,000 regulars and 490,000 local troops. Along with the troops 20,850 side arms, rifles, mortars, field pieces, et cetera, came under the control of the Communists. It is estimated that with American financial help the former figure could be increased during 1945 to 10% of the entire Puppet force, or 90,000 men. The budget is divided into two parts: a reserve fund to be used for sabotage and demolition work to be carried out behind Jap lines by the Puppet troops along with the principal expenses for political and financial measures for buying over Puppet soldiers and officers.

General Chu Teh while stating in his letter of January 23 to General Wedemeyer that his army would assume full responsibility for repayment following victory over Japan requested that the United States Army lend the Communist Army $20,000,000 United States currency for its undertaking.

Apparently these two documents have a real connection in that the proposal for making a loan of $20,000,000 to the Communists is predicated on acceptance by us of the "proof" of the bad faith of the National Government present in the first document. It is clear from the statement contained in the telegram to military headquarters to the effect that the documents not be shown to me that the Communist leaders were afraid that I might penetrate their scheme. It clearly indicates that the Communist Party hoped to bypass the National Government as well as this Embassy to obtain financial assistance and arms through out military establishment without the knowledge of the Government of China or this Embassy.

General Wedemeyer and myself have been working in closest cooperation on this subject. He has finally instructed his officers to refrain from participating in political discussions at least until we have reached a decision in the controversy now pending between the Chinese Communist armed party and the National Government of China.

The established policy of the United States to sustain Chiang Kai Shek as Generalissimo of the Armies and as President of the Government and to prevent the collapse of the National Government would be defeated by acceptance of the Communist Party's plan or by granting the Lend-lease and monetary assistance requested by General Chu Teh. Although financial assistance of the type requested by General Chu might in the end prove to be more economical than importing a similar quantity of arms and ammunition from the United States for use against Japan, I am of the firm opinion that such help would be identical to supplying arms to the Communist armed party and would therefore be a dangerous precedent.

Going forward to you by pouch are copies of documents referred to herein.

CHUNGKING, *February 18, 1945.*

Secretary of State from Hurley:

A report on the negotiations currently taking place between the Communist Party of China and the National Government of China follows:

General Chou En-Lai, representing the Communist Party, and Dr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, Minister of Information, and General Chang Chih Chung, Director of Political Training of National Military Council represented the National Government. I attended at the invitation of both parties. At the close of our second meeting on January 24, Dr. Wang Shih Chieh presented for consideration the following:

(These proposals were received in a separate paper.)

(It was indicated that an American Army officer would participate in the plan. I had to state that I had no authority from my government to agree to that proposal.)

General Chou En-Lai studied the proposal and then stated that Dr. Wang Shih Chieh was not yet fully impressed by the Communists primary objectives. Chou En-Lai further stated that the document presented by Dr. Wang Shih Chieh was based upon Kuomintang concessions while the Kuomintang was still to remain in control of the government. Chou En-Lai stated that the above was true notwithstanding the New Year's speech of the Generalissimo, in which he spoke of returning the control of the government to the people and adopting a constitution. Chou En-Lai reiterated the positive stand taken by Mao Tse Tung and himself when I was in conference with them at Yenan, namely that only when the one party rule of the Kuomintang has been abolished and control of the Government turned over to a coalition administration composed of the representatives of the political parties will the Communist Party submit command of its troops to the National Government or join the National Government in an effort to unify China. These ideas were the ones expressed in the Communist five points, signed by Mao on November 10, 1944, and submitted to the National Government. Further, Chou En-Lai at that time said that he agreed that a military commission or council should be set up for the unification and reorganization of the armed forces of China. Chou En-Lai did not agree that such a committee would reorganize only the Communist troops. He contended that the entire military establishment of China should be reorganized and he looked favorably on the idea of an American serving on the commission. The commission would plan the reorganization and direct its execution.

I told the Generalissimo of this Communist position in a meeting with him and Dr. T. V. Soong and Dr. Wang Shih Chieh. Chiang stated at this meeting that he was, according to the will of Dr. Sun Yat Sen and Chiang's own New Year's day speech, taking steps to abolish the single party rule of the Kuomintang and to pass to the people the control of the national government. In Chiang's opinion all the political parties in China, the Kuomintang included, make up less than 2% of the population of China. He believes it to be his duty to develop a democratic constitution for China adopted not by a convention in which only the minority organized political parties will take part but by one in which all the people of China are represented. He expressed his opinion that the Communist Party of China professes to be democratic only for the purpose of endeavoring to achieve control of the administration of the National Government; that in fact it is not a democratic party. The word "communism" does not mean "democracy," Chiang pointed out and he further stated that if the Communists claim to be democratic why do they continue to call themselves Communists. In order to shorten the period of transition and gain control of the Communist forces I indicated to Chiang that political concessions should be made. As the first step toward China's major objections of unification of all military forces to defeat Japan and unification of China to prevent outside forces from keeping China divided against herself and further objectives of preventing a civil war in China and obtaining a democratic China under a democratic constitution adopted by a convention of the Chinese people I impressed on Chiang that his most important objective at the moment was unifying the armed forces of China.

Chou En Lai had in the meantime devoted all of this time in the conferences toward advocating a friendly consultative meeting in Chungking of representatives of other parties as well as the Communist party and the Kuomintang. It was suggested by him that some nonpartisan persons be invited to attend this meeting.

It was my idea that a bipartisan group be set up which would devise the plan for unification serving as a procedural steering guide to conduct all parties during the transitory period of the government from a one-man government into a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Chou En-Lai suggested also that some nonpartisan person be invited to attend this meeting. Dr. T. V. Soong during each debate ably described the objectives, position, and success of the Kuomintang in conducting the government up to the present. Chou En-Lai presented the Communist Party objectives. The Nationalists' position, as ably set forth by T. V. Soong was that the Kuomintang is the party of Sun Yat Sen and the party of reformation in China; and further that it is the party of liberalism. Dr. Soong contended that historically it is now responsible for the government of China; that it has been steadfast in upholding its ideals through the reformation and during the war against the Japanese; that there will be chaos in China without the Kuomintang; and that, since he had become Acting President of the executive Yuan, he keenly felt his personal responsibility for preventing a chaos which would result from a collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

The above points were presented in an eloquent and a vigorous manner. With the exception of the argument that now the time had come when, in accordance with the will of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, and the desire of the Chinese people, the government should be turned back to the people, Chou En-Lai agreed with Dr. Soong's arguments. Chou En-Lai insisted that the leaders of the major parties of China must trust each other and form a coalition in order to sustain the government through the transitory period. The Nationalist Government replied, via Dr. Soong, that it was not in favor of surrendering authority in the midst of a war against the Japanese because the resulting weakness during the transitory period might cause the collapse of the government. Chou En-Lai assured them that the National Government would have the unlimited support of the Communists if the proper concessions were made. Chou made it known that it was necessary that China be united, for otherwise imperialistic nations economically interested in China would keep her divided against herself and thus would keep her from economic development depriving her of her rightful place among the nations of the world.

General Chou and Dr. Wang were appointed as a committee to draw up a document which would pave the way for action. Just prior to the assignment of the committee, Dr. Wang Shih Chieh told me that he felt I favored the position taken by Chou En-Lai. I was not in full agreement with the position taken by Chou, and I frankly told him so; but I also added that the fundamental issues involved had been debated by everyone so many times that we were now merely repeating what had been said before. I reminded them that they had been negotiating with the Communists for over five years, and I ended up by saying that everyone had made too many speeches; that there had been too much negotiating and no action.

Dr. Wang, on February 3, presented a draft to me (this draft is included in another document). That very afternoon Chou informed me that he was sending the draft to Yenan and he stated that for the first time he had a feeling that we were reaching a basis upon which cooperation would result. The following day, during a meeting between myself, T. V. Soong, and Chiang, the Generalissimo said he had consented to the plans stated in the foregoing proposal but that he felt that the Communists obtained what they had been endeavoring to obtain all along. I frankly replied that the only previous instrument with which we could have worked was the Communist Five-Point Proposal; that if he had revised the proposal at the time it was offered, that the Communists, in my opinion, would have been reasonable in their acceptance of any revision. I further stated that it was the only document in which there is a signed agreement by the Communists to submit control of their armed forces to the National Government. The chances for successful conclusion are restricted by the fact that the conclusions of the suggested political consultant committee must be unanimous before the National Government will be bound to act. The further restriction is the fact that the unification of the armed forces is still predicated on political action to be taken by the Kuomintang in the future. The document drawn up by Wang and Chou, agreed to by Chiang, had been transmitted to Yenan. He said that all the arguments and all the documents submitted should indicate to you that the Chinese Communist Party is not democratic; that its purpose is to destroy the control of the government by the Kuomintang before here has been an opportunity to adopt a constitution or to return the control of the government to the people on a democratic basis. The government representatives, including the Generalissimo, claim that the support of democratic principles given by the Communists is merely a ruse which they are using in an effort to obtain control of the government under the Communist one-party rule. The representatives of the National Government state that the real purpose of the Chinese Communist Party is to overthrow control by the Kuomintang Party and obtain a one-party rule of China by the Chinese Communist Party and in the evolution of the one-party rule by the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang's purpose is to have a democratic constitution adopted and to return the government to the people. It is contended by the National Government that whether by design or by accident the Kuomintang has had the responsibility of leading China over a long period of trying time. The National Government will appoint a bipartisan War Cabinet with policy-making powers. Until control is returned to the people of China under a democratic constitution, the Kuomintang will not relinquish control of the government. Kuomintang will not give up its authority in these troublesome times to a so-called coalition government. They claim that the surrendering of power of government to partisan organizations would not be returning the power to the people. Chiang wanted the Communist Party to agree to the Good Faith Offer of the National Government. Chiang stated that the National Government had given every possible guarantee to the Chinese Communist Party that their armed forces would not be discriminated against or destroyed.

The Generalissimo stated that if the Chinese Communist party is really supporting the program for the unification of a democratic China, they should stop reciting falsehoods. He labeled the charges of the Chinese Communist party that the Chinese National Government had made an agreement with or was negotiating an agreement with the Japanese as ridiculous. Chiang alleges that this lie was perpetrated by the Communists for the purpose of breaking the faith of the United States in the integrity of the Chinese National Government. He said that some Americans who were well-meaning but misled had accepted and reported this falsehood as if it were true. He also stated that the claims made by the Communist party concerning their military strength are untrue, having been made only for the purpose of trying to convince the rest of the world that China is divided. Chiang stated that the fact was that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people are supporting the National Government and that they support the program of returning the control of the government to the people and the adoption of a democratic constitution. Chiang said that the purpose of the Communists, while retaining the principles of the Communist party, but publicly stating that they are a leading democratic party in China, is to effect a coup by which they could take control of the National Government and convert it into a one-party Communist government similar to that in Russia. Chiang stated further that the Communists believe that if Russia enters the war in Asia, it will support the Communists against the National Government.

Notwithstanding all of this, Chiang stated the National Government had decided to undertake this bold measure of returning to the people, in the midst of a war, the control of their government; and that, therefore, now the government invites the Communists and their party representatives to meet on an equal status for the purpose of a united and intensified effort against the enemy and also to strengthen the national unity and to provide a program for guiding the country through the transitory period which would end in a democratic, constitutional government. The Generalissimo stated that if the Communists really want a democratic, constitutional government, this give them ample opportunity to take part in its inauguration.

Before General Chou En-Lai left for Yenan on February 16, he had indicated to me that he would agree to the political consultant meeting provided for in the document quoted above. It was his opinion that the one-party Kuomintang rule should end immediately and that a coalition administration should be formed to help China in her effort to draw up a democratic constitution to be adopted by a people's convention and thus form a democratic government. I pointed out that all of this sounded very nice, but that it did not accomplish the immediate unification of the armed forces of China. The position of China will suffer in the forthcoming San Francisco conference if she cannot show a greater degree of unity than that indicated, and I pointed this out to him.

In the opinion of General Wedemeyer, who has been kept fully informed of the negotiations' progress, this report is a logical and excellent presentation of the facts.

The decision to support the leadership of Chiang Kie Chiek and to support the National Government, I am convinced, was a proper one for our Government to make. On many occasions I have advised the Generalissimo and Soong that China must make her own decisions, be responsible for her own international and domestic policies, and furnish her own leadership. At no time have I submitted any principle or method that in my opinion would weaken the leadership of Chiang or the National Government.

End of part four.

New subject: I had prepared a reply to your message which I did not send. In your message you appear to have reduced my role in these negotiations to the position of merely making a suggestion without implementing the suggestion. That is the method followed by Ambassador Gauss when he transmitted the President's and the Secretary of State's message on September 9th last. That message, as you now know, obtained no results whatever because it lacked vigorous implementation. I decided, however, not to send the telegram as I hope to see you and discuss the situation more fully. It is my earnest desire to be amenable to every suggestion from State Department even when I believe our position is weakened and accomplishment postponed by lack of vigorous implementation of suggestions. Perhaps this respite in negotiations and my visit with the State Department will clarify my mind on the distance I will be able to go in promoton of the war effort by inducing or compelling the unification of Chinese armed forces and a coordination of effort to assist us in the defeat of Japan.

Appendix WW

Conversion tables showing stenographic transcript page numbers with printed hearing page numbers

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